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TS 33.246 (SA3)
Security of
Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS)

use "3GPP‑Page" to get the Word version
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for a better overview, the Table of Contents (ToC) is reproduced
V15.0.0 (PDF)  2018/06  77 p.
V14.2.0  2017/09  78 p.
V13.1.0  2015/12  76 p.
V12.2.0  2014/12  76 p.
V11.2.0  2013/06  72 p.
V10.1.0  2012/12  71 p.
V9.1.0  2012/12  71 p.
V8.4.0  2009/06  70 p.
V7.6.0  2007/12  66 p.

Rapporteur:  Dr. Escott, Adrian

The security of MBMS provides different challenges compared to the security of services delivered over point-to-point services. In addition to the normal threat of eavesdropping, there is also the threat that it may not be assumed that valid subscribers have any interest in maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the communications, and they may therefore conspire to circumvent the security solution (for example one subscriber may publish the decryption keys enabling non-subscribers to view broadcast content).
Countering this threat requires the decryption keys to be updated frequently in a manner that may not be predicted by subscribers while making efficient use of the radio network. The stage 1 requirements for MBMS are specified in TS 22.146.
The Technical Specification covers the security procedures of the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) for 3GPP systems (UTRAN, GERAN and E-UTRAN). MBMS is a 3GPP system network bearer service over which many different applications could be carried. The actual method of protection may vary depending on the type of MBMS application.

full Table of Contents for  TS 33.246  Word version:   15.0.0


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1  ScopeWord-p. 8
2  References
3  Definitions, abbreviations, symbols and conventionsWord-p. 10
4  MBMS security overview
5  MBMS security functionsWord-p. 16
6  Security mechanismsWord-p. 18
6.1  Using GBA for MBMS
6.2  Authentication and authorisation of a userWord-p. 19
6.3  Key management procedures
6.4  MIKEY message creation and processing in the ME
6.5  Validation and key derivation functions in MGV-FWord-p. 36
6.6  Protection of the transmitted trafficWord-p. 37
6.7  Confidentiality protection of associated delivery procedures [R11]Word-p. 40
A  Trust modelWord-p. 42
B  Security threatsWord-p. 43
C (Normative)  MBMS security requirementsWord-p. 46
D (Normative)  UICC-ME interfaceWord-p. 49
E  MIKEY features not used in MBMSWord-p. 51
F (Normative)  MRK key derivation for ME based MBMS key managementWord-p. 52
G (Normative)  HTTP based key management messagesWord-p. 53
H  Signalling flows for MSK proceduresWord-p. 57
I  Example of using MSKs and MTKs in MBMSWord-p. 61
J  Mapping the MBMS security requirements into security functions and mechanismWord-p. 62
K  SRTP features not used in MBMSWord-p. 66
L (Normative)  Multicasting MBMS user data on Iub [R8]Word-p. 67
M  Relation to IMS based MBMS user services [R8]Word-p. 68
N (Normative)  GCSE security aspects [R12]Word-p. 69
O (Normative)  Security aspects of xMB reference point between Content Provider and BM-SC [R14]Word-p. 71
P  Change historyWord-p. 72

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