Section 20.10). Unlike HTTP, the SIP response MAY contain several Contact fields or a list of addresses in a Contact field. UAs MAY use the Contact header field value for automatic redirection or MAY ask the user to confirm a choice. However, this specification does not define any standard for such automatic selection. This status response is appropriate if the callee can be reached at several different locations and the server cannot or prefers not to proxy the request. Section 20.10). The requestor SHOULD update any local directories, address books, and user location caches with this new value and redirect future requests to the address(es) listed. Section 20.10). The Request-URI of the new request uses the value of the Contact header field in the response.
The duration of the validity of the Contact URI can be indicated through an Expires (Section 20.19) header field or an expires parameter in the Contact header field. Both proxies and UAs MAY cache this URI for the duration of the expiration time. If there is no explicit expiration time, the address is only valid once for recursing, and MUST NOT be cached for future transactions. If the URI cached from the Contact header field fails, the Request- URI from the redirected request MAY be tried again a single time. The temporary URI may have become out-of-date sooner than the expiration time, and a new temporary URI may be available.
Section 22.214.171.124. Section 126.96.36.199. Section 20.29) or Require (Section 20.32) header field. The server MUST include a list of the unsupported extensions in an Unsupported header field in the response. UAC processing of this response is described in Section 188.8.131.52.
10.2.8, 10.3, and 20.23. Section 16.3 Item 4).
Section 20.22) header field with the value zero.
elsewhere, such as through a voice mail service. Status 600 (Busy Everywhere) SHOULD be used if the client knows that no other end system will be able to accept this call. Section 14.2 describes how such "glare" situations are resolved. Section 23.2.
A message body containing a description of media capabilities MAY be present in the response, which is formatted according to the Accept header field in the INVITE (or application/sdp if not present), the same as a message body in a 200 (OK) response to an OPTIONS request. It is hoped that negotiation will not frequently be needed, and when a new user is being invited to join an already existing conference, negotiation may not be possible. It is up to the invitation initiator to decide whether or not to act on a 606 (Not Acceptable) response. This status response is returned only if the client knows that no other end point will answer the request. Section 22.1), it MAY challenge the initiator of the request to provide assurance of its identity. Once the originator has been identified, the recipient of the request SHOULD ascertain whether or not this user is authorized to make the request in question. No authorization systems are recommended or discussed in this document. The "Digest" authentication mechanism described in this section provides message authentication and replay protection only, without message integrity or confidentiality. Protective measures above and beyond those provided by Digest need to be taken to prevent active attackers from modifying SIP requests and responses. Note that due to its weak security, the usage of "Basic" authentication has been deprecated. Servers MUST NOT accept credentials using the "Basic" authorization scheme, and servers also MUST NOT challenge with "Basic". This is a change from RFC 2543. RFC 2617 ). In particular, the BNF for auth-scheme, auth-param, challenge, realm, realm-value, and credentials is identical (although the usage of "Basic" as a scheme is not permitted). In SIP, a UAS uses the 401 (Unauthorized) response to challenge the identity of a UAC. Additionally, registrars and redirect servers MAY make use of 401 (Unauthorized) responses for authentication, but proxies MUST NOT, and instead MAY use the 407 (Proxy Authentication Required)
response. The requirements for inclusion of the Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization, WWW-Authenticate, and Authorization in the various messages are identical to those described in RFC 2617 . Since SIP does not have the concept of a canonical root URL, the notion of protection spaces is interpreted differently in SIP. The realm string alone defines the protection domain. This is a change from RFC 2543, in which the Request-URI and the realm together defined the protection domain. This previous definition of protection domain caused some amount of confusion since the Request-URI sent by the UAC and the Request-URI received by the challenging server might be different, and indeed the final form of the Request-URI might not be known to the UAC. Also, the previous definition depended on the presence of a SIP URI in the Request-URI and seemed to rule out alternative URI schemes (for example, the tel URL). Operators of user agents or proxy servers that will authenticate received requests MUST adhere to the following guidelines for creation of a realm string for their server: o Realm strings MUST be globally unique. It is RECOMMENDED that a realm string contain a hostname or domain name, following the recommendation in Section 3.2.1 of RFC 2617 . o Realm strings SHOULD present a human-readable identifier that can be rendered to a user. For example: INVITE sip:email@example.com SIP/2.0 Authorization: Digest realm="biloxi.com", <...> Generally, SIP authentication is meaningful for a specific realm, a protection domain. Thus, for Digest authentication, each such protection domain has its own set of usernames and passwords. If a server does not require authentication for a particular request, it MAY accept a default username, "anonymous", which has no password (password of ""). Similarly, UACs representing many users, such as PSTN gateways, MAY have their own device-specific username and password, rather than accounts for particular users, for their realm. While a server can legitimately challenge most SIP requests, there are two requests defined by this document that require special handling for authentication: ACK and CANCEL.
