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TR 33.821 (SA3)
Rationale and Track of Security decisions in
Long Term Evolution (LTE) RAN / 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)

3GPP‑Page   full‑ToC    
use "3GPP‑Page" to get the Word version
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V9.0.0 (Wzip)  2009/06  141 p.
V8.0.0  2009/03  137 p.


Rapporteur:  Dr. Zhang, Dajiang

The scope of this 3GPP Technical Report is rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolved (LTE) RAN and 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE) for release 8.

Disclaimer:
This TR reflects the discussions held in 3GPP SA3 while 3GPP SA3 was working towards TS 33.401. This TR is useful to better understand the basis on which decisions in TS 33.401 were taken, and the alternatives that were discussed towards the decision. Some of the text in this TR reflected 3GPP SA3's decision. However 3GPP's position on EPS Security Architecture is reflected in the normative text in TS 33.401.

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.821  Word version:   9.0.0

 

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1  ScopeWord-p. 8
2  References
3  AbbreviationsWord-p. 9
4  Layered Security Approach in LTE
5  ThreatsWord-p. 12
5.1  Threats to UE
5.2  Threats to eNB and last-mile transport linksWord-p. 24
5.3  Threats to MME/SAE gatewayUp
5.4  Threats related to mobility management
6  User Plane SecurityUp
7  Control Plane Security
7.1  MAC, RLC and RRC layer security
7.1.1  ConclusionsWord-p. 36
7.2  SAE/LTE AKA
7.3  Security set-up procedure
7.4  Key handlingWord-p. 51
7.4.1  UMTS AKAUp
7.4.2  Serving Network Authentication for LTE
7.4.3  Key derivationWord-p. 55
7.4.4  Key management aspects for LTE/UMTS interworking
7.4.5Void
7.4.6  Key identities in LTE/SAEWord-p. 57
7.4.7  Hierarchy of user-related keys in SAE/LTEWord-p. 59
7.4.8  Use of AMF for SAE bindingWord-p. 66
7.4.9  Key handling on active to idle and idle to active transitions in SAEWord-p. 68
7.4.10  Key handling on mobility within an SAE/LTE network and between two different SAE/LTE networksWord-p. 69
7.4.11  K_eNB refresh at state transitions
7.4.12  Key handling on idle mode mobilityWord-p. 70
7.4.13  Key handling on active mode mobilityWord-p. 75
7.4.14  Security algorithm negotiation and Security mode command in SAE/LTE networksWord-p. 88
7.4.15  Key-change-on-the-flyWord-p. 97
7.4.16  Independence of keys at different eNodeBsWord-p. 99
7.5  START value transfer
7.6  Security algorithms
7.6.1  Choice of algorithms
7.6.2  Terminal supportWord-p. 101
7.6.3  Network support
7.6.4  Algorithm input
7.6.5  Algorithm IDs in EPSWord-p. 105
7.6.6  KDF negotiationWord-p. 106
7.7  Rationale for approach to security handling in inter-RAT mobility proceduresUp
7.8  Track of decision
8  Network Domain SecurityWord-p. 118
8.1  Introduction
8.2  How particular threats can be counteracted.Word-p. 120
8.3  SummaryWord-p. 122
8.4  Network Domain Security Evolution
8.5  IKE version in NDS/IP for EPSWord-p. 123
8.6  S1/X2 reference point securityWord-p. 124
8.7  S6a Reference Point SecurityWord-p. 125
8.8  Authentication Failure Reporting (AFR) functionality for EPS
8.9  EPS interworking with a pre-Rel-8 HSS/HLRWord-p. 126
9  Security Requirements for LTE eNBs
A  Decision made in RAN2/3-SA3 joint meeting in Jan 2006Word-p. 136
B  Issues and Threats of emergency callsWord-p. 137
C  Change HistoryWord-p. 141

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