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Content for  TS 33.501  Word version:  16.3.0

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5  Security requirements and features

5.1  General security requirements

5.1.1  Mitigation of bidding down attacks

An attacker could attempt a bidding down attack by making the UE and the network entities respectively believe that the other side does not support a security feature, even when both sides in fact support that security feature. It shall be ensured that a bidding down attack, in the above sense, can be prevented.

5.1.2  Authentication and Authorization

The 5G system shall satisfy the following requirements:
Subscription authentication:
The serving network shall authenticate the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) in the process of authentication and key agreement between UE and network.
Serving network authentication:
The UE shall authenticate the serving network identifier through implicit key authentication.
UE authorization:
The serving network shall authorize the UE through the subscription profile obtained from the home network. UE authorization is based on the authenticated SUPI.
Serving network authorization by the home network:
Assurance shall be provided to the UE that it is connected to a serving network that is authorized by the home network to provide services to the UE. This authorization is 'implicit' in the sense that it is implied by a successful authentication and key agreement run.
Access network authorization:
Assurance shall be provided to the UE that it is connected to an access network that is authorized by the serving network to provide services to the UE. This authorization is 'implicit' in the sense that it is implied by a successful establishment of access network security. This access network authorization applies to all types of access networks.
Unauthenticated Emergency Services:
In order to meet regulatory requirements in some regions, the 5G system shall support unauthenticated access for emergency services. This requirement applies to all MEs and only to those serving networks where regulatory requirements for unauthenticated emergency services exist. Serving networks located in regions where unauthenticated emergency services are forbidden shall not support this feature.
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5.1.3  Requirements on 5GC and NG-RAN related to keysWord‑p. 26
The 5GC and NG-RAN shall allow for use of encryption and integrity protection algorithms for AS and NAS protection having keys of length 128 bits. The network interfaces shall support the transport of 256 bit keys.
The keys used for UP, NAS and AS protection shall be dependent on the algorithm with which they are used.

5.2  Requirements on the UE

5.2.1  General

The support and usage of ciphering and integrity protection between the UE and the ng-eNB is identical to the support and usage of ciphering and integrity protection between the UE and the eNB as specified in TS 33.401.
The PEI shall be securely stored in the UE to ensure the integrity of the PEI.

5.2.2  User data and signalling data confidentiality

The UE shall support ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB.
The UE shall activate ciphering of user data based on the indication sent by the gNB.
The UE shall support ciphering of RRC and NAS-signalling.
The UE shall implement the following ciphering algorithms:
NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The UE may implement the following ciphering algorithm:
128-NEA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The UE shall implement the ciphering algorithms as specified in TS 33.401 if it supports E-UTRA connected to 5GC.
Confidentiality protection of the user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use.
Confidentiality protection of the RRC-signalling, and NAS-signalling is optional to use.
Confidentiality protection should be used whenever regulations permit.
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5.2.3  User data and signalling data integrity

The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB. The UE shall support integrity protection of user data at any data rate, up to and including, the highest data rate supported by the UE.
The UE shall activate integrity protection of user data based on the indication sent by the gNB.
The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of RRC and NAS-signalling.
The UE shall implement the following integrity protection algorithms:
NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The UE may implement the following integrity protection algorithm:
128-NIA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The UE shall implement the integrity algorithms as specified in TS 33.401 if it supports E-UTRA connected to 5GC.
Integrity protection of the user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use.
Integrity protection of the RRC-signalling, and NAS-signalling is mandatory to use, except in the following cases:
All NAS signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 24.501 as exceptions shall be integrity-protected.
All RRC signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 38.331 as exceptions shall be integrity-protected with an integrity protection algorithm different from NIA0, except for unauthenticated emergency calls.
The UE shall implement NIA0 for integrity protection of NAS and RRC signalling. NIA0 is only allowed for unauthenticated emergency session as specified in clause 10.2.2.
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5.2.4  Secure storage and processing of subscription credentialsWord‑p. 27
The following requirements apply for the storage and processing of the subscription credentials used to access the 5G network:
  • The subscription credential(s) shall be integrity protected within the UE using a tamper resistant secure hardware component.
  • The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) (i.e. K) shall be confidentiality protected within the UE using a tamper resistant secure hardware component.
  • The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) shall never be available in the clear outside of the tamper resistant secure hardware component.
  • The authentication algorithm(s) that make use of the subscription credentials shall always be executed within the tamper resistant secure hardware component.
  • It shall be possible to perform a security evaluation / assessment according to the respective security requirements of the tamper resistant secure hardware component.
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5.2.5  Subscriber privacy

