Requirement Name:
Control plane data confidentiality protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4a.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Requirement Name:
Control plane data integrity protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall provide integrity protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4a.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Requirement Name:
User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall cipher and decipher user plane packets between the Uu reference point and the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
Purpose:
To verify that the user data packets are confidentiality protected over the air interface.
Pre-Condition:
-
The eNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE and the MME may be simulated,
-
The tester can capture the messages via the air interface.
-
The tester shall enable the user plane ciphering protection and ensure EEA0 is not used.
Execution Steps:
-
The UE sends an attach request to the MME.
-
The MME sends a KeNB and the UE security capability to the eNB.
-
eNB selects an algorithm and sends AS SMC to the UE,
-
eNB receive AS SMP from the UE.
Expected Results:
User plane packets sent by the eNB after eNB sending AS SMC is ciphered.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
Test Name:
TC-DATA-CIP-eNB-S1/X2
The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance to the procedure mentioned in
clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
Requirement Name:
User plane data integrity protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Requirement Name:
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The serving network shall select the algorithms to use dependent on: the UE security capabilities of the UE, and the configured allowed list of security capabilities of the currently serving network entity."
as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.1.
"Each eNB shall be configured via network management with lists of algorithms which are allowed for usage. There shall be one list for integrity algorithms, and one for ciphering algorithms. These lists shall be ordered according to a priority decided by the operator."
as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.1.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB selects the algorithms with the highest priority in its configured list.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with the eNB has been pre-configured with allowed security algorithms with priority.
Execution Steps
-
The UE sends attach request message to the eNB.
-
The eNB receives S1 context setup request message.
-
The eNB sends the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message.
-
The UE replies with the AS SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
Expected Results:
The eNB initiates the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message that includes the chosen algorithm with the highest priority according to the ordered lists and is contained in the UE EPS security capabilities.
The MAC in the AS SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message is verified, and the AS protection algorithms are selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
Requirement Name:
The check of RRC integrity
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The supervision of failed RRC integrity checks shall be performed both in the ME and the eNB. In case of failed integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I) is detected after the start of integrity protection, the concerned message shall be discarded." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.4.1.
Security Objective References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that the message is discarded in case of failed integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I).
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with RRC Protection is activated at the eNB.
Execution Steps
Positive:
The eNB receives a RRC message with a right MAC-I.
Negative:
The eNB receives a RRC message with a wrong MAC-I or missing MAC-I.
Expected Results:
The RRC message is discarded in the negative test.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
Requirement Name:
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
Threat References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS NULL integrity algorithm is used correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE . The UE may be simulated.
The vendor shall provide documentation describing how EIA0 is disabled or enabled.
Execution Steps
Positive:
-
The eNB receives a UE security capability only containing EIA0 from S1 context setup message.
-
The eNB sends AS SMC to the UE.
Negative:
-
The eNB receives a UE security capability that contains EIA0 and other integrity algorithm(s).
-
The eNB sends AS SMC to the UE.
Expected Results:
EIA0 is only selected in the Positive test.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
Requirement Name:
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"Key refresh shall be possible for
KeNB, KRRC-enc, KRRC-int, KUP-int, and KUP-enc and shall be initiated by the eNB when a PDCP COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same
KeNB."
as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.2.9.1.
Moreover, "The eNB is responsible for avoiding reuse of the COUNT with the same RB identity and with the same
KeNB, e.g. due to the transfer of large volumes of data, release and establishment of new RBs. In order to avoid such re-use, the eNB may e.g. use different RB identities for successive RB establishments, trigger an intra cell handover or by triggering a transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED."
as specified in
TS 36.331, clause 5.3.1.2.
Threat References:
Test Case 1:
Test Name:
TC_ENB_KEY_REFRESH_ PDCP_COUNT
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB performs
KeNB refresh when PDCP COUNTs are about to wrap around.
Pre-Conditions:
Execution Steps
-
The eNB sends AS Security Mode Command message to the UE, and the UE respondswith the AS ecurity Sode Momplete messageC.
-
The UE sends RRC messages or UP messages to the eNB with an increasing PDCP COUNT until the value wraps around.
Expected Results:
The eNB triggers an intra-cell handover and takes a new
KeNB into use.
Expected format of evidence:
Part of log that shows the PDCP COUNT wraping around and the intra-cell handover. This part can be presented, for example as a screenshot.
Test Case 2:
Test Name:
TC_ENB_KEY_REFRESH_DRB_ID
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB performs
KeNB refresh when DRB-IDs are about to be reused under the following conditions:
-
the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity while the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0, or
-
the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around.
Pre-Conditions:
The UE and MME may be simulated.
Execution Steps
-
The eNB sends the AS Security Mode Command message to the UE.
-
the UE responds with the AS Security Mode Complete message.
-
A DRB is set up.
-
DRB is set up and torn down for multiple times within one active radio connection without the UE going to idle (e.g. by the UE making multiple IMS calls, or by the MME requesting bearer setup and bearer deactivation), until the DRB ID is reused.
Expected Results:
Before DRB ID reuse, the eNB takes a new
KeNB into use by e.g. triggering an intra-cell handover or triggering a transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED.
Expected format of evidence:
Part of log that shows all the DRB identities and the intra-cell handover or the transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED. This part can be presented, for example, as a screenshot.
