IEEE-802.11i-req]. A security claims section is required in EAP method specifications, so that EAP methods can be evaluated against the requirements. RFC1661] and was later adapted for use in wired IEEE 802 networks [IEEE-802] in [IEEE-802.1X]. Subsequently, EAP has been proposed for use on wireless LAN networks and over the Internet. In all these situations, it is possible for an attacker to gain access to links over which EAP packets are transmitted. For example, attacks on telephone infrastructure are documented in [DECEPTION]. An attacker with access to the link may carry out a number of attacks, including:  An attacker may try to discover user identities by snooping authentication traffic.  An attacker may try to modify or spoof EAP packets.  An attacker may launch denial of service attacks by spoofing lower layer indications or Success/Failure packets, by replaying EAP packets, or by generating packets with overlapping Identifiers.  An attacker may attempt to recover the pass-phrase by mounting an offline dictionary attack.  An attacker may attempt to convince the peer to connect to an untrusted network by mounting a man-in-the-middle attack.  An attacker may attempt to disrupt the EAP negotiation in order cause a weak authentication method to be selected.  An attacker may attempt to recover keys by taking advantage of weak key derivation techniques used within EAP methods.
 An attacker may attempt to take advantage of weak ciphersuites subsequently used after the EAP conversation is complete.  An attacker may attempt to perform downgrading attacks on lower layer ciphersuite negotiation in order to ensure that a weaker ciphersuite is used subsequently to EAP authentication.  An attacker acting as an authenticator may provide incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server via out-of-band mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol). This includes impersonating another authenticator, or providing inconsistent information to the peer and EAP server. Depending on the lower layer, these attacks may be carried out without requiring physical proximity. Where EAP is used over wireless networks, EAP packets may be forwarded by authenticators (e.g., pre-authentication) so that the attacker need not be within the coverage area of an authenticator in order to carry out an attack on it or its peers. Where EAP is used over the Internet, attacks may be carried out at an even greater distance. Section 7.2.1: mutual authentication, integrity protection, replay protection, confidentiality, key derivation, dictionary attack resistance, fast reconnect, cryptographic binding. The Security Claims section of an EAP method specification SHOULD provide justification for the claims that are made. This can be accomplished by including a proof in an Appendix, or including a reference to a proof. [c] Key strength. If the method derives keys, then the effective key strength MUST be estimated. This estimate is meant for potential users of the method to determine if the keys produced are strong enough for the intended application.
The effective key strength SHOULD be stated as a number of bits, defined as follows: If the effective key strength is N bits, the best currently known methods to recover the key (with non- negligible probability) require, on average, an effort comparable to 2^(N-1) operations of a typical block cipher. The statement SHOULD be accompanied by a short rationale, explaining how this number was derived. This explanation SHOULD include the parameters required to achieve the stated key strength based on current knowledge of the algorithms. (Note: Although it is difficult to define what "comparable effort" and "typical block cipher" exactly mean, reasonable approximations are sufficient here. Refer to e.g. [SILVERMAN] for more discussion.) The key strength depends on the methods used to derive the keys. For instance, if keys are derived from a shared secret (such as a password or a long-term secret), and possibly some public information such as nonces, the effective key strength is limited by the strength of the long-term secret (assuming that the derivation procedure is computationally simple). To take another example, when using public key algorithms, the strength of the symmetric key depends on the strength of the public keys used. [d] Description of key hierarchy. EAP methods deriving keys MUST either provide a reference to a key hierarchy specification, or describe how Master Session Keys (MSKs) and Extended Master Session Keys (EMSKs) are to be derived. [e] Indication of vulnerabilities. In addition to the security claims that are made, the specification MUST indicate which of the security claims detailed in Section 7.2.1 are NOT being made.
