Content for  TS 33.501  Word version:  16.3.0

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7A  Security for trusted non-3GPP access to the 5G core network |R16|Word‑p. 113

7A.1  General

Security for trusted non-3GPP access to the 5G Core network is achieved when the UE registers to the 5GC via the TNAN. The UE registers to 5GC and, at the same time, it authenticates with the TNAN by using the EAP-5G procedure, similar to the one used with the registration procedure for untrusted non-3GPP access.
The link between the UE and the TNAN can be any data link (L2) that supports EAP encapsulation. The requirement on the Ta interface between the TNAP and TNGF can be found in clause of TS 23.501. The TNGF terminates the EAP-5G signalling andfowards the NAS message to the 5GC when the UE attempts to register to 5GC via the TNAN. The security relies on Layer-2 security between UE and TNAP, which is a trusted entity so that no IPSec encryption would be necessary between UE and TNGF, i.e. NULL encryption is sufficient for the user plane and signalling.
Separate IPSec SAs may be used for NAS transport and PDU Sessions. At the end of the UE's registration to 5GC, an IPSec SA (NWt) is established between the UE and TNGF. This is used to protect NAS messages between the UE and TNGF. Later when the UE initiates a PDU session establishment, the TNGF initiates establishment of one or more IPSec child SAs per PDU session. This results in additional IPSec SA's (NWt) to be setup between the UE and TNGF-UP which are then for user plane transport between the two.
Clause 7A.b.xx describes how WLAN UEs that do not support 5GC NAS (N5CW) register via trusted non-3GPP access. Those N5CW devices are able to authenticate to the network with 3GPP credentials and register with the help of an interworking function (TWIF) that provides the 5GC NAS protocol stack towards the AMF.
As defined in clause 7.1, it is the home operator policy decision if a non-3GPP access network is treated as trusted non-3GPP access network. When all of the security domains in clause 4.1 of the present specification related to the non-3GPP access network are considered sufficiently secure by the home operator, the non-3GPP access may be identified as a trusted non-3GPP access for that operator. However, this policy decision may additionally be based on reasons not related to security feature groups.

