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TR 33.891
Study on Security of Phase 2 for
Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS),
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and
Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

3GPP‑Page  
V18.0.0 (Wzip)  2023/03  22 p.
Rapporteur:
Dr. Escott, Adrian
Qualcomm CDMA Technologies

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.891  Word version:  18.0.0

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1 Scope  2 References  3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  4 Overview  5 Key Issues  6 Solutions  7 Conclusions  $ Change history 

 

1  Scope  p. 7

The present document investigates and identifies the security and privacy threats and corresponding security requirements for Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) that derive from the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-58. Furthermore, the present document considers solutions and analyses these to make recommendations for possible normative work taking into consideration the conclusions of TR 23.700-58.
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2  References  p. 7

3  Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  p. 7

3.1  Terms  p. 7

3.2  Symbols  p. 7

3.3  Abbreviations  p. 8

4  Overview  p. 8

5  Key Issues  p. 8

5.1  Key issue #1: Direct C2 Security  p. 8

5.1.1  Key issue details  p. 8

5.1.2  Security threats  p. 8

5.1.3  Potential security requirements  p. 9

5.2  Key issue #2: Security of DAA unicast connection  p. 9

5.2.1  Key issue details  p. 9

5.2.2  Security threats  p. 9

5.2.3  Potential security requirements  p. 9

5.3  Key issue #3: Direct C2 Authorization  p. 9

5.3.1  Key issue details  p. 9

5.3.2  Security threats  p. 9

5.3.3  Potential security requirement  p. 10

5.4  Key issue #4: UAV/UAV-C Privacy over PC5 link for C2  p. 10

5.4.1  Key issue details  p. 10

5.4.2  Security threats  p. 10

5.4.3  Potential security requirement  p. 10

5.5  Key issue #5: Privacy protection over PC5 for DAA unicast messages  p. 10

5.5.1  Key issue details  p. 10

5.5.2  Security threats  p. 11

5.5.3  Potential security requirements  p. 11

5.6  Key issue #6: Privacy and security aspects of broadcast DAA traffic  p. 11

5.6.1  Key Issue Details  p. 11

5.6.2  Security Threats  p. 11

5.6.3  Potential Security Requirements  p. 11

5.7  Key issue #7: Privacy and security aspects of Broadcast Remote ID  p. 11

5.7.1  Key Issue Details  p. 11

5.7.2  Security Threats  p. 11

5.7.3  Potential Security Requirements  p. 11

6  Solutions  p. 12

6.1  Solution #1: Security establishment and link security protection of unicast PC5 communication  p. 12

6.1.1  Introduction  p. 12

6.1.2  Solution details  p. 12

6.1.3  Evaluation  p. 12

6.2  Solution #2: Solution to secure direct C2 and DAA connection  p. 13

6.2.1  Introduction  p. 13

6.2.2  Solution details  p. 13

6.2.3  Evaluation  p. 15

6.3  Solution #3: C2 and DAA unicast security using V2X unicast solution  p. 15

6.3.1  Introduction  p. 15

6.3.2  Solution details  p. 16

6.3.3  Evaluation  p. 16

6.4  Solution #4: Direct C2 communication over PC5 security  p. 16

6.4.1  Introduction  p. 16

6.4.2  Solution details  p. 17

6.4.3  Evaluation  p. 18

6.5  Solution #5: Restricted Discovery for Direct C2  p. 18

6.5.1  Introduction  p. 18

6.5.2  Solution details  p. 18

6.5.3  Evaluation  p. 19

6.6  Solution #6: Privacy for 3GPP identifiers used to transport DAA traffic  p. 19

6.6.1  Introduction  p. 19

6.6.2  Solution details  p. 19

6.6.3  Evaluation  p. 19

6.7  Solution #7: Privacy for 3GPP identifiers used to transport Broadcast Remote ID  p. 19

6.7.1  Introduction  p. 19

6.7.2  Solution details  p. 20

6.7.3  Evaluation  p. 20

7  Conclusions  p. 20

7.1  Conclusion for Key issue #1  p. 20

7.2  Conclusion for Key issue #2  p. 20

7.3  Conclusion for Key issue #3  p. 20

7.4  Conclusion for Key issue #4  p. 21

7.5  Conclusion for Key Issue #5  p. 21

7.6  Conclusion for Key Issue #6  p. 21

7.7  Conclusion for Key Issue #7  p. 21

$  Change history  p. 22

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