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RFC 7826

Real-Time Streaming Protocol Version 2.0

Pages: 318
Proposed Standard
Obsoletes:  2326
Part 9 of 13 – Pages 185 to 213
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Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 185   prevText

19. Security Framework

The RTSP security framework consists of two high-level components: the pure authentication mechanisms based on HTTP authentication and the message transport protection based on TLS, which is independent of RTSP. Because of the similarity in syntax and usage between RTSP servers and HTTP servers, the security for HTTP is reused to a large extent.

19.1. RTSP and HTTP Authentication

RTSP and HTTP share common authentication schemes; thus, they follow the same framework as specified in [RFC7235]. RTSP uses the corresponding RTSP error codes (401 and 407) and headers (WWW- Authenticate, Authorization, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization) by importing the definitions from [RFC7235]. Servers SHOULD implement both the Basic [RFC7617] and the Digest [RFC7616] authentication schemes. Clients MUST implement both the Basic and the Digest authentication schemes so that a server that requires the client to authenticate can trust that the capability is present. If implementing the Digest authentication scheme, then the additional considerations specified below in Section 19.1.1 MUST be followed.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 186
   It should be stressed that using the HTTP authentication alone does
   not provide full RTSP message security.  Therefore, TLS SHOULD be
   used; see Section 19.2.  Any RTSP message containing an Authorization
   header using the Basic authentication scheme MUST be using a TLS
   connection with confidentiality protection enabled, i.e., no NULL

   In cases where there is a chain of proxies between the client and the
   server, each proxy may individually request the client or previous
   proxy to authenticate itself.  This is done using the Proxy-
   Authenticate (Section 18.34), the Proxy-Authorization
   (Section 18.36), and the Proxy-Authentication-Info (Section 18.35)
   headers.  These headers are hop-by-hop headers and are only scoped to
   the current connection and hop.  Thus, if a proxy chain exists, a
   proxy connecting to another proxy will have to act as a client to
   authorize itself towards the next proxy.  The WWW-Authenticate
   (Section 18.58), Authorization (Section 18.8), and Authentication-
   Info (Section 18.7) headers are end-to-end and MUST NOT be modified
   by proxies.

   This authentication mechanism works only for client-to-server
   requests as currently defined.  This leaves server-to-client request
   outside of the context of TLS-based communication more vulnerable to
   message-injection attacks on the client.  Based on the server-to-
   client methods that exist, the potential risks are various: hijacking
   (REDIRECT), denial of service (TEARDOWN and PLAY_NOTIFY), or attacks
   with uncertain results (SET_PARAMETER).

19.1.1. Digest Authentication

This section describes the modifications and clarifications required to apply the HTTP Digest authentication scheme to RTSP. The RTSP scheme usage is almost completely identical to that for HTTP [RFC7616]. These modifications are based on the procedures defined for SIP 2.0 [RFC3261] (in Section 22.4) but updated to use RFC 7235, RFC 7616 and RFC 7615 instead of RFC 2617. Digest authentication uses two additional headers, Authentication- Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info, that are defined as in [RFC7615]. The rules for Digest authentication follow those defined in [RFC7616], with "HTTP/1.1" replaced by "RTSP/2.0" in addition to the following differences: 1. Use the ABNF specified in the referenced documents, with the difference that the URI parameter uses the request URI format for RTSP, i.e. the ABNF element: Request-URI (see Section 20.2.1). The domain parameter uses the RTSP-URI-Ref element for absolute and relative URIs.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 187
   2.  If MTags are used, then the example procedure for choosing a
       nonce based on ETag can work, based on replacing the ETag with
       the MTag.

   3.  As a clarification to the calculation of the A2 value for message
       integrity assurance in the Digest authentication scheme,
       implementers should assume, when the entity-body is empty (that
       is, when the RTSP messages have no message body) that the hash of
       the message body resolves to the hash of an empty string, or:
       H(entity-body), example MD5("") =

19.2. RTSP over TLS

RTSP agents MUST implement RTSP over TLS as defined in this section and the next Section 19.3. RTSP MUST follow the same guidelines with regard to TLS [RFC5246] usage as specified for HTTP; see [RFC2818]. RTSP over TLS is separated from unsecured RTSP both on the URI level and the port level. Instead of using the "rtsp" scheme identifier in the URI, the "rtsps" scheme identifier MUST be used to signal RTSP over TLS. If no port is given in a URI with the "rtsps" scheme, port 322 MUST be used for TLS over TCP/IP. When a client tries to set up an insecure channel to the server (using the "rtsp" URI), and the policy for the resource requires a secure channel, the server MUST redirect the client to the secure service by sending a 301 redirect response code together with the correct Location URI (using the "rtsps" scheme). A user or client MAY upgrade a non secured URI to a secured by changing the scheme from "rtsp" to "rtsps". A server implementing support for "rtsps" MUST allow this. It should be noted that TLS allows for mutual authentication (when using both server and client certificates). Still, one of the more common ways TLS is used is to provide only server-side authentication (often to avoid client certificates). TLS is then used in addition to HTTP authentication, providing transport security and server authentication, while HTTP Authentication is used to authenticate the client. RTSP includes the possibility to keep a TCP session up between the client and server, throughout the RTSP session lifetime. It may be convenient to keep the TCP session, not only to save the extra setup time for TCP, but also the extra setup time for TLS (even if TLS uses the resume function, there will be almost two extra round trips). Still, when TLS is used, such behavior introduces extra active state in the server, not only for TCP and RTSP, but also for TLS. This may increase the vulnerability to DoS attacks.
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   There exists a potential security vulnerability when reusing TCP and
   TLS state for different resources (URIs).  If two different hostnames
   point at the same IP address, it can be desirable to reuse the TCP/
   TLS connection to that server.  In that case, the RTSP agent having
   the TCP/TLS connection MUST verify that the server certificate
   associated with the connection has a SubjectAltName matching the
   hostname present in the URI for the resource an RTSP request is to be

   In addition to these recommendations, Section 19.3 gives further
   recommendations of TLS usage with proxies.

