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TS 33.216
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS)
for evolved Node B (eNB) Network Product Class

V16.7.0 (PDF)  2021/09  22 p.
V15.3.0  2020/09  18 p.
Rapporteur:
Mr. Wong, Marcus
Huawei Tech.(UK) Co.. Ltd

Content for  TS 33.216  Word version:  16.7.0

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1  ScopeWord‑p. 6

The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the eNB network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the eNB network product class.

2  ReferencesWord‑p. 6

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
  • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non specific.
  • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
  • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1]
TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2]
TR 33.117: (Release 15) "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[3]
TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture".
[4]
TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[5]
TS 36.331: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification".
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3  Definitions and abbreviationsWord‑p. 6

3.1  DefinitionsWord‑p. 6

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905.

3.2  AbbreviationsWord‑p. 7

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905.

4  eNodeB-specific security requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 7

4.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 7

eNodeB specific security requirements include both requirements derived from eNodeB-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to eNB as described in TR 33.926. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117 and are not repeated in the present document.
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4.2  eNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 7

4.2.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 7

Present clause contains eNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.

4.2.2  Security functional requirements on the eNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test casesWord‑p. 7

4.2.2.1  Security functional requirements on the eNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications - TS 33.401 [3]Word‑p. 7

4.2.2.1.1  Control plane data confidentiality protectionWord‑p. 7
Requirement Name:
Control plane data confidentiality protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall provide confidentiality protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4a.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause C.2.2.1 - Control plane data confidentiality protection.
Test Case:
The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance to the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.2.1.2  Control plane data integrity protectionWord‑p. 7
Requirement Name:
Control plane data integrity protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall provide integrity protection for control plane packets on the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4a.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause C.2.2.2 - Control plane data integrity protection.
Test Case:
The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance to the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.2.1.3  User plane data ciphering and deciphering at the eNBWord‑p. 8
Requirement Name:
User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall cipher and decipher user plane packets between the Uu reference point and the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause C.2.2.3 - User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB.
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC-DATA-CIP-eNB-Uu
Purpose:
To verify that the user data packets are confidentiality protected over the air interface.
Pre-Condition:
  • The eNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE and the MME may be simulated,
  • The tester can capture the messages via the air interface.
  • The tester shall enable the user plane ciphering protection and ensure EEA0 is not used.
Execution Steps:
  1. The UE sends an attach request to the MME.
  2. The MME sends a KeNB and the UE security capability to the eNB.
  3. eNB selects an algorithm and sends AS SMC to the UE,
  4. eNB receive AS SMP from the UE.
Expected Results:
User plane packets sent by the eNB after eNB sending AS SMC is ciphered.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
Test Name:
TC-DATA-CIP-eNB-S1/X2
The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance to the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.2.1.4  User plane data integrity protectionWord‑p. 8
Requirement Name:
User plane data integrity protection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall handle integrity protection for user plane packets for the S1/X2 reference points." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 5.3.4.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause C.2.2.4 - User plane data integrity protection.
Test Case:
The requirement mentioned in this clause is tested in accordance to the procedure mentioned in clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.2.1.5  AS algorithms selectionWord‑p. 9
Requirement Name:
AS algorithms selection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The serving network shall select the algorithms to use dependent on: the UE security capabilities of the UE, and the configured allowed list of security capabilities of the currently serving network entity."
as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.1.
"Each eNB shall be configured via network management with lists of algorithms which are allowed for usage. There shall be one list for integrity algorithms, and one for ciphering algorithms. These lists shall be ordered according to a priority decided by the operator."
as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.1.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB selects the algorithms with the highest priority in its configured list.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with the eNB has been pre-configured with allowed security algorithms with priority.
Execution Steps
  1. The UE sends attach request message to the eNB.
  2. The eNB receives S1 context setup request message.
  3. The eNB sends the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message.
  4. The UE replies with the AS SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
Expected Results:
The eNB initiates the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message that includes the chosen algorithm with the highest priority according to the ordered lists and is contained in the UE EPS security capabilities.
The MAC in the AS SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message is verified, and the AS protection algorithms are selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
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4.2.2.1.6  Verify RRC integrity protectionWord‑p. 9
Requirement Name:
The check of RRC integrity
