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TS 33.512
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) –
Access and Mobility management Function (AMF)

V17.3.0 (PDF)  2022/03  26 p.
V16.6.0  2021/12  22 p.
Rapporteur:
Ms. Deng, Juan
HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd

Content for  TS 33.512  Word version:  17.3.0

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1  ScopeWord‑p. 7

The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network product class.

2  ReferencesWord‑p. 7

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
  • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non specific.
  • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
  • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1]
TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2]
TS 33.501: (Release 15) "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[3]
TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[4]
TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
[5]
TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3".
[6]
TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[7]
TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[8]
TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System".
[9]
TS 38.413: "NG-RAN; NG Application Protocol (NGAP)".
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3  Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviationsWord‑p. 7

3.1  TermsWord‑p. 7

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905.

3.2  SymbolsWord‑p. 7

Void.

3.3  AbbreviationsWord‑p. 7

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905.

4  AMF-specific security requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 8

4.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 8

AMF specific security requirements include both requirements derived from AMF-specific security functional requirements in relevant specifications as well as security requirements introduced in the present document derived from the threats specific to AMF as described in TR 33.926.

4.2  AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases.Word‑p. 8

4.2.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 8

The present clause describes the security functional requirements and the corresponding test cases for AMF network product class. The proposed security requirements are classified in two groups:
  • Security functional requirements derived from TS 33.501 and detailed in clause 4.2.2.
  • General security functional requirements which include requirements not already addressed in TS 33.501 but whose support is also important to ensure that AMF conforms to a common security baseline detailed in clause 4.2.3.
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4.2.2  Security functional requirements on the AMF deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test casesWord‑p. 8

4.2.2.0  GeneralWord‑p. 8

The general approach in TS 33.117, clause 4.2.2.1 and all the requirements and test cases in TS 33.117, clause 4.2.2.2 related to SBA/SBI aspect apply to the AMF network product class.

