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TR 33.809
Study on 5G Security enhancements against False Base Stations (FBS)

3GPP‑Page   fToC↓   Partial Content →
V18.1.0 (Wzip)  2023/09  131 p.
Rapporteur:
Ms. Guo, Ivy
Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.809  Word version:  18.1.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
Here   Top
0Introduction  p. 11
1Scope  p. 12
2References  p. 12
3Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  p. 13
3.1Terms  p. 13
3.2Symbols  p. 13
3.3Abbreviations  p. 13
4Security overviews of 5G system against false base stations  p. 14
5Key Issues  p. 14
5.1Key Issue #1: Security of unprotected unicast messages  p. 14
5.1.1Key issue details  p. 14
5.1.2Security Threats  p. 15
5.1.3Potential Requirements  p. 15
5.2Key Issue #2: Security protection of system information  p. 16
5.2.1Key issue details  p. 16
5.2.2Security Threats  p. 16
5.2.3Potential Requirements  p. 16
5.3Key Issue #3: Network detection of false base stations  p. 17
5.3.1Key issue details  p. 17
5.3.2Security Threats  p. 17
5.3.3Potential Requirements  p. 17
5.4Key Issue #4: Protection against SON poisoning attempts  p. 17
5.4.1Key issue details  p. 17
5.4.2Security Threats  p. 18
5.4.3Potential Requirements  p. 18
5.5Key Issue #5: Mitigation against the authentication relay attack  p. 19
5.5.1Key issue details  p. 19
5.5.2Security Threats  p. 19
5.5.3Potential Requirements  p. 19
5.6Key Issue #6: Resistance to radio jamming  p. 19
5.6.1Key issue details  p. 19
5.6.2Security Threats  p. 20
5.6.3Potential Requirements  p. 20
5.7Key Issue #7: Protection against Man-in-the-Middle false gNB attacks  p. 20
5.7.1Key issue details  p. 20
5.7.2Security Threats  p. 20
6Candidate Solutions  p. 21
6.0Mapping between key issues and solutions  p. 21
6.1Solution #1: Protection for the UE Capability Transfer  p. 22
6.1.1Introduction  p. 22
6.1.2Solution details  p. 22
6.1.3Evaluation  p. 22
6.2Solution #2: Protection of RRCReject message in RRC_INACTIVE state  p. 22
6.2.1Introduction  p. 22
6.2.2Solution details  p. 22
6.2.3Evaluation  p. 23
6.3Solution #3: Protection of uplink UECapabilityInformation RRC message  p. 23
6.3.1Introduction  p. 23
6.3.2Solution details  p. 24
6.3.3Evaluation  p. 24
6.4Solution #4: Enriched measurement reports  p. 24
6.4.1Introduction  p. 24
6.4.2Solution details  p. 25
6.4.2.1Enrichment of measurement report  p. 25
6.4.2.2Verification of the MIB/SIBs Hashes  p. 25
6.4.3Evaluation  p. 26
6.5Solution #5: Mitigation against the authentication relay attack  p. 27
6.5.1Introduction  p. 27
6.5.2Solution details  p. 27
6.5.3Evaluation  p. 29
6.6Solution #6: Avoiding UE connecting to false base station during HO  p. 29
6.6.1Introduction  p. 29
6.6.2Solution details  p. 29
6.6.2.1Background  p. 29
6.6.2.2Procedure  p. 31
6.6.2.2.0General  p. 31
6.6.2.2.1Always on Feature  p. 31
6.6.2.2.2On demand Feature  p. 33
6.6.3Evaluation  p. 33
6.7Solution #7: Verification of authenticity of the cell  p. 33
6.7.1Introduction  p. 33
6.7.2Solution details  p. 34
6.7.2.1System Information verification using Digital Signatures  p. 34
6.7.2.2System Information verification using Identity Based Cryptography  p. 35
6.7.2.3Optimization of SI verification using the other SI  p. 36
6.7.2.4Capability negotiation  p. 36
6.7.3Evaluation  p. 37
6.7.4Assessment using clause A.3  p. 37
6.7.4.1UE aspects  p. 37
6.7.4.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 38
6.7.4.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 38
6.7.4.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 38
6.7.4.5Provisioning of keys  p. 38
6.7.4.6RAN aspects  p. 39
6.7.4.7VPLMN aspects  p. 39
6.7.4.8HPLMN aspects  p. 40
6.7.4.9Network sharing aspects  p. 40
6.7.4.10Roaming aspects  p. 40
6.7.4.11Regulatory aspects  p. 40
6.7.4.12Signature schemes  p. 40
6.7.4.13Signature length  p. 40
6.7.4.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 40
6.8Solution #8: Network detection of nearby false base stations from call statistics and measurements  p. 40
6.8.1Introduction  p. 40
6.8.2Solution details  p. 41
6.8.2.1Detection of false base Stations from Active UE Measurement report  p. 41
