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Content for  TR 33.845  Word version:  17.0.0

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5  Parameters relevant to securing 5G communication

6  Key IssuesWord‑p. 14

6.1  Key Issue #1: Separation of authentication subscription data from subscription data

6.2  Key Issue #2: protection of long-term key during storage in UDR

6.3  Key Issue #3: protection of long-term key during transfer out of UDR

6.4  Key Issue #4: protection of Milenage OPc value during storage in UDR

6.5  Key Issue #5: protection of Milenage OPc value during transfer out of UDRWord‑p. 16

6.6  Key Issue #6: protection of Milenage OP value during storage in UDR

6.7  Key Issue #7: protection of Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDRWord‑p. 17

6.8  Key Issue #8: protection of sequence number SQNHE during storage in UDR

6.9  Key Issue #9: protection of sequence number SQNHE during transfer out of UDR

6.10  Key Issue #10: protection of TUAK TOPc value during storage in UDR

6.11  Key Issue #11: protection of TUAK TOPc value during transfer out of UDR

7  Solutions

7.1  Solution #1: Authorization and Isolation of Authentication Data using existing techniques.

7.2  Solution #2: Protection of LTK during storage in UDR.Word‑p. 20

7.3  Solution #3: Protection of LTK over NudrWord‑p. 21

7.4  Solution #4: Encrypted storage of the long-term key in the UDR

7.5  Solution #5: Encrypted transfer of the long-term key between UDR and UDM/ARPF

7.6  Solution #6: Storage of the LTK in the UDRWord‑p. 23

7.7  Solution #7: Transfer of the LTK out of the UDR

7.8  Solution #8: Encrypted transfer of Milenage OPc value between UDR and UDM/ARPF

7.9  Solution #9: Encrypted transfer of Milenage OP value between UDR and UDM/ARPFWord‑p. 25

7.10  Solution #10: Encrypted storage of Milenage OPc value in the UDR

7.11  Solution #11: Encrypted storage of Milenage OP value in the UDR

7.12  Solution #12: Access control for protection of SQNHE during storage in UDRWord‑p. 27

7.13  Solution #13: Encrypted storage of TUAK TOPc value in the UDR

7.14  Solution #14: OAuth 2.0 secured transfer of SQNHE out of UDR

7.15  Solution #15: Encrypted transfer of TUAK TOPc value between UDR and UDM/ARPF

8  Conclusions

A  Models for ARPF deploymentWord‑p. 30

$  Change historyWord‑p. 34


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