4.2.2.1  Authentication and key agreement procedureWord‑p. 8

4.2.2.1.1  Synchronization failure handlingWord‑p. 8
Requirement Name:
Synchronization failure handling
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"Upon receiving an authentication failure message with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from the UE, the SEAF sends an Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" to the AUSF and the AUSF sends an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to the UDM/ARPF, together with the following parameters:
  • RAND sent to the UE in the preceding Authentication Request, and
  • AUTS received by the SEAF in the response from the UE to that request, as described in clause 6.1.3.2.0 and 6.1.3.3.1.
An SEAF will not react to unsolicited "synchronisation failure indication" messages from the UE.
The SEAF does not send new authentication requests to the UE before having received the response to its Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" from the AUSF (or before it is timed out). "
as specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.1.3.3.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.2.1, Resynchronization
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_SYNC_FAIL_SEAF_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that synchronization failure is correctly handled by the SEAF/AMF.
Pre-Conditions:
  • Test environment with UE and AUSF. The UE and the AUSF may be simulated.
  • AMF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps
Test A:
  1. The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with synchronisation failure (AUTS).
  2. The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" to the AUSF.
  3. The AUSF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF immediately after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF, to make sure the SEAF/AMF will receive the response before timeout.
Test B:
  1. The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with synchronisation failure (AUTS).
  2. The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" to the AUSF.
  3. The AUSF does not send a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF before timeout.
Expected Results:
Before receiving Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF and before the timer for receiving Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message runs out,
For Test B, the SEAF/AMF does not send any new authentication request to the UE.
For Test A, the SEAF/AMF may initiate new authentication towards the UE.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.1.2  RES* verification failure handlingWord‑p. 9
Requirement Name:
RES* verification failure handling
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The SEAF shall proceed with step 10 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 and after receiving the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF in step 12 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, proceed as described below:
  • If the AUSF has indicated in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF that the verification of the RES* was not successful in the AUSF, or
  • if the verification of the RES* was not successful in the SEAF,
then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE if the SUCI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message or the SEAF/AMF shall initiate an Identification procedure with the UE if the 5G-GUTI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message to retrieve the SUCI and an additional authentication attempt may be initiated.
Also, if the SEAF does not receive any Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF as expected, then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication to the UE or initiate an Identification procedure with the UE."
As specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.1.3.2.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.2.3, RES* verification failure
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_RES*_VERIFICATION_FAILURE
Purpose:
  1. Verify that the SEAF/AMF correctly handles RES* verification failure detected in the SEAF/AMF or/and in the AUSF, when the SUCI is included in the initial NAS message.
  2. Verify that the SEAF/AMF correctly handles RES* verification failure detected in the SEAF/AMF or/and in the AUSF, when the 5G-GUTI is included in the initial NAS message.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE and AUSF. The UE and the AUSF may be simulated.
Execution Steps
  1. Test Case 1
    1. The UE sends RR with SUCI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to initiate the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
    2. The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message with an authentication vector to the SEAF/AMF under test.
    3. The UE, after receiving the Authentication Request message from the SEAF/AMF under test, returns an incorrect RES* to the SEAF/AMF under test in the NAS Authentication Response message, which will trigger the AMF to compute HRES*, compare HRES* with HXRES* and send an authentication request to the AUSF. The tester captures the value of RES* in the request.
    4. The AUSF returns to the AMF under test the indication of RES* verification failure.
  2. Test Case 2
    1. The UE sends RR with a 5G-GUTI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to initiate the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
    2. The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message with an authentication vector to the SEAF/AMF under test.
    3. The UE, after receiving the Authentication Request message from the SEAF/AMF under test, returns an incorrect RES* to the SEAF/AMF in the NAS Authentication Response message, which will trigger the AMF to compute HRES* and compare HRES* with HXRES*, and send an authentication request to the AUSF. The tester captures the value of RES* in the request.
    4. The AUSF returns to the AMF under test an indication of RES* verification failure.
  3. Test Case 3
    1. The UE sends RR with SUCI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to initiate the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
    2. The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message with an authentication vector to the SEAF/AMF under test.
    3. The UE returns RES* to the SEAF/AMF under test in the NAS Authentication Response message, which will trigger the AMF to compute HRES*, compare HRES* with HXRES*, and send to the received RES* to the AUSF.
    4. The AUSF returns to the AMF under test an indication of RES* verification failure.
  4. Test Case 4
    1. The UE sends RR with 5G-GUTI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to initiate the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
    2. The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message with an authentication vector to the SEAF/AMF under test.
    3. The UE returns RES* to the SEAF/AMF under test in the NAS Authentication Response message, which will trigger the AMF to compute HRES*, compare HRES* with HXRES*, and send to the received RES* to the AUSF.
    4. The AUSF returns to the AMF under test an indication of RES* verification failure.
Expected Results:
For test case 1 and 3, the SEAF/AMF rejects the authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE.
For test case 2 and 4, the SEAF/AMF initiates an Identification procedure with the UE to retrieve the SUCI.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.1.3  NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPSWord‑p. 11
Requirement Name:
NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"When a UE initiates registration procedure with the AMF, the AMF may redirect the UE from 5GC to EPC by including a EMM cause indicating to the UE that it shall not use 5GC, as described in clause 5.31.3 in TS 23.501. The following requirements apply to Registration Reject message with an EMM cause which indicates to the UE that the UE shall not use 5GC:
  • the AMF shall only send such a Registration Reject message once NAS security has been established between the AMF and the UE; and
  • the UE shall only act upon such Registration Reject message if received integrity protected and if UE has verified the integrity of the Registration Reject message successfully.
" as specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.16.4. "
"In networks that support CIoT features in both EPC and 5GC, the operator may steer UEs from a specific CN type due to operator policy, e.g. due to roaming agreements, Preferred and Supported Network Behaviour, load redistribution, etc. Operator policies in EPC and 5GC are assumed to avoid steering UEs back and forth between EPC and 5GC." as specified in TS 23.501, clause 5.31.3.
Threat Reference:
TBD
Test case:
Test Name:
TC_AMF_REDIRCTION_5GS_EPS
Purpose:
Verify that AMF under test does not send a Registration Reject message containing an EMM cause indicating to the UE that the UE shall not use 5GC , if NAS security is not established. .
Pre-Conditions:
  • Test environment with UE. The UE may be simulated.
  • AMF under test is connected in emulated/real network environment.
  • Tester configures the operator policy of the AMF that all the UEs sending initial registration request should be redirected from 5GS to EPS.
Execution Steps
  1. UE initiates initial registration procedure with the AMF.
  2. The AMF under test determines that the UE shall not use 5GC, and needs to redirect the UE from 5GC to EPC.
  3. The AMF under test sends a Registration Reject message with a 5GMM cause indicating to the UE that the UE shall not use 5GC.
Expected Results:
The NAS SMC is performed before sending the Registration Reject message.
Expected format of evidence:
Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.2Void