The UE shall support 5G-GUTI.
The SUPI should not be transferred in clear text over NG-RAN except routing information, e.g. Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC).
The Home Network Public Key shall be stored in the USIM.
The protection scheme identifier shall be stored in the USIM.
The Home Network Public Key Identifier shall be stored in the USIM.
The SUCI calculation indication, either USIM or ME calculating the SUCI, shall be stored in USIM.
The ME shall support the null-scheme.If the home network has not provisioned the Home Network Public Key in USIM, the SUPI protection in initial registration procedure is not provided. In this case, the null-scheme shall be used by the ME.
Based on home operator's decision, indicated by the USIM, the calculation of the SUCI shall be performed either by the USIM or by the ME.
In case of an unauthenticated emergency call, privacy protection for SUPI is not required.
Provisioning, and updating the Home Network Public Key, Home Network Public Key Identifier, protection scheme identifier, Routing Indicator, and SUCI calculation indication in the USIM shall be in the control of the home network operator.
Subscriber privacy enablement shall be under the control of the home network of the subscriber.
The UE shall only send the PEI in the NAS protocol after NAS security context is established, unless during emergency registration when no NAS security context can be established.
The Routing Indicator shall be stored in the USIM. If the Routing Indicator is not present in the USIM, the ME shall set it to a default value as defined in TS 23.003.
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5.3  Requirements on the gNBWord‑p. 28

5.3.1  General

The security requirements given in this section apply to all types of gNBs. More stringent requirements for specific types of gNBs may be defined in other 3GPP specifications.

5.3.2  User data and signalling data confidentiality

The gNB shall support ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB.
The gNB shall activate ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF.
The gNB shall support ciphering of RRC-signalling.
The gNB shall implement the following ciphering algorithms:
NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The gNB may implement the following ciphering algorithm:
128-NEA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
Confidentiality protection of user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use.
Confidentiality protection of the RRC-signalling is optional to use.
Confidentiality protection should be used whenever regulations permit.
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5.3.3  User data and signalling data integrity

The gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB.
The gNB shall activate integrity protection of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF.
The gNB shall support integrity protection and replay protection of RRC-signalling.
The gNB shall support the following integrity protection algorithms:
NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The gNB may support the following integrity protection algorithm:
128-NIA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
Integrity protection of the user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use, and shall not use NIA0.
All RRC signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 38.331 as exceptions shall be integrity-protected with an integrity protection algorithm different from NIA0, except for unauthenticated emergency calls.
NIA0 shall be disabled in gNB in the deployments where support of unauthenticated emergency session is not a regulatory requirement.
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5.3.4  Requirements for the gNB setup and configurationWord‑p. 29
Setting up and configuring gNBs by O&M systems shall be authenticated and authorized by gNB so that attackers shall not be able to modify the gNB settings and software configurations via local or remote access.
  • The certificate enrolment mechanism specified in TS 33.310 for base station should be supported for gNBs. The decision on whether to use the enrolment mechanism is left to operators.
  • Communication between the O&M systems and the gNB shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected from unauthorized parties. The security associations between the gNB and an entity in the 5G Core or in an O&M domain trusted by the operator shall be supported. These security association establishments shall be mutually authenticated. The security associations shall be realized according to TS 33.210 and TS 33.310.
  • The gNB shall be able to ensure that software/data change attempts are authorized.
  • The gNB shall use authorized data/software.
  • Sensitive parts of the boot-up process shall be executed with the help of the secure environment.
  • Confidentiality of software transfer towards the gNB shall be ensured.
  • Integrity protection of software transfer towards the gNB shall be ensured.
  • The gNB software update shall be verified before its installation (cf. subclause 4.2.3.3.5 of TS 33.117).
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5.3.5  Requirements for key management inside the gNB