Under an authentication scheme that uses responses to carry values used to compute nonces (such as Digest), some problems come up for any requests that take no response, including ACK. For this reason, any credentials in the INVITE that were accepted by a server MUST be accepted by that server for the ACK. UACs creating an ACK message will duplicate all of the Authorization and Proxy-Authorization header field values that appeared in the INVITE to which the ACK corresponds. Servers MUST NOT attempt to challenge an ACK. Although the CANCEL method does take a response (a 2xx), servers MUST NOT attempt to challenge CANCEL requests since these requests cannot be resubmitted. Generally, a CANCEL request SHOULD be accepted by a server if it comes from the same hop that sent the request being canceled (provided that some sort of transport or network layer security association, as described in Section 26.2.1, is in place). When a UAC receives a challenge, it SHOULD render to the user the contents of the "realm" parameter in the challenge (which appears in either a WWW-Authenticate header field or Proxy-Authenticate header field) if the UAC device does not already know of a credential for the realm in question. A service provider that pre-configures UAs with credentials for its realm should be aware that users will not have the opportunity to present their own credentials for this realm when challenged at a pre-configured device. Finally, note that even if a UAC can locate credentials that are associated with the proper realm, the potential exists that these credentials may no longer be valid or that the challenging server will not accept these credentials for whatever reason (especially when "anonymous" with no password is submitted). In this instance a server may repeat its challenge, or it may respond with a 403 Forbidden. A UAC MUST NOT re-attempt requests with the credentials that have just been rejected (though the request may be retried if the nonce was stale).
An example of the WWW-Authenticate header field in a 401 challenge is: WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="biloxi.com", qop="auth,auth-int", nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" When the originating UAC receives the 401 (Unauthorized), it SHOULD, if it is able, re-originate the request with the proper credentials. The UAC may require input from the originating user before proceeding. Once authentication credentials have been supplied (either directly by the user, or discovered in an internal keyring), UAs SHOULD cache the credentials for a given value of the To header field and "realm" and attempt to re-use these values on the next request for that destination. UAs MAY cache credentials in any way they would like. If no credentials for a realm can be located, UACs MAY attempt to retry the request with a username of "anonymous" and no password (a password of ""). Once credentials have been located, any UA that wishes to authenticate itself with a UAS or registrar -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) response -- MAY do so by including an Authorization header field with the request. The Authorization field value consists of credentials containing the authentication information of the UA for the realm of the resource being requested as well as parameters required in support of authentication and replay protection. An example of the Authorization header field is: Authorization: Digest username="bob", realm="biloxi.com", nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", uri="sip:firstname.lastname@example.org", qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce="0a4f113b", response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" When a UAC resubmits a request with its credentials after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) or 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response, it MUST increment the CSeq header field value as it would normally when sending an updated request.