4.2.2.3  Security mode command procedureWord‑p. 12

4.2.2.3.1  Replay protection of NAS signalling messagesWord‑p. 12
Requirement Name:
Replay protection of NAS signalling messages
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
" The AMF shall support integrity protection and replay protection of NAS-signalling." as specified in TS 33.501, clause 5.5.2.
Threat References:
Test case:
Test Name:
TC_NAS_REPLAY_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that the NAS signalling messages are replay protected by AMF over N1 interface between UE and AMF.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
  • AMF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.
  • Tester shall have access to the NAS signalling packets sent between UE and AMF over N1 interface.
  • Tester shall ensure that integrity protection algorithm other than NIA0 is used.
Execution Steps:
  1. The tester shall capture the NAS SMC procedure taking place between UE and AMF over N1 interface using any network analyser.
  2. The tester shall filter the NAS Security Mode Complete message by using a filter.
  3. The tester shall check for the NAS SQN of filtered NAS Security Mode Complete message and using any packet crafting tool the tester shall create a NAS Security Mode Complete message containing same NAS SQN of the filtered NAS Security Mode Complete message or the tester shall replay the captured NAS signalling packets.
  4. Tester shall check whether the replayed NAS signalling packets were processed by the AMF by capturing over N1interface to see if any corresponding response message is received from the AMF.
  5. Tester shall confirm that AMF provides replay protection by dropping/ignoring the replayed packet if no corresponding response is sent by the AMF to the replayed packet.
  6. Tester shall verify from the result that if the crafted NAS Security Mode Complete message or replayed NAS signalling messages are not processed by the AMF when the N1 interface is replay protected
Expected Results:
The NAS signalling messages sent between UE and AMF over N1 interface are replay protected.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.3.2  NAS NULL integrity protectionWord‑p. 13
Requirement Name:
NAS NULL integrity protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"NIA0 shall be disabled in AMF in the deployments where support of unauthenticated emergency session is not a regulatory requirement." as specified in TS 33.501, clause 5.5.2
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.3.3, NAS NULL integrity protection
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_NAS_NULL_INT_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that NAS NULL integrity protection algorithm is used correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated.
The AMF under test is configured to initiate authentication for both emergency and non-emergency registrations.
Execution Steps
Test case A:
  1. The UE initiates an emergency registration.
  2. The AMF derives the KAMF and NAS signalling keys after successful authentication of the UE.
  3. The AMF sends the NAS Security Mode Command message to the UE containing the selected NAS algorithms.
Test case B:
  1. The UE initiates a non-emergency registration.
  2. The AMF derives the KAMF and NAS signalling keys after successful authentication of the UE.
  3. The AMF sends the NAS Security Mode Command message to the UE containing the selected NAS algorithms.
Expected Results:
In both emergency and non-emergency registrations, the UE was successfully authentication and the integrity algorithm selected by the AMF in NAS SMC message is different from NIA0.
The NAS Security Mode Command message is integrity protected by the AMF.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.3.3  NAS integrity algorithm selection and useWord‑p. 14
Requirement Name:
NAS integrity algorithm selection and use
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The AMF shall then initiate a NAS security mode command procedure, and include the chosen algorithm and UE security capabilities (to detect modification of the UE security capabilities by an attacker) in the message to the UE (see sub-clause 6.7.2 of the present document). The AMF shall select the NAS algorithm which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists." as specified in TS 33.501, clause 5.5.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.3.2, NAS integrity selection and use
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_NAS_INT_SELECTION_USE_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that the AMF selects the NAS integrity algorithm which has the highest priority according to the ordered list of supported integrity algorithms and is contained in the 5G security capabilities supported by the UE.
Verify that the selected NAS security algorithm is being used.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE containing its 5G security capabilities, AUSF and UDM. The UE, AUSF and UDM may be simulated.
The list of ordered NAS integrity algorithms are configured on the AMF under test.
Execution Steps:
  1. The UE sends a Registration Request with Initial Registration type to the AMF unders test.
  2. The tester filters the Security Mode Command and Security Mode Complete messages.
  3. The tester examines the selected integrity algorithm in the SMC against the list of ordered NAS integrity algorithm and the 5G security capabilities supported by the UE. The tester examines the MAC verification of the Security Mode Complete at the AMF under test.
Expected Results:
The selected integrity algorithm has the highest priority according to the list of ordered NAS integrity algorithm and is contained in the UE 5G security capabilities.
The MAC verification of the Security Mode Complete message is successful.
Expected format of evidence:
Logs and communication flow saved in a .pcap file.
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4.2.2.4  Security in intra-RAT mobilityWord‑p. 15