The 5GC provides subscription specific session keying material for the gNBs, which also hold long term keys used for authentication and security association setup purposes. Protecting all these keys is important. The following requirements apply:
  • Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes keys in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then keys in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment. Keys stored inside a secure environment in any part of the gNB shall never leave the secure environment except when done in accordance with this or other 3GPP specifications.
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5.3.6  Requirements for handling user plane data for the gNB

The following requirements apply:
  • Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes user plane data in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then user plane data in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment.

5.3.7  Requirements for handling control plane data for the gNB

The following requirements apply:
  • Any part of a gNB deployment that stores or processes control plane data in cleartext shall be protected from physical attacks. If not, the whole entity is placed in a physically secure location, then control plane data in cleartext shall be stored and processed in a secure environment.

5.3.8  Requirements for secure environment of the gNBWord‑p. 30
The secure environment is logically defined within the gNB. It ensures protection and secrecy of all sensitive information and operations from any unauthorized access or exposure. The following list defines the requirements of the secure environment:
  • The secure environment shall support secure storage of sensitive data, e.g. long-term cryptographic secrets and vital configuration data.
  • The secure environment shall support the execution of sensitive functions, e.g. en-/decryption of user data and the basic steps within protocols which use long term secrets (e.g. in authentication protocols).
  • The secure environment shall support the execution of sensitive parts of the boot process.
  • The secure environment's integrity shall be assured.
  • Only authorised access shall be granted to the secure environment, i.e. to data stored and used within it, and to functions executed within it.
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5.3.9  Requirements for the gNB F1 interfaces

Requirements given below apply to gNBs with split DU-CU implementations using F1 interface defined in TS 38.470. Signalling traffic (i.e. both F1-C interface management traffic defined in TS 38.470 and F1-C signalling bearer defined in TS 38.472) and user plane data can be sent on the F1 interface between a given DU and its CU.
  • F1-C interface shall support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection.
  • All management traffic carried over the CU-DU link shall be integrity, confidentiality and replay protected.
  • The gNB shall support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection on the gNB DU-CU F1-U interface [33] for user plane.
  • F1-C and management traffic carried over the CU-DU link shall be protected independently from F1-U traffic.
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5.3.10  Requirements for the gNB E1 interfaces

Requirements given below apply to gNBs with split DU-CU implementations, particularly with an open interface between CU-CP and CU-UP using the E1 interface defined in TS 38.460.
  • The E1 interface between CU-CP and CU-UP shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.

5.4  Requirements on the ng-eNB

The security requirements for ng-eNB are as specified for eNB in TS 33.401.

5.5  Requirements on the AMF

5.5.1  Signalling data confidentiality

The AMF shall support ciphering of NAS-signalling.
The AMF shall support the following ciphering algorithms:
NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The AMF may support the following ciphering algorithm:
128-NEA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
Confidentiality protection NAS-signalling is optional to use.
Confidentiality protection should be used whenever regulations permit.
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5.5.2  Signalling data integrityWord‑p. 31
The AMF shall support integrity protection and replay protection of NAS-signalling.
The AMF shall support the following integrity protection algorithms:
NIA-0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
The AMF may support the following integrity protection algorithm:
128-NIA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.
NIA0 shall be disabled in AMF in the deployments where support of unauthenticated emergency session is not a regulatory requirement.
All NAS signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 24.501 as exceptions shall be integrity-protected with an algorithm different to NIA-0 except for emergency calls.
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5.5.3  Subscriber privacy

The AMF shall support to trigger primary authentication using the SUCI.
The AMF shall support assigning 5G-GUTI to the UE.
The AMF shall support reallocating 5G-GUTI to UE.
The AMF shall be able to confirm SUPI from UE and from home network. The AMF shall deny service to the UE if this confirmation fails.

5.6  Requirements on the SEAF

The security anchor function (SEAF) provides the authentication functionality via the AMF in the serving network. The SEAF shall fulfil the following requirements:
The SEAF shall support primary authentication using SUCI.

