Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Chen, Ed. Request for Comments: 7606 Cisco Systems, Inc. Updates: 1997, 4271, 4360, 4456, 4760, J. Scudder, Ed. 5543, 5701, 6368 Juniper Networks Category: Standards Track P. Mohapatra ISSN: 2070-1721 Sproute Networks K. Patel Cisco Systems, Inc. August 2015 Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages Abstract According to the base BGP specification, a BGP speaker that receives an UPDATE message containing a malformed attribute is required to reset the session over which the offending attribute was received. This behavior is undesirable because a session reset would impact not only routes with the offending attribute but also other valid routes exchanged over the session. This document partially revises the error handling for UPDATE messages and provides guidelines for the authors of documents defining new attributes. Finally, it revises the error handling procedures for a number of existing attributes. This document updates error handling for RFCs 1997, 4271, 4360, 4456, 4760, 5543, 5701, and 6368. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606.
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Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Error-Handling Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Revision to BGP UPDATE Message Error Handling . . . . . . . . 5 4. Attribute Length Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Parsing of Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Encoding NLRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Missing NLRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Syntactic Correctness of NLRI Fields . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.4. Typed NLRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Error-Handling Procedures for Existing Attributes . . . . . . 11 7.1. ORIGIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. AS_PATH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.3. NEXT_HOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.4. MULTI_EXIT_DISC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.5. LOCAL_PREF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.6. ATOMIC_AGGREGATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.7. AGGREGATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.8. Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.9. ORIGINATOR_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.10. CLUSTER_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.11. MP_REACH_NLRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.12. MP_UNREACH_NLRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.13. Traffic Engineering Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.14. Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.15. IPv6 Address Specific BGP Extended Community Attribute . 15 7.16. ATTR_SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Guidance for Authors of BGP Specifications . . . . . . . . . 15 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction According to the base BGP specification [RFC4271], a BGP speaker that receives an UPDATE message containing a malformed attribute is required to reset the session over which the offending attribute was received. This behavior is undesirable because a session reset impacts not only routes with the offending attribute but also other valid routes exchanged over the session. In the case of optional transitive attributes, the behavior is especially troublesome and may present a potential security vulnerability. This is because attributes may have been propagated without being checked by intermediate routers that don't recognize the attributes. In effect, the attributes may have been tunneled; when they reach a router that recognizes and checks the attributes, the session that is reset may not be associated with the router that is at fault. To make matters worse, in such cases, although the problematic attributes may have originated with a single update transmitted by a single BGP speaker, by the time they encounter a router that checks them they may have been replicated many times and thus may cause the reset of many peering sessions. Thus, the damage inflicted may be multiplied manyfold. The goal for revising the error handling for UPDATE messages is to minimize the impact on routing by a malformed UPDATE message while maintaining protocol correctness to the extent possible. This can be achieved largely by maintaining the established session and keeping the valid routes exchanged but removing the routes carried in the malformed UPDATE message from the routing system. This document partially revises the error handling for UPDATE messages and provides guidelines for the authors of documents defining new attributes. Finally, it revises the error handling procedures for a number of existing attributes. Specifically, the error handling procedures of [RFC1997], [RFC4271], [RFC4360], [RFC4456], [RFC4760], [RFC5543], [RFC5701], and [RFC6368] are revised. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Error-Handling Approaches In this document, we refer to four different approaches to handle errors found in a BGP UPDATE message. They are as follows (listed in order, from the one with the "strongest" action to the one with the "weakest" action): o Session reset: This is the approach used throughout the base BGP specification [RFC4271], where a NOTIFICATION is sent and the session terminated. o AFI/SAFI disable: Section 7 of [RFC4760] allows a BGP speaker that detects an error in a message for a given AFI/SAFI to optionally "ignore all the subsequent routes with that AFI/SAFI received over that session". We refer to this as "disabling a particular AFI/ SAFI" or "AFI/SAFI disable". o Treat-as-withdraw: In this approach, the UPDATE message containing the path attribute in question MUST be treated as though all contained routes had been withdrawn just as if they had been listed in the WITHDRAWN ROUTES field (or in the MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute if appropriate) of the UPDATE message, thus causing them to be removed from the Adj-RIB-In according to the procedures of [RFC4271]. o Attribute discard: In this approach, the malformed attribute MUST be discarded and the UPDATE message continues to be processed. This approach MUST NOT be used except in the case of an attribute that has no effect on route selection or installation. 3. Revision to BGP UPDATE Message Error Handling This specification amends Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] in a number of ways. See Section 7 for treatment of specific path attributes. a. The first paragraph is revised as follows: Old Text: All errors detected while processing the UPDATE message MUST be indicated by sending the NOTIFICATION message with the Error Code UPDATE Message Error. The error subcode elaborates on the specific nature of the error.
