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Content for
TR 22.857
Word version: 6.0.0
1…
4…
4
Current Situation
5
Reusable technology: An alternate approach
6
Integrating the Runtime Independent Framework into the Current MExE Specification
7
Additional open issues
8
Out of scope issues
9
Conclusion
A
Generic MExE Security
$
Change history
4
Current Situation
Word‑p. 7
4.1
Delaying new technology adoption into 3GPP
Word‑p. 7
4.2
Unbounded specification growth
Word‑p. 7
4.3
Inefficient use of 3GPP technical resources
Word‑p. 7
4.4
Uncertain implementation requirements
Word‑p. 8
4.5
Potential fragmentation of the application market
Word‑p. 8
4.6
Unclear technology requirements for classmarks
Word‑p. 8
4.7
Summary of current situation
Word‑p. 9
5
Reusable technology: An alternate approach
Word‑p. 9
5.1
Security infrastructure
Word‑p. 9
5.1.1
Security model
Word‑p. 10
5.1.1.1
Application isolation
Word‑p. 10
5.1.1.2
Domain definitions
Word‑p. 10
5.1.1.3
User permission types
Word‑p. 11
5.1.1.4
Control of application connections and network activity
Word‑p. 11
5.1.2
Certificates and certificate management
Word‑p. 11
5.1.2.1
Certificate format requirements
Word‑p. 11
5.1.2.2
Domain-based certificate requirements
Word‑p. 11
5.1.2.3
Certificate chain structure and authorization
Word‑p. 11
5.1.2.4
Certification Configuration Message (CCM)
Word‑p. 12
5.1.2.5
Handling of root public key stored on an installed security device
Word‑p. 12
5.1.3
Administrator role
Word‑p. 12
5.2
Service environment
Word‑p. 12
5.2.1
Capability negotiation
Word‑p. 13
5.2.2
Provisioning
Word‑p. 13
5.2.3
Management requirements
Word‑p. 13
5.3
Core software update
Word‑p. 13
5.4
Provisioning a runtime environment
Word‑p. 13
5.5
Multiple execution environment support
Word‑p. 13
6
Integrating the Runtime Independent Framework into the Current MExE Specification
Word‑p. 14
6.1
RTIF conformance requirements
Word‑p. 14
6.1.1
Runtime generic requirements
Word‑p. 14
6.1.2
Runtime mapping requirements
Word‑p. 14
6.2
UAProf extensions
Word‑p. 15
6.3
Other MExE specification changes
Word‑p. 16
6.3.1
RTIF conformance
Word‑p. 16
6.3.2
Multiple execution environment and runtime support
Word‑p. 16
7
Additional open issues
Word‑p. 16
7.1
Binding executables to certificates and metadata
Word‑p. 16
7.2
Root key certificate packaging and metadata
Word‑p. 17
7.3
Handling of existing MExE classmarks
Word‑p. 17
8
Out of scope issues
Word‑p. 17
9
Conclusion
Word‑p. 18
A
Generic MExE Security
Word‑p. 19
A.1
Introduction
Word‑p. 19
A.2
MExE executable integrity
Word‑p. 19
A.2.1
Full signature verification
Word‑p. 20
A.2.2
Optimised pre-launch signature verification
Word‑p. 20
A.3
MExE executable permissions
Word‑p. 20
A.3.1
MExE executable permissions for operator, manufacturer and third party security domains
Word‑p. 20
A.3.2
MExE executable permissions for untrusted MExE executables
Word‑p. 23
A.4
Handling of MExE executables when their valid root public key is not available
Word‑p. 25
A.4.1
Launching of MExE executables when their valid RPK is not available
Word‑p. 25
A.4.2
Currently executing secure MExE executables when their valid RPK is no longer available
Word‑p. 25
A.5
User permission types
Word‑p. 25
A.6
Root Public keys
Word‑p. 26
A.6.1
Operator root public key
Word‑p. 26
A.6.1.1
Caching of root public keys
Word‑p. 27
A.6.1.2
MExE device actions on detection of valid (U)SIM application and/or power up
Word‑p. 27
A.6.2
Manufacturer root public key
Word‑p. 29
A.6.3
Third party root public key
Word‑p. 29
A.7
Certification and authorisation architecture
Word‑p. 30
A.7.1
Certification requirements
Word‑p. 30
A.7.1.1
MExE terminal requirements for certificate processing
Word‑p. 30
A.7.2
Certification administration requirements
Word‑p. 31
A.7.3
Example certification process
Word‑p. 31
A.7.4
Certificate Chain Verification
Word‑p. 32
A.8
Usage of Signed Content
Word‑p. 34
A.8.1
Example of sSigned packages used for installation
Word‑p. 34
A.8.2
Installation of root certificates in a signed data package
Word‑p. 35
6.8.3
Installation of other signed data
Word‑p. 36
A.9
Certificate fFormat
Word‑p. 36
A.9.1
Certificate extension for removal of network access
Word‑p. 36
A.9.1.1
X.509 version 3
Word‑p. 36
A.10
Certificate management
Word‑p. 36
A.10.1
Certificate configuration message (CCM)
Word‑p. 37
A.10.1.1
CCM numbering convention
Word‑p. 40
A.10.1.2
CCM order of transmission
Word‑p. 40
A.10.1.3
CCM field mapping convention
Word‑p. 40
A.10.1.4
Authorised CCM download mechanisms
Word‑p. 40
A.11
Separation of I/O streams
Word‑p. 41
6.12
Core software download
Word‑p. 41
A.13
Administrator Concept
Word‑p. 41
A.13.1
Administrator root public key
Word‑p. 41
A.13.2
Provisioned mechanism for designating administrative responsibilities and adding third parties in a MExE device
Word‑p. 42
A.13.3
MExE administrator determination mechanism
Word‑p. 42
A.13.3.1
Determining the administrator of the MExE device
Word‑p. 42
A.13.3.2
Determining the administrator of the MExE device, for MExE-(U)SIM supporting third party certificates
Word‑p. 43
A.13.3.2.1
Administrator of the MExE device is the user
Word‑p. 43
A.13.3.2.2
Administrator of the MExE device is not the user
Word‑p. 44
A.13.4
Administrator root certificate download mechanism
Word‑p. 45
$
Change history
Word‑p. 46