The UE connects to an untrusted non-3GPP access network with procedures outside the scope of 3GPP. When the UE decides to attach to 5GC network, the UE selects an N3IWF in a 5G PLMN, as described in clause 6.3.6 of TS 23.501
The UE proceeds with the establishment of an IPsec Security Association (SA) with the selected N3IWF by initiating an IKE initial exchange according to RFC 7296
. After step 2 all subsequent IKE messages are encrypted and integrity protected by using the IKE SA established in this step.
The UE shall initiate an IKE_AUTH exchange by sending an IKE_AUTH request message. The AUTH payload is not included in the IKE_AUTH request message, which indicates that the IKE_AUTH exchange shall use EAP signalling (in this case EAP-5G signalling). As per the RFC 7296
, in the IDi the UE shall set the ID type as ID_KEY-ID in this message and set its value equal to any random number. The UE shall not use its GUTI/SUCI/SUPI as the Id in this step. If the UE is provisioned with the N3IWF root certificate, it shall include the CERTREQ payload within the IKE_AUTH request message to request N3IWF's certificate.
The N3IWF responds with an IKE_AUTH response message which includes the N3IWF identity, the AUTH payload to protect the previous message it sent to the UE (in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange) and an EAP-Request/5G-Start packet. The EAP-Request/5G-Start packet informs the UE to initiate an EAP-5G session, i.e. to start sending NAS messages encapsulated within EAP-5G packets. If the UE has sent a CERTREQ payload in step 3, the N3IWF shall also include the CERT payload including N3IWF certificate.
The UE shall validate the N3IWF certificate and shall confirm that the N3IWF identity matches the N3IWF selected by the UE. An absence of the certificate from the N3IWF if the UE had requested the certificate or unsuccessful identity confirmation shall result in a connection failure. The UE shall send an IKE_AUTH request which includes an EAP-Response/5G-NAS packet that contains a Registration Request message containing UE security capabilities and the SUCI. If UE is already with the 5GC over 3GPP access and there is an available security context, the UE shall integrity protect the Registration Request message and shall send the 5G-GUTI instead of SUCI. The N3IWF shall refrain from sending an EAP-Identity request. The UE may ignore an EAP Identity request or respond with the SUCI it sent in the Registration Request. If the UE has registered to the same AMF through 3GPP access, and if this is the first time that the UE connects to the 5GC through non-3GPP access, the value of corresponding UL NAS COUNT used for integrity protection is 0; else it can use the existing non-3GPP specific UL NAS COUNT for integrity protection
The N3IWF shall select an AMF as specified in clause 6.3.5 of TS 23.501
. The N3IWF forwards the Registration Request received from the UE to the AMF.
If the AMF receives a 5G-GUTI and the Registration is integrity protected, it may use the security context to verify the integrity protection as describe in clause 6.4.6
. If the UE has registered to the same AMF through 3GPP access, and if this is the first time that the AMF receives UE's NAS signalling through non-3GPP access, the value of corresponding UL NAS COUNT used for integrity verification is 0; else it can use the existing non-3GPP specific UL NAS COUNT for integrity verification. If integrity is verified successfully, this means that UE is authenticated by AMF.If integrity is verified successfully and no newer security context has been activated over the 3GPP access, then s the primary authentication and tep 8 to step 11 may be skipped. If integrity is verified successfully and a newer security context has been activated over the 3GPP access then authentication may be skipped but the AMF shall activate the newer context with a NAS SMC procedure as described in step 8 and onwards. Otherwise, the AMF shall authenticate the UE.
If the AMF decides to authenticate the UE, it shall use one of the methods from clause 6.1.3
. In this case, the AMF shall send a key request to the AUSF. The AUSF may initiate an authentication procedure as specified in clause 6.1.3
. Between AMF and UE, the authentication packets are encapsulated within NAS authentication messages and the NAS authentication messages are carried in N2 signalling between the AMF and N3IWF, and then are encapsulated within EAP-5G/5G-NAS packets between the N3IWF and the UE.
In the final authentication message from the home network, the AUSF shall send the anchor key KSEAF
derived from KAUSF
to the SEAF. The SEAF shall derive the KAMF
and send it to the AMF which is used by the AMF to derive NAS security keys. If EAP-AKA' is used for authentication as described in clause 188.8.131.52
, then the AUSF shall include the EAP-Success. The UE also derives the anchor key KSEAF
and from that key it derives the KAMF
followed by NAS security keys. The NAS COUNTs associated with NAS connection identifier "0x02"
are set at the UE and AMF.
The AMF shall send a Security Mode Command (SMC) to the UE in order to activate NAS security associated with NAS connection identifier "0x02". This message is first sent to N3IWF (within an N2 message). If EAP-AKA' is used for authentication, the AMF shall encapsulate the EAP-Success received from AUSF within the SMC message.
The N3IWF shall forward the NAS SMC to UE within an EAP-Request/5G-NAS packet.
The UE completes the authentication (if initiated in step 7) and creates a NAS security context or activates another one based on the received ngKSI in the NAS SMC. UE shall respond to the NAS SMC it received from the AMF based on the selected algorithms and parameters as described in clause 6.7.2
. The UE shall encapsulate the NAS SMC Complete in the EAP-5G Response.
The N3IWF shall forward the NAS packet containing NAS SMC Complete to the AMF over the N2 interface.
The AMF upon reception of the NAS SMC Complete from the UE or upon success of integrity protection verification, initiates the NGAP procedure to set up the AN context. AMF shall compute the N3IWF key, KN3IWF
, using the uplink NAS COUNT associated with NAS connection identifier "0x02"
as defined in Annex A.9
for the establishment of the IPsec SA between the UE and the N3IWF and shall include it in the NGAP Initial Context Setup Request sent to the N3IWF.
N3IWF sends an EAP-Success/EAP-5G to the UE upon reception of the NGAP Initial Context Setup Request containing the N3IWF key, KN3IWF. This completes the EAP-5G session and no further EAP-5G packets are exchanged. If the N3IWF does not receive the KN3IWF from AMF, the N3IWF shall respond with an EAP-Failure
The IPsec SA is established between the UE and N3IWF by using the N3IWF key KN3IWF
that was created in the UE using the uplink NAS COUNT associated with NAS connection identifier "0x02"
as defined in Annex A.9
and was received by N3IWF from the AMF in step 12.
Upon successful establishment of the IPsec SA between the UE and the N3IWF, the N3IWF shall send the NGAP Initial Context Setup Response message to the AMF.
The AMF may determine whether the N3IWF is appropriate for the slice selected as defined in clause 184.108.40.206 of TS 23.502
. If it is compatible with the selected N3IWF, then proceed with step 16 and step 17. Otherwise, the AMF shall proceed with step 18 to step 20, and step 16 to 17 are skipped.