Mutual authentication This refers to an EAP method in which, within an interlocked exchange, the authenticator authenticates the peer and the peer authenticates the authenticator. Two independent one-way methods, running in opposite directions do not provide mutual authentication as defined here. Integrity protection This refers to providing data origin authentication and protection against unauthorized modification of information for EAP packets (including EAP Requests and Responses). When making this claim, a method specification MUST describe the EAP packets and fields within the EAP packet that are protected. Replay protection This refers to protection against replay of an EAP method or its messages, including success and failure result indications. Confidentiality This refers to encryption of EAP messages, including EAP Requests and Responses, and success and failure result indications. A method making this claim MUST support identity protection (see Section 7.3). Key derivation This refers to the ability of the EAP method to derive exportable keying material, such as the Master Session Key (MSK), and Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The MSK is used only for further key derivation, not directly for protection of the EAP conversation or subsequent data. Use of the EMSK is reserved. Key strength If the effective key strength is N bits, the best currently known methods to recover the key (with non-negligible probability) require, on average, an effort comparable to 2^(N-1) operations of a typical block cipher. Dictionary attack resistance Where password authentication is used, passwords are commonly selected from a small set (as compared to a set of N-bit keys), which raises a concern about dictionary attacks. A method may be said to provide protection against dictionary attacks if, when it uses a password as a secret, the method does not allow an offline attack that has a work factor based on the number of passwords in an attacker's dictionary.
Fast reconnect The ability, in the case where a security association has been previously established, to create a new or refreshed security association more efficiently or in a smaller number of round- trips. Cryptographic binding The demonstration of the EAP peer to the EAP server that a single entity has acted as the EAP peer for all methods executed within a tunnel method. Binding MAY also imply that the EAP server demonstrates to the peer that a single entity has acted as the EAP server for all methods executed within a tunnel method. If executed correctly, binding serves to mitigate man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities. Session independence The demonstration that passive attacks (such as capture of the EAP conversation) or active attacks (including compromise of the MSK or EMSK) does not enable compromise of subsequent or prior MSKs or EMSKs. Fragmentation This refers to whether an EAP method supports fragmentation and reassembly. As noted in Section 3.1, EAP methods should support fragmentation and reassembly if EAP packets can exceed the minimum MTU of 1020 octets. Channel binding The communication within an EAP method of integrity-protected channel properties such as endpoint identifiers which can be compared to values communicated via out of band mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol). Note: This list of security claims is not exhaustive. Additional properties, such as additional denial-of-service protection, may be relevant as well. RFC2607], it may be necessary to locate the appropriate backend authentication server before the authentication conversation can proceed. The realm portion of the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [RFC2486] is typically
included within the EAP-Response/Identity in order to enable the authentication exchange to be routed to the appropriate backend authentication server. Therefore, while the peer-name portion of the NAI may be omitted in the EAP-Response/Identity where proxies or relays are present, the realm portion may be required. It is possible for the identity in the identity response to be different from the identity authenticated by the EAP method. This may be intentional in the case of identity privacy. An EAP method SHOULD use the authenticated identity when making access control decisions. BINDING] and [MITM]. As noted in Section 2.1, EAP does not permit untunneled sequences of authentication methods. Were a sequence of EAP authentication methods to be permitted, the peer might not have proof that a single entity has acted as the authenticator for all EAP methods within the sequence. For example, an authenticator might terminate one EAP method, then forward the next method in the sequence to another party without the peer's knowledge or consent. Similarly, the authenticator might not have proof that a single entity has acted as the peer for all EAP methods within the sequence. Tunneling EAP within another protocol enables an attack by a rogue EAP authenticator tunneling EAP to a legitimate server. Where the tunneling protocol is used for key establishment but does not require peer authentication, an attacker convincing a legitimate peer to connect to it will be able to tunnel EAP packets to a legitimate server, successfully authenticating and obtaining the key. This allows the attacker to successfully establish itself as a man-in- the-middle, gaining access to the network, as well as the ability to decrypt data traffic between the legitimate peer and server. This attack may be mitigated by the following measures: [a] Requiring mutual authentication within EAP tunneling mechanisms. [b] Requiring cryptographic binding between the EAP tunneling protocol and the tunneled EAP methods. Where cryptographic binding is supported, a mechanism is also needed to protect against downgrade attacks that would bypass it. For further details on cryptographic binding, see [BINDING].