New Text: An error detected while processing the UPDATE message for which a session reset is specified MUST be indicated by sending the NOTIFICATION message with the Error Code UPDATE Message Error. The error subcode elaborates on the specific nature of the error. b. Error handling for the following case remains unchanged: If the Withdrawn Routes Length or Total Attribute Length is too large (i.e., if Withdrawn Routes Length + Total Attribute Length + 23 exceeds the message Length), then the Error Subcode MUST be set to Malformed Attribute List. c. Attribute Flag error handling is revised as follows: Old Text: If any recognized attribute has Attribute Flags that conflict with the Attribute Type Code, then the Error Subcode MUST be set to Attribute Flags Error. The Data field MUST contain the erroneous attribute (type, length, and value). New Text: If the value of either the Optional or Transitive bits in the Attribute Flags is in conflict with their specified values, then the attribute MUST be treated as malformed and the "treat-as-withdraw" approach used, unless the specification for the attribute mandates different handling for incorrect Attribute Flags. d. If any of the well-known mandatory attributes are not present in an UPDATE message, then "treat-as-withdraw" MUST be used. (Note that [RFC4760] reclassifies NEXT_HOP as what is effectively discretionary.) e. "Treat-as-withdraw" MUST be used for the cases that specify a session reset and involve any of the attributes ORIGIN, AS_PATH, NEXT_HOP, MULTI_EXIT_DISC, or LOCAL_PREF. f. "Attribute discard" MUST be used for any of the cases that specify a session reset and involve ATOMIC_AGGREGATE or AGGREGATOR.
g. If the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute or the MP_UNREACH_NLRI [RFC4760] attribute appears more than once in the UPDATE message, then a NOTIFICATION message MUST be sent with the Error Subcode "Malformed Attribute List". If any other attribute (whether recognized or unrecognized) appears more than once in an UPDATE message, then all the occurrences of the attribute other than the first one SHALL be discarded and the UPDATE message will continue to be processed. h. When multiple attribute errors exist in an UPDATE message, if the same approach (as described in Section 2) is specified for the handling of these malformed attributes, then the specified approach MUST be used. Otherwise, the approach with the strongest action MUST be used. i. The Withdrawn Routes field MUST be checked for syntactic correctness in the same manner as the NLRI field. This is discussed further below and in Section 5.3. j. Finally, we observe that in order to use the approach of "treat- as-withdraw", the entire NLRI field and/or the MP_REACH_NLRI and MP_UNREACH_NLRI attributes need to be successfully parsed -- what this entails is discussed in more detail in Section 5. If this is not possible, the procedures of [RFC4271] and/or [RFC4760] continue to apply, meaning that the "session reset" approach (or the "AFI/SAFI disable" approach) MUST be followed. 4. Attribute Length Fields There are two error cases in which the Total Attribute Length value can be in conflict with the enclosed path attributes, which themselves carry length values: o In the first case, the length of the last encountered path attribute would cause the Total Attribute Length to be exceeded when parsing the enclosed path attributes. o In the second case, fewer than three octets remain (or fewer than four octets, if the Attribute Flags field has the Extended Length bit set) when beginning to parse the attribute. That is, this case exists if there remains unconsumed data in the path attributes but yet insufficient data to encode a single minimum- sized path attribute. In either of these cases, an error condition exists and the "treat- as-withdraw" approach MUST be used (unless some other, more severe error is encountered dictating a stronger approach), and the Total