19.3. Security and Proxies

The nature of a proxy is often to act as a "man in the middle", while security is often about preventing the existence of one. This section provides clients with the possibility to use proxies even when applying secure transports (TLS) between the RTSP agents. The TLS proxy mechanism allows for server and proxy identification using certificates. However, the client cannot be identified based on certificates. The client needs to select between using the procedure specified below or using a TLS connection directly (bypassing any proxies) to the server. The choice may be dependent on policies. In general, there are two categories of proxies: the transparent proxies (of which the client is not aware) and the non-transparent proxies (of which the client is aware). This memo specifies only non-transparent RTSP proxies, i.e., proxies visible to the RTSP client and RTSP server. An infrastructure based on proxies requires that the trust model be such that both client and server can trust the proxies to handle the RTSP messages correctly. To be able to trust a proxy, the client and server also need to be aware of the proxy. Hence, transparent proxies cannot generally be seen as trusted and will not work well with security (unless they work only at the transport layer). In the rest of this section, any reference to "proxy" will be to a non-transparent proxy, which inspects or manipulates the RTSP messages. HTTP Authentication is built on the assumption of proxies and can provide user-proxy authentication and proxy-proxy/server authentication in addition to the client-server authentication. When TLS is applied and a proxy is used, the client will connect to the proxy's address when connecting to any RTSP server. This implies that for TLS, the client will authenticate the proxy server and not the end server. Note that when the client checks the server
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 189
   certificate in TLS, it MUST check the proxy's identity (URI or
   possibly other known identity) against the proxy's identity as
   presented in the proxy's Certificate message.

   The problem is that for a proxy accepted by the client, the proxy
   needs to be provided information on which grounds it should accept
   the next-hop certificate.  Both the proxy and the user may have rules
   for this, and the user should have the possibility to select the
   desired behavior.  To handle this case, the Accept-Credentials header
   (see Section 18.2) is used, where the client can request the proxy or
   proxies to relay back the chain of certificates used to authenticate
   any intermediate proxies as well as the server.  The assumption that
   the proxies are viewed as trusted gives the user a possibility to
   enforce policies on each trusted proxy of whether it should accept
   the next agent in the chain.  However, it should be noted that not
   all deployments will return the chain of certificates used to
   authenticate any intermediate proxies as well as the server.  An
   operator of such a deployment may want to hide its topology from the
   client.  It should be noted well that the client does not have any
   insight into the proxy's operation.  Even if the proxy is trusted, it
   can still return an incomplete chain of certificates.

   A proxy MUST use TLS for the next hop if the RTSP request includes an
   "rtsps" URI.  TLS MAY be applied on intermediate links (e.g., between
   client and proxy or between proxy and proxy) even if the resource and
   the end server are not required to use it.  The chain of proxies used
   by a client to reach a server and its TLS sessions MUST have
   commensurate security.  Therefore, a proxy MUST, when initiating the
   next-hop TLS connection, use the incoming TLS connections cipher-
   suite list, only modified by removing any cipher suites that the
   proxy does not support.  In case a proxy fails to establish a TLS
   connection due to cipher-suite mismatch between proxy and next-hop
   proxy or server, this is indicated using error code 472 (Failure to
   Establish Secure Connection).

19.3.1. Accept-Credentials

The Accept-Credentials header can be used by the client to distribute simple authorization policies to intermediate proxies. The client includes the Accept-Credentials header to dictate how the proxy treats the server / next proxy certificate. There are currently three methods defined: Any: With "any", the proxy (or proxies) MUST accept whatever certificate is presented. Of course, this is not a recommended option to use, but it may be useful in certain circumstances (such as testing).
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 190
   Proxy:  For the "proxy" method, the proxy (or proxies) MUST use its
         own policies to validate the certificate and decide whether or
         not to accept it.  This is convenient in cases where the user
         has a strong trust relation with the proxy.  Reasons why a
         strong trust relation may exist are personal/company proxy or
         the proxy has an out-of-band policy configuration mechanism.

   User: For the "user" method, the proxy (or proxies) MUST send
         credential information about the next hop to the client for
         authorization.  The client can then decide whether or not the
         proxy should accept the certificate.  See Section 19.3.2 for
         further details.

   If the Accept-Credentials header is not included in the RTSP request
   from the client, then the "Proxy" method MUST be used as default.  If
   a method other than the "Proxy" is to be used, then the Accept-
   Credentials header MUST be included in all of the RTSP requests from
   the client.  This is because it cannot be assumed that the proxy
   always keeps the TLS state or the user's previous preference between
   different RTSP messages (in particular, if the time interval between
   the messages is long).

   With the "Any" and "Proxy" methods, the proxy will apply the policy
   as defined for each method.  If the policy does not accept the
   credentials of the next hop, the proxy MUST respond with a message
   using status code 471 (Connection Credentials Not Accepted).

   An RTSP request in the direction server to client MUST NOT include
   the Accept-Credentials header.  As for the non-secured communication,
   the possibility for these requests depends on the presence of a
   client established connection.  However, if the server-to-client
   request is in relation to a session established over a TLS secured
   channel, it MUST be sent in a TLS secured connection.  That secured
   connection MUST also be the one used by the last client-to-server
   request.  If no such transport connection exists at the time when the
   server desires to send the request, the server MUST discard the

   Further policies MAY be defined and registered, but this should be
   done with caution.

19.3.2. User-Approved TLS Procedure

For the "User" method, each proxy MUST perform the following procedure for each RTSP request: o Set up the TLS session to the next hop if not already present (i.e., run the TLS handshake, but do not send the RTSP request).
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   o  Extract the peer certificate chain for the TLS session.

   o  Check if a matching identity and hash of the peer certificate are
      present in the Accept-Credentials header.  If present, send the
      message to the next hop and conclude these procedures.  If not, go
      to the next step.

   o  The proxy responds to the RTSP request with a 470 or 407 response
      code.  The 407 response code MAY be used when the proxy requires
      both user and connection authorization from user or client.  In
      this message the proxy MUST include a Connection-Credentials
      header, see Section 18.13, with the next hop's identity and

   The client MUST upon receiving a 470 (Connection Authorization
   Required) or 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response with
   Connection-Credentials header take the decision on whether or not to
   accept the certificate (if it cannot do so, the user SHOULD be
   consulted).  Using IP addresses in the next-hop URI and certificates
   rather than domain names makes it very difficult for a user to
   determine whether or not it should approve the next hop.  Proxies are
   RECOMMENDED to use domain names to identify themselves in URIs and in
   the certificates.  If the certificate is accepted, the client has to
   again send the RTSP request.  In that request, the client has to
   include the Accept-Credentials header including the hash over the
   DER-encoded certificate for all trusted proxies in the chain.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 192

   C->P: SETUP rtsps:// RTSP/2.0
         CSeq: 2
         Transport: RTP/AVP;unicast;dest_addr=""/
         Accept-Ranges: npt, smpte, clock
         Accept-Credentials: User

   P->C: RTSP/2.0 470 Connection Authorization Required
         CSeq: 2
         Connection-Credentials: "rtsps://";