6.8.2.2Detection of false base stations from duplicate Cell IDs in Active UE Measurement report  p. 41
6.8.3Evaluation  p. 41
6.9Solution #9: Using symmetric algorithm with assistance of USIM and home network  p. 41
6.9.1Introduction  p. 41
6.9.1.1General  p. 41
6.9.1.2Mitigate replayed broadcast attack  p. 42
6.9.2Solution details  p. 42
6.9.2.1Framework  p. 42
6.9.2.1.1General  p. 42
6.9.2.1.2Principle of dynamic provisioning  p. 43
6.9.2.2Provisioning  p. 44
6.9.2.2.1Protection Key Agreement (PKA) and Protection Key Transfer (PKT) procedure  p. 44
6.9.2.2.2Protection area  p. 45
6.9.2.2.3Protection Area Information Provisioning (PAIP) procedure  p. 46
6.9.2.3Authenticity  p. 47
6.9.2.3.1Security procedure for broadcast messages  p. 47
6.9.2.3.2Security procedure for unicast messages  p. 48
6.9.3Evaluation  p. 49
6.10Solution #10: Protection on the unicast message based on ECDH  p. 49
6.10.1Introduction  p. 49
6.10.2Solution details  p. 49
6.10.2.1General description  p. 49
6.10.2.2Pre-provision  p. 50
6.10.2.3Message used to send ePK uplink  p. 50
6.10.2.4Replay resistant  p. 50
6.10.2.5Procedures  p. 50
6.10.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 51
6.10.3.1UE aspects  p. 51
6.10.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 51
6.10.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 51
6.10.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 51
6.10.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 51
6.10.3.6RAN aspects  p. 51
6.10.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 51
6.10.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 51
6.10.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 51
6.10.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 52
6.10.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 52
6.10.3.12Signature schemes  p. 52
6.10.3.13Signature length  p. 52
6.10.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 52
6.11Solution #11: Certificate based solution against false base station  p. 52
6.11.1Introduction  p. 52
6.11.2Solution details  p. 52
6.11.2.1Pre-provision and certificate distribution  p. 52
6.11.2.2Signature algorithm  p. 53
6.11.2.3Procedures  p. 54
6.11.2.4Certificate format:  p. 54
6.11.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 54
6.11.3.1UE aspects  p. 54
6.11.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 55
6.11.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 55
6.11.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 55
6.11.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 55
6.11.3.6RAN aspects  p. 55
6.11.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 55
6.11.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 56
6.11.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 56
6.11.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 56
6.11.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 56
6.11.3.12Signature schemes  p. 56
6.11.3.13Signature length  p. 56
6.11.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 57
6.12Solution #12: ID based solution against false base station  p. 57
6.12.1Introduction  p. 57
6.12.2Solution details  p. 57
6.12.2.1Pre-provision  p. 57
6.12.2.2Procedure  p. 58
6.12.2.3Revocation  p. 58
6.12.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 59
6.12.3.1UE aspects  p. 59
6.12.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 59
6.12.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 59
6.12.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 59
6.12.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 59
6.12.3.6RAN aspects  p. 59
6.12.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 59
6.12.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 60
6.12.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 60
6.12.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 60
6.12.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 60
6.12.3.12Signature schemes  p. 60
6.12.3.13Signature length  p. 60
6.12.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 60
6.12.4Evaluation  p. 60
6.13Solution #13: Protecting RRCResumeRequest against MiTM  p. 61
6.13.1Introduction  p. 61
6.13.2Solution details  p. 61
