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Content for  TS 33.220  Word version:  17.2.0

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5  UICC-based enhancements to Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA_U)Word‑p. 33

It is assumed that the UICC, BSF, and HSS involved in the procedures specified in this clause are capable of handling the GBA_U specific enhancements. The procedures specified in this clause also apply if NAF is not GBA_U aware.

5.1  Architecture and reference points for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancementsWord‑p. 33

The text from clause 4.4 of this specification applies also here, with the addition that the interface between the ME and the UICC, as specified in TS 31.102 and TS 31.103, needs to be enhanced with GBA_U specific commands. The requirements on these commands can be found in clause 5.2.1, details on the procedures are in clause 5.3.
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5.2  Requirements and principles for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancementsWord‑p. 33

The requirements and principles from clause 4.4 also apply here with the following addition:

5.2.1  Requirements on UEWord‑p. 33

The 3G AKA keys CK and IK resulting from a run of the protocol over the Ub reference point shall not leave the UICC.
The UICC shall be able to distinguish between authentication requests for GBA_U, and authentication requests for other 3G authentication domains.
Upon an authentication request from the ME, which the UICC recognises as related to GBA_U, the UICC shall derive the bootstrapping key.
Upon request from the ME, the UICC shall be able to derive further NAF-specific keys from the derived key stored on the UICC.
All GBA-aware MEs shall support procedures for the two previous requests.
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5.2.2  Requirements on BSFWord‑p. 33

BSF shall support both GBA_U and GBA_ME bootstrapping procedures. The decision on running one or the other shall be based on subscription information (i.e. UICC capabilities).
The BSF shall be able to acquire the UICC capabilities related to GBA as part of the GBA user security settings received from the HSS.

5.3  Procedures for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancementsWord‑p. 33

5.3.1  Initiation of bootstrappingWord‑p. 33

The text from clause 4.5.1 of the present document applies also here.