Attribute Length MUST be relied upon to enable the beginning of the NLRI field to be located. For all path attributes other than those specified as having an attribute length that may be zero, it SHALL be considered a syntax error for the attribute to have a length of zero. Of the path attributes considered in this specification, only AS_PATH and ATOMIC_AGGREGATE may validly have an attribute length of zero. 5. Parsing of Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) Fields 5.1. Encoding NLRI To facilitate the determination of the NLRI field in an UPDATE message with a malformed attribute: o The MP_REACH_NLRI or MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute (if present) SHALL be encoded as the very first path attribute in an UPDATE message. o An UPDATE message MUST NOT contain more than one of the following: non-empty Withdrawn Routes field, non-empty Network Layer Reachability Information field, MP_REACH_NLRI attribute, and MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute. Since older BGP speakers may not implement these restrictions, an implementation MUST still be prepared to receive these fields in any position or combination. If the encoding of [RFC4271] is used, the NLRI field for the IPv4 unicast address family is carried immediately following all the attributes in an UPDATE message. When such an UPDATE message is received, we observe that the NLRI field can be determined using the Message Length, Withdrawn Route Length, and Total Attribute Length (when they are consistent) carried in the message instead of relying on the length of individual attributes in the message. 5.2. Missing NLRI [RFC4724] specifies an End-of-RIB message (EoR) that can be encoded as an UPDATE message that contains only a MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute that encodes no NLRI (it can also be a completely empty UPDATE message in the case of the "legacy" encoding). In all other well- specified cases, an UPDATE message either carries only withdrawn routes (either in the Withdrawn Routes field or the MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute) or it advertises reachable routes (either in the Network Layer Reachability Information field or the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute).
Thus, if an UPDATE message is encountered that does contain path attributes other than MP_UNREACH_NLRI and doesn't encode any reachable NLRI, we cannot be confident that the NLRI have been successfully parsed as Section 3 (j) requires. For this reason, if any path attribute errors are encountered in such an UPDATE message and if any encountered error specifies an error-handling approach other than "attribute discard", then the "session reset" approach MUST be used. 5.3. Syntactic Correctness of NLRI Fields The NLRI field or Withdrawn Routes field SHALL be considered "syntactically incorrect" if either of the following are true: o The length of any of the included NLRI is greater than 32. o When parsing NLRI contained in the field, the length of the last NLRI found exceeds the amount of unconsumed data remaining in the field. Similarly, the MP_REACH_NLRI or MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute of an update SHALL be considered to be incorrect if any of the following are true: o The length of any of the included NLRI is inconsistent with the given AFI/SAFI (for example, if an IPv4 NLRI has a length greater than 32 or an IPv6 NLRI has a length greater than 128). o When parsing NLRI contained in the attribute, the length of the last NLRI found exceeds the amount of unconsumed data remaining in the attribute. o The attribute flags of the attribute are inconsistent with those specified in [RFC4760]. o The length of the MP_UNREACH_NLRI attribute is less than 3, or the length of the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute is less than 5. 5.4. Typed NLRI Certain address families, for example, MCAST-VPN [RFC6514], MCAST- VPLS [RFC7117], and EVPN [RFC7432] have NLRI that are typed. Since supported type values within the address family are not expressed in the Multiprotocol BGP (MP-BGP) capability [RFC4760], it is possible for a BGP speaker to advertise support for the given address family and subaddress family while still not supporting a particular type of NLRI within that AFI/SAFI.