6.13.3Evaluation  p. 61
6.14Solution #14: Shared key based MIB/SIBs protection  p. 62
6.14.1Introduction  p. 62
6.14.2Solution details  p. 62
6.14.3Evaluation  p. 63
6.15Solution #15: Mitigation against the authentication relay attack with different PLMNs  p. 63
6.15.1Introduction  p. 63
6.15.2Solution details  p. 63
6.15.3Evaluation  p. 66
6.16Solution #16: Protection of RRC Reject Message  p. 66
6.16.1Introduction  p. 66
6.16.2Solution details  p. 67
6.16.2.1Protection of RRC Reject Message in RRC_IDLE state  p. 67
6.16.2.2Protection of RRC Reject Message in RRC_INACTIVE state  p. 67
6.16.3Evaluation  p. 67
6.17Solution 17: Integrity protection of the whole RRCResumeRequest message  p. 68
6.17.1Introduction  p. 68
6.17.2Solution Details  p. 68
6.17.3Evaluation  p. 69
6.18Solution #18: Avoiding UE connecting to False Base Station during Conditional Handover  p. 69
6.18.1Introduction  p. 69
6.18.2Solution details  p. 69
6.18.2.1General  p. 69
6.18.2.2Always on Feature  p. 70
6.18.2.3On Demand Feature  p. 71
6.18.3Evaluation  p. 71
6.19Solution #19: AS security based MIB/SIBs integrity information provided by gNB  p. 71
6.19.1Introduction  p. 71
6.19.2Solution details  p. 72
6.19.3Evaluation  p. 73
6.20Solution #20: Digital Signing Network Function (DSnF)  p. 73
6.20.1Introduction  p. 73
6.20.2Solution details  p. 74
6.20.2.1Digital Signatures of System Information  p. 74
6.20.2.2Digital Signing Network Function (DSnF)  p. 74
6.20.2.2.1Digital Signing Request  p. 74
6.20.2.2.2Digital Signature Computation  p. 75
6.20.2.2.3Digital Signing Response  p. 75
6.20.2.2.4Short-term Certificate: request and usage  p. 75
6.20.2.3gNB Behaviours  p. 77
6.20.2.3.0General  p. 77
6.20.2.3.1Requesting Digital Signatures  p. 77
6.20.2.3.2Receiving Digital Signatures  p. 78
6.20.2.3.3Broadcasting Digital Signatures  p. 78
6.20.2.4Procedures for digital signature request and response  p. 78
6.20.2.5UE Behaviours  p. 80
6.20.2.5aGeneral  p. 80
6.20.2.5.0Introduction  p. 80
6.20.2.5.1Trust Anchors in UE  p. 80
6.20.2.5.2Cell Scanning  p. 81
6.20.2.5.3Verification of Digital Signatures  p. 81
6.20.2.5.4Verification of Time Counter  p. 82
6.20.2.5.5Cell Selection and Reselection  p. 83
6.20.2.6Security Analysis  p. 84
6.20.2.6.0General  p. 84
6.20.2.6.1Mitigating Replay Attacks  p. 84
6.20.2.6.2Mitigating Denial of Services  p. 84
6.20.2.6.3Mitigating downgrading attacks  p. 85
6.20.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 85
6.20.3.1UE aspects  p. 85
6.20.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 85
6.20.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 86
6.20.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 86
6.20.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 86
6.20.3.6RAN aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 86
6.20.3.12Signature schemes  p. 86
6.20.3.13Signature length  p. 86
6.20.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 87
6.20.4Evaluation  p. 87
6.21Solution #21: Certificate based solution against false base station for Non-Public Networks  p. 88
6.21.1Introduction  p. 88
6.21.2Solution details  p. 89
6.21.2.1Certificate Provisioning  p. 89
6.21.2.2Procedure for NPN Deployments  p. 89
6.21.2.2.1Procedure  p. 89
6.21.2.3Certificate format:  p. 90
6.21.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 90
6.21.3.1UE aspects  p. 90
6.21.3.2UE actions without the network's certificate  p. 90
6.21.3.3Threats that are mitigated by protecting system information messages using Digital Signature as well as encrypting unicast signalling messages  p. 91
6.21.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by protecting system information messages using Digital Signature or encrypting unicast signalling messages.  p. 91
6.21.3.5Provisioning of certificates into the UE  p. 91
6.21.3.6RAN aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.9NSPN aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.10Network sharing aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.11Roaming aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.12Regulatory aspects  p. 91
6.21.3.13Encryption schemes  p. 91
6.21.3.14Signature / Encryption length  p. 92
