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TR 33.885SA3
Study on Security aspects
for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Services

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V14.1.0 (Wzip)  2017/09  74 p.

Rapporteur:  Mr. Wong, Marcus

The present document contains a study of the security aspects of V2X services and an evaluation of possible technical solutions needed to support such services. The Stage 1 requirements for these services are defined in TS 22.185. Potential stage 2 solutions for V2X Services are being studied in TR 23.785.

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.885  Word version:   14.1.0

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1  ScopeWord-p. 8
2  References
3  Definitions, symbols and abbreviationsWord-p. 9
4  Overview of V2X ServicesWord-p. 11
5  Security Analysis of V2XWord-p. 15
5.1  Key Issue #1: V2X Communication Security
5.2  Key Issue #2: Authorization for LTE-V2X Radio Resources
5.3  Key Issue #3: V2X Entities Secure Environment
5.4  Key Issue #4: Local MBMS Entity (LME) - security of Mv interfaceWord-p. 17
5.5  Key Issue #5: V2V/P authority broadcast communication security by UE for public information announcement over PC5 InterfaceWord-p. 18
5.6  Key Issue #6: Identity/Credentials Security for V2V/P ServicesWord-p. 20
5.7  Key Issue #7: Vehicle UE privacyWord-p. 21
5.8  Key Issue #8: V2X data source accountabilityWord-p. 23
5.9  Key Issue #9: authentication and authorization
5.10  Key Issue #10: Local V2X application serverUp
5.11  Key Issue #11: Choice of cryptoalgorithmWord-p. 25
5.12  Key Issue #12: Credential provisioning for V2X services
5.13  Key Issue#13: Data communication security between network entities
5.14  Key Issue#14: V2I broadcast communication security over PC5 interfaceWord-p. 27
5.15  Key Issue#15: Security of UE to V2X Control Function interfaceWord-p. 28
5.16  Key Issue #16: Detectability of Malicious LTE-V2X UE Behavior- achieving trust and confidence in messagesWord-p. 29
5.17  Key Issue #17: Securing the communication between V2X AS and LTE network
6  Proposed Solutions
6.1  Security for one to many V2X Direct Communication
6.2  Solution #2: V2X Communication Security
6.3  Solution for attach identifier obfuscation for vehicle UE privacyWord-p. 47
6.4  Data communication security between network entitiesWord-p. 50
6.5  Solution for Vehicle UE privacy from the MNO based on attach dataWord-p. 51
6.6  Solution for Vehicle UE privacy based on data traversing the network
6.7  Solution for authorization and accountabilityWord-p. 54
6.8  Security of UE to V2X Control Function interfaceWord-p. 56
6.9  Solution using encrypted IMSI to proven MNO identifying the UEWord-p. 60
6.10  Solution for communication security with the V2X network entities
6.11  Solution #11: V2X Communication Security
6.12  Hiding UE identity from other V2X UEs and the serving networkWord-p. 67
6.13  Solution against V2X UE tracking based on PC5 autonomous modeWord-p. 70
6.14  Providing privacy from serving network by using a dedicated V2X MVNO
6.15  A Vehicle UE Privacy Protection Framework with Homomorphic EncryptionWord-p. 72
7  ConclusionWord-p. 73
A  Overview of IEEE 1609.2 Security Standards for WAVWord-p. 75
B  Network options for PC3 securityWord-p. 77
C  Overview of existing privacy solution for V2XWord-p. 79
D  Privacy by regulationWord-p. 80
X  Change historyWord-p. 85

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