   C->P: SETUP rtsps:// RTSP/2.0
         CSeq: 3
         Transport: RTP/AVP;unicast;dest_addr=""/
         Accept-Credentials: User "rtsps://";sha-256;
         Accept-Ranges: npt, smpte, clock

   P->S: SETUP rtsps:// RTSP/2.0
         CSeq: 3
         Transport: RTP/AVP;unicast;dest_addr=""/
         Via: RTSP/2.0
         Accept-Credentials: User "rtsps://";sha-256;
         Accept-Ranges: npt, smpte, clock

   One implication of this process is that the connection for secured
   RTSP messages may take significantly more round-trip times for the
   first message.  A complete extra message exchange between the proxy
   connecting to the next hop and the client results because of the
   process for approval for each hop.  However, if each message contains
   the chain of proxies that the requester accepts, the remaining
   message exchange should not be delayed.  The procedure of including
   the credentials in each request rather than building state in each
   proxy avoids the need for revocation procedures.

20. Syntax

The RTSP syntax is described in an Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) as defined in RFC 5234 [RFC5234]. It uses the basic definitions present in RFC 5234.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 193
   Please note that ABNF strings, e.g., "Accept", are case insensitive
   as specified in Section 2.3 of RFC 5234.

   The RTSP syntax makes use of the ISO 10646 character set in UTF-8
   encoding [RFC3629].

20.1. Base Syntax

RTSP header values can be folded onto multiple lines if the continuation line begins with a space or horizontal tab. All linear whitespace, including folding, has the same semantics as SP. A recipient MAY replace any linear whitespace with a single SP before interpreting the field-value or forwarding the message downstream. The SWS construct is used when linear whitespace is optional, generally between tokens and separators. To separate the header name from the rest of value, a colon is used, which, by the above rule, allows whitespace before, but no line break, and whitespace after, including a line break. The HCOLON defines this construct. OCTET = %x00-FF ; any 8-bit sequence of data CHAR = %x01-7F ; any US-ASCII character (octets 1 - 127) UPALPHA = %x41-5A ; any US-ASCII uppercase letter "A".."Z" LOALPHA = %x61-7A ; any US-ASCII lowercase letter "a".."z" ALPHA = UPALPHA / LOALPHA DIGIT = %x30-39 ; any US-ASCII digit "0".."9" CTL = %x00-1F / %x7F ; any US-ASCII control character ; (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127) CR = %x0D ; US-ASCII CR, carriage return (13) LF = %x0A ; US-ASCII LF, linefeed (10) SP = %x20 ; US-ASCII SP, space (32) HT = %x09 ; US-ASCII HT, horizontal-tab (9) BACKSLASH = %x5C ; US-ASCII backslash (92) CRLF = CR LF LWS = [CRLF] 1*( SP / HT ) ; Line-breaking whitespace SWS = [LWS] ; Separating whitespace HCOLON = *( SP / HT ) ":" SWS TEXT = %x20-7E / %x80-FF ; any OCTET except CTLs tspecials = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@" / "," / ";" / ":" / BACKSLASH / DQUOTE / "/" / "[" / "]" / "?" / "=" / "{" / "}" / SP / HT token = 1*(%x21 / %x23-27 / %x2A-2B / %x2D-2E / %x30-39 / %x41-5A / %x5E-7A / %x7C / %x7E) ; 1*<any CHAR except CTLs or tspecials> quoted-string = ( DQUOTE *qdtext DQUOTE )
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 194
   qdtext          = %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / quoted-pair
                   / UTF8-NONASCII
                   ; No DQUOTE and no "\"
   quoted-pair     = "\\" / ( "\" DQUOTE )
   ctext           =  %x20-27 / %x2A-7E
                   /  %x80-FF  ; any OCTET except CTLs, "(" and ")"
   generic-param   =  token [ EQUAL gen-value ]
   gen-value       =  token / host / quoted-string

   safe            =  "$" / "-" / "_" / "." / "+"
   extra           =  "!" / "*" / "'" / "(" / ")" / ","
   rtsp-extra      =  "!" / "*" / "'" / "(" / ")"

   HEX             =  DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"
                   /  "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
   LHEX            =  DIGIT /  "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
                      ; lowercase "a-f" Hex
   reserved        =  ";" / "/" / "?" / ":" / "@" / "&" / "="

   unreserved      =  ALPHA / DIGIT / safe / extra
   rtsp-unreserved  =  ALPHA / DIGIT / safe / rtsp-extra

   base64          =  *base64-unit [base64-pad]
   base64-unit     =  4base64-char
   base64-pad      =  (2base64-char "==") / (3base64-char "=")
   base64-char     =  ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/"
   SLASH    =  SWS "/" SWS ; slash
   EQUAL    =  SWS "=" SWS ; equal
   LPAREN   =  SWS "(" SWS ; left parenthesis
   RPAREN   =  SWS ")" SWS ; right parenthesis
   COMMA    =  SWS "," SWS ; comma
   SEMI     =  SWS ";" SWS ; semicolon
   COLON    =  SWS ":" SWS ; colon
   MINUS    =  SWS "-" SWS ; minus/dash
   LDQUOT   =  SWS DQUOTE ; open double quotation mark
   RDQUOT   =  DQUOTE SWS ; close double quotation mark
   RAQUOT   =  ">" SWS ; right angle quote
   LAQUOT   =  SWS "<" ; left angle quote

   TEXT-UTF8char    =  %x21-7E / UTF8-NONASCII
   UTF8-NONASCII    = UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4
   UTF8-1           = <As defined in RFC 3629>
   UTF8-2           = <As defined in RFC 3629>
   UTF8-3           = <As defined in RFC 3629>
   UTF8-4           = <As defined in RFC 3629>
   UTF8-tail        = <As defined in RFC 3629>
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 195
   POS-FLOAT        = 1*12DIGIT ["." 1*9DIGIT]
   FLOAT            = ["-"] POS-FLOAT