6.21.3.15Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 92
6.22Solution #22: Detecting false base stations based on UE positioning measurements  p. 92
6.22.1Introduction  p. 92
6.22.2Solution details  p. 93
6.22.3Evaluation  p. 95
6.23Solution #23: Cryptographic CRC to avoid MitM relay nodes  p. 96
6.23.1Introduction  p. 96
6.23.2Solution details  p. 96
6.23.2.1Requirements  p. 96
6.23.2.2Operation  p. 97
6.23.2.3Prevention of MitM attacks:  p. 98
6.23.3Evaluation  p. 98
6.24Solution #24: UE&Network-assisted UE avoidance and Network detection of FBS  p. 99
6.24.1Introduction  p. 99
6.24.2Solution details  p. 100
6.24.2.1UE Initialization  p. 100
6.24.2.2UE Operation (IDLE mode)  p. 100
6.24.2.3UE Operation (CONNECTED mode)  p. 101
6.24.2.4Network operation  p. 101
6.24.3Evaluation  p. 101
6.25Solution #25: Detection of Man-in-the-Middle false base stations  p. 102
6.25.1Introduction  p. 102
6.25.2Solution Details  p. 103
6.25.3Evaluation  p. 104
6.26Solution #26: KI#2 with PKC-based and without tight time synchronization  p. 104
6.26.1Introduction  p. 104
6.26.2Solution details  p. 104
6.26.2.1Requirements  p. 104
6.26.2.2Protocol Operation  p. 104
6.26.2.3Clarifications regarding the protocol operation  p. 106
6.26.3Evaluation  p. 107
6.27Solution #27: Short-lived asymmetric key-based solution for protecting system information  p. 108
6.27.1Introduction  p. 108
6.27.1.1General  p. 108
6.27.1.2Hash-based consistency checks  p. 109
6.27.1.3Symmetric key based MAC  p. 109
6.27.1.4Asymmetric key based digital signatures  p. 109
6.27.2Solution details  p. 110
6.27.2.1Authenticity of system information  p. 110
6.27.2.1.1Signing entities  p. 110
6.27.2.1.2Raw public keys or certificates  p. 110
6.27.2.1.3Trust anchors  p. 111
6.27.2.1.4PKI trust models  p. 112
6.27.2.1.5Trust anchor provisioning  p. 112
6.27.2.1.6Delivering signatures and short-lived public keys  p. 113
6.27.2.1.7System information to be protected  p. 113
6.27.2.2Replay mitigation  p. 114
6.27.2.2.0General  p. 114
6.27.2.2.1Message timeliness  p. 114
6.27.2.2.2gNB unique properties  p. 116
6.27.2.2.3Time synchronization issues  p. 117
6.27.2.2.4Limitations  p. 117
6.27.2.3Cell selection and reselection  p. 118
6.27.3Assessment using clause A.3  p. 119
6.27.3.1UE aspects  p. 119
6.27.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 119
6.27.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 120
6.27.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 120
6.27.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 120
6.27.3.6RAN aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 120
6.27.3.12Signature schemes  p. 120
6.27.3.13Signature length  p. 120
6.27.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 121
6.27.4Evaluation  p. 121
7Conclusions  p. 121
7.1Conclusions on Key Issue #1  p. 121
7.2Conclusions on Key Issue #2  p. 121
7.3Conclusions on Key Issue #3  p. 121
7.4Conclusions on Key Issue #4  p. 121
7.5Conclusions on Key Issue #5  p. 121
7.6Conclusions on Key Issue #6  p. 122
7.7Conclusions on Key Issue #7  p. 122
AAssessment of system, architectural and security impacts of signing SI messages  p. 123
A.1Introduction  p. 123
A.2Example architecture  p. 123
A.3Aspects that need to be addressed  p. 123
A.3.1UE Aspects  p. 123
A.3.2UE actions upon detection of invalid signature  p. 123
A.3.3Threats that are mitigated by signed SI messages  p. 124
A.3.4Threats that are not mitigated by signed Si messages  p. 124
A.3.5Provisioning of keys  p. 124
A.3.6RAN aspects  p. 124
A.3.7VPLMN aspects  p. 124
A.3.8HPLMN aspects  p. 124
A.3.9Network sharing aspects  p. 124
A.3.10Roaming aspects  p. 124
A.3.11Regulatory aspects  p. 124
A.3.12Signature schemes  p. 124
A.3.13Signature length  p. 124
A.3.14Resistance against Quantum Computing  p. 125
BTaxonomy of attacks against 5G UE over radio interfaces  p. 125
B.1Introduction  p. 125
B.2Attack taxonomy  p. 125
B.2.0General  p. 125
B.2.1Active Attacks  p. 126
B.2.1.0General  p. 126
B.2.1.1Radio Jamming  p. 126
B.2.1.2Signal shadowing  p. 126
B.2.1.3Message attacks  p. 127
B.2.2Passive Attacks  p. 128
$Change history  p. 129

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