5.3.2  Bootstrapping procedureWord‑p. 33

The procedure specified in this clause differs from the procedure specified clause 4.5.2 in the local handling of keys and Authentication Vectors in the UE and the BSF. The messages exchanged over the Ub reference point are identical for both procedures.
When a UE wants to interact with a NAF, and it knows that the bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see Figure 5.1). Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a bootstrapping renegotiation indication from the NAF, or when the lifetime of the key in UE has expired (see clause 5.3.3).
Reproduction of 3GPP TS 33.220, Fig. 5.1: The bootstrapping procedure with UICC-based enhancements
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A UE shall always include the product token "3gpp-gba-tmpi" in the user agent request-header field when communicating over Ub. A BSF shall always include the product token "3gpp-gba-tmpi" in the server response-header field when communicating over Ub.
Step 1.
The ME sends an HTTP request towards the BSF. When a TMPI associated with the IMPI in use is available on the UE, the UE includes this TMPI in the "username" parameter, otherwise the UE includes the IMPI.
Step 2.
The BSF recognises from the structure of the "username" parameter (cf. Annex B.4) whether a TMPI or an IMPI was sent. If a TMPI was sent the BSF looks up the corresponding IMPI in its local database. If the BSF does not find an IMPI corresponding to the received TMPI it returns an appropriate error message to the UE. The UE then deletes the TMPI and retries the request using the IMPI.
The BSF retrieves the complete set of GBA user security settings and one Authentication Vector
(AV, AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over the Zh reference point from the HSS.
The HSS shall also send an indication that the UICC supports SHA-256 to the BSF if the UICC supports SHA-256.
If the BSF implements the timestamp option and has a local copy of the GUSS for the subscriber that has been fetched from the HSS during a previous bootstrapping procedure, and this GUSS includes a timestamp, the BSF may include the GUSS timestamp in the request message. Upon receiving that timestamp, if the HSS implements the timestamp option, the HSS may compare it with the timestamp of the GUSS stored in the HSS. In this case, if and only if the HSS has done the comparison and the timestamps are equal, then the HSS shall send "GUSS TIMESTAMP EQUAL" indication to the BSF. In any other case, the HSS shall send the GUSS (if available) to the BSF. If the BSF receives "GUSS TIMESTAMP EQUAL" indication, it shall keep the local copy of the GUSS. In any other case, the BSF shall delete the local copy of the GUSS, and store the received GUSS (if sent).
The BSF can then decide to perform GBA_U, based on the user security settings (USSs). In this case, the BSF proceeds in the following way:
  • The BSF computes MAC*. If an indication that the UICC supports SHA-256 is received from the HSS, the MAC* is computed as MAC*= MAC* Trunc(SHA-256(IK)); otherwise, MAC* = MAC* Trunc(SHA-1(IK)).
The BSF stores the XRES after flipping the least significant bit.
Step 3.
Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN* (where AUTN* = SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC*) to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
Step 4.
The ME sends RAND and AUTN* to the UICC. The UICC calculates IK and MAC (by performing MAC= MAC* ⊕ Trunc(SHA-256(IK)) if the UICC supports SHA-256, otherwise by performing MAC= MAC* ⊕ Trunc(SHA-1(IK)). Then the UICC checks AUTN(i.e. SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC) to verify that the challenge is from an authorised network; the UICC also calculates CK and RES. This will result in session keys CK and IK in both BSF and UICC. The UICC then transfers RES (after flipping the least significant bit) to the ME and stores Ks, which is the concatenation of CK and IK, on the UICC.
The usage of SHA-256 for MAC* computation at BSF and MAC calculation at UICC is recommended.
Step 5.
The ME sends another HTTP request, containing the Digest AKA response (calculated using RES), to the BSF.
Step 6.
The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA response.
Step 7.
The BSF generates the key Ks by concatenating CK and IK. The B-TID value shall be also generated in format of NAI by taking the base64 encoded [12] RAND value from step 3, and the BSF server name, i.e. base64encode(RAND)@BSF_servers_domain_name.
If the request included the product token "3gpp-gba-tmpi" in the user agent request-header field the BSF shall compute a new TMPI as specified in Annex B.4 and store it together with the IMPI, overwriting a previous TMPI related to this IMPI, if any.
Step 8.
The BSF shall send a 200 OK message, including the B-TID, to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. In addition, in the 200 OK message, the BSF shall supply the lifetime of the key Ks.
Step 9.
Both the UICC and the BSF shall use the Ks to derive NAF-specific keys Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF during the procedures as specified in clause 5.3.3, if applicable. Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF are used for securing the Ua reference point.
Ks_ext_NAF is computed in the UICC as Ks_ext_NAF = KDF(Ks, "gba-me", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id), and Ks_int_NAF is computed in the UICC as Ks_int_NAF = KDF(Ks, "gba-u, RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id), where KDF is the key derivation function as specified in Annex B, and the key derivation parameters include the user's IMPI, the NAF_Id and RAND. The NAF_Id is constructed as follows: NAF_Id = FQDN of the NAF || Ua security protocol identifier. The Ua security protocol identifier is specified in Annex H. The key derivation parameters used for Ks_ext_NAF derivation must be different from those used for Ks_int_NAF derivation. This is done by adding a static string "gba-me" in Ks_ext_NAF and "gba-u" in Ks_int_NAF as an input parameter to the key derivation function.
To allow consistent key derivation based on NAF name in UE and BSF, at least one of the prerequisites which are specified in clause 4.5.2 shall be met.
The UICC and the BSF store the key Ks with the associated B-TID for further use, until the lifetime of Ks has expired, or until the key Ks is updated or until the deletion conditions are satisfied (see 4.4.11).
If the response included the product token "3gpp-gba-tmpi" in the server response-header field the UE shall compute the TMPI as specified in Annex B.4 and store it together with the IMPI, overwriting a previous TMPI related to this IMPI, if any.
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5.3.3  Procedures using bootstrapped Security AssociationWord‑p. 36