A BGP speaker advertising support for such a typed address family MUST handle routes with unrecognized NLRI types within that address family by discarding them, unless the relevant specification for that address family specifies otherwise. 6. Operational Considerations Although the "treat-as-withdraw" error-handling behavior defined in Section 2 makes every effort to preserve BGP's correctness, we note that if an UPDATE message received on an Internal BGP (IBGP) session is subjected to this treatment, inconsistent routing within the affected Autonomous System may result. The consequences of inconsistent routing can include long-lived forwarding loops and black holes. While lamentable, this issue is expected to be rare in practice, and, more importantly, is seen as less problematic than the session-reset behavior it replaces. When a malformed attribute is indeed detected over an IBGP session, we recommend that routes with the malformed attribute be identified and traced back to the ingress router in the network where the routes were sourced or received externally and then a filter be applied on the ingress router to prevent the routes from being sourced or received. This will help maintain routing consistency in the network. Even if inconsistent routing does not arise, the "treat-as-withdraw" behavior can cause either complete unreachability or suboptimal routing for the destinations whose routes are carried in the affected UPDATE message. Note that "treat-as-withdraw" is different from discarding an UPDATE message. The latter violates the basic BGP principle of an incremental update and could cause invalid routes to be kept. Because of these potential issues, a BGP speaker must provide debugging facilities to permit issues caused by a malformed attribute to be diagnosed. At a minimum, such facilities must include logging an error listing the NLRI involved and containing the entire malformed UPDATE message when such an attribute is detected. The malformed UPDATE message should be analyzed, and the root cause should be investigated. Section 8 mentions that "attribute discard" should not be used in cases where "the attribute in question has or may have an effect on route selection." Although all cases that specify "attribute discard" in this document do not affect route selection by default, in principle, routing policies could be written that affect selection based on such an attribute. Operators should take care when writing
such policies to consider the possible consequences of an attribute discard. In general, as long as such policies are only applied to external BGP sessions, correctness issues are not expected to arise. 7. Error-Handling Procedures for Existing Attributes In the following subsections, we elaborate on the conditions for error-checking various path attributes and specify what approach(es) should be used to handle malformations. It is possible that implementations may apply other error checks not contemplated here. If so, the error handling approach given here should generally be applied. This section addresses all path attributes that are defined at the time of this writing that were not defined with error handling consistent with Section 8 and that are not marked as "deprecated" in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry [IANA-BGP-ATTRS]. Attributes 17 (AS4_PATH), 18 (AS4_AGGREGATOR), 22 (PMSI_TUNNEL), 23 (Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute), 26 (AIGP), 27 (PE Distinguisher Labels), and 29 (BGP-LS Attribute) do have error handling consistent with Section 8 and thus are not further discussed herein. Attributes 11 (DPA), 12 (ADVERTISER), 13 (RCID_PATH / CLUSTER_ID), 19 (SAFI Specific Attribute), 20 (Connector Attribute), 21 (AS_PATHLIMIT), and 28 (BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute) are deprecated and thus are not further discussed herein. 7.1. ORIGIN The attribute is considered malformed if its length is not 1 or if it has an undefined value [RFC4271]. An UPDATE message with a malformed ORIGIN attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.2. AS_PATH An AS_PATH is considered malformed if an unrecognized segment type is encountered or if it contains a malformed segment. A segment is considered malformed if any of the following are true: o There is an overrun where the Path Segment Length field of the last segment encountered would cause the Attribute Length to be exceeded. o There is an underrun where after the last successfully parsed segment there is only a single octet remaining (that is, there is not enough unconsumed data to provide even an empty segment header).
o It has a Path Segment Length field of zero. An UPDATE message with a malformed AS_PATH attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". [RFC4271] also says that an implementation optionally "MAY check whether the leftmost ... AS in the AS_PATH attribute is equal to the autonomous system number of the peer that sent the message". A BGP implementation SHOULD also handle routes that violate this check using "treat-as-withdraw" but MAY follow the "session reset" behavior if configured to do so. 7.3. NEXT_HOP The attribute is considered malformed if its length is not 4 [RFC4271]. An UPDATE message with a malformed NEXT_HOP attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.4. MULTI_EXIT_DISC The attribute is considered malformed if its length is not 4 [RFC4271]. An UPDATE message with a malformed MULTI_EXIT_DISC attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.5. LOCAL_PREF The error handling of [RFC4271] is revised as follows: o if the LOCAL_PREF attribute is received from an external neighbor, it SHALL be discarded using the approach of "attribute discard"; or o if received from an internal neighbor, it SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not equal to 4. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as- withdraw". 7.6. ATOMIC_AGGREGATE The attribute SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not 0 [RFC4271]. An UPDATE message with a malformed ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "attribute discard".
