Content for  TS 33.107  Word version:  16.0.0

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12  Lawful Interception for Evolved Packet System |R8|Word‑p. 113

12.1  LI functional architecture for EPS

In addition to the reference configurations applicable to PS interception, the following figures contain the reference configuration applicable for the lawful interception in the EPS nodes (TS 23.401, TS 23.402):
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Figure 12.1.1: MME Intercept configuration
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Figure 12.1.1a: Configuration for Intercept of HeNB
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Figure 12.1.2: HSS Intercept configuration
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Figure 12.1.3: S-GW, PDN-GW, ePDG Intercept configuration
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Figure 12.1.4: Intercept Configuration for SGW and PGW with CUPS
The definition of the LI functional entities (ADMF, DF, MF, LEMF) and interfaces (X, HI) is the same as for 3G as given in chapter 4. Packet Header Information Reporting is a national option. For Packet Data Header Information reporting, a S-GW/PDN-GW either isolates the relevant data and sends it to the DF2 or sends the packet stream to another entity in the network (e.g., DF3) for isolation which then provides the relevant data to the DF2.
National regulations on a per interception basis may limit delivery of communications (CC and IRI) of an outbound international roaming target by the MME/S-GW/PDN-GW as described in clause 5.1.4 of TS 33.106.
If roaming is not allowed and it is determined that the target is outside the country, the HPLMN shall act as follows:
  • all session related EPS events defined in clause 12 are subject to this mechanism;
  • the HPLMN shall not report IRI and CC for Evolued Packet services while the target is in the VPLMN.
Non-communications-associated IRI (e.g. those identified by the HSS) are not affected by this requirement.
Procedures for LI activation, deactivation and interrogation are the same as for 3G as given in chapter 5, provided that:
  • the 3G ICE is replaced by the EPS node;
  • the proper target identity applicable to EPS node is used.
When the SGSN is used as node in the Evolved Packet System, to support 2G/3G access and mobility between E-UTRAN and pre-E-UTRAN 3GPP radio access technologies, it is subjected to all the related PS requirements specified throughout this document.
Figure 12.1.1a depicts how the HeNB location information is transferred from the HeNB location verifying node per TS 33.320 to the DF2 via an Xv interface, in order to allow the DF2 to perform its functionality. The public IP Address of the HeNB is provided to the HeNB location verifying node. The manner that the HeNB location verifying node provides the DF2 with the HeNB location and HeNB IP Address is outside the scope of this document. Additional information on HeNB interception is found in Clause 13.
Figure 12.1.4 depicts the LI configuration for SGW and PGW with PLMN implementing CUPS (see TS 23.214). This is described in subclause 12.9. The Sxa' and SXb' are the LI specific instances of Sxa and Sxb reference points. The X2 reference point support at SX3LIF is required only if the first option described in sub-clauses and are used to generate the IRI events that require access to the user plane packets (e.g. packet data header information). The IRI events generated by the SX3LIF are therefore limited to the IRI events that require access to user plane packets. The administrative information passed onto the SX3LIF is to provide the DF2 and DF3 addresses to enable SX3LIF to deliver those IRI events to the DF2, and the CC to the DF3.
The target identities for 3GPP HeNB interception can be IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI, or ME Id. Use of the HeNB ID or the CSG ID as a target identity is FFS.

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