7A.2  Security proceduresWord‑p. 114

7A.2.1  Authentication for trusted non-3GPP access

This clause specifies how a UE is authenticated to 5G network via a trusted non-3GPP access network.
This is based on the specified procedure in TS 23.502, clause 4.12a.2.2 "Registration procedure for trusted non-3GPP access". The authentication procedure is similar to the authentication procedure for trusted non-3GPP access defined in clause 7.2.1 with few differences, which are mentioned below:
[not reproduced yet]
Figure 7A.2.1-1: Registration \ Authentication and PDU Session establishment for trusted non-3GPP access
Step 0.
The UE selects a PLMN and a TNAN for connecting to this PLMN by using the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network selection procedure specified in TS 23.501, clause 6.3.12. During this procedure, the UE discovers the PLMNs with which the TNAN supports trusted connectivity (e.g. "5G connectivity").
Step 1.
A layer-2 connection is established between the UE and the TNAP. In case of IEEE 802.11 [80], this step corresponds to an 802.11 [80] Association. In case of PPP, this step corresponds to a PPP LCP negotiation. In other types of non-3GPP access (e.g. Ethernet), this step may not be required.
Step 2-3.
An EAP authentication procedure is initiated. EAP messages shall be encapsulated into layer-2 packets, e.g. into IEEE 802.3/802.1x packets, into IEEE 802.11/802.1x packets, into PPP packets, etc. The UE provides a NAI that triggers the TNAP to send an AAA request to a TNGF. Between the TNAP and TNGF the EAP packets are encapsulated into AAA messages.
Step 4-10.
An EAP-5G procedure is executed as specified in clause 7.2.1 with the following modifications:
  • The EAP-5G packets shall not be encapsulated into IKEv2 packets. The UE shall also include a UE Id in the AN parameters, e.g. a 5G-GUTI if available from a prior registration to the same PLMN.
  • A K TNGF as specified in Annex A.9 (equivalentto K N3IWF) is created in the UE and in the AMF after the successful authentication. The K TNGF is transferred from the AMF to TNGF in step 10a (within the N2 Initial Context Setup Request).
  • The TNAP is a trusted entity. The TNGF shall generate the K TNAP as specified in Annex A.22 and transfers it from TNGF to TNAP in step 10b (within an AAA message).
  • After receiving the TNGF key from AMF in step 10a, the TNGF shall send to UE an EAP-Request/5G-Notification packet containing the "TNGF Contact Info", which includes the IP address of TNGF. After receiving an EAP-Response/5G-Notification packet from the UE, the TNGF shall send message 10b containing the EAP-Success packet.
Step 11.
The common TNAP key is used by the UE and TNAP to derive security keys according to the applied non-3GPP technology and to establish a security association to protect all subsequent traffic. In case of IEEE 802.11 [80], the K TNAP is the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) and a 4-way handshake is executed (see IEEE 802.11 [80]) which establishes a security context between the WLAN AP and the UE that is used to protect unicast and multicast traffic over the air. All messages between UE and TNAP are encrypted and integrity protected from this step onwards.
Step 12.
The UE receives IP configuration from the TNAN, e.g. with DHCP.
Step 13.
The UE shall initiate an IKE_INIT exchange with the TNGF. The UE has received the IP address of TNGF during the EAP-5G signalling in step 9b, subsequently, the UE shall initiate an IKE_AUTH exchange andshall include the same UE Id (i.e. SUCI or 5G-GUTI) as in the UE Id provided in step 5. The common KTIPSe is used for mutual authentication. The key K TIPSec is derived as specified in Annex A.22. NULL encryption is negotiated as specified in RFC 2410. After step 13c, an IPsec SA is established between the UE and TNGF (i.e. a NWt connection) and it is used to transfer all subsequent NAS messages. This IPsec SA does not apply encryption but only apply integrity protection.
Step 14.
After the NWtp connection is successfully established, the TNGF responds to AMF with an N2 Initial Context Setup Response message.
Step 15.
Finally, the NAS Registration Accept message is sent by the AMF and is forwarded to UE via the established NWt connection.
Step 16-18.
The UE initiates a PDU session establishment. This is carried out exactly as specified in TS 23.502, clause 4.12a.5. The TNGF may establish one or more IPSec child SA's per PDU session.
Step 19.
User plane data for the established PDU session is transported between the UE and TNGF inside the established IPSec child SA.

7A.2.2  Mobility handling for trusted non-3GPP accessWord‑p. 117
Editor's note: This clause will capture the security of mobility handling for a UE accessing to the 5GC via trusted non-3GPP access.

7A.2.3  Key hierarchy for trusted non-3GPP access

The key hierarchy described in clause 6.2.1 applies, with the following changes:
The key derived for non-3GPP access is called K TNGF in the context of trusted access.
The key K TNGF received from AMF is used for two different purposes; to setup IPSec SAs between the UE and the TNGF and to create WLAN keys between the UE and the TNAP.
To separate the keys for these purposes, the key hierarchy in Figure 7A.2.3-1 shall be used. The K TIPSec key is used to setup IPSec SAs and the K TNAP key is used to setup access security.
The keys K TIPSec and K TNAP are derived as described in Clause A.22.
[not reproduced yet]
Figure 7A.2.3-1: Key hierarchy for trusted non-3GPP access

7A.2.4  Authentication for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN access

