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5.7   Security area #7: Subscription privacy
5.7.1   Introduction
5.7.2   Security assumptions   Word-p. 390
5.7.3   Key issues
5.7.3.1   Key Issue #7.1: Refreshing of temporary subscription identifier
5.7.3.2   Key issue #7.2: Concealing permanent or long-term subscription identifier
5.7.3.3   Key issue #7.3: Concealing permanent or long-term equipment identifier
5.7.3.4   Key issue #7.4: Using effective temporary or short-term subscription identifiers
5.7.3.5   Key issue #7.5: Transmitting permanent identifiers in secure interface
5.7.3.6   Key issue #7.6: Transmitting permanent subscription identifiers only when needed
5.7.3.7   Key issue #7.7: Using effective temporary or short-term equipment identifiers
5.7.3.8   Key issue #7.8: Privacy protection of network slice identifier
5.7.3.9   Key issue #7.9: Need to protect entire Permanent Identifier.
5.7.3.10   Key issue #7.10: Avoiding IMSI / SUPI Paging
5.7.3.y   Key issue #7.y: <key issue name>
5.7.4   Solutions
5.7.4.1   Solution #7.1: UE can request an update of temporary identifier
5.7.4.2   Solution #7.2: UE encrypts permanent identifier sent to network   Word-p. 400
5.7.4.3   Solution #7.3: Concealing permanent or long-term subscriber identifier by using pseudonyms and public key encryption
5.7.4.4   Solution #7.4: Privacy enhanced Mobile Subscription identifier (PMSI)
5.7.4.5   Solution #7.5: Effective generation of temporary or short-term identifiers using channel estimation      Up
5.7.4.6   Solution #7.6: Parameters for Refreshing of temporary subscription identifier   Word-p. 414
5.7.4.7   Solution #7.7: Revealing permanent or long-term subscriber identifier to a serving PLMN
5.7.4.8   Solution #7.8: Opportunistic encryption for IMSI exchange   Word-p. 416
5.7.4.9   Solution #7.9 Adding the Diffie-Hellman key exchange process to the attach procedure
5.7.4.10   Solution #7.10: Applying DHIES to the attach procedure
5.7.4.11   Solution #7.11: Protect the Permanent or Long Term User Identity with Public Key Technologies
5.7.4.12   Solution #7.12: Mechanisms of Pseudo-IMSI for hiding long-term identifier   Word-p. 428
5.7.4.13   Solution #7.13: Refreshing CN short-term subscriber identifiers
5.7.4.14   Solution #7.14: Privacy protection of permanent or long-term subscription identifier using ABE   Word-p. 435
5.7.4.15   Solution #7.15: Encrypting IMSI based on Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)   Word-p. 439
5.7.4.16   Solution #7.16: Mechanism for temporary identifier assignment   Word-p. 443
5.7.4.17   Solution #7.17: IMSI Privacy using Initial Authentication Enhancement
5.7.4.18   Solution #7.18: Using pools of IMSIs for privacy protection by frequent change
5.7.4.19   Solution #7.19: Encrypted pseudonym in RAND
5.7.4.20   Solution #7.20: Solution related to synchronisation and recovery   Word-p. 450
5.7.4.21   Solution #7.21: HN asymmetric key (solution variant to #7.3)
5.7.4.22   Solution #7.22: Efficient handling of privacy protected AV requests
5.7.4.23   Solution #7.23: Securing and refreshing the temporary subscriber identifier using scrambling key
5.7.4.24   Solution #7.24: Dynamic pseudonyms as short-term subscription identifiers
5.7.4.z   Solution #7.z: <solution name>
5.7.5   Comparative evaluation of public-key encryption privacy solutions
5.7.6   Conclusion   Word-p. 466
5.8   Security area #8: Network slicing security   Word-p. 468
5.8.1   Introduction
5.8.2   Security assumptions   Word-p. 469
5.8.3   Key issues
5.8.3.1   Key Issue #8.1: Security isolation of network slices
5.8.3.2   Key Issue #8.2: Security mechanism differentiation for network slices
5.8.3.3   Key Issue #8.3: Security on UEs' access to slices
5.8.3.4   Key Issue #8.4: Security on sensitive network elements
5.8.3.5   Key Issue #8.5: Security on management of slicing
5.8.3.6   Key Issue #8.6: Security on interacting with third party   Word-p. 476
5.8.3.7   Key Issue #8.7: Security of inter slice communications
5.8.3.8   Key Issue #8.8: Virtualization security
5.8.3.y   Key issue #8.y: <key issue name>
5.8.4   Solutions
5.8.4.1   Solution #8.1: Security isolation of network slices, Security mechanism differentiation
5.8.4.2   Solution #8.2: UE Authentication only by AUSF
5.8.4.3   Solution #8.3: UE Authentication by AUSF and NSI
5.8.4.4   Solution #8.4: UE Authentication by NSI   Word-p. 481
5.8.4.5   Solution #8.5: UE access network and slices
5.8.4.6   Solution#8.6: UE authentication and initial attach to a network slice using NSSAI
5.8.4.7   Solution #8.7: Security architecture for network slice   Word-p. 488
5.8.4.8   Solution #8.8: UE access network and slices
5.8.4.9   Solution #8.9: Security mechanism differentiation for network slices
5.8.4.10   Solution #8.10: Network authentication supporting network slices
5.8.4.11   Solution #8.11: Slice Authentication
5.8.4.12   Solution #8.12: PCO based authentication and authorization for Slice access      Up
5.8.4.13   Solution #8.13: Slice-specific NAS keys   Word-p. 501
5.8.4.14   Solution #8.14: Network Slicing Security Architecture and General Procedure
5.8.4.z   Solution #8.z: <solution name>   Word-p. 504
5.8.5   Conclusions
5.9   Security area #9: Relay security
5.10   Security area #10: Network domain security

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