4.2.2.4.1  Bidding down prevention in Xn-handoverWord‑p. 15
Requirement Name:
Bidding down prevention in Xn-handovers
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"In the Path-Switch message, the target gNB/ng-eNB shall send the UE's 5G security capabilities received from the source gNB/ng-eNB to the AMF. The AMF shall verify that the UE's 5G security capabilities received from the target gNB/ng-eNB are the same as the UE's 5G security capabilities that the AMF has locally stored. If there is a mismatch, the AMF shall send its locally stored 5G security capabilities of the UE to the target gNB/ng-eNB in the Path-Switch Acknowledge message. The AMF shall support logging capabilities for this event and may take additional measures, such as raising an alarm."
as specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.7.3.1.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.4.1, Bidding down on Xn-Handover
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_BIDDING_DOWN_XN_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that bidding down is prevented by the AMF under test in Xn handovers.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with (source and target) gNBs may be simulated.
The AMF under test is configured with the UE's security context for the UE.
The AMF under test is configured to log UE security capability mismatch.
Execution Steps
The tester sends 5G security capabilities for the UE, different from the ones stored in the AMF, to the AMF under test using a Path-Switch message.
Expected Results:
The tester captures the Path-Switch Acknowledge message sent by AMF under test to the target gNB, which includes the locally stored 5G security capabilities in the AMF under test for that UE.
The tester verifies that a log entry showing the capability mismatch is logged.
Expected format of evidence
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.4.2  NAS protection algorithm selection in AMF changeWord‑p. 15
Requirement Name:
NAS protection algorithm selection in AMF change
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"If the change of the AMF at N2-Handover or mobility registration update results in the change of algorithm to be used for establishing NAS security, the target AMF shall indicate the selected algorithm to the UE as defined in clause 6.9.2.3.3 for N2-Handover (i.e., using NAS Container) and clause 6.9.3 for mobility registration update (i.e., using NAS SMC). The AMF shall select the NAS algorithm which has the highest priority according to the ordered lists (see sub-clause 6.7.1.1 of the present document)."
as specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.7.1.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.4.2, NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in AMF change
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_NAS_ALG_AMF_CHANGE _AMF
Purpose:
Verify that NAS protection algorithms are selected correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source gNB, target gNB and source AMF. Source and target gNBs and source AMF may be simulated.
Execution Steps
Test case 1: N2-Handover
The AMF under test receives the UE security capabilities and the NAS algorithms used by the source AMF from the source AMF. The AMF under test selects the NAS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists. The lists are configured such that the algorithms selected by the AMF under test are different from the ones received from the source AMF.
Test case 2: Mobility registration update
The AMF under test receives the UE security capabilities and the NAS algorithms used by the source AMF from the source AMF. The AMF under test selects the NAS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists. The lists are configured such that the algorithms selected by the AMF under test are different from the ones received from the source AMF.
Expected Results:
For Test case 1, the tester captures the NASC of the NGAP HANDOVER REQUEST message sent by the AMF under test to the gNB, which includes the chosen algorithm.
For Test case 2, the AMF under test initiates a NAS security mode command procedure and includes the chosen algorithms.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.5  5G-GUTI allocationWord‑p. 16

