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TS 33.116
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS)
for the MME Network Product Class

3GPP‑Page   ETSI‑search   fToC↓   Partial Content →
V19.0.0 (PDF)  2025/03  17 p.
V18.0.0  2024/03  20 p.
V17.0.0  2022/03  20 p.
V16.1.0  2021/12  20 p.
V15.1.0  2021/12  20 p.
V14.2.0  2021/12  20 p.
Rapporteur:
Dr. Zugenmaier, Alf
NTT DOCOMO INC.

full Table of Contents for  TS 33.116  Word version:  19.0.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
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1Scope  p. 6
2References  p. 6
3Definitions and abbreviations  p. 6
3.1Definitions  p. 6
3.2Abbreviations  p. 7
4MME-specific security requirements and related test cases  p. 7
4.1Introduction  p. 7
4.2MME-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases  p. 7
4.2.1Introduction  p. 7
4.2.2Security functional requirements on the MME deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases  p. 7
4.2.2.1Security functional requirements on the MME deriving from 3GPP specifications - general approach  p. 7
4.2.2.2Authentication and key agreement procedure  p. 7
4.2.2.2.1Access with GSM SIM forbidden  p. 7
4.2.2.2.2Re-synchronization  p. 8
4.2.2.2.3Integrity check of Attach message  p. 9
4.2.2.2.4Not forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN  p. 9
4.2.2.2.5Not forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains  p. 10
4.2.2.3Security mode command procedure  p. 10
4.2.2.3.1Bidding down prevention  p. 10
4.2.2.3.2NAS integrity algorithm selection and use  p. 11
4.2.2.3.3NAS NULL integrity protection  p. 11
4.2.2.3.4NAS confidentiality protection  p. 12
4.2.2.4Security in intra-RAT mobility  p. 12
4.2.2.4.1Bidding down prevention in X2-handovers  p. 12
4.2.2.4.2NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change  p. 13
4.2.2.5Security in inter-RAT mobility  p. 13
4.2.2.5.1No access with GSM SIM via idle mode mobility  p. 13
4.2.2.5.2No access with GSM SIM via handover  p. 14
4.2.2.5.3No access with GSM SIM via SRVCC  p. 14
4.2.2.6Security Aspects of IMS Emergency Session Handling  p. 15
4.2.2.6.1Authentication failure for emergency bearers  p. 15
4.2.3Technical Baseline  p. 15
4.2.3.1Introduction  p. 15
4.2.3.2Protecting data and information  p. 15
4.2.3.2.1Protecting data and information - general  p. 15
4.2.3.2.2Protecting data and information - unauthorized viewing  p. 16
4.2.3.2.3Protecting data and information in storage  p. 16
4.2.3.2.4Protecting data and information in transfer  p. 16
4.2.3.2.5Logging access to personal data  p. 16
4.2.3.3Protecting availability and integrity  p. 16
4.2.3.4Authentication and authorization  p. 16
4.2.3.5Protecting sessions  p. 16
4.2.3.6Logging  p. 16
4.2.4Operating Systems  p. 16
4.2.5Web Servers  p. 16
4.2.6Network Devices  p. 16
4.3MME-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases  p. 16
4.3.1Introduction  p. 16
4.3.2Technical Baseline  p. 16
4.3.3Operating Systems  p. 17
4.3.4Web Servers  p. 17
4.3.5Network Devices  p. 17
4.4MME-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases  p. 17
$Change History  p. 18

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