20.2. RTSP Protocol Definition

20.2.1. Generic Protocol Elements

RTSP-IRI = schemes ":" IRI-rest IRI-rest = ihier-part [ "?" iquery ] ihier-part = "//" iauthority ipath-abempty RTSP-IRI-ref = RTSP-IRI / irelative-ref irelative-ref = irelative-part [ "?" iquery ] irelative-part = "//" iauthority ipath-abempty / ipath-absolute / ipath-noscheme / ipath-empty iauthority = < As defined in RFC 3987> ipath = ipath-abempty ; begins with "/" or is empty / ipath-absolute ; begins with "/" but not "//" / ipath-noscheme ; begins with a non-colon segment / ipath-rootless ; begins with a segment / ipath-empty ; zero characters ipath-abempty = *( "/" isegment ) ipath-absolute = "/" [ isegment-nz *( "/" isegment ) ] ipath-noscheme = isegment-nz-nc *( "/" isegment ) ipath-rootless = isegment-nz *( "/" isegment ) ipath-empty = 0<ipchar> isegment = *ipchar [";" *ipchar] isegment-nz = 1*ipchar [";" *ipchar] / ";" *ipchar isegment-nz-nc = (1*ipchar-nc [";" *ipchar-nc]) / ";" *ipchar-nc ; non-zero-length segment without any colon ":" ; No parameter (; delimited) inside path. ipchar = iunreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@" ipchar-nc = iunreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / "@" ; sub-delims is different from RFC 3987 ; not including ";" iquery = < As defined in RFC 3987> iunreserved = < As defined in RFC 3987> pct-encoded = < As defined in RFC 3987>
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   RTSP-URI       =  schemes ":" URI-rest
   RTSP-REQ-URI   =  schemes ":" URI-req-rest
   RTSP-URI-Ref   =  RTSP-URI / RTSP-Relative
   schemes        =  "rtsp" / "rtsps" / scheme
   scheme         =  < As defined in RFC 3986>
   URI-rest       =  hier-part [ "?" query ]
   URI-req-rest   =  hier-part [ "?" query ]
                     ; Note fragment part not allowed in requests
   hier-part      =  "//" authority path-abempty

   RTSP-Relative  =  relative-part [ "?" query ]
   RTSP-REQ-Rel   =  relative-part [ "?" query ]
   relative-part  =  "//" authority path-abempty
                     / path-absolute
                     / path-noscheme
                     / path-empty

   authority      =  < As defined in RFC 3986>
   query          =  < As defined in RFC 3986>

   path           =  path-abempty    ; begins with "/" or is empty
                     / path-absolute ; begins with "/" but not "//"
                     / path-noscheme ; begins with a non-colon segment
                     / path-rootless ; begins with a segment
                     / path-empty    ; zero characters

   path-abempty   =  *( "/" segment )
   path-absolute  =  "/" [ segment-nz *( "/" segment ) ]
   path-noscheme  =  segment-nz-nc *( "/" segment )
   path-rootless  =  segment-nz *( "/" segment )
   path-empty     =  0<pchar>

   segment        =  *pchar [";" *pchar]
   segment-nz     =  ( 1*pchar [";" *pchar]) / (";" *pchar)
   segment-nz-nc  =  ( 1*pchar-nc [";" *pchar-nc]) / (";" *pchar-nc)
                     ; non-zero-length segment without any colon ":"
                     ; No parameter (; delimited) inside path.

   pchar          =  unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@"
   pchar-nc       =  unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / "@"

   sub-delims     =  "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
                     / "*" / "+" / "," / "="
                     ; sub-delims is different from RFC 3986/3987
                     ; not including ";"
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 197
   smpte-range        =  smpte-type [EQUAL smpte-range-spec]
                         ; See section 4.4
   smpte-range-spec   =  ( smpte-time "-" [ smpte-time ] )
                      /  ( "-" smpte-time )
   smpte-type         =  "smpte" / "smpte-30-drop"
                      /  "smpte-25" / smpte-type-extension
                      ; other timecodes may be added
   smpte-type-extension  =  "smpte" token
   smpte-time         =  1*2DIGIT ":" 1*2DIGIT ":" 1*2DIGIT
                         [ ":" 1*2DIGIT [ "." 1*2DIGIT ] ]

   npt-range        =  "npt" [EQUAL npt-range-spec]
   npt-range-spec   =  ( npt-time "-" [ npt-time ] ) / ( "-" npt-time )
   npt-time         =  "now" / npt-sec / npt-hhmmss / npt-hhmmss-comp
   npt-sec          =  1*19DIGIT [ "." 1*9DIGIT ]
   npt-hhmmss       =  npt-hh ":" npt-mm ":" npt-ss [ "." 1*9DIGIT ]
   npt-hh           =  2*19DIGIT   ; any positive number
   npt-mm           =  2*2DIGIT  ; 0-59
   npt-ss           =  2*2DIGIT  ; 0-59
   npt-hhmmss-comp  =  npt-hh-comp ":" npt-mm-comp ":" npt-ss-comp
                       [ "." 1*9DIGIT ] ; Compatibility format
   npt-hh-comp      =  1*19DIGIT   ; any positive number
   npt-mm-comp      =  1*2DIGIT  ; 0-59
   npt-ss-comp      =  1*2DIGIT  ; 0-59

   utc-range        =  "clock" [EQUAL utc-range-spec]
   utc-range-spec   =  ( utc-time "-" [ utc-time ] ) / ( "-" utc-time )
   utc-time         =  utc-date "T" utc-clock "Z"
   utc-date         =  8DIGIT
   utc-clock        =  6DIGIT [ "." 1*9DIGIT ]

   feature-tag       =  token

   session-id        =  1*256( ALPHA / DIGIT / safe )

   extension-header  =  header-name HCOLON header-value
   header-name       =  token
   header-value      =  *(TEXT-UTF8char / LWS)
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 198