7.7. AGGREGATOR The error conditions specified in [RFC4271] for the attribute are revised as follows: The AGGREGATOR attribute SHALL be considered malformed if any of the following applies: o Its length is not 6 (when the 4-octet AS number capability is not advertised to or not received from the peer [RFC6793]). o Its length is not 8 (when the 4-octet AS number capability is both advertised to and received from the peer). An UPDATE message with a malformed AGGREGATOR attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "attribute discard". 7.8. Community The error handling of [RFC1997] is revised as follows: o The Community attribute SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not a non-zero multiple of 4. o An UPDATE message with a malformed Community attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.9. ORIGINATOR_ID The error handling of [RFC4456] is revised as follows: o if the ORIGINATOR_ID attribute is received from an external neighbor, it SHALL be discarded using the approach of "attribute discard"; or o if received from an internal neighbor, it SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not equal to 4. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as- withdraw". 7.10. CLUSTER_LIST The error handling of [RFC4456] is revised as follows: o if the CLUSTER_LIST attribute is received from an external neighbor, it SHALL be discarded using the approach of "attribute discard"; or
o if received from an internal neighbor, it SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not a non-zero multiple of 4. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.11. MP_REACH_NLRI If the Length of Next Hop Network Address field of the MP_REACH attribute is inconsistent with that which was expected, the attribute is considered malformed. Since the next hop precedes the NLRI field in the attribute, in this case it will not be possible to reliably locate the NLRI; thus, the "session reset" or "AFI/SAFI disable" approach MUST be used. "That which was expected", while somewhat vague, is intended to encompass the next hop specified for the Address Family Identifier and Subsequent Address Family Identifier fields and is potentially modified by any extensions in use. For example, if [RFC5549] is in use, then the next hop would have to have a length of 4 or 16. Sections 3 and 5 provide further discussion of the handling of this attribute. 7.12. MP_UNREACH_NLRI Sections 3 and 5 discuss the handling of this attribute. 7.13. Traffic Engineering Path Attribute We note that [RFC5543] does not detail what constitutes "malformation" for the Traffic Engineering path attribute. A future update to that specification may provide more guidance. In the interim, an implementation that determines (for whatever reason) that an UPDATE message contains a malformed Traffic Engineering path attribute MUST handle it using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". 7.14. Extended Community The error handling of [RFC4360] is revised as follows: o The Extended Community attribute SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not a non-zero multiple of 8. o An UPDATE message with a malformed Extended Community attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw". Note that a BGP speaker MUST NOT treat an unrecognized Extended Community Type or Sub-Type as an error.
7.15. IPv6 Address Specific BGP Extended Community Attribute The error handling of [RFC5701] is revised as follows: o The IPv6 Address Specific Extended Community attribute SHALL be considered malformed if its length is not a non-zero multiple of 20. o An UPDATE message with a malformed IPv6 Address Specific Extended Community attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat- as-withdraw". Note that a BGP speaker MUST NOT treat an unrecognized IPv6 Address Specific Extended Community Type or Sub-Type as an error. 7.16. ATTR_SET The final paragraph of Section 5 of [RFC6368] is revised as follows: Old Text: An UPDATE message with a malformed ATTR_SET attribute SHALL be handled as follows. If its Partial flag is set and its Neighbor-Complete flag is clear, the UPDATE message is treated as a route withdraw as discussed in [OPT-TRANS-BGP]. Otherwise (i.e., Partial flag is clear or Neighbor-Complete is set), the procedures of the BGP-4 base specification [RFC4271] MUST be followed with respect to an Optional Attribute Error. New Text: An UPDATE message with a malformed ATTR_SET attribute SHALL be handled using the approach of "treat as withdraw". Furthermore, the normative reference to [OPT-TRANS-BGP] in [RFC6368] is removed. 8. Guidance for Authors of BGP Specifications A document that specifies a new BGP attribute MUST provide specifics regarding what constitutes an error for that attribute and how that error is to be handled. Allowable error-handling approaches are detailed in Section 2. The "treat-as-withdraw" approach is generally preferred and the "session reset" approach is discouraged. Authors of BGP documents are also reminded to review the discussion of optional transitive attributes in the first paragraph of the
Introduction of this document. The document SHOULD also provide consideration of what debugging facilities may be required to permit issues caused by a malformed attribute to be diagnosed. For any malformed attribute that is handled by the "attribute discard" instead of the "treat-as-withdraw" approach, it is critical to consider the potential impact of doing so. In particular, if the attribute in question has or may have an effect on route selection or installation, the presumption is that discarding it is unsafe unless careful analysis proves otherwise. The analysis should take into account the tradeoff between preserving connectivity and potential side effects. Authors can refer to Section 7 for examples. 9. Security Considerations This specification addresses the vulnerability of a BGP speaker to a potential attack whereby a distant attacker can generate a malformed optional transitive attribute that is not recognized by intervening routers. Since the intervening routers do not recognize the attribute, they propagate it without checking it. When the malformed attribute arrives at a router that does recognize the given attribute type, that router resets the session over which it arrived. Since significant fan-out can occur between the attacker and the routers that do recognize the attribute type, this attack could potentially be particularly harmful. The improved error handling of this specification could in theory interact badly with some now-known weaker cryptographic mechanisms should such be used in future to secure BGP. For example, if a (fictional) mechanism that did not supply data integrity was used, an attacker could manipulate ciphertext in any attempt to change or observe how the receiver reacts. Absent this specification, the BGP session would have been terminated; with this specification, the attacker could make potentially many attempts. While such a confidentiality-only mechanism would not be defined today, we have in the past seen mechanism definitions that result in similar, though not as obviously exploitable, vulnerabilities [RFC7366]. The approach recommended today to avoid such issues is to prefer use of Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) ciphers [RFC5116] and thus to discard messages that don't verify. In other respects, this specification does not change BGP's security characteristics.