5.7Void

5.8  Requirements on the UDM

5.8.1  Generic requirements

The long-term key(s) used for authentication and security association setup purposes shall be protected from physical attacks and shall never leave the secure environment of the UDM/ARPF unprotected.

5.8.2  Subscriber privacy related requirements to UDM and SIDF

The SIDF is responsible for de-concealment of the SUCI and shall fulfil the following requirements:
  • The SIDF shall be a service offered by UDM.
  • The SIDF shall resolve the SUPI from the SUCI based on the protection scheme used to generate the SUCI.
The Home Network Private Key used for subscriber privacy shall be protected from physical attacks in the UDM.
The UDM shall hold the Home Network Public Key Identifier(s) for the private/public key pair(s) used for subscriber privacy.
The algorithm used for subscriber privacy shall be executed in the secure environment of the UDM.
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5.8a  Requirements on AUSFWord‑p. 32
The Authentication server function (AUSF) shall handle authentication requests for both, 3GPP access and non-3GPP access.
The AUSF shall provide SUPI to the VPLMN only after authentication confirmation if authentication request with SUCI was sent by VPLMN.
The AUSF shall inform the UDM that a successful or unsuccessful authentication of a subscriber has occurred.

5.9  Core network security

5.9.1  Trust boundaries

It is assumed for the set of requirements in this subclause that mobile network operators subdivide their networks into trust zones. Subnetworks of different operators are assumed to lie in different trust zones. Messages that traverse trust boundaries shall follow the requirements in subclause 5.9.2 of the present document, if not protected end to end by NDS/IP as specified in TS 33.210.
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5.9.2  Requirements on service-based architecture

5.9.2.1  Security Requirements for service registration, discovery and authorization

NF Service Based discovery and registration shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection.
NRF shall be able to ensure that NF Discovery and registration requests are authorized.
NF service based discovery and registration shall be able to hide the topology of the available / supported NF's in one administrative/trust domain from entities in different trust/administrative domains (e.g. between NFs in visited and the home networks.)
NF Service Request and Response procedure shall support mutual authentication between NF consumer and NF producer.
Each NF shall validate all incoming messages. Messages that are not valid according to the protocol specification and network state shall be either rejected or discarded by the NF.
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5.9.2.2  NRF security requirements

The Network Repository Function (NRF) receives NF Discovery Request from an NF instance, provides the information of the discovered NF instances to the NF instance, and maintains NF profiles.
The following NRF service-based architecture security requirements shall apply:
  • NRF and NFs that are requesting service shall be mutually authenticated.
  • NRF may provide authentication and authorization to NFs for establishing secure communication between each other

5.9.2.3  NEF security requirementsWord‑p. 33
The Network Exposure Function (NEF) supports external exposure of capabilities of Network Functions to Application Functions, which interact with the relevant Network Functions via the NEF.
The interface between the NEF and the Application Function shall fulfil the following requirements:
  • Integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection for communication between the NEF and Application Function shall be supported.
  • Mutual authentication between the NEF and Application Function shall be supported.
  • Internal 5G Core information such as DNN, S-NSSAI etc., shall not be sent outside the 3GPP operator domain.
  • SUPI shall not be sent outside the 3GPP operator domain by NEF.
The NEF shall be able to determine whether the Application Function is authorized to interact with the relevant Network Functions..
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5.9.2.4  Requirements on the Service Communication Proxy (SCP) |R16|

The SCP has interfaces with Network Functions (NF) and peer SCPs within the PLMN. The interface between the SCP and the NFs and between the two SCPs shall fulfil the following requirements:
  • Mutual authentication shall be performed between the SCP and NFs, and between the two SCPs within the PLMN.
  • All communication between the SCP and NFs and between SCPs shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
If SCP endpoints are co-located with the NFs, the above two requirements may be satisfied by colocation.
The SCP shall provide confidentiality, integrity and replay protection for its internal communication over SCP internal network interfaces.
Editor's note: It is ffs if the SCP could perform OAuth based service access authorization on behalf of Network Functions.
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5.9.3  Requirements for e2e core network interconnection security