20.2.2. Message Syntax

RTSP-message = Request / Response ; RTSP/2.0 messages Request = Request-Line *((general-header / request-header / message-body-header) CRLF) CRLF [ message-body-data ] Response = Status-Line *((general-header / response-header / message-body-header) CRLF) CRLF [ message-body-data ] Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP RTSP-Version CRLF Status-Line = RTSP-Version SP Status-Code SP Reason-Phrase CRLF Method = "DESCRIBE" / "GET_PARAMETER" / "OPTIONS" / "PAUSE" / "PLAY" / "PLAY_NOTIFY" / "REDIRECT" / "SETUP" / "SET_PARAMETER" / "TEARDOWN" / extension-method extension-method = token Request-URI = "*" / RTSP-REQ-URI RTSP-Version = "RTSP/" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT message-body-data = 1*OCTET Status-Code = "100" ; Continue / "200" ; OK / "301" ; Moved Permanently / "302" ; Found / "303" ; See Other / "304" ; Not Modified / "305" ; Use Proxy
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                /  "400"  ; Bad Request
                /  "401"  ; Unauthorized
                /  "402"  ; Payment Required
                /  "403"  ; Forbidden
                /  "404"  ; Not Found
                /  "405"  ; Method Not Allowed
                /  "406"  ; Not Acceptable
                /  "407"  ; Proxy Authentication Required
                /  "408"  ; Request Timeout
                /  "410"  ; Gone
                /  "412"  ; Precondition Failed
                /  "413"  ; Request Message Body Too Large
                /  "414"  ; Request-URI Too Long
                /  "415"  ; Unsupported Media Type
                /  "451"  ; Parameter Not Understood
                /  "452"  ; reserved
                /  "453"  ; Not Enough Bandwidth
                /  "454"  ; Session Not Found
                /  "455"  ; Method Not Valid In This State
                /  "456"  ; Header Field Not Valid for Resource
                /  "457"  ; Invalid Range
                /  "458"  ; Parameter Is Read-Only
                /  "459"  ; Aggregate Operation Not Allowed
                /  "460"  ; Only Aggregate Operation Allowed
                /  "461"  ; Unsupported Transport
                /  "462"  ; Destination Unreachable
                /  "463"  ; Destination Prohibited
                /  "464"  ; Data Transport Not Ready Yet
                /  "465"  ; Notification Reason Unknown
                /  "466"  ; Key Management Error
                /  "470"  ; Connection Authorization Required
                /  "471"  ; Connection Credentials Not Accepted
                /  "472"  ; Failure to Establish Secure Connection
                /  "500"  ; Internal Server Error
                /  "501"  ; Not Implemented
                /  "502"  ; Bad Gateway
                /  "503"  ; Service Unavailable
                /  "504"  ; Gateway Timeout
                /  "505"  ; RTSP Version Not Supported
                /  "551"  ; Option Not Supported
                /  "553"  ; Proxy Unavailable
                /  extension-code

   extension-code  =  3DIGIT

   Reason-Phrase   =  1*(TEXT-UTF8char / HT / SP)
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 200
   rtsp-header     = general-header
                   / request-header
                   / response-header
                   / message-body-header

   general-header  =  Accept-Ranges
                   /  Cache-Control
                   /  Connection
                   /  CSeq
                   /  Date
                   /  Media-Properties
                   /  Media-Range
                   /  Pipelined-Requests
                   /  Proxy-Supported
                   /  Range
                   /  RTP-Info
                   /  Scale
                   /  Seek-Style
                   /  Server
                   /  Session
                   /  Speed
                   /  Supported
                   /  Timestamp
                   /  Transport
                   /  User-Agent
                   /  Via
                   /  extension-header

   request-header  =  Accept
                   /  Accept-Credentials
                   /  Accept-Encoding
                   /  Accept-Language
                   /  Authorization
                   /  Bandwidth
                   /  Blocksize
                   /  From
                   /  If-Match
                   /  If-Modified-Since
                   /  If-None-Match
                   /  Notify-Reason
                   /  Proxy-Authorization
                   /  Proxy-Require
                   /  Referrer
                   /  Request-Status
                   /  Require
                   /  Terminate-Reason
                   /  extension-header
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 201
   response-header  =  Authentication-Info
                    /  Connection-Credentials
                    /  Location
                    /  MTag
                    /  Proxy-Authenticate
                    /  Proxy-Authentication-Info
                    /  Public
                    /  Retry-After
                    /  Unsupported
                    /  WWW-Authenticate
                    /  extension-header

   message-body-header    =  Allow
                    /  Content-Base
                    /  Content-Encoding
                    /  Content-Language
                    /  Content-Length
                    /  Content-Location
                    /  Content-Type
                    /  Expires
                    /  Last-Modified
                    /  extension-header

20.2.3. Header Syntax

Accept = "Accept" HCOLON [ accept-range *(COMMA accept-range) ] accept-range = media-type-range [SEMI accept-params] media-type-range = ( "*/*" / ( m-type SLASH "*" ) / ( m-type SLASH m-subtype ) ) *( SEMI m-parameter ) accept-params = "q" EQUAL qvalue *(SEMI generic-param ) qvalue = ( "0" [ "." *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." *3("0") ] ) Accept-Credentials = "Accept-Credentials" HCOLON cred-decision cred-decision = ("User" [LWS cred-info]) / "Proxy" / "Any" / (token [LWS 1*header-value]) ; For future extensions cred-info = cred-info-data *(COMMA cred-info-data) cred-info-data = DQUOTE RTSP-REQ-URI DQUOTE SEMI hash-alg SEMI base64 hash-alg = "sha-256" / extension-alg extension-alg = token Accept-Encoding = "Accept-Encoding" HCOLON
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 202
                        [ encoding *(COMMA encoding) ]
   encoding          =  codings [SEMI accept-params]
   codings           =  content-coding / "*"
   content-coding    =  "identity" / token
   Accept-Language   =  "Accept-Language" HCOLON
                        language *(COMMA language)
   language          =  language-range [SEMI accept-params]
   language-range    =  language-tag / "*"
   language-tag      =  primary-tag *( "-" subtag )
   primary-tag       =  1*8ALPHA
   subtag            =  1*8ALPHA
   Accept-Ranges     =  "Accept-Ranges" HCOLON acceptable-ranges
   acceptable-ranges =  (range-unit *(COMMA range-unit))
   range-unit        =  "npt" / "smpte" / "smpte-30-drop" / "smpte-25"
                        / "clock" / extension-format
   extension-format  =  token
   Allow             =  "Allow" HCOLON Method *(COMMA Method)
   Authentication-Info = "Authentication-Info" HCOLON auth-param-list
   auth-param-list   =  <As the Authentication-Info element in RFC 7615>
   Authorization     =  "Authorization" HCOLON credentials
   credentials       =  <As defined by RFC 7235>

   Bandwidth         =  "Bandwidth" HCOLON 1*19DIGIT

   Blocksize         =  "Blocksize" HCOLON 1*9DIGIT

   Cache-Control     =  "Cache-Control" HCOLON cache-directive
                        *(COMMA cache-directive)
   cache-directive   =  cache-rqst-directive
                     /  cache-rspns-directive

   cache-rqst-directive =  "no-cache"
                        /  "max-stale" [EQUAL delta-seconds]
                        /  "min-fresh" EQUAL delta-seconds
                        /  "only-if-cached"
                        /  cache-extension

   cache-rspns-directive =  "public"
                            /  "private"
                            /  "no-cache"
                            /  "no-transform"
                            /  "must-revalidate"
                            /  "proxy-revalidate"
                            /  "max-age" EQUAL delta-seconds
                            /  cache-extension

   cache-extension   =  token [EQUAL (token / quoted-string)]
   delta-seconds     =  1*19DIGIT
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 203
   Connection         =  "Connection" HCOLON connection-token
                         *(COMMA connection-token)
   connection-token   =  "close" / token

