TR 33.819
Study on Security enhancements of 5GS
for Vertical and Local Area Network (LAN) Services

3GPP‑Page fToC_↓ Partial Content _→

V16.1.0 (Wzip) 2020/06 46 p.

Rapporteur:: Miss Jerichow, Anja
Nokia Germany

full Table of Contents for TR 33.819 Word version: 16.1.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content

Introduction p. 7

Scope p. 8

References p. 8

Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations p. 8

3.1	Terms p. 8
3.2	Symbols p. 9
3.3	Abbreviations p. 9

Security aspects in the 5G System to enable enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services p. 9

Key issues p. 10

5.1

Key Issues related to security for SNPNs p. 10

5.1.1

Key Issue #1.1: Completing AKA based authentication and calculating KSEAF for SNPNs p. 10

5.1.1.1	Key issue details p. 10
5.1.1.2	Security threats p. 10
5.1.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 10
5.1.1.4	Potential architectural requirements p. 10

5.2

Key Issues related to Security aspects on interworking between NPN and PLMN p. 10

5.2.1

Key Issue #2.1: Authentication and Authorization for Interworking, Roaming between NPN and PLMN p. 10

5.2.1.1	Key issue details p. 10
5.2.1.2	Security threats p. 11
5.2.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 11

5.2.2

Key Issue #2.2: Security and privacy aspects of service continuity and session continuity p. 11

5.2.2.1	Key issue details p. 11
5.2.2.2	Security threats p. 12
5.2.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 12

5.2.3

Key Issue #2.3: Independent credentials for authentication and authorization with NPN and PLMN p. 13

5.2.3.1	Key issue details p. 13
5.2.3.2	Security threats p. 13
5.2.3.3	Potential security requirements p. 13

5.3

Key Issues related to Security for 5G LAN services p. 13

5.3.1

Key Issue #3.1: Authentication and Authorization of UE in 5GLAN communication p. 13

5.3.1.1	Key issue details p. 13
5.3.1.2	Security threats p. 13
5.3.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 14

5.3.2

Key Issue #3.2: UP security policy for the 5GLAN Group p. 14

5.3.2.1	Key issue details p. 14
5.3.2.2	Security threats p. 14
5.3.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 14

5.4

Key Issues related to Security for TSC and 5GS interaction p. 14

5.4.1

Key Issue #4.1: Protection of interfaces that 5GS interacts with a TSN network p. 14

5.4.1.1	Key issue details p. 14
5.4.1.2	Security threats p. 15
5.4.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 15

5.4.2

Key Issue #4.2: TSC time synchronisation p. 15

5.4.2.1	Key issue details p. 15
5.4.2.2	Security threats p. 15
5.4.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 15

5.5

Key Issues related to authentication on NPNs p. 15

5.5.1

Key Issue #5.1: Key hierarchy for NPNs p. 15

5.5.1.1	Key issue details p. 15
5.5.1.2	Security threats p. 16
5.5.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 16

5.5.2

Key Issue #5.2: Authentication and authorization of NPN subscribers by an AAA p. 16

5.5.2.1	Key issue details p. 16
5.5.2.2	Security threats p. 16
5.5.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 16

5.6

Key Issues related to security for PNiNPNs p. 17

5.6.1

Key Issue #6.1: (D)DoS attack by large number of registration requests to CAG Cell p. 17

5.6.1.1	Key issue details p. 17
5.6.1.2	Security threats p. 17
5.6.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 17

5.6.2

Key Issue #6.2: CAG ID Privacy p. 17

5.6.2.1	Key issue details p. 17
5.6.2.2	Security threats p. 18
5.6.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 18

5.6.3

Key Issue #6.3: DoS attack by unauthorized removal of entries from the UE's Allowed CAG ID list p. 18

5.6.3.1	Key issue details p. 18
5.6.3.2	Security threats p. 18
5.6.3.3	Potential security requirements p. 19

Solutions p. 19

6.1

Solution #1: Solution for NPN network access via PLMN p. 19

6.1.1

Introduction p. 19

6.1.2

Solution details p. 20

6.1.2.1	Registration to NPN via PLMN p. 20
6.1.2.2	Registration to PLMN via NPN p. 21

6.1.3

Evaluation p. 21

6.2

Solution #2: Security solution for handling UP security policy for a 5GLAN Group p. 21