10. References 10.1. Normative References [IANA-BGP-ATTRS] IANA, "BGP Path Attributes", <http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters>. [RFC1997] Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>. [RFC4456] Bates, T., Chen, E., and R. Chandra, "BGP Route Reflection: An Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP (IBGP)", RFC 4456, DOI 10.17487/RFC4456, April 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4456>. [RFC4724] Sangli, S., Chen, E., Fernando, R., Scudder, J., and Y. Rekhter, "Graceful Restart Mechanism for BGP", RFC 4724, DOI 10.17487/RFC4724, January 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4724>. [RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter, "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>. [RFC5543] Ould-Brahim, H., Fedyk, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Traffic Engineering Attribute", RFC 5543, DOI 10.17487/RFC5543, May 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5543>. [RFC5701] Rekhter, Y., "IPv6 Address Specific BGP Extended Community Attribute", RFC 5701, DOI 10.17487/RFC5701, November 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5701>.
[RFC6368] Marques, P., Raszuk, R., Patel, K., Kumaki, K., and T. Yamagata, "Internal BGP as the Provider/Customer Edge Protocol for BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 6368, DOI 10.17487/RFC6368, September 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6368>. [RFC6793] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793, DOI 10.17487/RFC6793, December 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6793>. 10.2. Informative References [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>. [RFC5549] Le Faucheur, F. and E. Rosen, "Advertising IPv4 Network Layer Reachability Information with an IPv6 Next Hop", RFC 5549, DOI 10.17487/RFC5549, May 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5549>. [RFC6514] Aggarwal, R., Rosen, E., Morin, T., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Encodings and Procedures for Multicast in MPLS/BGP IP VPNs", RFC 6514, DOI 10.17487/RFC6514, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6514>. [RFC7117] Aggarwal, R., Ed., Kamite, Y., Fang, L., Rekhter, Y., and C. Kodeboniya, "Multicast in Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS)", RFC 7117, DOI 10.17487/RFC7117, February 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7117>. [RFC7366] Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>. [RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A., Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>.
Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank Juan Alcaide, Deniz Bahadir, Ron Bonica, Mach Chen, Andy Davidson, Bruno Decraene, Stephen Farrell, Rex Fernando, Jeff Haas, Chris Hall, Joel Halpern, Dong Jie, Akira Kato, Miya Kohno, Warren Kumari, Tony Li, Alton Lo, Shin Miyakawa, Tamas Mondal, Jonathan Oddy, Tony Przygienda, Robert Raszuk, Yakov Rekhter, Eric Rosen, Shyam Sethuram, Rob Shakir, Naiming Shen, Adam Simpson, Ananth Suryanarayana, Kaliraj Vairavakkalai, Lili Wang, and Ondrej Zajicek for their observations and discussion of this topic and review of this document. Authors' Addresses Enke Chen (editor) Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: email@example.com John G. Scudder (editor) Juniper Networks Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Pradosh Mohapatra Sproute Networks Email: email@example.com Keyur Patel Cisco Systems, Inc. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org