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Content for  TR 33.845  Word version:  17.0.0

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0…   5… 
5 Parameters relevant to securing 5G communication  6 Key Issues  7 Solutions  8 Conclusions  A Models for ARPF deployment  $ Change history 

 

5  Parameters relevant to securing 5G communication  p. 11

5.1  Overview  p. 11

5.2  Milenage AKA authentication  p. 12

5.3  TUAK AKA authentication  p. 13

5.4  EAP methods for authentication  p. 13

5.5  Proprietary authentication algorithms  p. 13

5.6  AMF related parameters  p. 13

5.7  Counter related parameters  p. 13

6  Key Issues  p. 14

6.1  Key Issue #1: Separation of authentication subscription data from subscription data  p. 14

6.1.1  Key issue details  p. 14

6.1.2  Security threats  p. 14

6.1.3  Potential security requirements  p. 14

6.2  Key Issue #2: protection of long-term key during storage in UDR  p. 14

6.2.1  Key issue details  p. 14

6.2.2  Security threats  p. 14

6.2.3  Potential security requirements  p. 15

6.3  Key Issue #3: protection of long-term key during transfer out of UDR  p. 15

6.3.1  Key issue details  p. 15

6.3.2  Security threats  p. 15

6.3.3  Potential security requirements  p. 15

6.4  Key Issue #4: protection of Milenage OPc value during storage in UDR  p. 15

6.4.1  Key issue details  p. 15

6.4.2  Security threats  p. 15

6.4.3  Potential security requirements  p. 15

6.5  Key Issue #5: protection of Milenage OPc value during transfer out of UDR  p. 16

6.5.1  Key issue details  p. 16

6.5.2  Security threats  p. 16

6.5.3  Potential security requirements  p. 16

6.6  Key Issue #6: protection of Milenage OP value during storage in UDR  p. 16

6.6.1  Key issue details  p. 16

6.6.2  Security threats  p. 16

6.6.3  Potential security requirements  p. 16

6.7  Key Issue #7: protection of Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDR  p. 17

6.7.1  Key issue details  p. 17

6.7.2  Security threats  p. 17

6.7.3  Potential security requirements  p. 17

6.8  Key Issue #8: protection of sequence number SQNHE during storage in UDR  p. 17

6.8.1  Key issue details  p. 17

6.8.2  Security threats  p. 17

6.8.3  Potential security requirements  p. 17

6.9  Key Issue #9: protection of sequence number SQNHE during transfer out of UDR  p. 17

6.9.1  Key issue details  p. 17

6.9.2  Security threats  p. 18

6.9.3  Potential security requirements  p. 18

6.10  Key Issue #10: protection of TUAK TOPc value during storage in UDR  p. 18

6.10.1  Key issue details  p. 18

6.10.2  Security threats  p. 18

6.10.3  Potential security requirements  p. 18

6.11  Key Issue #11: protection of TUAK TOPc value during transfer out of UDR  p. 18

6.11.1  Key issue details  p. 18

6.11.2  Security threats  p. 18

6.11.3  Potential security requirements  p. 19

7  Solutions  p. 19

7.1  Solution #1: Authorization and Isolation of Authentication Data using existing techniques.  p. 19

7.1.1  Introduction  p. 19

7.1.2  Solution details  p. 19

7.1.3  Evaluation  p. 19

7.2  Solution #2: Protection of LTK during storage in UDR.  p. 20

7.2.1  Introduction  p. 20

7.2.2  Solution details  p. 20

7.2.3  Evaluation  p. 20

7.3  Solution #3: Protection of LTK over Nudr  p. 21

7.3.1  Introduction  p. 21

7.3.2  Solution details  p. 21

7.3.3  Evaluation  p. 21

7.4  Solution #4: Encrypted storage of the long-term key in the UDR  p. 21

7.4.1  Introduction  p. 21

7.4.2  Solution details  p. 22

7.4.3  Evaluation  p. 22

7.5  Solution #5: Encrypted transfer of the long-term key between UDR and UDM/ARPF  p. 22

7.5.1  Introduction  p. 22

7.5.2  Solution details  p. 22

7.5.3  Evaluation  p. 22

7.6  Solution #6: Storage of the LTK in the UDR  p. 23

7.6.1  Introduction  p. 23

7.6.2  Solution details  p. 23

7.6.3  Evaluation  p. 23

7.7  Solution #7: Transfer of the LTK out of the UDR  p. 23

7.7.1  Introduction  p. 23

7.7.2  Solution details  p. 24

7.7.3  Evaluation  p. 24

7.8  Solution #8: Encrypted transfer of Milenage OPc value between UDR and UDM/ARPF  p. 24

7.8.1  Introduction  p. 24

7.8.2  Solution details  p. 24

7.8.3  Evaluation  p. 24

7.9  Solution #9: Encrypted transfer of Milenage OP value between UDR and UDM/ARPF  p. 25

7.9.1  Introduction  p. 25

7.9.2  Solution details  p. 25

7.9.3  Evaluation  p. 25

7.10  Solution #10: Encrypted storage of Milenage OPc value in the UDR  p. 25

7.10.1  Introduction  p. 25

7.10.2  Solution details  p. 26

7.10.3  Evaluation  p. 26

7.11  Solution #11: Encrypted storage of Milenage OP value in the UDR  p. 26

7.11.1  Introduction  p. 26

7.11.2  Solution details  p. 26

7.11.3  Evaluation  p. 26

7.12  Solution #12: Access control for protection of SQNHE during storage in UDR  p. 27

7.12.1  Introduction  p. 27

7.12.2  Solution details  p. 27

7.12.3  Evaluation  p. 27

7.13  Solution #13: Encrypted storage of TUAK TOPc value in the UDR  p. 27

7.13.1  Introduction  p. 27

7.13.2  Solution details  p. 27

7.13.3  Evaluation  p. 28

7.14  Solution #14: OAuth 2.0 secured transfer of SQNHE out of UDR  p. 28

7.14.1  Introduction  p. 28

7.14.2  Solution details  p. 28

7.14.3  Evaluation  p. 28

7.15  Solution #15: Encrypted transfer of TUAK TOPc value between UDR and UDM/ARPF  p. 28

7.15.1  Introduction  p. 28

7.15.2  Solution details  p. 29

7.15.3  Evaluation  p. 29

8  Conclusions  p. 29

A  Models for ARPF deployment  p. 30

A.1  General  p. 30

A.2  ARPF deployment options in 3GPP TS 33.501 [2] and TS 23.501 [10]  p. 30

A.3  ARPF deployment options in UDICOM  p. 31

$  Change history  p. 34

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