[c] Limiting the EAP methods authorized for use without protection, based on peer and authenticator policy. [d] Avoiding the use of tunnels when a single, strong method is available. Section 7.2.1 for definitions of these security claims. Method-specific MICs may be used to provide protection. If a per- packet MIC is employed within an EAP method, then peers, authentication servers, and authenticators not operating in pass- through mode MUST validate the MIC. MIC validation failures SHOULD be logged. Whether a MIC validation failure is considered a fatal error or not is determined by the EAP method specification. It is RECOMMENDED that methods providing integrity protection of EAP packets include coverage of all the EAP header fields, including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Type-Data fields. Since EAP messages of Types Identity, Notification, and Nak do not include their own MIC, it may be desirable for the EAP method MIC to cover information contained within these messages, as well as the header of each EAP message. To provide protection, EAP also may be encapsulated within a protected channel created by protocols such as ISAKMP [RFC2408], as is done in [IKEv2] or within TLS [RFC2246]. However, as noted in Section 7.4, EAP tunneling may result in a man-in-the-middle vulnerability.
Existing EAP methods define message integrity checks (MICs) that cover more than one EAP packet. For example, EAP-TLS [RFC2716] defines a MIC over a TLS record that could be split into multiple fragments; within the FINISHED message, the MIC is computed over previous messages. Where the MIC covers more than one EAP packet, a MIC validation failure is typically considered a fatal error. Within EAP-TLS [RFC2716], a MIC validation failure is treated as a fatal error, since that is what is specified in TLS [RFC2246]. However, it is also possible to develop EAP methods that support per-packet MICs, and respond to verification failures by silently discarding the offending packet. In this document, descriptions of EAP message handling assume that per-packet MIC validation, where it occurs, is effectively performed as though it occurs before sending any responses or changing the state of the host which received the packet. RFC2433], and Kerberos V [RFC1510] are known to be vulnerable to dictionary attacks. MS-CHAPv1 vulnerabilities are documented in [PPTPv1]; MS-CHAPv2 vulnerabilities are documented in [PPTPv2]; Kerberos vulnerabilities are described in [KRBATTACK], [KRBLIM], and [KERB4WEAK]. In order to protect against dictionary attacks, authentication methods resistant to dictionary attacks (as defined in Section 7.2.1) are recommended. If an authentication algorithm is used that is known to be vulnerable to dictionary attacks, then the conversation may be tunneled within a protected channel in order to provide additional protection. However, as noted in Section 7.4, EAP tunneling may result in a man- in-the-middle vulnerability, and therefore dictionary attack resistant methods are preferred. Section 7.2.1) address this vulnerability. In EAP there is no requirement that authentication be full duplex or that the same protocol be used in both directions. It is perfectly
acceptable for different protocols to be used in each direction. This will, of course, depend on the specific protocols negotiated. However, in general, completing a single unitary mutual authentication is preferable to two one-way authentications, one in each direction. This is because separate authentications that are not bound cryptographically so as to demonstrate they are part of the same session are subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, as discussed in Section 7.4. IEEE-802.1X], limited traffic may be permitted on the uncontrolled port. In EAP there is no provision for retries of failed authentication. However, in PPP the LCP state machine can renegotiate the authentication protocol at any time, thus allowing a new attempt. Similarly, in IEEE 802.1X the Supplicant or Authenticator can re- authenticate at any time. It is recommended that any counters used for authentication failure not be reset until after successful authentication, or subsequent termination of the failed link.
