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TS 33.310SA3
Network Domain Security (NDS) –
Authentication Framework (AF)

use "3GPP‑Page" to get the Word version
use "ETSI‑search" to get the PDF version
for a better overview, the Table of Contents (ToC) is reproduced
V16.3.0 (Wzip)2020/03  57 p.
V15.2.0 (PDF)  2018/12  57 p.
V14.0.0  2016/12  58 p.
V13.2.0  2016/12  59 p.
V12.2.0  2014/09  58 p.
V11.2.0  2012/12  55 p.
V10.7.0  2012/12  56 p.
V9.8.0  2012/12  54 p.
V8.4.0  2010/06  45 p.
V7.1.0  2006/10  38 p.
V6.2.0  2004/09  31 p.

Rapporteur:  Miss Jerichow, Anja

For 3GPP systems there is a need for truly scalable entity Authentication Framework (AF) since an increasing number of network elements and interfaces are covered by security mechanisms.
This specification provides a highly scalable entity authentication framework for 3GPP network nodes. This framework is developed in the context of the Network Domain Security work item, which effectively limits the scope to the control plane entities of the core network. Thus, the Authentication Framework will provide entity authentication for the nodes that are using NDS/IP.
Feasible trust models (i.e. how CAs are organized) and their effects are provided. Additionally, requirements are presented for the used protocols and certificate profiles, to make it possible for operator IPsec and PKI implementations to interoperate.
The scope of thiS TS is limited to authentication of network elements, which are using NDS/IP or TLS.

full Table of Contents for  TS 33.310  Word version:   16.2.0

Here   Top
1  ScopeWord-p. 10
2  References
3  Definitions and abbreviationsWord-p. 12
4  Introduction to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
5  Architecture and use cases of the NDS/AF
5.1  PKI architecture for NDS/AF
5.2  Use casesWord-p. 17
5.2.1  Operator Registration: Creation of interconnect agreement
5.2.2  Establishment of secure communicationsWord-p. 19
5.2.3  Operator deregistration: Termination of interconnect agreementWord-p. 21
5.2.3a  Interconnection CA registration [R7]
5.2.3b  Interconnection CA deregistration [R7]
5.2.3c  Interconnection CA certification creation [R7]
5.2.3d  Interconnection CA certification revocation [R7]Word-p. 22
5.2.3e  Interconnection CA certification renewal [R7]
5.2.4  SEG/TLS CA registration
5.2.5  SEG/TLS CA deregistration
5.2.6  SEG/TLS CA certificate creation
5.2.7  SEG/TLS CA certificate revocationWord-p. 23
5.2.8  SEG/TLS CA certificate renewalUp
5.2.9  End entity registration
5.2.10  End entity deregistration
5.2.11  End entity certificate creation
5.2.12  End entity certificate revocation
5.2.13  End entity certificate renewal
5.2.14  NE CA deregistration [R8]
5.2.15  NE CA certification creation [R8]
5.2.16  NE CA certificate revocation [R8]Word-p. 25
5.2.17  NE CA certificate renewal [R8]
6  Profiling
7  Detailed description of architecture and mechanisms
8  Backward compatibility for NDS/IP NE's and SEGsWord-p. 36
9  Certificate enrolment for base stations [R9]Word-p. 37
AVoid
B  Decision for the simple trust modelWord-p. 45
C  Decision for the CRL repository access protocol for SEGsWord-p. 50
D  Decision for storing the cross-certificates in CRWord-p. 51
E  TLS protocol profile [R8]Word-p. 52
F  Manual handling of TLS certificates [R8]Word-p. 55
G  Example CMPv2 Message Flow for Initial Enrolment [R9]Word-p. 56
H  Guidance on eNB Certificate Enrolment in MOCN LTE RAN sharing [R12]Word-p. 59
I  Change historyWord-p. 60

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