4.2.2.5.1  5G-GUTI allocationWord‑p. 16
Requirement Name:
5G-GUTI allocation
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"A new 5G-GUTI shall be sent to a UE only after a successful activation of NAS security. The 5G-GUTI is defined in TS 23.003.
Upon receiving Registration Request message of type "initial registration" or "mobility registration update" from a UE, the AMF shall send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE during the registration procedure.
Upon receiving Registration Request message of type "periodic registration update" from a UE, the AMF should send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE during the registration procedure.
Upon receiving Service Request message sent by the UE in response to a Paging message, the AMF shall send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE. This new 5G-GUTI shall be sent before the current NAS signalling connection is released or the N1 NAS signalling connection is suspended.
Upon receiving an indication from the lower layers that the RRC connection has been resumed for a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication in response to a Paging message, the AMF shall send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE. This new 5G-GUTI shall be sent before the current NAS signalling connection is released or the suspension of the N1 NAS signalling connection.NOTE 1: It is left to implementation to re-assign 5G-GUTI more frequently than in cases mentioned above, for example after a Service Request message from the UE not triggered by the network..
as specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.12.3.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.7.1, Failure to allocate new 5G-GUTI
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_5G_GUTI_ALLOCATION _AMF
Purpose:
Verify that a new 5G-GUTI is allocated by the AMF under test in these scenarios accordingly.
Pre-Conditions:
For the following test case 1, 2, and 3, the following pre-conditions apply.
Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated.
Tester has access to the NAS signalling packets sent over N1 interface.
Tester has the knowledge of the UE's security context used for protecting the Registration Request of type "mobility registration update" and Service Request, including the old 5G-GUTI, ngKSI, UE NR security capability, NAS security context. And the tester shall configure the UE's security context on the AMF under test.For the following test case 4, more pre-conditions are required. Both the UE and the AMF under test support UP CIoT 5GS Optimization. The UE has requested the use of UP CIoT 5GS Optimization during the registration procedure, and afterwards the UE has gone to CM Idle with Suspend Indicator.
Execution Steps
Test case 1:
Upon receiving Registration Request message of type "initial registration" from a UE, the AMF sends a new 5G-GUTI to the UE during the registration procedure.
Test case 2:
Upon receiving Registration Request message of type "mobility registration update" from a UE, the AMF sends a new 5G-GUTI to the UE during the registration procedure.
Test case 3:
Upon receiving Service Request message sent by the UE in response to a Paging message, the AMF sends a new 5G-GUTI to the UE.
Test case 4:
The AMF under test is triggered to page the UE in CM Idle with Suspend Indicator. After paging the UE in CM-Idle with Suspend indicator, the AMF shall send a new 5G-GUTI to the UE.
Expected Results:
For Test case 1, 2, 3 and 4, the tester retrieves a new 5G-GUTI by accessing the NAS signalling packets sent by the AMF under test over N1 interface during registration procedure.
For Test case 1, 2, 3 and 4, the NAS message encapsulating the new 5G-GUTI is confidentiality and integrity protected by the AMF under test using the NAS security context, which is same as the UE's NAS security context.
The new 5G-GUTI is different from the old 5G-GUTI.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.6  Security in registration procedureWord‑p. 18

