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Content for TR 33.885 Word version: 14.1.0

1… 4…

4 Overview of V2X Services p. 11

4.1 Introduction p. 11

4.2 Architecture p. 11

4.2.1 Architectural Assumptions p. 11

4.2.2 PC5 and LTE-Uu based V2X architecture reference model p. 12

4.2.3 eMBMS and LTE-Uu based V2X architecture reference model p. 14

4.2.4 Security impact p. 14

5 Security Analysis of V2X p. 15

5.1 Key Issue #1: V2X Communication Security p. 15

5.1.1 Key issue details p. 15

5.1.2 Security threats p. 15

5.1.3 Potential Security requirements p. 15

5.2 Key Issue #2: Authorization for LTE-V2X Radio Resources p. 15

5.2.1 Key issue details p. 15

5.2.2 Security threats p. 16

5.2.3 Potential Security requirements p. 16

5.3 Key Issue #3: V2X Entities Secure Environment p. 16

5.3.1 Key issue details p. 16

5.3.2 Security threats p. 16

5.3.3 Potential Security requirements p. 16

5.4 Key Issue #4: Local MBMS Entity (LME) - security of Mv interface p. 17

5.4.1 Key issue details p. 17

5.4.2 Security threats p. 17

5.4.3 Potential Security requirements p. 17

5.5 Key Issue #5: V2V/P authority broadcast communication security by UE for public information announcement over PC5 Interface p. 18