Before communication between the UE and the NAF can start, the UE and the NAF first have to agree whether to use shared keys obtained by means of the GBA. If the UE does not know whether to use GBA with this NAF, it uses the Initiation of Bootstrapping procedure described in clause 5.3.1.
Once the UE and the NAF have established that they want to use GBA then every time the UE wants to interact with a NAF the following steps are executed as depicted in Figure 5.3.
Next, the UE and the NAF have to agree, which type of keys to use, Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both. The default is the use of Ks_ext_NAF only. This use is also supported by MEs and NAFs, which are GBA_U unaware. If Ks_int_NAF, or both Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF are to be used, this use has to be agreed between UE and NAF prior to the execution of the procedure described in the remainder of this clause 5.3.3. Any such agreement overrules the default use of the keys. A key selection indication, which key (i.e. Ks_int_NAF or Ks_ext_NAF) the NAF shall use in the Ua reference point may be present in the application specific USS as defined in stage 3 specification. If the indication exists, the NAF shall use the indicated key. If the Ks_int_NAF key was indicated in the USS, the UE attempts to use Ks_ext_NAF key, the NAF shall terminate the communication with the UE.
Step 1.
UE starts communication over reference point Ua with the NAF using the keys Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required:
  • in general, UE and NAF will not yet share the key(s) required to protect the Ua reference point. If they do not, the UE proceeds as follows:
  • if Ks_ext_NAF is required and a key Ks for the selected UICC application is available in the UICC, the ME requests the UICC to derive the key Ks_ext_NAF from Ks, as specified in clause 5.3.2;
  • if Ks_int_NAF is required and a key Ks for the selected UICC application is available in the UICC, the ME requests the UICC to derive the key Ks_int_NAF from Ks, as specified in clause 5.3.2;
    If it is not desired by the UE to use the same Ks for the selected UICC application to derive more than one Ks_ext/int_NAF, then the UE should first agree on new key Ks with the BSF over the Ub reference point, as specified in clause 5.3.2, and then proceeds to derive Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required.
  • if Ks for the selected UICC application is not available in the UE, the UE first agrees on a new key Ks with the BSF over the Ub reference point, as specified in clause 5.3.2, and then proceeds to derive Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required;
  • if the NAF shares a key with the UE, but the NAF requires an update of that key, it shall send a suitable bootstrapping renegotiation request to the UE. If the key's lifetime has expired the protocol used over reference point Ua shall be terminated. The form of this indication depends on the particular protocol used over Ua reference point. If the UE receives a bootstrapping renegotiation request, it starts a run of the protocol over Ub, as specified in clause 5.3.2, in order to obtain new keys.
  • The UE supplies the B-TID to the NAF, as specified in clause 5.3.2, to allow the NAF to retrieve the corresponding keys from the BSF
    To allow for consistent key derivation in BSF and UE, both have to use the same FQDN for derivation (cf. clause 4.5.2). For each protocol used over Ua it shall be specified if only cases (1) and (2) of clause 4.5.2 are allowed for the NAF or if the protocol used over Ua shall transfer also the FQDN used for key derivation by UE to NAF.
  • the key management procedures for GBA related keys in the ME (i.e. Ks_ext_NAF keys) are described in clause 4.4.11.
  • all GBA related keys in the UICC do not need to be deleted when the ME is powered down.
  • When new key Ks is agreed over the Ub reference point and new NAF-specific keys need to be derived for one NAF_Id, then both, Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF (if present), shall be updated for this NAF_Id, but other keys Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF relating to other NAF_Ids, which may be stored on the UE, shall not be affected.
    According to the procedures defined in clauses 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, in the UE there is at most one Ks_int_NAF/Ks_ext_NAF key pair stored per NAF_Id.
Step 2.
NAF now starts communication over the Zn reference point with the BSF.
  • The NAF requests from the BSF the keys corresponding to the B-TID, which was supplied by the UE to the NAF over the Ua reference point. If the NAF is GBA_U aware it indicates this by including a corresponding flag in the request;
  • The NAF may also request one or more application-specific USSs for the applications, which the request received over Ua from UE may access;
  • With the keys request over the Zn reference point, the NAF shall supply a NAF-Id (which includes NAF's FQDN that the UE has used to access this NAF and the Ua security protocol identifier) to the BSF. (This is to allow for consistent key derivation in the BSF and UE as described above). The BSF shall verify that the NAF is authorized to use that FQDN.
Step 3.
The BSF derives the keys Ks_ext_NAF, and Ks_int_NAF (if additionally required), as specified in clause 5.3.2. If the NAF indicated in its request that it is GBA_U aware, the BSF supplies to NAF both keys, Ks_ext_NAF, and Ks_int_NAF, otherwise the BSF supplies only Ks_ext_NAF. In addition, the BSF supplies the bootstrapping time and the lifetime time of these keys, and the requested application-specific and potentially NAF group specific USSs if they are available in subscriber's GUSS and if the NAF is authorized to receive the requested USSs. For any USSs containing a NAF Group attribute, this attribute shall be removed in the USSs supplied to the NAF.If the key identified by the B-TID supplied by the NAF is not available at the BSF, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF. The NAF then indicates a bootstrapping renegotiation request (See Figure 4.5) to the UE;
  • The BSF may require that one or more application-specific and potentially NAF group specific USSs shall be present in subscriber's GUSS for the NAF (see clause 4.4.6). If one or more of these required settings are missing from the GUSS, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF.
  • The BSF may also send the private user identity (IMPI) and requested USSs to NAF according to the BSF's policy.
Step 4.
The NAF now continues with the protocol used over the Ua reference point with the UE.
  • If the NAF requested an application-specific USS from the BSF and the USS was returned the NAF, the NAF shall check whether this USS contains an key selection indication. If the key selection indication is present, the NAF shall use only the indicated key. If a different key was used over Ua, then the protocol used over reference point Ua shall be terminated.
Once the run of the protocol used over Ua reference point is completed the purpose of bootstrapping is fulfilled as it enabled the UE and NAF to use Ua reference point in a secure way.
Reproduction of 3GPP TS 33.220, Fig. 5.3: The bootstrapping usage procedure with UICC-based enhancements
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5.3.4  Procedure related to service discoveryWord‑p. 39

The text from clause 4.5.4 of this document applies also here.

AVoid


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