4.2.2.6.1  Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handlingWord‑p. 18
Requirement Name:
Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"
i)
UE security capabilities invalid or unacceptable
If the REGISTRATION REQUEST message is received with invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities (e.g. no 5GS encryption algorithms (all bits zero), no 5GS integrity algorithms (all bits zero), mandatory 5GS encryption algorithms not supported or mandatory 5GS integrity algorithms not supported, etc.), the AMF shall return a REGISTRATION REJECT message."
as specified in TS 24.501, clause 5.5.1.2.8.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.6.1, Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_UE_SEC_CAP_HANDLING_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that UE security capabilities invalid or unacceptable are not accepted by the AMF under test in registration procedure.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with (target) UE, which may be simulated.
The tester configures invalid/unacceptable UE security capabilities (no 5GS encryption algorithms (all bits zero), no 5GS integrity algorithms (all bits zero), mandatory 5GS encryption algorithms not supported or mandatory 5GS integrity algorithms not supported) on the UE.
Execution Steps
The UE sends UE security capabilities to the AMF under test using registration request message.
Expected Results:
The tester captures the Registration reject message sent by AMF under test to the UE.
Expected format of evidence
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.7  RRCRestablishment in Control Plane CIoT 5GS OptimizationWord‑p. 18

Requirement Name:
RRCRestablishment in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"Upon receiving the RAN CP RELOCATION INDICATION message, the AMF shall authenticate the request using the NAS-level security information received in the UL CP Security Information IE and if the authentication is successful initiate the Connection Establishment Indication procedure including NAS-level security information in the DL CP Security Information IE.
In case the AMF cannot authenticate the UE's request, the CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT INDICATION message does not contain security information, and the NG-RAN node shall fail the RRC Re-establishment.
In case of authentication failure, the NG-RAN node and the AMF should locally release the allocated NG resources, if any." as specified in TS 38.413, clause 8.3.8.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.9.1 -Failed Verification of UE Identity during RRC Reestablishment Procedure for CP CIoT 5GS Optimization.
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_AMF_REEST_CP_CIOT
Purpose:
To verify that the verification of RRC Reestablishment is applied correctly.
Pre-Condition:
Test environment with UE and ng-eNB, which may be simulated. The UE is using Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization.
  • AMF Capability:
    Ability to support the CIoT senario.
Execution Steps:
  1. Test Case 1
    1. The UE sends the RRC Connection Reestablishment Request message to the ng-eNB.
    2. The ng-eNB sends RAN CP RELOCATION INDICATION message to the AMF.
  2. Test Case 2
    1. The UE sends the RRC Connection Reestablishment Request message to the ng-eNB.
    2. The ng-eNB sends RAN CP RELOCATION INDICATION message to the AMF. The ng-eNB modifies UL NAS MAC in UL CP Security Information
Expected Results:
For test case 1, the AMF sends CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT INDICATION to the ng-eNB, and DL CP Security Information is included.
For test case 2, the AMF sends CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT INDICATION to the ng-eNB, and DL CP Security Information is not included.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.8  Security in PDU session establishment procedureWord‑p. 19