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The supervision of failed RRC integrity checks shall be performed both in the ME and the eNB. In case of failed integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I) is detected after the start of integrity protection, the concerned message shall be discarded." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.4.1.
Security Objective References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that the message is discarded in case of failed integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I).
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with RRC Protection is activated at the eNB.
Execution Steps
Positive:
The eNB receives a RRC message with a right MAC-I.
Negative:
The eNB receives a RRC message with a wrong MAC-I or missing MAC-I.
Expected Results:
The RRC message is discarded in the negative test.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
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4.2.2.1.7  The selection of EIA0Word‑p. 10
Requirement Name:
The selection of EIA0
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"EIA0 is only allowed for unauthenticated emergency calls" as specified in TS 33.401, clause 5.1.4.2.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS NULL integrity algorithm is used correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE . The UE may be simulated.
The vendor shall provide documentation describing how EIA0 is disabled or enabled.
Execution Steps
Positive:
  1. The eNB receives a UE security capability only containing EIA0 from S1 context setup message.
  2. The eNB sends AS SMC to the UE.
Negative:
  1. The eNB receives a UE security capability that contains EIA0 and other integrity algorithm(s).
  2. The eNB sends AS SMC to the UE.
Expected Results:
EIA0 is only selected in the Positive test.
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
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4.2.2.1.8  Key refresh at the eNBWord‑p. 11
Requirement Name:
Key refresh at the eNB
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"Key refresh shall be possible for KeNB, KRRC-enc, KRRC-int, KUP-int, and KUP-enc and shall be initiated by the eNB when a PDCP COUNTs is about to be re-used with the same Radio Bearer identity and with the same KeNB."
as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.2.9.1.
Moreover, "The eNB is responsible for avoiding reuse of the COUNT with the same RB identity and with the same KeNB, e.g. due to the transfer of large volumes of data, release and establishment of new RBs. In order to avoid such re-use, the eNB may e.g. use different RB identities for successive RB establishments, trigger an intra cell handover or by triggering a transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED."
as specified in TS 36.331, clause 5.3.1.2.
Threat References:
TR 33.926, clause C.2.3.1 - Key reuse for eavesdropping
Test Case 1:
Test Name:
TC_ENB_KEY_REFRESH_ PDCP_COUNT
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB performs KeNB refresh when PDCP COUNTs are about to wrap around.
Pre-Conditions:
The UE may be simulated.
Execution Steps
  1. The eNB sends AS Security Mode Command message to the UE, and the UE respondswith the AS ecurity Sode Momplete messageC.
  2. The UE sends RRC messages or UP messages to the eNB with an increasing PDCP COUNT until the value wraps around.
Expected Results:
The eNB triggers an intra-cell handover and takes a new KeNB into use.
Expected format of evidence:
Part of log that shows the PDCP COUNT wraping around and the intra-cell handover. This part can be presented, for example as a screenshot.
Test Case 2:
Test Name:
TC_ENB_KEY_REFRESH_DRB_ID
Purpose:
Verify that the eNB performs KeNB refresh when DRB-IDs are about to be reused under the following conditions:
  • the successive Radio Bearer establishment uses the same RB identity while the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0, or
  • the PDCP COUNT is reset to 0 but the RB identity is increased after multiple calls and wraps around.
Pre-Conditions:
The UE and MME may be simulated.
Execution Steps
  1. The eNB sends the AS Security Mode Command message to the UE.
  2. the UE responds with the AS Security Mode Complete message.
  3. A DRB is set up.
  4. DRB is set up and torn down for multiple times within one active radio connection without the UE going to idle (e.g. by the UE making multiple IMS calls, or by the MME requesting bearer setup and bearer deactivation), until the DRB ID is reused.
Expected Results:
Before DRB ID reuse, the eNB takes a new KeNB into use by e.g. triggering an intra-cell handover or triggering a transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED.
Expected format of evidence:
Part of log that shows all the DRB identities and the intra-cell handover or the transition from RRC_CONNECTED to RRC_IDLE or RRC_INACTIVE and then back to RRC_CONNECTED. This part can be presented, for example, as a screenshot.
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4.2.2.1.9  AS Security Mode Command ProcedureWord‑p. 12
Requirement Name:
AS integrity algorithm selection
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
The eNB shall protect the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message with the integrity algorithm, which has the highest priority according to the ordered lists.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE. UE may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The eNB sends the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message. The UE replies with the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
Expected Results:
  1. The eNB has selected the integrity algorithm which has the highest priority according to the ordered lists and is contained in the UE EPS security capabilities. The eNB checks the message authentication code on the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message.
  2. The MAC in the SECURITY MODE COMPLETE is verified, and the AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.
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4.2.2.1.10  Bidding down prevention in X2-handoversWord‑p. 12
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"In the path-switch message, the target eNB shall send the UE EPS security capabilities received from the source eNB to the MME." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.2.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2-handovers.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB and target eNB, and the source eNB may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The target eNB sends the path-switch message to the MME.
Expected Results:
The UE EPS security capabilities are in the path-switch message.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result
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4.2.2.1.11  AS protection algorithm selection in eNB changeWord‑p. 13
Requirement Name:
AS protection algorithm selection in eNB change.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The target eNB shall select the algorithm with highest priority from the UE EPS security capabilities according to the prioritized locally configured list of algorithms (this applies for both integrity and ciphering algorithms). The chosen algorithms shall be indicated to the UE in the handover command if the target eNB selects different algorithms compared to the source eNB" as specified in TS 33.401, clause 7.2.4.2.2, and clause 7.2.4.2.3.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that AS protection algorithm is selected correctly.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB, target eNB and MME. Source eNB and MME may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
Test Case 1:
Source eNB transfers the ciphering and integrity algorithms used in the source cell to the target eNB in the handover request message.
Target eNB verifies the algorithms and selects AS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists. Target eNB includes the algorithm in the handover command.
Test Case 2:
MME sends the UE EPS security capability to the Target eNB.
The target eNB selects the AS algorithms which have the highest priority according to the ordered lists in the HANDOVER COMMAND.
The above test cases assume that the algorithms selected by the target eNB are different from the ones received from the source eNB.
Expected Results:
For both test cases:
  1. The UE checks the message authentication code on the handover command message.
  2. The MAC in the handover complete message is verified, and the AS integrity protection algorithm is selected and applied correctly.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.
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4.2.2.1.12  RRC and UP downlink ciphering at the eNBWord‑p. 14
Requirement Name:
RRC and UP downlink ciphering at the eNB.
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The eNB shall start RRC and UP downlink ciphering after sending the AS security mode command message".
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_eNB_DL_Cipher
Purpose:
To verify that the eNB performs RRC and UP downlink ciphering after sending the AS security mode command message.
Pre-Condition:
  • The UE and eNB network products are connected in the test environment. UE may be simulated.
  • The tester shall have access to the AS security context and the corresponding cryptographic keys (e.g. RRC and UP cipher keys).
  • The tester has access to Uu interface and ability to capture the Uu interface messages with the debug port enabled in the UE.
Execution Steps:
  1. The tester shall POWER ON the UE to trigger the registration procedures (Attach and SMC).
  2. The tester performs packet capturing over the Uu interface using any packet analyser.
  3. The tester filters the AS SMC command message and the following RRC and UP downlink packets from eNB to UE.
  4. The tester proceeds the testing based on the parameters (algorithm identifier and algorithm distinguisher) present in the AS SMC command message.
    Case 1: If the parameters refer to null ciphering algorithm, the tester verifies that the downlink packets filtered in step 3 are unciphered.
    Case 2: If the parameters refer to algorithms such as SNOW, AES, ZUC, the tester verifies that the downlink packets filtered in step 3 are ciphered.
The tester also checks if the packets are ciphered in accordance with the selected algorithm stated in the AS SMC command message.
Expected Results:
  • The downlink packets following the AS SMC command message are ciphered except NULL ciphering algorithm case.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
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4.2.2.1.13  Map a UE NR security capability |R16|Word‑p. 15
Requirement Name:
Map a UE NR security capability
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"The MeNB that does not have the UE NR security capabilities shall create them as follow:
  • Set the support of NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3 to the same as EEA0, 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EEA3, EIA0, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, 128-EIA3 respectively; and
  • Set the rest of the bits to 0."
as specified in TS 33.401, clause E.3.10.2.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_MAP_NR_SEC_CAP
Purpose:
To verify that the eNB creates mapped UE NR security capabilities.
Pre-Condition:
  • The eNB and gNB network products are connected in the test environment. The gNB may be simulated.
  • Tester shall have access to trigger dual connection to a gNB.
  • The Tester shall have access to the X2 interface.
Execution Steps:
  1. The MeNB does not receive UE NR security capabilities from S1 Initial Context Setup Request message.
  2. The MeNB sends SN Addition Request Message to the SgNB.
  3. The tester checkes if the NR security capabilities are included in SN Addition Request Message.
Expected Results:
The SN Addition Request Message contains UE NR security capabilities, i.e. NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
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4.2.2.1.14  UE NR security capability is only sent to a SgNB |R16|Word‑p. 15
Requirement Name:
UE NR security capability is only sent to a SgNB
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"When adding SgNB while establishing an EN-DC connection, the MeNB shall send these created UE NR security capabilities to the SgNB. Other than for adding an SgNB, the created UE NR security capabilities shall not be sent from the MeNB." as specified in TS 33.401, clause E.3.4.3.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_NR_SEC_CAP_SENT
Purpose:
To verify that the UE NR security capabilities are only sent to a SgNB.
Pre-Condition:
  • The UE, gNB and eNB network products are connected in the test environment. UE and gNB may be simulated.
  • The tester shall have access to the X2 interface.
Execution Steps:
  1. The tester triggers MeNB to send SN addition Request message to a SgNB.
  2. The tester triggers UE HO from MeNB to another eNB.
  3. The tester checks if the UE NR security capabilities were sent in the X2 interface in both step 1 and step 2.
Expected Results:
The UE NR security capabilities are only sent to the SgNB.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot contains the operation results.
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4.2.2.1.15  Bidding down prevention in X2-handovers when target eNB receives a NR security capability |R16|Word‑p. 16
Requirement Reference:
Requirement Description:
"A target eNB that has received the UE NR security capabilities during handover shall include the UE NR security capabilities in the S1-PATH SWITCH-REQUEST message." as specified in TS 33.401, clause E.3.4.3.
Threat References:
TBA
Test Case:
Test Name:
TC_BID_DOWN_X2
Purpose:
Verify that bidding down is prevented in X2-handovers when target eNB receives a NR security capability.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with source eNB and target eNB, and the source eNB may be simulated.
Execution Steps:
The target eNB sends the path-switch message to the MME.
Expected Results:
The UE NR security capability is in the path-switch message.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the result.
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4.2.3  Technical baselineWord‑p. 17

