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TR 33.885 (SA3)
Study on security aspects for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services

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(W-zip) V14.1.0    2017/09    74 p.


Rapporteur:  Mr. Wong, Marcus
See also:  V2X-related TS/TR    


The present document contains a study of the security aspects of V2X services and an evaluation of possible technical solutions needed to support such services. The Stage 1 requirements for these services are defined in TS 22.185. Potential stage 2 solutions for V2X Services are being studied in TR 23.785.


 

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1 Scope    2 References    3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations    3.1 Definitions    3.2 Symbols    3.3 Abbreviations    4 Overview of V2X Services    4.1 Introduction    4.2 Architecture    5 Security Analysis of V2X    5.1 Key Issue #1: V2X Communication Security    5.2 Key Issue #2: Authorization for LTE-V2X Radio Resources    5.3 Key Issue #3: V2X Entities Secure Environment    5.4 Key Issue #4: Local MBMS Entity (LME) - security of Mv interface    5.5 Key Issue #5: V2V/P authority broadcast communication security by UE for public information announcement over PC5 Interface    5.6 Key Issue #6: Identity/Credentials Security for V2V/P Services    5.7 Key Issue #7: Vehicle UE privacy    5.8 Key Issue #8: V2X data source accountability    5.9 Key Issue #9: authentication and authorization    5.10 Key Issue #10: Local V2X application server    5.11 Key Issue #11: Choice of cryptoalgorithm    5.12 Key Issue #12: Credential provisioning for V2X services    5.13 Key Issue#13: Data communication security between network entities    5.14 Key Issue#14: V2I broadcast communication security over PC5 interface    5.15 Key Issue#15: Security of UE to V2X Control Function interface    5.16 Key Issue #16: Detectability of Malicious LTE-V2X UE Behavior- achieving trust and confidence in messages    5.17 Key Issue #17: Securing the communication between V2X AS and LTE network   
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1   Scope   Word-p. 8
2   References
3   Definitions, symbols and abbreviations   Word-p. 9
4   Overview of V2X Services   Word-p. 11
5   Security Analysis of V2X   Word-p. 15
5.1   Key Issue #1: V2X Communication Security
5.2   Key Issue #2: Authorization for LTE-V2X Radio Resources
5.3   Key Issue #3: V2X Entities Secure Environment
5.4   Key Issue #4: Local MBMS Entity (LME) - security of Mv interface   Word-p. 17
5.5   Key Issue #5: V2V/P authority broadcast communication security by UE for public information announcement over PC5 Interface   Word-p. 18      Up
5.6   Key Issue #6: Identity/Credentials Security for V2V/P Services   Word-p. 20
5.7   Key Issue #7: Vehicle UE privacy   Word-p. 21
5.8   Key Issue #8: V2X data source accountability   Word-p. 23
5.9   Key Issue #9: authentication and authorization
5.10   Key Issue #10: Local V2X application server      Up
5.11   Key Issue #11: Choice of cryptoalgorithm   Word-p. 25
5.12   Key Issue #12: Credential provisioning for V2X services
5.13   Key Issue#13: Data communication security between network entities
5.14   Key Issue#14: V2I broadcast communication security over PC5 interface   Word-p. 27
5.15   Key Issue#15: Security of UE to V2X Control Function interface   Word-p. 28      Up
5.16   Key Issue #16: Detectability of Malicious LTE-V2X UE Behavior- achieving trust and confidence in messages   Word-p. 29
5.17   Key Issue #17: Securing the communication between V2X AS and LTE network

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