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TR 33.890
Study on Security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services
3GPP‑Page
fToC
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Partial Content
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V18.0.0 (Wzip)
2023/06 23 p.
Rapporteur:
Mr. Li, Fei
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd.
full Table of Contents for
TR 33.890
Word version: 18.0.0
each clause number in
'red'
refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
1
Scope
p. 6
2
References
p. 6
3
Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
p. 6
3.1
Terms
p. 6
3.2
Symbols
p. 7
3.3
Abbreviations
p. 7
4
Assumptions
p. 7
5
Key issues
p. 7
5.1
Key issue #1: Third party specific user identities
p. 7
5.1.1
Key issue details
p. 7
5.1.2
Threats
p. 7
5.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 7
5.2
Key issue #2: Security aspects of Data Channel usage in IMS network
p. 8
5.2.1
Key issue details
p. 8
5.2.2
Security threats
p. 8
5.2.3
Potential security requirements
p. 8
5.3
Key issue #3: security aspects of SBA in IMS media control plane
p. 8
5.3.1
Key issue details
p. 8
5.3.2
Security threats
p. 8
5.3.3
Potential security requirements
p. 8
6
Proposed solutions
p. 9
6.0
Mapping of solutions to key issues
p. 9
6.1
Solution #1: How the Originating IMS network signs the 3rd party IDs and terminating IMS network verifies the 3rd party IDs
p. 9
6.1.1
Introduction
p. 9
6.1.2
Solution details
p. 9
6.1.2.1
Solution Description
p. 9
6.1.2.2
How Originating IMS network invokes the signing on behalf of 3rd party (SIP trunk)
p. 11
6.1.2.3
How Originating IMS network invokes the signing on behalf of 3rd party (Single SIP registration)
p. 12
6.1.3
Evaluation
p. 14
6.2
Solution #2: SHAKEN based third-party specific user identities
p. 14
6.2.1
Introduction
p. 14
6.2.2
Solution details
p. 14
6.2.2.1
General procedures
p. 14
6.2.2.2
Alternative authorisation procedure
p. 16
6.2.3
Evaluation
p. 16
6.3
Solution #3: Service based interface protection in media control plane
p. 16
6.3.1
Introduction
p. 16
6.3.2
Solution details
p. 16
6.3.2.1
Protection at the network or transport layer
p. 16
6.3.2.2
Authentication and authorization
p. 16
6.3.3
Evaluation
p. 16
6.4
Solution #4: End-to-access-edge security for IMS data channels
p. 16
6.4.1
Introduction
p. 16
6.4.2
Solution details
p. 16
6.4.3
Evaluation
p. 17
6.5
Solution #5: How to avoid e2ae limitation and achieve e2e security for IMS Data Channel
p. 17
6.5.1
Introduction
p. 17
6.5.2
Solution details
p. 18
6.5.2.1
Solution Description
p. 18
6.5.3
Evaluation
p. 19
7
Conclusions
p. 19
7.1
Conclusion on Key Issue #3
p. 19
7.2
Conclusion on Key Issue #2
p. 19
7.3
Conclusions for Key Issue #1
p. 19
$
Change history
p. 20