4.2.2.8.1  Validation of S-NSSAIs in PDU session establishment requestWord‑p. 19
Requirement Name:
validation of S-NSSAIs in PDU session establishment request
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"
13)
if the Request type IE is set to "initial request" and the S-NSSAI IE contains an S-NSSAI that is not allowed by the network, then the AMF shall send back to the UE the 5GSM message which was not forwarded as specified in subclause 5.4.5.3.1 case e) or case f);" as specified in TS 24.501, clause 5.4.5.2.5.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause K.2.10.1, Incorrect Validation of S-NSSAIs
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_VALIDTATION_SNSSAI_IN_PDU_REQUEST
Purpose:
Verify that S-NSSAIs which are not within Allowed NSSAI list are not accepted by the AMF under test in PDU session establishment procedure.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE, UDM, SMF and NSSAAF, which may be simulated.
The tester configures UDM with an S-NSSAI that require Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorizationin in UE's subscription information.
  • AMF Capability:
    Ability to support Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization scenario.
Execution Steps
  1. Test Case 1
    1. The UE sends the S-NSSAI that require NSSAA to the AMF under test using registration request message.
    2. After receiving the NSSAA request from the AMF, the NSSAAF sends EAP success to AMF.
    3. The UE sends PDU session establishment request to the AMF with the S-NSSAI.
  2. Test Case 2
    1. The UE sends the S-NSSAI that require NSSAA to the AMF under test using registration request message.
    2. After receiving the NSSAA request from the AMF, the NSSAAF sends EAP failure to AMF.
    3. The UE sends PDU session establishment request to the AMF with the S-NSSAI.
Expected Results:
For test case 1, the AMF continues the PDU session establishment procedure by sending a Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext Request to the SMF.
For test case 2, the AMF aborts the PDU session establishment procedure by sending back the 5GSM message to the UE.
Expected format of evidence
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.2.9  Network Slice Specific Authentication and AuthorizationWord‑p. 20

4.2.2.9.1  NSSAA revocationWord‑p. 20
Requirement Name:
NSSAA revocation
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
" If no S-NSSAI is left in Allowed NSSAI for an access after the revocation, and no Default NSSAI can be provided to the UE in the Allowed NSSAI or a previous NSSAA failed for the Default NSSAI over this access, then the AMF shall execute the Network-initiated Deregistration procedure for the access as described in subclause 4.2.2.3.3 of TS 23.502, and it shall include in the explicit De-Registration Request message the list of Rejected S-NSSAIs, each of them with the appropriate rejection cause value. "
as specified in TS 33.501, clause 16.5
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_NSSAA_REVOCATION
Purpose:
Verify that AMF deregisters UE when, after slice specific authorization revocation, there is no allowed NSSAI or Default NSSAI that can be used by UE.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE. The UE may be simulated.
The AMF under test is configured with one S-NSSAI in the Allowed NSSAI and no default S-NSSAI.
Execution Steps
A message requesting the AMF under test to revoke the authorization of the S-NSSAI in the Allowed NSSAI is simulated and sent the AMF under test.
Expected Results:
The Deregistration Request message is sent by the AMF under test to the UE.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.3  Technical BaselineWord‑p. 21

4.2.3.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 21

The present clause provides baseline technical requirements.

4.2.3.2  Protecting data and informationWord‑p. 21

4.2.3.2.1  Protecting data and information - generalWord‑p. 21
There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.1 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.2  Protecting data and information - unauthorized viewingWord‑p. 21
There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.2 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.3  Protecting data and information in storageWord‑p. 21
There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.3 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.4  Protecting data and information in transferWord‑p. 21
There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.5  Logging access to personal dataWord‑p. 21
There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.5 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.3  Protecting availability and integrityWord‑p. 21

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.3 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.4  Authentication and authorizationWord‑p. 21

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.4 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.5  Protecting sessionsWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.5 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.6  LoggingWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.6 of TS 33.117.

4.2.4  Operating SystemsWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF -specific additions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117.

4.2.5  Web ServersWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF -specific additions to clause 4.2.5 of TS 33.117

4.2.6  Network DevicesWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.2.6 of TS 33.117.

4.3  AMF-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 22

4.3.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 22

The present clause contains AMF-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.

4.3.2  Technical baselineWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.3.2 of TS 33.117.

4.3.3  Operating systemsWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.3.3 of TS 33.117.

4.3.4  Web serversWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.3.4 of TS 33.117.

4.3.5  Network devicesWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.3.6 of TS 33.117.

4.3.6  Network functions in service-based architectureWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.3.6 in TS 33.117.

4.4  AMF-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 22

There are no AMF-specific additions to clause 4.4 of TS 33.117.

$  Change historyWord‑p. 23


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