   Connection-Credentials = "Connection-Credentials" HCOLON cred-chain
   cred-chain         =  DQUOTE RTSP-REQ-URI DQUOTE SEMI base64

   Content-Base       =  "Content-Base" HCOLON RTSP-URI
   Content-Encoding   =  "Content-Encoding" HCOLON
                         content-coding *(COMMA content-coding)
   Content-Language   =  "Content-Language" HCOLON
                         language-tag *(COMMA language-tag)
   Content-Length     =  "Content-Length" HCOLON 1*19DIGIT
   Content-Location   =  "Content-Location" HCOLON RTSP-REQ-Ref
   Content-Type       =  "Content-Type" HCOLON media-type
   media-type         =  m-type SLASH m-subtype *(SEMI m-parameter)
   m-type             =  discrete-type / composite-type
   discrete-type      =  "text" / "image" / "audio" / "video"
                      /  "application" / extension-token
   composite-type   =  "message" / "multipart" / extension-token
   extension-token  =  ietf-token / x-token
   ietf-token       =  token
   x-token          =  "x-" token
   m-subtype        =  extension-token / iana-token
   iana-token       =  token
   m-parameter      =  m-attribute EQUAL m-value
   m-attribute      =  token
   m-value          =  token / quoted-string

   CSeq           =  "CSeq" HCOLON cseq-nr
   cseq-nr        =  1*9DIGIT
   Date           =  "Date" HCOLON RTSP-date
   RTSP-date      =  date-time ;
   date-time      =  <As defined in RFC 5322>
   Expires        =  "Expires" HCOLON RTSP-date
   From           =  "From" HCOLON from-spec
   from-spec      =  ( name-addr / addr-spec ) *( SEMI from-param )
   name-addr      =  [ display-name ] LAQUOT addr-spec RAQUOT
   addr-spec      =  RTSP-REQ-URI / absolute-URI
   absolute-URI   =  < As defined in RFC 3986>
   display-name   =  *(token LWS) / quoted-string
   from-param     =  tag-param / generic-param
   tag-param      =  "tag" EQUAL token
   If-Match       =  "If-Match" HCOLON ("*" / message-tag-list)
   message-tag-list =  message-tag *(COMMA message-tag)
   message-tag      =  [ weak ] opaque-tag
   weak             =  "W/"
   opaque-tag       =  quoted-string
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 204
   If-Modified-Since  =  "If-Modified-Since" HCOLON RTSP-date
   If-None-Match    =  "If-None-Match" HCOLON ("*" / message-tag-list)
   Last-Modified    =  "Last-Modified" HCOLON RTSP-date
   Location         =  "Location" HCOLON RTSP-REQ-URI
   Media-Properties = "Media-Properties" HCOLON [media-prop-list]
   media-prop-list  = media-prop-value *(COMMA media-prop-value)
   media-prop-value = ("Random-Access" [EQUAL POS-FLOAT])
                    / "Beginning-Only"
                    / "No-Seeking"
                    / "Immutable"
                    / "Dynamic"
                    / "Time-Progressing"
                    / "Unlimited"
                    / ("Time-Limited" EQUAL utc-time)
                    / ("Time-Duration" EQUAL POS-FLOAT)
                    / ("Scales" EQUAL scale-value-list)
                    / media-prop-ext
   media-prop-ext   = token [EQUAL (1*rtsp-unreserved / quoted-string)]
   scale-value-list = DQUOTE scale-entry *(COMMA scale-entry) DQUOTE
   scale-entry      = scale-value / (scale-value COLON scale-value)
   scale-value      = FLOAT
   Media-Range      = "Media-Range" HCOLON [ranges-list]
   ranges-list      =  ranges-spec *(COMMA ranges-spec)
   MTag             =  "MTag" HCOLON message-tag
   Notify-Reason    = "Notify-Reason" HCOLON Notify-Reas-val
   Notify-Reas-val  = "end-of-stream"
                    / "media-properties-update"
                    / "scale-change"
                    / Notify-Reason-extension
   Notify-Reason-extension  = token
   Pipelined-Requests = "Pipelined-Requests" HCOLON startup-id
   startup-id  = 1*8DIGIT

   Proxy-Authenticate =  "Proxy-Authenticate" HCOLON challenge-list
   challenge-list     = <As defined by the WWW-Authenticate in RFC 7235>
   Proxy-Authentication-Info = "Proxy-Authentication-Info" HCOLON
   Proxy-Authorization = "Proxy-Authorization" HCOLON credentials
   Proxy-Require      =  "Proxy-Require" HCOLON feature-tag-list
   feature-tag-list   =  feature-tag *(COMMA feature-tag)
   Proxy-Supported    =  "Proxy-Supported" HCOLON [feature-tag-list]

   Public             =  "Public" HCOLON Method *(COMMA Method)

   Range              =  "Range" HCOLON ranges-spec

   ranges-spec        =  npt-range / utc-range / smpte-range
                      /  range-ext
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 205
   range-ext          =  extension-format [EQUAL range-value]
   range-value        =  1*(rtsp-unreserved / quoted-string / ":" )

   Referrer           =  "Referrer" HCOLON (absolute-URI / RTSP-URI-Ref)
   Request-Status     =  "Request-Status" HCOLON req-status-info
   req-status-info    =  cseq-info LWS status-info LWS reason-info
   cseq-info          =  "cseq" EQUAL cseq-nr
   status-info        =  "status" EQUAL Status-Code
   reason-info        =  "reason" EQUAL DQUOTE Reason-Phrase DQUOTE
   Require            =  "Require" HCOLON feature-tag-list
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 206
   RTP-Info         =  "RTP-Info" HCOLON [rtsp-info-spec
                       *(COMMA rtsp-info-spec)]
   rtsp-info-spec   =  stream-url 1*ssrc-parameter
   stream-url       =  "url" EQUAL DQUOTE RTSP-REQ-Ref DQUOTE
   ssrc-parameter   =  LWS "ssrc" EQUAL ssrc HCOLON
                       ri-parameter *(SEMI ri-parameter)
   ri-parameter     =  ("seq" EQUAL 1*5DIGIT)
                    /  ("rtptime" EQUAL 1*10DIGIT)
                    /  generic-param

   Retry-After      =  "Retry-After" HCOLON (RTSP-date / delta-seconds)
   Scale            =  "Scale" HCOLON scale-value
   Seek-Style       =  "Seek-Style" HCOLON Seek-S-values
   Seek-S-values    =  "RAP"
                    /  "CoRAP"
                    /  "First-Prior"
                    /  "Next"
                    /  Seek-S-value-ext
   Seek-S-value-ext =  token