A N5CW device is capable to register to 5GC with 3GPP credentials and to establish 5GC connectivity via a trusted WLAN access network. The reference architecture is captured in clause of TS 23.501. The 3GPP credentials are stored as defined in clause The Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF) provides interworking functionality that enables connectivity with 5GC and implements the NAS protocol stack and exchanges NAS messages with the AMF on behalf of the N5CW device. A single EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is executed for connecting the N5CW device both to the trusted WLAN access network and to the 5G core network.
[not reproduced yet]
Figure 7A.2.4-1: Authentication Procedure for N5CW
0. The N5CW device selects a PLMN and a trusted WLAN that supports "5G connectivity-without-NAS" to this PLMN by using the procedure specified in TS 23.501, clause 6.3.12a, "Access Network selection for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN".
Steps 1-10: Initial registration to 5GC.
Step 1.
The N5CW device associates with the trusted WLAN network and the EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is initiated.
Step 2.
The N5CW device shall provide its Network Access Identity (NAI) The Trusted WLAN Access Point (TWAP) selects a Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF), e.g. based on the received realm, and sends an AAA request to the selected TWIF.
If the N5CW device registers to 5GC over 3GPP access for the first time when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI shall include the SUCI. The SUCI shall be constructed as specified in clause 6.12.2.
If the N5CW device has registered to 5GC over 3GPP access when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI includes the 5G-GUTI assigned to the N5CW device over 3GPP access. This enables the TWIF in step 4a below to select the same AMF as the one serving the N5CW device over 3GPP access.
Step 3.
The TWIF shall create a 5GC Registration Request message on behalf of the N5CW device. The TWIF shall use default values to populate the parameters in the Registration Request message, which are the same for all N5CW device that do not support 5G NAS. The Registration type indicates "Initial Registration".
Step 4.
The TWIF shall select an AMF (e.g. by using the 5G-GUTI in the NAI, if provided by the N5CW device) and shall send an N2 message to the AMF including the Registration Request, the User Location and an AN Type.
Step 5.
In case of SUCI is received by the AMF, the AMF triggers an authentication procedure by sending a request to AUSF by sending Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message. The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message contains SUCI.
Step 6.
The AUSF shall send Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request to the UDM including SUCI.
Step 7.
Upon reception of the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM shall invoke SIDF if a SUCI is received. SIDF shall de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request.
Step 8.
The EAP-AKA' procedure will be trigged to perform mutual authentication between the N5CW device and the home network as specified in clause
EAP-AKA' takes place between the N5CW device and AUSF. Over the N2 interface, the EAP messages are encapsulated within NAS Authentication messages. The EAP-AKA' messages exchanged between the N5CW Device and the TWIF shall be encapsulated into the layer-2 packets, e.g. into IEEE 802.3/802.1x packets, into IEEE 802.11/802.1x packets, into PPP packets, etc.
Step 9.
The NAS security context is not be required in this scenario. The AMF shall derive an K TWIF key from the received K AMF key as specified in Annex A.9. NAS security between AMF and TWIF is established similar to unauthenticated emergency calls, i.e. with NULL encryption and NULL integrity protection.
Step 10a.
The AMF shall send NAS Security Mode Command to the TWIF. The NAS Security Mode Command shall contain the EAP-Success message and the NULL security algorithms.
Step 10b.
The TWIF shall not forward the EAP-Success to the N5CW directly, instead, it shall store the EAP-Success message and wait for K TWIF.
Step 10c.
The TWIF shall send the NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF.
Step 11.
The AMF sends an N2 Initial Context Setup Request and provides the K TWIF key to TWIF.
Step 12.
The TWIF shall derive a TNAP key, K TNAP, from the K TWIF key as specified in Appendix A.X and send the TNAP key and the EAP-Success message to the Trusted WLAN Access Point, which forwards the EAP-Success to the N5CW device. The TNAP key corresponds to the PMK (Pairwise Master Key) which is used to secure the WLAN air-interface communication according to IEEE 802.11 [80]. A layer-2 or layer-3 connection is established between the Trusted WLAN Access Point and the TWIF for transporting all user-plane traffic of the N5CW device to TWIF. This connection is later bound to an N3 connection that is created for this N5CW device.
Step 13.
The TWIF shall send N2 Initial Context Setup Response message to the AMF.
Step 14.
The following steps are captured in clause 4.12b.2 of TS 23.502.

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