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Content for TR 33.851 Word version: 17.1.0

1… 5…

5 Key issues Word‑p. 9

5.1 Key issue#1: Security for time synchronization messages Word‑p. 9

5.1.1 Key issue details Word‑p. 9

5.1.2 Security threats Word‑p. 9

5.1.3 Potential security requirements Word‑p. 9

5.2 Key issue #2: Multiple TSN working domains Word‑p. 9

5.2.1 Key issue details Word‑p. 9

5.2.2 Threats Word‑p. 10

5.2.3 Potential security requirements Word‑p. 10

5.3 Key Issue #3: Protection of UE-UE TSC communication Word‑p. 10

5.3.1 Key issue details Word‑p. 10

5.3.2 Security threats Word‑p. 10

5.3.3 Potential security requirements Word‑p. 11

5.4 Key Issue #4: Protection of AF-NEF interface Word‑p. 11

5.4.1 Key issue details Word‑p. 11

5.4.2 Security threats Word‑p. 11

5.4.3 Potential security requirements Word‑p. 11

6 Solutions Word‑p. 12

6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues Word‑p. 12

6.1 Solution#1: Protection on time synchronization messages in TSN bridge mode Word‑p. 12

6.1.1 Introduction Word‑p. 12

6.1.2 Solution details Word‑p. 12

6.1.3 Evaluation Word‑p. 13

6.2 Solution #2: Security solution for protection of AF-NEF interface Word‑p. 13

6.2.1 Introduction Word‑p. 13

6.2.2 Solution details Word‑p. 14

6.2.3 Evaluation Word‑p. 14

6.3 Solution #3: Protection on time synchronization messages by fixing the security protection policy Word‑p. 14

6.3.1 Introduction Word‑p. 14

6.3.2 Solution details Word‑p. 14

6.3.3 Evaluation Word‑p. 15

7 Conclusions Word‑p. 15

7.1 Conclusions on Key Issue #1: Security for time synchronization messages Word‑p. 15

7.2 Conclusion on Key Issue #2: Multiple TSN working domains Word‑p. 15

7.3 Conclusions on Key Issue #3: Protection of UE-UE TSC communication Word‑p. 15

7.4 Conclusion for Key Issue #4: Protection of AF-NEF interface for TSN bridge mode Word‑p. 15

A Security considerations Word‑p. 15

A.1 Guidance on TSN AF - CUC/CNC interface security for integration with TSN Word‑p. 15

B Prevention of spoofing attacks due to tampered Domain Number Word‑p. 16

B.1 Filtering incoming messages based on authorization policies Word‑p. 16

B.1.1 General Word‑p. 16

B.1.2 Threat description Word‑p. 16

B.1.3 Countermeasures Word‑p. 17

C Asymmetric delay attacks Word‑p. 17

C.1 Introduction Word‑p. 17

C.2 Calculation of offset between clocks Word‑p. 17

C.3 Delay attacks on time synchronisation messages Word‑p. 17

C.4 Considerations Word‑p. 18

$ Change history Word‑p. 19