   Server           =  "Server" HCOLON ( product / comment )
                       *(LWS (product / comment))
   product          =  token [SLASH product-version]
   product-version  =  token
   comment          =  LPAREN *( ctext / quoted-pair) RPAREN

   Session          =  "Session" HCOLON session-id
                       [ SEMI "timeout" EQUAL delta-seconds ]

   Speed            =  "Speed" HCOLON lower-bound MINUS upper-bound
   lower-bound      =  POS-FLOAT
   upper-bound      =  POS-FLOAT

   Supported        =  "Supported" HCOLON [feature-tag-list]
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 207
   Terminate-Reason      =  "Terminate-Reason" HCOLON TR-Info
   TR-Info              =  TR-Reason *(SEMI TR-Parameter)
   TR-Reason            =  "Session-Timeout"
                        /  "Server-Admin"
                        /  "Internal-Error"
                        /  token
   TR-Parameter         =  TR-time / TR-user-msg / generic-param
   TR-time              =  "time" EQUAL utc-time
   TR-user-msg          =  "user-msg" EQUAL quoted-string

   Timestamp        =  "Timestamp" HCOLON timestamp-value [LWS delay]
   timestamp-value  =  *19DIGIT [ "." *9DIGIT ]
   delay            =  *9DIGIT [ "." *9DIGIT ]

   Transport        =  "Transport" HCOLON transport-spec
                       *(COMMA transport-spec)
   transport-spec   =  transport-id *trns-parameter
   transport-id     =  trans-id-rtp / other-trans
   trans-id-rtp     =  "RTP/" profile ["/" lower-transport]
                       ; no LWS is allowed inside transport-id
   other-trans      =  token *("/" token)
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 208
   profile           = "AVP" / "SAVP" / "AVPF" / "SAVPF" / token
   lower-transport   = "TCP" / "UDP" / token
   trns-parameter    = (SEMI ( "unicast" / "multicast" ))
                     / (SEMI "interleaved" EQUAL channel ["-" channel])
                     / (SEMI "ttl" EQUAL ttl)
                     / (SEMI "layers" EQUAL 1*DIGIT)
                     / (SEMI "ssrc" EQUAL ssrc *(SLASH ssrc))
                     / (SEMI "mode" EQUAL mode-spec)
                     / (SEMI "dest_addr" EQUAL addr-list)
                     / (SEMI "src_addr" EQUAL addr-list)
                     / (SEMI "setup" EQUAL contrans-setup)
                     / (SEMI "connection" EQUAL contrans-con)
                     / (SEMI "RTCP-mux")
                     / (SEMI "MIKEY" EQUAL MIKEY-Value)
                     / (SEMI trn-param-ext)
   contrans-setup    = "active" / "passive" / "actpass"
   contrans-con      = "new" / "existing"
   trn-param-ext     = par-name [EQUAL trn-par-value]
   par-name          = token
   trn-par-value     = *(rtsp-unreserved / quoted-string)
   ttl               = 1*3DIGIT ; 0 to 255
   ssrc              = 8HEX
   channel           = 1*3DIGIT ; 0 to 255
   MIKEY-Value       = base64
   mode-spec         = ( DQUOTE mode *(COMMA mode) DQUOTE )
   mode              = "PLAY" / token
   addr-list         = quoted-addr *(SLASH quoted-addr)
   quoted-addr       = DQUOTE (host-port / extension-addr) DQUOTE
   host-port         = ( host [":" port] )
                     / ( ":" port )
   extension-addr    = 1*qdtext
   host              = < As defined in RFC 3986>
   port              = < As defined in RFC 3986>
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 209
   Unsupported     = "Unsupported" HCOLON feature-tag-list
   User-Agent      = "User-Agent" HCOLON ( product / comment )
                     *(LWS (product / comment))
   Via             = "Via" HCOLON via-parm *(COMMA via-parm)
   via-parm        = sent-protocol LWS sent-by *( SEMI via-params )
   via-params      = via-ttl / via-maddr
                   / via-received / via-extension
   via-ttl         = "ttl" EQUAL ttl
   via-maddr       = "maddr" EQUAL host
   via-received    = "received" EQUAL (IPv4address / IPv6address)
   IPv4address     = < As defined in RFC 3986>
   IPv6address     = < As defined in RFC 3986>
   via-extension   = generic-param
   sent-protocol   = protocol-name SLASH protocol-version
                     SLASH transport-prot
   protocol-name   = "RTSP" / token
   protocol-version = token
   transport-prot  = "UDP" / "TCP" / "TLS" / other-transport
   other-transport = token
   sent-by         = host [ COLON port ]

   WWW-Authenticate = "WWW-Authenticate" HCOLON challenge-list

20.3. SDP Extension Syntax

This section defines in ABNF the SDP extensions defined for RTSP. See Appendix D for the definition of the extensions in text. control-attribute = "a=control:" *SP RTSP-REQ-Ref CRLF a-range-def = "a=range:" ranges-spec CRLF a-mtag-def = "a=mtag:" message-tag CRLF

21. Security Considerations

The security considerations and threats around RTSP and its usage can be divided into considerations around the signaling protocol itself and the issues related to the media-stream delivery. However, when it comes to mitigation of security threats, a threat depending on the media-stream delivery may in fact be mitigated by a mechanism in the signaling protocol.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 210
   There are several chapters and an appendix in this document that
   define security solutions for the protocol.  These sections will be
   referenced when discussing the threats below.  However, the reader
   should take special notice of the Security Framework (Section 19) and
   the specification of how to use SRTP and its key-management
   (Appendix C.1.4) to achieve certain aspects of the media security.