17], with one difference. Proxies MUST NOT add values to the Proxy-Authorization header field. All 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) responses MUST be forwarded upstream toward the UAC following the procedures for any other response. It is the UAC's responsibility to add the Proxy-Authorization header field value containing credentials for the realm of the proxy that has asked for authentication. If a proxy were to resubmit a request adding a Proxy-Authorization header field value, it would need to increment the CSeq in the new request. However, this would cause the UAC that submitted the original request to discard a response from the UAS, as the CSeq value would be different. When the originating UAC receives the 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) it SHOULD, if it is able, re-originate the request with the proper credentials. It should follow the same procedures for the display of the "realm" parameter that are given above for responding to 401. If no credentials for a realm can be located, UACs MAY attempt to retry the request with a username of "anonymous" and no password (a password of ""). The UAC SHOULD also cache the credentials used in the re-originated request. The following rule is RECOMMENDED for proxy credential caching: If a UA receives a Proxy-Authenticate header field value in a 401/407 response to a request with a particular Call-ID, it should incorporate credentials for that realm in all subsequent requests that contain the same Call-ID. These credentials MUST NOT be cached across dialogs; however, if a UA is configured with the realm of its local outbound proxy, when one exists, then the UA MAY cache
credentials for that realm across dialogs. Note that this does mean a future request in a dialog could contain credentials that are not needed by any proxy along the Route header path. Any UA that wishes to authenticate itself to a proxy server -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response -- MAY do so by including a Proxy- Authorization header field value with the request. The Proxy- Authorization request-header field allows the client to identify itself (or its user) to a proxy that requires authentication. The Proxy-Authorization header field value consists of credentials containing the authentication information of the UA for the proxy and/or realm of the resource being requested. A Proxy-Authorization header field value applies only to the proxy whose realm is identified in the "realm" parameter (this proxy may previously have demanded authentication using the Proxy-Authenticate field). When multiple proxies are used in a chain, a Proxy- Authorization header field value MUST NOT be consumed by any proxy whose realm does not match the "realm" parameter specified in that value. Note that if an authentication scheme that does not support realms is used in the Proxy-Authorization header field, a proxy server MUST attempt to parse all Proxy-Authorization header field values to determine whether one of them has what the proxy server considers to be valid credentials. Because this is potentially very time- consuming in large networks, proxy servers SHOULD use an authentication scheme that supports realms in the Proxy-Authorization header field. If a request is forked (as described in Section 16.7), various proxy servers and/or UAs may wish to challenge the UAC. In this case, the forking proxy server is responsible for aggregating these challenges into a single response. Each WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate value received in responses to the forked request MUST be placed into the single response that is sent by the forking proxy to the UA; the ordering of these header field values is not significant. When a proxy server issues a challenge in response to a request, it will not proxy the request until the UAC has retried the request with valid credentials. A forking proxy may forward a request simultaneously to multiple proxy servers that require authentication, each of which in turn will not forward the request until the originating UAC has authenticated itself in their respective realm. If the UAC does not provide credentials for
each challenge, the proxy servers that issued the challenges will not forward requests to the UA where the destination user might be located, and therefore, the virtues of forking are largely lost. When resubmitting its request in response to a 401 (Unauthorized) or 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) that contains multiple challenges, a UAC MAY include an Authorization value for each WWW- Authenticate value and a Proxy-Authorization value for each Proxy- Authenticate value for which the UAC wishes to supply a credential. As noted above, multiple credentials in a request SHOULD be differentiated by the "realm" parameter. It is possible for multiple challenges associated with the same realm to appear in the same 401 (Unauthorized) or 407 (Proxy Authentication Required). This can occur, for example, when multiple proxies within the same administrative domain, which use a common realm, are reached by a forking request. When it retries a request, a UAC MAY therefore supply multiple credentials in Authorization or Proxy-Authorization header fields with the same "realm" parameter value. The same credentials SHOULD be used for the same realm. 17]. Since RFC 2543 is based on HTTP Digest as defined in RFC 2069 , SIP servers supporting RFC 2617 MUST ensure they are backwards compatible with RFC 2069. Procedures for this backwards compatibility are specified in RFC 2617. Note, however, that SIP servers MUST NOT accept or request Basic authentication. The rules for Digest authentication follow those defined in , with "HTTP/1.1" replaced by "SIP/2.0" in addition to the following differences: 1. The URI included in the challenge has the following BNF: URI = SIP-URI / SIPS-URI 2. The BNF in RFC 2617 has an error in that the 'uri' parameter of the Authorization header field for HTTP Digest