KEYFRAME] for details). EAP methods SHOULD ensure the freshness of the MSK and EMSK, even in cases where one party may not have a high quality random number generator. A RECOMMENDED method is for each party to provide a nonce of at least 128 bits, used in the derivation of the MSK and EMSK. EAP methods export the MSK and EMSK, but not Transient Session Keys so as to allow EAP methods to be ciphersuite and media independent. Keying material exported by EAP methods MUST be independent of the ciphersuite negotiated to protect data. Depending on the lower layer, EAP methods may run before or after ciphersuite negotiation, so that the selected ciphersuite may not be known to the EAP method. By providing keying material usable with any ciphersuite, EAP methods can used with a wide range of ciphersuites and media. In order to preserve algorithm independence, EAP methods deriving keys SHOULD support (and document) the protected negotiation of the ciphersuite used to protect the EAP conversation between the peer and server. This is distinct from the ciphersuite negotiated between the peer and authenticator, used to protect data. The strength of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) used to protect data is ultimately dependent on the strength of keys generated by the EAP method. If an EAP method cannot produce keying material of sufficient strength, then the TSKs may be subject to a brute force
attack. In order to enable deployments requiring strong keys, EAP methods supporting key derivation SHOULD be capable of generating an MSK and EMSK, each with an effective key strength of at least 128 bits. Methods supporting key derivation MUST demonstrate cryptographic separation between the MSK and EMSK branches of the EAP key hierarchy. Without violating a fundamental cryptographic assumption (such as the non-invertibility of a one-way function), an attacker recovering the MSK or EMSK MUST NOT be able to recover the other quantity with a level of effort less than brute force. Non-overlapping substrings of the MSK MUST be cryptographically separate from each other, as defined in Section 7.2.1. That is, knowledge of one substring MUST NOT help in recovering some other substring without breaking some hard cryptographic assumption. This is required because some existing ciphersuites form TSKs by simply splitting the AAA-Key to pieces of appropriate length. Likewise, non-overlapping substrings of the EMSK MUST be cryptographically separate from each other, and from substrings of the MSK. The EMSK is reserved for future use and MUST remain on the EAP peer and EAP server where it is derived; it MUST NOT be transported to, or shared with, additional parties, or used to derive any other keys. (This restriction will be relaxed in a future document that specifies how the EMSK can be used.) Since EAP does not provide for explicit key lifetime negotiation, EAP peers, authenticators, and authentication servers MUST be prepared for situations in which one of the parties discards the key state, which remains valid on another party. This specification does not provide detailed guidance on how EAP methods derive the MSK and EMSK, how the AAA-Key is derived from the MSK and/or EMSK, or how the TSKs are derived from the AAA-Key. The development and validation of key derivation algorithms is difficult, and as a result, EAP methods SHOULD re-use well established and analyzed mechanisms for key derivation (such as those specified in IKE [RFC2409] or TLS [RFC2246]), rather than inventing new ones. EAP methods SHOULD also utilize well established and analyzed mechanisms for MSK and EMSK derivation. Further details on EAP Key Derivation are provided within [KEYFRAME].
Section 7.2.1) be used, along with lower layers providing per-packet confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and replay protection. Additionally, if the lower layer performs ciphersuite negotiation, it should be understood that EAP does not provide by itself integrity protection of that negotiation. Therefore, in order to avoid downgrading attacks which would lead to weaker ciphersuites being used, clients implementing lower layer ciphersuite negotiation SHOULD protect against negotiation downgrading. This can be done by enabling users to configure which ciphersuites are acceptable as a matter of security policy, or the ciphersuite negotiation MAY be authenticated using keying material derived from the EAP authentication and a MIC algorithm agreed upon in advance by lower-layer peers.
In IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.1X data frames may be sent as Class 3 unicast data frames, and are therefore forwardable. This implies that while EAPOL-Start and EAPOL-Logoff messages may be authenticated and integrity protected, they can be spoofed by an authenticated attacker far from the target when "pre-authentication" is enabled. In IEEE 802.11, a "link down" indication is an unreliable indication of link failure, since wireless signal strength can come and go and may be influenced by radio frequency interference generated by an attacker. To avoid unnecessary resets, it is advisable to damp these indications, rather than passing them directly to the EAP. Since EAP supports retransmission, it is robust against transient connectivity losses. RFC3579], the authenticator is dependent on the AAA protocol in order to know the outcome of an authentication conversation, and does not look at the encapsulated EAP packet (if one is present) to determine the outcome. In practice, this implies that the AAA protocol spoken between the authenticator and authentication server MUST support per-packet authentication, integrity, and replay protection. [c] After completion of the EAP conversation, where lower layer security services such as per-packet confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and replay protection will be enabled, a secure association protocol SHOULD be run between the peer and authenticator in order to provide mutual authentication between
the peer and authenticator, guarantee liveness of transient session keys, provide protected ciphersuite and capabilities negotiation for subsequent data, and synchronize key usage. [d] A AAA-Key derived from the MSK and/or EMSK negotiated between the peer and authentication server MAY be transmitted to the authenticator. Therefore, a mechanism needs to be provided to transmit the AAA-Key from the authentication server to the authenticator that needs it. The specification of the AAA-key derivation, transport, and wrapping mechanisms is outside the scope of this document. Further details on AAA-Key Derivation are provided within [KEYFRAME]. RFC3579], may not provide confidentiality, EAP packets may be subsequently encapsulated for transport over the Internet where they may be captured by an attacker. As a result, cleartext passwords cannot be securely used within EAP, except where encapsulated within a protected tunnel with server authentication. Some of the same risks apply to EAP methods without dictionary attack resistance, as defined in Section 7.2.1. For details, see Section 7.6. Section 4.3.7 of [RFC3579] describes how an EAP pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client can be detected if it attempts to impersonate another authenticator (such by sending incorrect NAS- Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865] or NAS-IPv6-Address
[RFC3162] attributes via the AAA protocol). However, it is possible for a pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client to provide correct information to the AAA server while communicating misleading information to the EAP peer via a lower layer protocol. For example, it is possible for a compromised authenticator to utilize another authenticator's Called-Station-Id or NAS-Identifier in communicating with the EAP peer via a lower layer protocol, or for a pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client to provide an incorrect peer Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580] to the AAA server via the AAA protocol. In order to address this vulnerability, EAP methods may support a protected exchange of channel properties such as endpoint identifiers, including (but not limited to): Called-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580], Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580], NAS- Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865], and NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162]. Using such a protected exchange, it is possible to match the channel properties provided by the authenticator via out-of-band mechanisms against those exchanged within the EAP method. Where discrepancies are found, these SHOULD be logged; additional actions MAY also be taken, such as denying access. IEEE-802.11i], additional resilience is typically of marginal benefit. Depending on the method and circumstances, result indications can be spoofable by an attacker. A method is said to provide protected result indications if it supports result indications, as well as the "integrity protection" and "replay protection" claims. A method supporting protected result indications MUST indicate which result indications are protected, and which are not. Protected result indications are not required to protect against rogue authenticators. Within a mutually authenticating method, requiring that the server authenticate to the peer before the peer will accept a Success packet prevents an attacker from acting as a rogue authenticator.
However, it is possible for an attacker to forge a Success packet after the server has authenticated to the peer, but before the peer has authenticated to the server. If the peer were to accept the forged Success packet and attempt to access the network when it had not yet successfully authenticated to the server, a denial of service attack could be mounted against the peer. After such an attack, if the lower layer supports failure indications, the authenticator can synchronize state with the peer by providing a lower layer failure indication. See Section 7.12 for details. If a server were to authenticate the peer and send a Success packet prior to determining whether the peer has authenticated the authenticator, an idle timeout can occur if the authenticator is not authenticated by the peer. Where supported by the lower layer, an authenticator sensing the absence of the peer can free resources. In a method supporting result indications, a peer that has authenticated the server does not consider the authentication successful until it receives an indication that the server successfully authenticated it. Similarly, a server that has successfully authenticated the peer does not consider the authentication successful until it receives an indication that the peer has authenticated the server. In order to avoid synchronization