Requirement Name:
AS integrity algorithm selection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
The eNB shall protect the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message with the integrity algorithm, which has the highest priority according to the ordered lists.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE. UE may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The eNB sends the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message. The UE replies with the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
Expected Results:
-
The eNB has selected the integrity algorithm which has the highest priority according to the ordered lists and is contained in the UE EPS security capabilities. The eNB checks the message authentication code on the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
-
The MAC in the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE is verified, and the AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"In the path-switch message, the target eNB shall send the UE EPS security capabilities received from the source eNB to the MME." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.2.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2-handovers.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB and target eNB, and the source eNB may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The target eNB sends the path-switch message to the MME.
Expected Results:
The UE EPS security capabilities are in the path-switch message.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result
Requirement Name:
AS protection algorithm selection in eNB change.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The target eNB shall select the algorithm with highest priority from the UE EPS security capabilities according to the prioritized locally configured list of algorithms (this applies for both integrity and ciphering algorithms). The chosen algorithms shall be indicated to the UE in the handover command if the target eNB selects different algorithms compared to the source eNB" as specified in
TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.2.
clause 7.2.4.2.3.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS protection algorithm is selected correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB, target eNB and MME. Source eNB and MME may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
Test Case 1:
Source eNB transfers the ciphering and integrity algorithms used in the source cell to the target eNB in the handover request message.
Target eNB verifies the algorithms and selects AS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists. Target eNB includes the algorithm in the handover command.
Test Case 2:
MME sends the UE EPS security capability to the Target eNB.
The target eNB selects the AS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists in the HANDOVER COMMAND.
The above test cases assume that the algorithms selected by the target eNB are different from the ones received from the source eNB.
Expected Results:
For both test cases:
-
The UE checks the message authentication code on the handover command message.
-
The MAC in the handover complete message is verified, and the AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.
Requirement Name:
RRC and UP downlink ciphering at the eNB.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall start RRC and UP downlink ciphering after sending the AS security mode command message".
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
Purpose:
To verify that the eNB performs RRC and UP downlink ciphering after sending the AS security mode command message.
Pre-Condition:
-
The UE and eNB network products are connected in the test environment. UE may be simulated.
-
The tester shall have access to the AS security context and the corresponding cryptographic keys (e.g. RRC and UP cipher keys).
-
The tester has access to Uu interface and ability to capture the Uu interface messages with the debug port enabled in the UE.
Execution Steps:
-
The tester shall POWER ON the UE to trigger the registration procedures (Attach and SMC).
-
The tester performs packet capturing over the Uu interface using any packet analyser.
-
The tester filters the AS SMC command message and the following RRC and UP downlink packets from eNB to UE.
-
The tester proceeds the testing based on the parameters (algorithm identifier and algorithm distinguisher) present in the AS SMC command message.
Case 1: If the parameters refer to null ciphering algorithm, the tester verifies that the downlink packets filtered in step 3 are unciphered.
Case 2: If the parameters refer to algorithms such as SNOW, AES, ZUC, the tester verifies that the downlink packets filtered in step 3 are ciphered.
The tester also checks if the packets are ciphered in accordance with the selected algorithm stated in the AS SMC command message.
Expected Results:
-
The downlink packets following the AS SMC command message are ciphered except NULL ciphering algorithm case.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
Requirement Name:
Map a UE NR security capability
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The MeNB that does not have the UE NR security capabilities shall create them as follow:
-
Set the support of NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3 to the same as EEA0, 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EEA3, EIA0, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, 128-EIA3 respectively; and
-
Set the rest of the bits to 0."
as specified in
TS 33.401, clause E.3.10.2.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
Purpose:
To verify that the eNB creates mapped UE NR security capabilities.
Pre-Condition:
-
The eNB and gNB network products are connected in the test environment. The gNB may be simulated.
-
Tester shall have access to trigger dual connection to a gNB.
-
The Tester shall have access to the X2 interface.
Execution Steps:
-
The MeNB does not receive UE NR security capabilities from S1 Initial Context Setup Request message.
-
The MeNB sends SN Addition Request Message to the SgNB.
-
The tester checkes if the NR security capabilities are included in SN Addition Request Message.
Expected Results:
The SN Addition Request Message contains UE NR security capabilities, i.e. NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
Requirement Name:
UE NR security capability is only sent to a SgNB
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"When adding SgNB while establishing an EN-DC connection, the MeNB shall send these created UE NR security capabilities to the SgNB. Other than for adding an SgNB, the created UE NR security capabilities shall not be sent from the MeNB." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause E.3.4.3.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
Purpose:
To verify that the UE NR security capabilities are only sent to a SgNB.
Pre-Condition:
-
The UE, gNB and eNB network products are connected in the test environment. UE and gNB may be simulated.
-
The tester shall have access to the X2 interface.
Execution Steps:
-
The tester triggers MeNB to send SN addition Request message to a SgNB.
-
The tester triggers UE HO from MeNB to another eNB.
-
The tester checks if the UE NR security capabilities were sent in the X2 interface in both step 1 and step 2.
Expected Results:
The UE NR security capabilities are only sent to the SgNB.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"A target eNB that has received the UE NR security capabilities during handover shall include the UE NR security capabilities in the S1-PATH SWITCH-REQUEST message." as specified in
TS 33.401, clause E.3.4.3.
Threat References:
Test Case:
Test Name:
Purpose:
Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2-handovers when target eNB receives a NR security capability.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB and target eNB, and the source eNB may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The target eNB sends the path-switch message to the MME.
Expected Results:
The UE NR security capability is in the path-switch message.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.