6.2.1	Introduction p. 21
6.2.2	Potential solution details p. 21
6.2.3	Evaluation p. 22

6.3

Solution #3: Security solution for mitigation of (D)DoS attack in PNiNPNs p. 22

6.3.1	Introduction p. 22
6.3.2	Potential solution details p. 22
6.3.3	Evaluation p. 24

6.4

Solution #4: Security solution for key derivation in SNPNs p. 24

6.4.1	Introduction p. 24
6.4.2	Solution details p. 24
6.4.3	Evaluation p. 24

6.5

Solution #5: Key hierarchy for authentication using non-AKA EAP methods in NPN p. 25

6.5.1	Introduction p. 25
6.5.2	Solution details p. 25
6.5.3	Evaluation p. 25

6.6

Solution #6: 5GLAN authentication p. 25

6.6.1	Introduction p. 25
6.6.2	Solution details p. 26
6.6.3	Evaluation p. 26

6.7

Solution #7: SMF handling the UP security policy for a 5GLAN Group based on information from DN AAA p. 26

6.7.1	Introduction p. 26
6.7.2	Potential solution details p. 27
6.7.3	Evaluation p. 27

6.8

Solution #8: TSC security p. 27

6.8.1	Introduction p. 27
6.8.2	Solution details p. 27

6.9

Solution #9: (D)DoS attack mitigation in PNiNPNs p. 27

6.9.1	Introduction p. 27
6.9.2	Solution details p. 27
6.9.3	Evaluation p. 28

6.10

Solution #10: Using NAS security for messages that modify the CAG list p. 28

6.10.1	Introduction p. 28
6.10.2	Solution details p. 28
6.10.3	Evaluation p. 29

6.11

Solution #11: DH based solution for CAG ID privacy p. 29

6.11.1	Introduction p. 29
6.11.2	Solution details p. 29
6.11.3	Evaluation p. 31

6.12

Solution #12: Hash based solution for CAG ID privacy p. 31

6.12.1	Introduction p. 31
6.12.2	Solution details p. 32
6.12.3	Evaluation p. 34

6.13

Solution #13: CAG ID Privacy in PNiNPNs by embedding CAG ID in the SUCI p. 34

6.13.1	Introduction p. 34
6.13.2	Solution details p. 35
6.13.3	Evaluation p. 36

6.14

Solution #14: CAG ID privacy by re-use of SUPI protection mechanism p. 36

6.14.1	Introduction p. 36
6.14.2	Solution details p. 36
6.14.3	Evaluation p. 37

6.15

Solution #15: CAG ID privacy by indication in RRC layer and providing CAG ID only after NAS security establishment p. 38

6.15.1	Introduction p. 38
6.15.2	Solution details p. 38
6.15.3	Evaluation p. 39

6.16

Solution #16: CAG ID privacy by sending CAG ID only in protected NAS signalling p. 39

6.16.1	Introduction p. 39
6.16.2	Solution details p. 39
6.16.3	Evaluation p. 40

6.17

Solution #17: Protection on TSC time synchronisation within UP security policy p. 40

6.17.1	Introduction p. 40
6.17.2	Solution details p. 40
6.17.3	Evaluation p. 40

6.18

Solution #18: CAG ID privacy considering RAN optimization p. 40

6.18.1	Introduction p. 40
6.18.2	Potential solution details p. 40
6.18.3	Evaluation p. 41

6.19

Solution #19: Privacy protected CAG ID Privacy in PNiNPNs p. 41

6.19.1	Introduction p. 41
6.19.2	Solution details p. 41
6.19.3	Evaluation p. 42

Conclusions p. 43

7.1	Security for 5G LAN services p. 43
7.2	Security for TSC p. 43
7.3	PLMN service access via SNPN and vice versa p. 43
7.4	Key hierarchy for NPNs p. 43
7.5	AKA based authentication and calculating KSEAF for SNPNs p. 43
7.6	Modification of CAG ID list in the UE p. 43
7.7	CAG ID Privacy p. 43

Deployment options for authentication in SNPNs considering different types of NPN credentials p. 44

Change history p. 46

TR 33.819 Study on Security enhancements of 5GS for Vertical and Local Area Network (LAN) Services

full Table of Contents for TR 33.819 Word version: 16.1.0

TR 33.819
Study on Security enhancements of 5GS
for Vertical and Local Area Network (LAN) Services