problems, prior to sending a success result indication, it is desirable for the sender to verify that sufficient authorization exists for granting access, though, as discussed below, this is not always possible. While result indications may enable synchronization of the authentication result between the peer and server, this does not guarantee that the peer and authenticator will be synchronized in terms of their authorization or that timeouts will not occur. For example, the EAP server may not be aware of an authorization decision made by a AAA proxy; the AAA server may check authorization only after authentication has completed successfully, to discover that authorization cannot be granted, or the AAA server may grant access but the authenticator may be unable to provide it due to a temporary lack of resources. In these situations, synchronization may only be achieved via lower layer result indications. Success indications may be explicit or implicit. For example, where a method supports error messages, an implicit success indication may be defined as the reception of a specific message without a preceding error message. Failures are typically indicated explicitly. As described in Section 4.2, a peer silently discards a Failure packet received at a point where the method does not explicitly permit this
to be sent. For example, a method providing its own error messages might require the peer to receive an error message prior to accepting a Failure packet. Per-packet authentication, integrity, and replay protection of result indications protects against spoofing. Since protected result indications require use of a key for per-packet authentication and integrity protection, methods supporting protected result indications MUST also support the "key derivation", "mutual authentication", "integrity protection", and "replay protection" claims. Protected result indications address some denial-of-service vulnerabilities due to spoofing of Success and Failure packets, though not all. EAP methods can typically provide protected result indications only in some circumstances. For example, errors can occur prior to key derivation, and so it may not be possible to protect all failure indications. It is also possible that result indications may not be supported in both directions or that synchronization may not be achieved in all modes of operation. For example, within EAP-TLS [RFC2716], in the client authentication handshake, the server authenticates the peer, but does not receive a protected indication of whether the peer has authenticated it. In contrast, the peer authenticates the server and is aware of whether the server has authenticated it. In the session resumption handshake, the peer authenticates the server, but does not receive a protected indication of whether the server has authenticated it. In this mode, the server authenticates the peer and is aware of whether the peer has authenticated it. RFC1994]. Valuable feedback was provided by Yoshihiro Ohba of Toshiba America Research, Jari Arkko of Ericsson, Sachin Seth of Microsoft, Glen Zorn of Cisco Systems, Jesse Walker of Intel, Bill Arbaugh, Nick Petroni and Bryan Payne of the University of Maryland, Steve Bellovin of AT&T Research, Paul Funk of Funk Software, Pasi Eronen of Nokia, Joseph Salowey of Cisco, Paul Congdon of HP, and members of the EAP working group. The use of Security Claims sections for EAP methods, as required by Section 7.2 and specified for each EAP method described in this document, was inspired by Glen Zorn through [EAP-EVAL].
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994. [RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2243] Metz, C., "OTP Extended Responses", RFC 2243, November 1997. [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. [RFC2289] Haller, N., Metz, C., Nesser, P. and M. Straw, "A One-Time Password System", RFC 2289, February 1998. [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. [RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000. [IEEE-802] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Overview and Architecture", IEEE Standard 802, 1990. [IEEE-802.1X] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X, September 2001.
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, September 1981. [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and B. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. [RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994. [RFC2246] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999. [RFC2284] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998. [RFC2486] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 2486, January 1999. [RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schneider, M. and M. Schertler, "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998. [RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. [RFC2433] Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions", RFC 2433, October 1998. [RFC2607] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999. [RFC2661] Townsley, W., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G., Zorn, G. and B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"", RFC 2661, August 1999. [RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999. [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2960] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000. [RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC 3162, August 2001. [RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002. [RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003. [RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003. [RFC3692] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. [DECEPTION] Slatalla, M. and J. Quittner, "Masters of Deception", Harper-Collins, New York, 1995. [KRBATTACK] Wu, T., "A Real-World Analysis of Kerberos Password Security", Proceedings of the 1999 ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/99/ proceedings/papers/wu.pdf. [KRBLIM] Bellovin, S. and M. Merrit, "Limitations of the Kerberos authentication system", Proceedings of the 1991 Winter USENIX Conference, pp. 253-267, 1991. [KERB4WEAK] Dole, B., Lodin, S. and E. Spafford, "Misplaced trust: Kerberos 4 session keys", Proceedings of the Internet Society Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp. 60-70, March 1997.