5.9.3.1  General

The present subclause contains requirements common to subclauses 5.9.2 and 5.9.3.
A solution for e2e core network interconnection security shall satisfy the following requirements:
  • The solution shall support application layer mechanisms for addition, deletion and modification of message elements by intermediate nodes except for specific message elements described in the present document.
  • The solution shall provide confidentiality and/or integrity end-to-end between source and destination network for specific message elements identified in the present document. For this requirement to be fulfilled, the SEPP - cf TS 23.501, clause 6.2.17 shall be present at the edge of the source and destination networks dedicated to handling e2e Core Network Interconnection Security. The confidentiality and/or integrity for the message elements is provided between two SEPPs of the source and destination PLMN-.
  • The destination network shall be able to determine the authenticity of the source network that sent the specific message elements protected according to the preceding bullet. For this requirement to be fulfilled, it shall suffice that a SEPP in the destination network that is dedicated to handling e2e Core Network Interconnection Security can determine the authenticity of the source network.
  • The solution should have minimal impact and additions to 3GPP-defined network elements.
  • The solution should be using standard security protocols.
  • The solution shall cover interfaces used for roaming purposes.
  • The solution should take into account considerations on performance and overhead.
  • The solution shall cover prevention of replay attacks.
  • The solution shall cover algorithm negotiation and prevention of bidding down attacks.
  • The solution should take into account operational aspects of key management.
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5.9.3.2  Requirements for Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP)Word‑p. 34
The SEPP shall act as a non-transparent proxy node:
  • The SEPP shall protect application layer control plane messages between two NFs belonging to different PLMNs that use the N32 interface to communicate with each other.
  • The SEPP shall perform mutual authentication and negotiation of cipher suites with the SEPP in the roaming network.
  • The SEPP shall handle key management aspects that involve setting up the required cryptographic keys needed for securing messages on the N32 interface between two SEPPs.
  • The SEPP shall perform topology hiding by limiting the internal topology information visible to external parties.
  • As a reverse proxy the SEPP shall provide a single point of access and control to internal NFs.
The receiving SEPP shall be able to verify whether the sending SEPP is authorized to use the PLMN ID in the received N32 message.
The SEPP shall be able to clearly differentiate between certificates used for authentication of peer SEPPs and certificates used for authentication of intermediates performing message modifications.
The SEPP shall discard malformed N32 signaling messages.
The SEPP shall implement rate-limiting functionalities to defend itself and subsequent NFs against excessive CP signaling. This includes SEPP-to-SEPP signaling messages.
The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms that enable cross-layer validation of source and destination address and identifiers (e.g. FQDNs or PLMN IDs).
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5.9.3.3  Protection of attributes

Integrity protection shall be applied to all attributes transferred over the N32 interface.
Confidentiality protection shall be applied to all attributes specified in SEPP's Data-type Encryption Policy (clause 13.2.3.2). The following attributes shall be confidentiality protected when being sent over the N32 interface, irrespective of the Data-type Encryption Policy:
  • Authentication Vectors
  • Cryptographic material
  • Location data, e.g. Cell ID and Physical Cell ID
The following attributes should additionally be confidentiality protected when being sent over the N32 interface:
  • SUPI.
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5.9.3.4  Requirements for IPUPS functionality |R16|Word‑p. 35
The IPUPS shall only forward GTP-U packets that contain an F-TEID that belongs to an active PDU session and discard all others.
The IPUPS shall discard malformed GTP-U messages.

5.10  Visibility and configurability

5.10.1  Security visibility

Although in general the security features should be transparent to the user or application, for certain events and according to the user's or application's concern, greater visibility of the operation of following security feature shall be provided:
  • AS confidentiality: (AS confidentiality, Confidentiality algorithm, bearer information)
  • AS integrity: (AS integrity, Integrity algorithm, bearer information)
  • NAS confidentiality: (NAS confidentiality, Confidentiality algorithm)
  • NAS integrity: (NAS integrity, Integrity algorithm)
The UE shall provide above security information to the applications in the UE (e.g. via APIs), on a per PDU session granularity.
The serving network identifier shall be available for applications in the UE.
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5.10.2  Security configurability

Security configurability lets a user to configure certain security feature settings on a UE that allows the user to manage additional capability or use certain advanced security features.
The following configurability feature should be provided:
  • Granting or denying access to USIM without authentication as described in TS 33.401.

