Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner Request for Comments: 5753 IECA Obsoletes: 3278 D. Brown Category: Informational Certicom ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2010 Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Abstract This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC 3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and RFC 4231 for message authentication code standards. This document obsoletes RFC 3278. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents

carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................3 1.1. Requirements Terminology ...................................3 2. SignedData Using ECC ............................................3 2.1. SignedData Using ECDSA .....................................4 3. EnvelopedData Using ECC Algorithms ..............................5 3.1. EnvelopedData Using (ephemeral-static) ECDH ................5 3.2. EnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ...........................8 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData Using ECC ..............11 4.1. AuthenticatedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ......................11 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV ......................12 5. Certificates Using ECC .........................................13 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC ............................13 7. ASN.1 Syntax ...................................................21 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers .....................................21 7.2. Other Syntax ..............................................24 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves .....................26 9. Security Considerations ........................................28 10. IANA Considerations ...........................................33 11. References ....................................................33 11.1. Normative References .....................................33 11.2. Informative References ...................................35 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules.........................................37 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module.........................................37 A.2. 2004 ASN.1 Module.........................................45 Appendix B. Changes since RFC 3278.................................59 Acknowledgements...................................................61

1. Introduction The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content types: - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods (ECDSA) to sign content; - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content encryption; - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to encrypt message-authentication keys used for content authentication and integrity; and - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public key agreement methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used for content authentication, integrity, and encryption. Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public key distribution in support of the specified techniques. The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B. 1.1. Requirements Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. 2. SignedData Using ECC This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS SignedData format to sign data.

2.1. SignedData Using ECDSA This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3]. In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the following techniques and formats MUST be used. 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following restrictions: - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash algorithm (see Section 7.1.1), which MUST be one of the following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-sha512. - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier (see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. The hash algorithm identified in the name of the signature algorithm MUST be the same as the digestAlgorithm (e.g., digestAlgorithm is id- sha256 therefore signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256). - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. 2.1.2. Actions of the Sending Agent When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message digest calculation process and signature generation process for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3]. The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the ECDSA- Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the SignerInfo signature field.

2.1.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the message digest calculation process and signature verification process for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified in [FIPS186-3]. In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received message. 3. EnvelopedData Using ECC Algorithms This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS EnvelopedData format. This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key agreement scheme. 3.1. EnvelopedData Using (ephemeral-static) ECDH This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. This algorithm has two variations: - 'Standard' ECDH, described as the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in [SEC1], and - 'Co-factor' ECDH, described as the 'One-Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme' (method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in [SP800-56A]. Both variations of ephemeral-static ECDH are elliptic curve analogs of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-DH]. If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the following techniques and formats MUST be used. The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as ECDH is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.

3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: - version MUST be 3. - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy implementations. The previous version of this document required NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then they MUST be namedCurve. The originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER encoding of the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be supported. - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing, so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than once, by using the ECC- CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key derivation function (see Section 7.2). - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the key-encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key- encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH public key.

RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content- encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static, ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm. 3.1.2. Actions of the Sending Agent When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g., from the recipient's certificate). The sending agent then performs one of the two ECDH variations mentioned above: - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'standard' Diffie-Hellman, then the sending agent performs the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in [SEC1]. - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'co- factor' Diffie-Hellman, then the sending agent performs the 'One- Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme' (method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in [SP800-56A]. In both of these cases, the sending agent uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm identified by the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm. As a result, the sending agent obtains: - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator originatorKey publicKey field, and - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key- encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for that recipient in each of the different layers. 3.1.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" from the key size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if

present, originally supplied additional user key material from the ukm field. The receiving agent then performs one of the two ECDH variations mentioned above: - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'standard' Diffie-Hellman, then the receiving agent performs the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme' with the 'Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Primitive' in [SEC1]. - If the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm indicates the use of 'co- factor' Diffie-Hellman, then the receiving agent performs the 'One- Pass Diffie-Hellman scheme' (method C(1, 1, ECC CDH)) in [SP800-56A]. In both of these cases, the receiving agent uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm identified by the value of keyEncryptionAlgorithm. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. 3.2. EnvelopedData Using 1-Pass ECMQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass Elliptic Curve Menezes- Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can, in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData, while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then the following techniques and formats MUST be used. The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.

3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: - version MUST be 3. - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's certificates. - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string that MUST contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with id- ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or ECParameters, as NULL is allowed to support legacy implementations. The previous version of this document required NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then they MUST be namedCurve. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains additional user keying material from the sending agent. - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the key-encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content- encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm.

3.2.2. Actions of the Sending Agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g., from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As a result, the sending agent obtains: - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field (see Section 7.2), and - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key- encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for that recipient in each of the different layers. 3.2.3. Actions of the Receiving Agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" from the key size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.

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