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Content for  TR 33.851  Word version:  17.1.0

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1…   5… 
5 Key issues  6 Solutions  7 Conclusions  A Security considerations  B Prevention of spoofing attacks due to tampered Domain Number  C Asymmetric delay attacks  $ Change history 

 

5  Key issues  p. 9

5.1  Key issue#1: Security for time synchronization messages  p. 9

5.1.1  Key issue details  p. 9

5.1.2  Security threats  p. 9

5.1.3  Potential security requirements  p. 9

5.2  Key issue #2: Multiple TSN working domains  p. 9

5.2.1  Key issue details  p. 9

5.2.2  Threats  p. 10

5.2.3  Potential security requirements  p. 10

5.3  Key Issue #3: Protection of UE-UE TSC communication  p. 10

5.3.1  Key issue details  p. 10

5.3.2  Security threats  p. 10

5.3.3  Potential security requirements  p. 11

5.4  Key Issue #4: Protection of AF-NEF interface  p. 11

5.4.1  Key issue details  p. 11

5.4.2  Security threats  p. 11

5.4.3  Potential security requirements  p. 11

6  Solutions  p. 12

6.0  Mapping of solutions to key issues  p. 12

6.1  Solution#1: Protection on time synchronization messages in TSN bridge mode  p. 12

6.1.1  Introduction  p. 12

6.1.2  Solution details  p. 12

6.1.3  Evaluation  p. 13

6.2  Solution #2: Security solution for protection of AF-NEF interface  p. 13

6.2.1  Introduction  p. 13

6.2.2  Solution details  p. 14

6.2.3  Evaluation  p. 14

6.3  Solution #3: Protection on time synchronization messages by fixing the security protection policy  p. 14

6.3.1  Introduction  p. 14

6.3.2  Solution details  p. 14

6.3.3  Evaluation  p. 15

7  Conclusions  p. 15

7.1  Conclusions on Key Issue #1: Security for time synchronization messages  p. 15

7.2  Conclusion on Key Issue #2: Multiple TSN working domains  p. 15

7.3  Conclusions on Key Issue #3: Protection of UE-UE TSC communication  p. 15

7.4  Conclusion for Key Issue #4: Protection of AF-NEF interface for TSN bridge mode  p. 15

A  Security considerations  p. 15

A.1  Guidance on TSN AF - CUC/CNC interface security for integration with TSN  p. 15

B  Prevention of spoofing attacks due to tampered Domain Number  p. 16

B.1  Filtering incoming messages based on authorization policies  p. 16

B.1.1  General  p. 16

B.1.2  Threat description  p. 16

B.1.3  Countermeasures  p. 17

C  Asymmetric delay attacks  p. 17

C.1  Introduction  p. 17

C.2  Calculation of offset between clocks  p. 17

C.3  Delay attacks on time synchronisation messages  p. 17

C.4  Considerations  p. 18

$  Change history  p. 19

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