[PIC] Aboba, B., Krawczyk, H. and Y. Sheffer, "PIC, A Pre-IKE Credential Provisioning Protocol", Work in Progress, October 2002. [IKEv2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Work in Progress, January 2004. [PPTPv1] Schneier, B. and Mudge, "Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's Point-to- Point Tunneling Protocol", Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Communications and Computer Security, ACM Press, November 1998. [IEEE-802.11] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Standard 802.11, 1999. [SILVERMAN] Silverman, Robert D., "A Cost-Based Security Analysis of Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Lengths", RSA Laboratories Bulletin 13, April 2000 (Revised November 2001), http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/bulletins/ bulletin13.html. [KEYFRAME] Aboba, B., "EAP Key Management Framework", Work in Progress, October 2003. [SASLPREP] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords", Work in Progress, March 2004. [IEEE-802.11i] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Unapproved Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security", IEEE Draft 802.11i (work in progress), 2003. [DIAM-EAP] Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", Work in Progress, February 2004. [EAP-EVAL] Zorn, G., "Specifying Security Claims for EAP Authentication Types", Work in Progress, October 2002.
[BINDING] Puthenkulam, J., "The Compound Authentication Binding Problem", Work in Progress, October 2003. [MITM] Asokan, N., Niemi, V. and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the- Middle in Tunneled Authentication Protocols", IACR ePrint Archive Report 2002/163, October 2002, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/163>. [IEEE-802.11i-req] Stanley, D., "EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs", Work in Progress, February 2004. [PPTPv2] Schneier, B. and Mudge, "Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's PPTP Authentication Extensions (MS- CHAPv2)", CQRE 99, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 192-203.
RFC2284] and this document. Minor changes, including style, grammar, spelling, and editorial changes are not mentioned here. o The Terminology section (Section 1.2) has been expanded, defining more concepts and giving more exact definitions. o The concepts of Mutual Authentication, Key Derivation, and Result Indications are introduced and discussed throughout the document where appropriate. o In Section 2, it is explicitly specified that more than one exchange of Request and Response packets may occur as part of the EAP authentication exchange. How this may be used and how it may not be used is specified in detail in Section 2.1. o Also in Section 2, some requirements have been made explicit for the authenticator when acting in pass-through mode. o An EAP multiplexing model (Section 2.2) has been added to illustrate a typical implementation of EAP. There is no requirement that an implementation conform to this model, as long as the on-the-wire behavior is consistent with it. o As EAP is now in use with a variety of lower layers, not just PPP for which it was first designed, Section 3 on lower layer behavior has been added. o In the description of the EAP Request and Response interaction (Section 4.1), both the behavior on receiving duplicate requests, and when packets should be silently discarded has been more exactly specified. The implementation notes in this section have been substantially expanded. o In Section 4.2, it has been clarified that Success and Failure packets must not contain additional data, and the implementation note has been expanded. A subsection giving requirements on processing of success and failure packets has been added. o Section 5 on EAP Request/Response Types lists two new Type values: the Expanded Type (Section 5.7), which is used to expand the Type value number space, and the Experimental Type. In the Expanded Type number space, the new Expanded Nak (Section 5.3.2) Type has been added. Clarifications have been made in the description of most of the existing Types. Security claims summaries have been added for authentication methods.
o In Sections 5, 5.1, and 5.2, a requirement has been added such that fields with displayable messages should contain UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646 characters. o It is now required in Section 5.1 that if the Type-Data field of an Identity Request contains a NUL-character, only the part before the null is displayed. RFC 2284 prohibits the null termination of the Type-Data field of Identity messages. This rule has been relaxed for Identity Request messages and the Identity Request Type-Data field may now be null terminated. o In Section 5.5, support for OTP Extended Responses [RFC2243] has been added to EAP OTP. o An IANA Considerations section (Section 6) has been added, giving registration policies for the numbering spaces defined for EAP. o The Security Considerations (Section 7) have been greatly expanded, giving a much more comprehensive coverage of possible threats and other security considerations. o In Section 7.5, text has been added on method-specific behavior, providing guidance on how EAP method-specific integrity checks should be processed. Where possible, it is desirable for a method-specific MIC to be computed over the entire EAP packet, including the EAP layer header (Code, Identifier, Length) and EAP method layer header (Type, Type-Data). o In Section 7.14 the security risks involved in use of cleartext passwords with EAP are described. o In Section 7.15 text has been added relating to detection of rogue NAS behavior.
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