authentication is not enclosed in quotation marks. (The example in Section 3.5 of RFC 2617 is correct.) For SIP, the 'uri' MUST be enclosed in quotation marks. 3. The BNF for digest-uri-value is: digest-uri-value = Request-URI ; as defined in Section 25 4. The example procedure for choosing a nonce based on Etag does not work for SIP. 5. The text in RFC 2617  regarding cache operation does not apply to SIP. 6. RFC 2617  requires that a server check that the URI in the request line and the URI included in the Authorization header field point to the same resource. In a SIP context, these two URIs may refer to different users, due to forwarding at some proxy. Therefore, in SIP, a server MAY check that the Request-URI in the Authorization header field value corresponds to a user for whom the server is willing to accept forwarded or direct requests, but it is not necessarily a failure if the two fields are not equivalent. 7. As a clarification to the calculation of the A2 value for message integrity assurance in the Digest authentication scheme, implementers should assume, when the entity-body is empty (that is, when SIP messages have no body) that the hash of the entity-body resolves to the MD5 hash of an empty string, or: H(entity-body) = MD5("") = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" 8. RFC 2617 notes that a cnonce value MUST NOT be sent in an Authorization (and by extension Proxy-Authorization) header field if no qop directive has been sent. Therefore, any algorithms that have a dependency on the cnonce (including "MD5-Sess") require that the qop directive be sent. Use of the "qop" parameter is optional in RFC 2617 for the purposes of backwards compatibility with RFC 2069; since RFC 2543 was based on RFC 2069, the "qop" parameter must unfortunately remain optional for clients and servers to receive. However, servers MUST always send a "qop" parameter in WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate header field values. If a client receives a "qop" parameter in a challenge header field, it MUST send the "qop" parameter in any resulting authorization header field.
RFC 2543 did not allow usage of the Authentication-Info header field (it effectively used RFC 2069). However, we now allow usage of this header field, since it provides integrity checks over the bodies and provides mutual authentication. RFC 2617  defines mechanisms for backwards compatibility using the qop attribute in the request. These mechanisms MUST be used by a server to determine if the client supports the new mechanisms in RFC 2617 that were not specified in RFC 2069. RFC 1847 , RFC 2630  and RFC 2633 ). Implementers should note, however, that there may be rare network intermediaries (not typical proxy servers) that rely on viewing or modifying the bodies of SIP messages (especially SDP), and that secure MIME may prevent these sorts of intermediaries from functioning. This applies particularly to certain types of firewalls. The PGP mechanism for encrypting the header fields and bodies of SIP messages described in RFC 2543 has been deprecated.
Each user agent that supports S/MIME MUST contain a keyring specifically for end-users' certificates. This keyring should map between addresses of record and corresponding certificates. Over time, users SHOULD use the same certificate when they populate the originating URI of signaling (the From header field) with the same address-of-record. Any mechanisms depending on the existence of end-user certificates are seriously limited in that there is virtually no consolidated authority today that provides certificates for end-user applications. However, users SHOULD acquire certificates from known public certificate authorities. As an alternative, users MAY create self- signed certificates. The implications of self-signed certificates are explored further in Section 26.4.2. Implementations may also use pre-configured certificates in deployments in which a previous trust relationship exists between all SIP entities. Above and beyond the problem of acquiring an end-user certificate, there are few well-known centralized directories that distribute end-user certificates. However, the holder of a certificate SHOULD publish their certificate in any public directories as appropriate. Similarly, UACs SHOULD support a mechanism for importing (manually or automatically) certificates discovered in public directories corresponding to the target URIs of SIP requests.