5.5.1 Key issue details p. 18

5.5.2 Security threats p. 18

5.5.3 Potential Security requirements p. 19

5.6 Key Issue #6: Identity/Credentials Security for V2V/P Services p. 20

5.6.1 Key issue details p. 20

5.6.2 Security Threats p. 20

5.6.3 Potential Security requirements p. 20

5.7 Key Issue #7: Vehicle UE privacy p. 21

5.7.1 Key issue details p. 21

5.7.2 Security threats p. 21

5.7.3 Security requirements p. 22

5.8 Key Issue #8: V2X data source accountability p. 23

5.8.1 Key issue details p. 23

5.8.2 Security threats p. 23

5.8.3 Potential Security requirements p. 23

5.9 Key Issue #9: authentication and authorization p. 23

5.9.1 Key issue details p. 23

5.9.2 Security threats p. 24

5.9.3 Potential Security requirements p. 24

5.10 Key Issue #10: Local V2X application server p. 24

5.10.1 Key issue details p. 24

5.10.2 Security threats p. 24

5.10.3 Potential Security requirements p. 24

5.11 Key Issue #11: Choice of cryptoalgorithm p. 25

5.11.1 Key issue details p. 25

5.11.2 Security threats p. 25

5.11.3 Potential Security requirements p. 25

5.12 Key Issue #12: Credential provisioning for V2X services p. 25

5.12.1 Key issue details p. 25

5.12.2 Security threats p. 26

5.12.3 Potential Security requirements p. 26

5.13 Key Issue#13: Data communication security between network entities p. 26

5.13.1 Issue details p. 26

5.13.2 Security threats p. 26

5.13.3 Security Requirements p. 26

5.14 Key Issue#14: V2I broadcast communication security over PC5 interface p. 27

5.14.1 Issue details p. 27

5.14.2 Security threats p. 27

5.14.3 Security Requirements p. 27

5.15 Key Issue#15: Security of UE to V2X Control Function interface p. 28

5.15.1 Issue details p. 28

5.15.3 Security Requirements p. 28

5.16 Key Issue #16: Detectability of Malicious LTE-V2X UE Behavior- achieving trust and confidence in messages p. 29

5.16.1 Key issue details p. 29

5.16.2 Security threats p. 29

5.16.3 Security requirements p. 29

5.17 Key Issue #17: Securing the communication between V2X AS and LTE network p. 29

5.17.1 Key issue details p. 29

5.17.2 Security threats p. 30

5.17.3 Potential Security requirements p. 30

6 Proposed Solutions p. 30

6.1 Security for one to many V2X Direct Communication p. 30

6.1.1 Overview of one to many V2X Direct Communication p. 30

6.1.1.1 Security flows p. 30

6.1.1.1.1 Overview p. 30

6.1.1.1.1.1 UE Security Credential Provisioning with Identity based Cryptography p. 33

6.1.1.1.1.1.1 V2X Data Source Accountability based on Identity based Cryptography p. 36

6.1.1.1.1.2 UE Security Credential Provisioning with Certificate p. 36

6.1.1.1.1.2.1 V2X Data Source Accountability based on Certificate p. 38

6.1.1.1.1.3 UE Security Credential Provisioning and Tracing with Identity based Cryptography p. 38

6.1.1.1.1.3.1 Introduction p. 38

6.1.1.1.1.3.2 solution details p. 38

6.1.1.1.1.3.2.1 Credential Provisioning p. 38

6.1.1.1.1.3.2.2 Identity Tracing p. 40

6.1.1.1.2 Secure One to Many V2x Communication p. 41

6.1.1.1.2.1 Broadcast Messages Protected by Identity based Authentication p. 41

6.1.1.1.2.2 Broadcast Messages Protected by Certificate based authentication p. 42

6.1.1.1.2.2.1 Certificate Format p. 43

6.1.1.1.2.2.2 Certificate Refreshment p. 43

6.1.1.1.3 Security Architecture for V2X (PC5 and LTE-UU based) p. 44

6.1.1.1.4 The Format of PDCP Layer for Protection the Broadcast Messages p. 45

6.1.1.1.4.1 PDCP Format for Broadcast Messages Protected by Identity based Authentication p. 45

6.1.1.1.4.2 PDCP Format for Broadcast Messages Protected by Certificate based Authentication p. 46

6.2 Solution #2: V2X Communication Security p. 46

6.2.1 Security requirements addressed p. 46

6.2.2 Solution details p. 46

6.2.3 Justification for the solution p. 46

6.3 Solution for attach identifier obfuscation for vehicle UE privacy p. 47

6.3.1 Security requirements addressed p. 47

6.3.2 Solution details p. 48

6.3.3 LI support p. 49

6.4 Data communication security between network entities p. 50

6.4.1 Security requirements addressed p. 50

6.4.2 Solution details p. 50

6.5 Solution for Vehicle UE privacy from the MNO based on attach data p. 51

6.5.1 Security requirements addressed p. 51

6.5.2 Solution details p. 51

6.5.2.1 Simultaneous re-attach with new identities p. 51

6.5.2.2 MME Load spreading p. 51

6.5.2.3 Re-attach boundary time determination p. 51

6.5.2.4 Detach and Re-attach triggers p. 53

6.6 Solution for Vehicle UE privacy based on data traversing the network p. 53

6.6.1 Security requirements addressed p. 53

6.6.2 Solution details p. 53

6.7 Solution for authorization and accountability p. 54

6.7.1 Addressed key issues p. 54

6.7.2 Justification of the solution p. 54

6.7.3 Description of the solution p. 55

6.8 Security of UE to V2X Control Function interface p. 56

6.8.1 Security requirements addressed p. 56

6.8.2 Solution details p. 56

6.8.2.1 Security procedures for configuration transfer to the UICC p. 56

6.8.2.2 Security procedures for data transfer to the UE p. 57

6.8.2.3 Alternative security procedure for data transfer between UE and V2X Control Function p. 58

6.9 Solution using encrypted IMSI to proven MNO identifying the UE p. 60

6.9.1 Security requirements addressed p. 60

6.9.2 Solution details p. 60

6.9.2.1 Overview p. 60

6.9.2.2 HPLMN issuing the V2X subscription p. 61

6.9.2.2.1 Details of use case p. 61

6.9.2.2.2 Attachment flows p. 61

6.9.2.2.3 Encrypting IMSI and AVs p. 63

6.9.2.2.3.1 General p. 63

6.9.2.3 Regular subscription p. 63

6.9.2.3.1 Details of use case p. 63

6.9.2.3.2 Attachment flows p. 63

6.9.2.4 Changes from legacy LTE p. 65

6.9.2.4.1 Changes for V2X MNO subscription p. 65

6.9.2.4.2 Changes for regular subscription p. 65

6.9.3 Evaluation p. 66

6.10 Solution for communication security with the V2X network entities p. 66

6.10.1 Addressed key issues p. 66

6.10.2 Justification of the solution p. 66

6.10.3 Description of the solution p. 66

6.10.3.1 Security of the reference point V3 between the V-UE and the V2X Control Function p. 66

6.10.3.2 Security of the reference point V2 p. 66

6.10.3.3 Network domain security p. 66

6.11 Solution #11: V2X Communication Security p. 66

6.11.1 Security requirements addressed p. 66

6.11.2 Solution details p. 66

6.12 Hiding UE identity from other V2X UEs and the serving network p. 67

6.12.1 Requirements addressed p. 67

6.12.2 Solution details p. 67

6.12.2.1 Overview p. 67

6.12.2.2 Pseudonym generation, provisioning and usage p. 67

6.12.2.3 Impact to legacy LTE p. 69

6.12.2.4 Evaluation p. 69

6.13 Solution against V2X UE tracking based on PC5 autonomous mode p. 70

6.13.1 Addressed key issues p. 70

6.13.2 Justification of the solution p. 70

6.13.3 Description of the solution p. 70

6.13.4 Evaluation p. 70

6.14 Providing privacy from serving network by using a dedicated V2X MVNO p. 70

6.14.1 Addressed key issues p. 70

6.14.2 Description of the solution p. 71

6.14.2.1 Deployment model p. 71

6.14.2.2 Concealment of the IMSI p. 71

6.14.3 Evaluation p. 71

6.15 A Vehicle UE Privacy Protection Framework with Homomorphic Encryption p. 72

6.15.1 Introduction p. 72

6.15.2 Example of Homomorphic Encryption p. 72

6.15.3 Proposed Framework p. 72

7 Conclusion p. 73

7.1 Conclusion on V2X communication security p. 73

7.2 Conclusion on V3 interface security p. 74

7.3 Conclusion on the security between network entities p. 74

7.4 Interim agreement on PC5 security p. 74

7.6 Agreement on V2X UE authorization security p. 74

A Overview of IEEE 1609.2 Security Standards for WAV p. 75

A.1 DSRC/WAVE p. 75

A.2 WAVE standards p. 75

A.3 WAVE security p. 75

B Network options for PC3 security p. 77

B.1 General p. 77

B.2 ProSe Function using standalone BSF p. 77

B.3 BSF - ProSe Function/NAF colocation p. 77

B.4 ProSe Function with bootstrapping entity p. 78

C Overview of existing privacy solution for V2X p. 79

D Privacy by regulation p. 80

D.1 Introduction p. 80

D.2 Regulatory situation in EU p. 81

D.2.1 GDPR and ePD p. 81

D.2.2 Relevant paragraphs from General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) p. 81

D.2.3 Relevant paragraphs from e-Privacy Directive (ePD) p. 82

D.3 Regulatory situation in US p. 84

D.3.1 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) p. 84

D.3.2 Relevant citations from DOT HS 812 014 p. 84

$ Change history p. 85