5.11  Requirements for algorithms, and algorithm selection

5.11.1  Algorithm identifier values

5.11.1.1  Ciphering algorithm identifier values

All identifiers and names specified in this subclause are for 5G NAS and New Radio. In relation to AS capabilities, the identifiers and names for E-UTRAN connected to 5GC are specified in TS 33.401.
Each encryption algorithm will be assigned a 4-bit identifier. The following values for ciphering algorithms are defined:
"00002"
NEA0 Null ciphering algorithm;
"00012"
128-NEA1 128-bit SNOW 3G based algorithm;
"00102"
128-NEA2 128-bit AES based algorithm; and
"00112"
128-NEA3 128-bit ZUC based algorithm.
128-NEA1 is based on SNOW 3G (see TS 35.215).
128-NEA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CTR mode [16].
128-NEA3 is based on 128-bit ZUC (see TS 35.221).
Full details of the algorithms are specified in Annex D.
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5.11.1.2  Integrity algorithm identifier valuesWord‑p. 36
All identifiers and names specified in the present subclause are for 5G NAS and New Radio. In relation to AS capabilities, the identifiers and names for E-UTRAN connected to 5GC are specified in TS 33.401.
Each integrity algorithm used for 5G will be assigned a 4-bit identifier. The following values for integrity algorithms are defined:
"00002"
NIA0 Null Integrity Protection algorithm;
"00012"
128-NIA1 128-bit SNOW 3G based algorithm;
"00102"
128-NIA2 128-bit AES based algorithm; and
"00112"
128-NIA3 128-bit ZUC based algorithm.
128-NIA1 is based on SNOW 3G (see TS 35.215).
128-NIA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CMAC mode [17].
128-NIA3 is based on 128-bit ZUC (see TS 35.221).
Full details of the algorithms are specified in Annex D.
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5.11.2  Requirements for algorithm selection

a)
UE in RRC_Connected and a serving network shall have agreed upon algorithms for
  • Ciphering and integrity protection of RRC signalling and user plane (to be used between UE and gNB)
  • Ciphering and integrity protection of RRC signalling and ciphering of user plane (to be used between UE and ng-eNB)
  • NAS ciphering and NAS integrity protection (to be used between UE and AMF)
b)
The serving network shall select the algorithms to use dependent on
  • the UE security capabilities of the UE,
  • the configured allowed list of security capabilities of the currently serving network entity
c)
The UE security capabilities shall include NR NAS algorithms for NAS level, NR AS algorithms for AS layer and LTE algorithms for AS level if the UE supports E-UTRAN connected to 5GC.
d)
Each selected algorithm shall be indicated to a UE in a protected manner such that a UE is ensured that the integrity of algorithm selection is protected against manipulation.
e)
The UE security capabilities shall be protected against "bidding down attacks".
f) It shall be possible that the selected AS and NAS algorithms are different at a given point of time.
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5.12  Requirements on 5G-RG |R16|

The 5G-RG shall be equipped with UICC where the subscription credentials resides. If provisioned by the home operator, the 5G-RG shall store the Home Network Public Key required for concealing the SUPI in the UICC.
The 5G-RG shall support all the security requirements and features of the UE defined in clause 5.2.

5.13  Requirements on NSSAAF |R16|Word‑p. 37
The Network slice specific authentication and authorization function (NSSAAF) shall handle the Network Slice Specific Authentication requests from the serving AMF.
The NSSAAF is responsible to send the NSSAA requests to the appropriate AAA-S.
The NSSAAF shall support AAA-S triggered Network Slice-Specific Re-authentication and Re-authorization and Slice-Specific Authorization Revocation and translate any AAA protocol into a Service Based format.
NSSAAF shall translate the Service based messages from the serving AMF to AAA protocols towards AAA-P/AAA-S.
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