of the request. If the certificate cannot be verified, because it is self-signed, or signed by no known authority, or if it is verifiable but its subject does not correspond to the From header field of request, the UAS MUST notify its user of the status of the certificate (including the subject of the certificate, its signer, and any key fingerprint information) and request explicit permission before proceeding. If the certificate was successfully verified and the subject of the certificate corresponds to the From header field of the SIP request, or if the user (after notification) explicitly authorizes the use of the certificate, the UAS SHOULD add this certificate to a local keyring, indexed by the address-of-record of the holder of the certificate. When a UAS sends a response containing an S/MIME body that answers the first request in a dialog, or a response to a non-INVITE request outside the context of a dialog, the UAS SHOULD structure the body as an S/MIME 'multipart/signed' CMS SignedData body. If the desired CMS service is EnvelopedData, the UAS SHOULD send the EnvelopedData message encapsulated within a SignedData message. When a UAC receives a response containing an S/MIME CMS body that includes a certificate, the UAC SHOULD first validate the certificate, if possible, with any appropriate root certificate. The UAC SHOULD also determine the subject of the certificate and compare this value to the To field of the response; although the two may very well be different, and this is not necessarily indicative of a security breach. If the certificate cannot be verified because it is self-signed, or signed by no known authority, the UAC MUST notify its user of the status of the certificate (including the subject of the certificate, its signator, and any key fingerprint information) and request explicit permission before proceeding. If the certificate was successfully verified, and the subject of the certificate corresponds to the To header field in the response, or if the user (after notification) explicitly authorizes the use of the certificate, the UAC SHOULD add this certificate to a local keyring, indexed by the address-of-record of the holder of the certificate. If the UAC had not transmitted its own certificate to the UAS in any previous transaction, it SHOULD use a CMS SignedData body for its next request or response. On future occasions, when the UA receives requests or responses that contain a From header field corresponding to a value in its keyring, the UA SHOULD compare the certificate offered in these messages with the existing certificate in its keyring. If there is a discrepancy, the UA MUST notify its user of a change of the certificate (preferably in terms that indicate that this is a potential security breach) and acquire the user's permission before continuing to
process the signaling. If the user authorizes this certificate, it SHOULD be added to the keyring alongside any previous value(s) for this address-of-record. Note well however, that this key exchange mechanism does not guarantee the secure exchange of keys when self-signed certificates, or certificates signed by an obscure authority, are used - it is vulnerable to well-known attacks. In the opinion of the authors, however, the security it provides is proverbially better than nothing; it is in fact comparable to the widely used SSH application. These limitations are explored in greater detail in Section 26.4.2. If a UA receives an S/MIME body that has been encrypted with a public key unknown to the recipient, it MUST reject the request with a 493 (Undecipherable) response. This response SHOULD contain a valid certificate for the respondent (corresponding, if possible, to any address of record given in the To header field of the rejected request) within a MIME body with a 'certs-only' "smime-type" parameter. A 493 (Undecipherable) sent without any certificate indicates that the respondent cannot or will not utilize S/MIME encrypted messages, though they may still support S/MIME signatures. Note that a user agent that receives a request containing an S/MIME body that is not optional (with a Content-Disposition header "handling" parameter of "required") MUST reject the request with a 415 Unsupported Media Type response if the MIME type is not understood. A user agent that receives such a response when S/MIME is sent SHOULD notify its user that the remote device does not support S/MIME, and it MAY subsequently resend the request without S/MIME, if appropriate; however, this 415 response may constitute a downgrade attack. If a user agent sends an S/MIME body in a request, but receives a response that contains a MIME body that is not secured, the UAC SHOULD notify its user that the session could not be secured. However, if a user agent that supports S/MIME receives a request with an unsecured body, it SHOULD NOT respond with a secured body, but if it expects S/MIME from the sender (for example, because the sender's From header field value corresponds to an identity on its keychain), the UAS SHOULD notify its user that the session could not be secured. A number of conditions that arise in the previous text call for the notification of the user when an anomalous certificate-management event occurs. Users might well ask what they should do under these circumstances. First and foremost, an unexpected change in a certificate, or an absence of security when security is expected, are