21.1. Signaling Protocol Threats

This section focuses on issues related to the signaling protocol. Because of the similarity in syntax and usage between RTSP servers and HTTP servers, the security considerations outlined in [RFC7230], [RFC7231], [RFC7232], [RFC7233], [RFC7234], and [RFC7235] apply as well. Specifically, please note the following: Abuse of Server Log Information: A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's requests that might identify their media consumption patterns or subjects of interest. This information is clearly confidential in nature, and its handling can be constrained by law in certain countries. Log information needs to be securely stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis. See Section 9.8 of [RFC7230] for additional guidelines. Transfer of Sensitive Information: There is no reason to believe that information transferred in RTSP message, such as the URI and the content of headers, especially the Server, Via, Referrer, and From headers, may be any less sensitive than when used in HTTP. Therefore, all of the precautions regarding the protection of data privacy and user privacy apply to implementers of RTSP clients, servers, and proxies. See Sections 9.3-9.6 of [RFC7231] for further details. The RTSP methods defined in this document are primarily used to establish and control the delivery of the media data represented by the URI; thus, the RTSP message bodies are generally less sensitive than the ones in HTTP. Where HTTP bodies could contain, for example, your medical records, in RTSP, the sensitive video of your medical operation would be in the media stream over the media-transport protocol, not in the RTSP message. Still, one has to take note of what potential sensitive information is included in RTSP. The protection of the media data is separate, can be applied directly between client and server, and is dependent on the media-transport protocol in use. See Section 21.2 for further discussion. This possibility for separation of security between media-
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 211
         resource content and the signaling protocol mitigates the risk
         of exposing the media content when using hop-by-hop security
         for RTSP signaling using proxies (Section 19.3).

   Attacks Based On File and Path Names:  Though RTSP URIs are opaque
         handles that do not necessarily have file-system semantics, it
         is anticipated that many implementations will translate
         portions of the Request-URIs directly to file-system calls.  In
         such cases, file systems SHOULD follow the precautions outlined
         in Section 9.1 of [RFC7231], such as checking for ".." in path

   Personal Information:  RTSP clients are often privy to the same
         information that HTTP clients are (username, location, etc.)
         and thus should be equally sensitive.  See Section 9.8 of
         [RFC7230], Sections 9.3-9.7 of [RFC7231], and Section 8 of
         [RFC7234] for further recommendations.

   Privacy Issues Connected to Accept Headers:  Since similar usages of
         the "Accept" headers exist in RTSP as in HTTP, the same caveats
         outlined in Section 9.4 of [RFC7231] with regard to their use
         should be followed.

   Establishing Authority:  RTSP shares with HTTP the question of how a
         client communicates with the authoritative source for media
         streams (Section 9.1 of [RFC7230]).  The used DNS servers, the
         security of the communication, and any possibility of a man in
         the middle, and the trust in any RTSP proxies all affect the
         possibility that a client has received a non-authoritative
         response to a request.  Ensuring that a client receives an
         authoritative response is challenging, although using the
         secure communication for RTSP signaling (rtsps) simplifies it
         significantly as the server can provide a hostname identity
         assertion in the TLS handshake.

   Location Headers and Spoofing:  If a single server supports multiple
         organizations that do not trust each another, then it MUST
         check the values of the Content-Location header fields in
         responses that are generated under control of said
         organizations to make sure that they do not attempt to
         invalidate resources over which they have no authority (see
         Section 15.4 of [RFC2616]).

   In addition to the recommendations in the current HTTP specifications
   ([RFC7230], [RFC7231], [RFC7232], [RFC7233], [RFC7234], and [RFC7235]
   as of this writing) and also those of the previous relevant RFCs
   [RFC2068] [RFC2616], future HTTP specifications may provide
   additional guidance on security issues.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 212
   The following are added considerations for RTSP implementations.

   Session Hijacking:  Since there is no or little relation between a
         transport-layer connection and an RTSP session, it is possible
         for a malicious client to issue requests with random session
         identifiers that could affect other clients of an unsuspecting
         server.  To mitigate this, the server SHALL use a large, random
         and non-sequential session identifier to minimize the
         possibility of this kind of attack.  However, unless the RTSP
         signaling is always confidentiality protected, e.g., using TLS,
         an on-path attacker will be able to hijack a session.  Another
         choice for preventing session hijacking is to use client
         authentication and only allow the authenticated client creating
         the session to access that session.

   Authentication:  Servers SHOULD implement both basic and Digest
         [RFC2617] authentication.  In environments requiring tighter
         security for the control messages, the transport-layer
         mechanism TLS [RFC5246] SHOULD be used.

   Suspicious Behavior:  Upon detecting instances of behavior that is
         deemed a security risk, RTSP servers SHOULD return error code
         403 (Forbidden).  RTSP servers SHOULD also be aware of attempts
         to probe the server for weaknesses and entry points and MAY
         arbitrarily disconnect and ignore further requests from clients
         that are deemed to be in violation of local security policy.

   TLS through Proxies:  If one uses the possibility to connect TLS in
         multiple legs (Section 19.3), one really needs to be aware of
         the trust model.  This procedure requires trust in all proxies
         part of the path to the server.  The proxies one connects
         through are identified, assuming the proxies so far connected
         through are well behaved and fulfilling the trust.  The
         accepted proxies are men in the middle and have access to all
         that goes on over the TLS connection.  Thus, it is important to
         consider if that trust model is acceptable in the actual
         application.  Further discussion of the actual trust model is
         in Section 19.3.  It is important to note what difference in
         security properties, if any, may exist with the used media-
         transport protocol and its security mechanism.  Using SRTP and
         the MIKEY-based key-establishment defined in Appendix C.1.4.1
         enables media key-establishment to be done end-to-end without
         revealing the keys to the proxies.
Top   ToC   RFC7826 - Page 213
   Resource Exhaustion:  As RTSP is a stateful protocol and establishes
         resource usage on the server, there is a clear possibility to
         attack the server by trying to overbook these resources to
         perform a DoS attack.  This attack can be both against ongoing
         sessions and to prevent others from establishing sessions.
         RTSP agents will need to have mechanisms to prevent single
         peers from consuming extensive amounts of resources.  The
         methods for guarding against this are varied and depend on the
         agent's role and capabilities and policies.  Each
         implementation has to carefully consider its methods and
         policies to mitigate this threat.  There are recommendations
         regarding the handling of connections in Section 10.7.

   The above threats and considerations have resulted in a set of
   security functions and mechanisms built into or used by the protocol.
   The signaling protocol relies on two security features defined in the
   Security Framework (Section 19): namely client authentication using
   HTTP authentication and TLS-based transport protection of the
   signaling messages.  Both of these mechanisms are required to be
   implemented by any RTSP agent.

   A number of different security mitigations have been designed into
   the protocol and will be instantiated if the specification is
   implemented as written, for example, by ensuring sufficient amounts
   of entropy in the randomly generated session identifiers when not
   using client authentication to minimize the risk of session
   hijacking.  When client authentication is used, protection against
   hijacking will be greatly improved by scoping the accessible sessions
   to the one this client identity has created.  Some of the above
   threats are such that the implementation of the RTSP functionality
   itself needs to consider which policy and strategy it uses to
   mitigate them.

(page 213 continued on part 10)

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