4.2.3.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 17

The present clause provides baseline technical requirements.

4.2.3.2  Protecting data and informationWord‑p. 17

4.2.3.2.1  Protecting data and information - generalWord‑p. 17
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.1 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.2  Protecting data and information - unauthorized viewingWord‑p. 17
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.2 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.3  Protecting data and information in storageWord‑p. 17
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.3 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.4  Protecting data and information in transferWord‑p. 17
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117.
4.2.3.2.5  Logging access to personal dataWord‑p. 17
The requirement and testcases in clause 4.2.3.2.5 of TS 33.117 is not applicable to eNB network product.

4.2.3.3  Protecting availability and integrityWord‑p. 17

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.3 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.4  Authentication and authorizationWord‑p. 17

4.2.3.4.1  Authentication attributes |R16|Word‑p. 17
eNB-specific adaptation to clause 4.2.3.4.2.1 of TS 33.117 is:
  • Dual-factor authentication by combining several authentication options as noted in clause 4.2.3.4.2.1 of TS 33.117 for higher level of security is not applicable to the eNB.
Apart from the above exception, there are no other eNB-specific adaptations to clause 4.2.3.4.2 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.3.5  Protecting sessionsWord‑p. 17

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.5 of TS 33.117.

4.2.3.6  LoggingWord‑p. 17

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.6 of TS 33.117.

4.2.4  Operating systemsWord‑p. 17

eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117 are:
For the requirement defined in clause 4.2.4.1.1.2 of TS 33.117 Handling of ICMP:
  • Echo Reply can be sent by default.
  • In case of remote base station auto deployment, Router Advertisement can be processed.
Apart from the above exceptions, there are no eNB-specific addtions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117.
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4.2.5  Web serversWord‑p. 18

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.5 of TS 33.117.

4.2.6  Network devicesWord‑p. 18

4.2.6.1  Protection of data and informationWord‑p. 18

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6 of TS 33.117.

4.2.6.2  Protecting availability and integrityWord‑p. 18

4.2.6.2.1  Packet filteringWord‑p. 18
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.1 of TS 33.117.
4.2.6.2.2  Interface robustness requirementsWord‑p. 18
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.2 of TS 33.117.
4.2.6.2.3  GTP-C FilteringWord‑p. 18
The requirement and testcase in clause 4.2.6.2.3 of TS 33.117 is not applicable to eNB network product.
4.2.6.2.4  GTP-U FilteringWord‑p. 18
There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.2.6.2.4 of TS 33.117.

4.2.7Void

4.3  eNodeB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 18

4.3.1  IntroductionWord‑p. 18

The present clause contains eNodeB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.

4.3.2  Technical BaselineWord‑p. 18

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.2 of TS 33.117.

4.3.3  Operating SystemsWord‑p. 18

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.3 of TS 33.117.

4.3.4  Web ServersWord‑p. 18

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.4 of TS 33.117.

4.3.5  Network DevicesWord‑p. 19

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.3.5 of TS 33.117.

4.3.6Void

4.4  eNodeB-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test casesWord‑p. 19

There are no eNB-specific additions to clause 4.4 of TS 33.117.

$  Change historyWord‑p. 20


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