TR 33.841
SA3
★
Study on the support of 256-bit Algorithms for 5G
use "3GPP‑Page" to get the Word version
for a better overview, the Table of Contents (ToC) is reproduced
for a better overview, the Table of Contents (ToC) is reproduced
V16.1.0 (Wzip)
2019/03 25 p.
WI Acronym: FS_256_Algo
Rapporteur: Mr. Evans, Tim P.
Rapporteur: Mr. Evans, Tim P.
Quantum computing poses a long-term threat to information security. This may apply to some of the current protection measures in 5G systems. These threats are studied in this document so as to ensure that 5G systems remain secure also in the future.
The threats will impact symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in different ways. This document focuses on symmetric cryptographic algorithms. In particular, it focuses on the implications of introducing 256 bit cryptographic keys and algorithms.
full Table of Contents for TR 33.841 Word version: 16.1.0
1 Scope Word-p. 7
2 References
3 Definitions and abbreviations Word-p. 9
4 Threats posed by quantum computing and potential countermeasures Word-p. 10
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Threats to asymmetric cryptography
4.3 Threats to symmetric cryptography Word-p. 11
4.4 Threats to hash algorithms
5 Assessment of quantum computing impact timelines
5.1 Predicted timescales and resources for quantum computing
5.2 Timelines for transitioning asymmetric algorithms Word-p. 12
5.3 Timelines for transitioning symmetric algorithms
5.4 Considerations for assessing timelines
6 Impacted NextGen areas
6.1 Impacted use of asymmetric cryptography
7 Study of full entropy 256-bit keys in the 5G key hierarchy
8 Assessment of the requirement for and impact of a longer MAC Word-p. 17
6.1.1 Introduction
6.1.2 TLS for service based interfaces
6.1.3 NDS/IP for non-service based interfaces Word-p. 13
6.1.4 SUPI protection
6.1.5 OAuth in SBA
6.1.6 N32 Application Layer Security
6.1.7 Network product software package integrity
6.1.8 EAP TLS
6.1.9 Ephemeral key agreement in primary authentication
6.2 Impacted use of symmetric cryptography Word-p. 14
6.3 Impacted use of hash functions Word-p. 15
6.1.5 OAuth in SBA
6.1.6 N32 Application Layer Security
6.1.7 Network product software package integrity
6.1.8 EAP TLS
6.1.9 Ephemeral key agreement in primary authentication
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Integrity protection for control and user planes
8.3 MAC tag length impact on security Word-p. 18
8.4 Impact of a longer MAC tag on network
8.5 Minimal level of integrity protection
9 Study of coexistence of different size keys and key size negotiation.
9.1 Ensuring system parameters support variable length keys Word-p. 19
9.2 Ensuring system parameters support variable length MACs, AKA messages etc.
9.3 Ensuring key derivation functions support variable length keys
9.4 Using 256-bit keys in New RAN with legacy core
9.5 Co-existence between 128-bit and 256-bit key lengths Word-p. 20
9.6 Co-existence between multiple or variable lengths MAC tags
9.7 Reduced complexity of key derivation function negotiation
10 Study of desired number of 256-bit algorithms
11 Study the desired performance aspects for the new 256-bit algorithms
12 Study of key management Word-p. 22
13 Study of individual algorithm details
9.5 Co-existence between 128-bit and 256-bit key lengths Word-p. 20
9.6 Co-existence between multiple or variable lengths MAC tags
9.7 Reduced complexity of key derivation function negotiation
13.1 Radio interface encryption and integrity algorithms
13.2 AKA algorithms
13.3 Key derivation algorithms Word-p. 23
14 Potential requirements
14.1 Potential requirements for adoption of post-quantum algorithms
14.2 Potential requirements for longer MAC
15 Conclusions
A Change history Word-p. 25