causes for caution but not necessarily indications that an attack is in progress. Users might abort any connection attempt or refuse a connection request they have received; in telephony parlance, they could hang up and call back. Users may wish to find an alternate means to contact the other party and confirm that their key has legitimately changed. Note that users are sometimes compelled to change their certificates, for example when they suspect that the secrecy of their private key has been compromised. When their private key is no longer private, users must legitimately generate a new key and re-establish trust with any users that held their old key. Finally, if during the course of a dialog a UA receives a certificate in a CMS SignedData message that does not correspond with the certificates previously exchanged during a dialog, the UA MUST notify its user of the change, preferably in terms that indicate that this is a potential security breach. 24] with a few variations. o "multipart/signed" MUST be used only with CMS detached signatures. This allows backwards compatibility with non-S/MIME- compliant recipients. o S/MIME bodies SHOULD have a Content-Disposition header field, and the value of the "handling" parameter SHOULD be "required." o If a UAC has no certificate on its keyring associated with the address-of-record to which it wants to send a request, it cannot send an encrypted "application/pkcs7-mime" MIME message. UACs MAY send an initial request such as an OPTIONS message with a CMS detached signature in order to solicit the certificate of the remote side (the signature SHOULD be over a "message/sip" body of the type described in Section 23.4). Note that future standardization work on S/MIME may define non-certificate based keys. o Senders of S/MIME bodies SHOULD use the "SMIMECapabilities" (see Section 2.5.2 of ) attribute to express their capabilities and preferences for further communications. Note especially that senders MAY use the "preferSignedData"
capability to encourage receivers to respond with CMS SignedData messages (for example, when sending an OPTIONS request as described above). o S/MIME implementations MUST at a minimum support SHA1 as a digital signature algorithm, and 3DES as an encryption algorithm. All other signature and encryption algorithms MAY be supported. Implementations can negotiate support for these algorithms with the "SMIMECapabilities" attribute. o Each S/MIME body in a SIP message SHOULD be signed with only one certificate. If a UA receives a message with multiple signatures, the outermost signature should be treated as the single certificate for this body. Parallel signatures SHOULD NOT be used. The following is an example of an encrypted S/MIME SDP body within a SIP message: INVITE sip:email@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 To: Bob <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> From: Alice <sip:email@example.com>;tag=1928301774 Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 CSeq: 314159 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m handling=required ******************************************************* * Content-Type: application/sdp * * * * v=0 * * o=alice 53655765 2353687637 IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.com * * s=- * * t=0 0 * * c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.com * * m=audio 3456 RTP/AVP 0 1 3 99 * * a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 * *******************************************************
included in the "outer" message. UAs that receive any of these header fields in an encrypted body SHOULD ignore the encrypted values. Note that extensions to SIP may define additional header fields; the authors of these extensions should describe the integrity and confidentiality properties of such header fields. If a SIP UA encounters an unknown header field with an integrity violation, it MUST ignore the header field.
The following is an example of the use of a tunneled "message/sip" body: INVITE sip:email@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 To: Bob <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> From: Alice <sip:email@example.com>;tag=1928301774 Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 CSeq: 314159 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 13:02:03 GMT Contact: <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42 Content-Length: 568 --boundary42 Content-Type: message/sip INVITE sip:email@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 To: Bob <firstname.lastname@example.org> From: Alice <email@example.com>;tag=1928301774 Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 CSeq: 314159 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 13:02:03 GMT Contact: <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 147 v=0 o=UserA 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 here.com s=Session SDP c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.com t=0 0 m=audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0 a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 --boundary42 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s; handling=required
ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756 --boundary42-
In the following example, of an encrypted and signed message, the text boxed in asterisks ("*") is encrypted: INVITE sip:email@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 To: Bob <sip:firstname.lastname@example.org> From: Anonymous <sip:email@example.com>;tag=1928301774 Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 CSeq: 314159 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 13:02:03 GMT Contact: <sip:pc33.atlanta.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42 Content-Length: 568 --boundary42 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m handling=required Content-Length: 231 *********************************************************** * Content-Type: message/sip * * * * INVITE sip:firstname.lastname@example.org SIP/2.0 * * Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 * * To: Bob <email@example.com> * * From: Alice <firstname.lastname@example.org>;tag=1928301774 * * Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 * * CSeq: 314159 INVITE * * Max-Forwards: 70 * * Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 13:02:03 GMT * * Contact: <sip:email@example.com> * * * * Content-Type: application/sdp * * * * v=0 * * o=alice 53655765 2353687637 IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.com * * s=Session SDP * * t=0 0 * * c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.com * * m=audio 3456 RTP/AVP 0 1 3 99 * * a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 * ***********************************************************
--boundary42 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s; handling=required ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756 --boundary42-