5.3. Relay OperationThe following sections describe relay implementation requirements. A non-normative discussion of relay operation may be found in Section 4.2.
5.3.1. IP/IGMP/MLD Protocol RequirementsA relay requires a subset of router-mode IGMP and MLD functionality to provide group membership tracking and report processing. A relay accessible via IPv4 MUST support IPv4/IGMPv3 and MAY support IPv6/MLDv2. A relay accessible via IPv6 MUST support IPv6/MLDv2 and MAY support IPv4/IGMPv3. A relay MUST apply the forwarding rules described in Section 6.3 of [RFC3376] and Section 7.3 of [RFC3810]. A relay MUST handle incoming reports as described in Section 6.4 of [RFC3376] and Section 7.4 of [RFC3810], with the exception that actions that lead to queries MAY be modified to eliminate query generation. A relay MUST accept IGMP and MLD report datagrams regardless of the IP source address carried by those datagrams. All other aspects of IGMP/MLD router behavior, such as the handling of queries, querier election, etc., are not used or required for relay operation.
5.3.2. StartupIf a relay is deployed for anycast discovery, the relay MUST advertise an anycast Relay Discovery Address Prefix into the unicast routing system of the anycast domain. An address within that prefix, i.e., a Relay Discovery Address, MUST be assigned to a relay interface. A unicast IPv4 and/or IPv6 address MUST be assigned to the relay interface that will be used to send and receive AMT control and data messages. This address or addresses are returned in Relay Advertisement messages. The remaining details of relay "startup" are highly implementation dependent and are not addressed in this document.
5.3.3. RunningWhen a relay is started, it begins listening for AMT messages on the interface to which the unicast Relay Address(es) has been assigned, i.e., the address returned in Relay Advertisement messages.
22.214.171.124. Handling AMT MessagesA relay MUST ignore any message other than a Relay Discovery, Request, Membership Update, or Teardown message. The handling of Relay Discovery, Request, Membership Update, and Teardown messages is addressed in the sections that follow. Support for the Teardown message is OPTIONAL. If a relay does not support the Teardown message, it MUST also ignore this message. A relay that conforms to this specification MUST ignore any message with a Version field value other than zero.
126.96.36.199. Handling a Relay Discovery MessageThis section describes relay requirements related to the relay discovery message sequence described in Section 188.8.131.52. A relay MUST accept and respond to Relay Discovery messages sent to an anycast Relay Discovery Address or the unicast Relay Address. If a relay receives a Relay Discovery message sent to its unicast address, it MUST respond just as it would if the message had been sent to its anycast Relay Discovery Address. When a relay receives a Relay Discovery message, it responds by sending a Relay Advertisement message back to the source of the Relay Discovery message. The relay MUST use the source IP address and UDP port number of the Relay Discovery message as the destination IP address and UDP port number for the Relay Advertisement message. The source IP address and UDP port number carried by the Relay Advertisement message MUST match the destination IP address and UDP port number of the Relay Discovery message to ensure successful NAT traversal. The relay MUST copy the value contained in the Discovery Nonce field of the Relay Discovery message into the Discovery Nonce field in the Relay Advertisement message.
If the Relay Discovery message was received as an IPv4 datagram, the relay MUST return an IPv4 address in the Relay Address field of the Relay Advertisement message. If the Relay Discovery message was received as an IPv6 datagram, the relay MUST return an IPv6 address in the Relay Address field.
184.108.40.206. Handling a Request MessageThis section describes relay requirements related to the membership query portion of the message sequence described in Section 220.127.116.11. When a relay receives a Request message, it responds by sending a Membership Query message back to the source of the Request message. The relay MUST use the source IP address and UDP port of the Request message as the destination IP address and UDP port for the Membership Query message. The source IP address and UDP port carried by the Membership Query MUST match the destination IP address and UDP port of the Request to ensure successful NAT traversal. The relay MUST return the value contained in the Request Nonce field of the Request message in the Request Nonce field of the Membership Query message. The relay MUST compute a MAC value, as described in Section 5.3.5, and return that value in the Response MAC field of the Membership Query message. If a relay supports the Teardown message, it MUST set the G flag in the Membership Query message and return the source IP address and UDP port carried by the Request message in the corresponding Gateway IP Address and Gateway Port Number fields. If the relay does not support the Teardown message, it SHOULD NOT set these fields, as this may cause the gateway to generate unnecessary Teardown messages. If the P flag in the Request message is 0, the relay MUST return an IPv4-encapsulated IGMPv3 General Query in the Membership Query message. If the P flag is 1, the relay MUST return an IPv6-encapsulated MLDv2 General Query in the Membership Query message. If the relay is not accepting Membership Update messages that create new tunnel endpoints due to resource limitations, it SHOULD set the L flag in the Membership Query message to notify the gateway of this state. Support for the L flag is OPTIONAL. See Section 18.104.22.168.
The encapsulated IGMPv3 General Query datagrams generated by a relay MUST conform to the descriptions found in Section 4.1 of [RFC3376]. These datagrams MUST possess the IP headers, header options, and header values called for in [RFC3376], with the following exception: a relay MAY use any source IP address for an IGMP General Query datagram, including the "unspecified" address (all octets are zero). This exception is made because any source address that a relay might normally send may not be a valid link-local address on any gateway interface. It is for this reason that a gateway must accept encapsulated IGMP queries regardless of the source address they carry. See Section 5.2.1. The encapsulated MLDv2 General Query datagrams generated by a relay MUST conform to the descriptions found in Section 5.1 of [RFC3810]. These datagrams MUST possess the IP headers, header options, and header values called for in [RFC3810], with the following exception: a relay MAY use any source IP address for an MLD General Query datagram, including the "unspecified" address (all octets are zero). This exception is made because any source address that a relay might normally send may not be a valid link-local address on any gateway interface. As with IGMP, it is for this reason that a gateway must accept encapsulated MLD queries regardless of the source address they carry. See Section 5.2.1. A relay MUST set the Querier's Query Interval Code (QQIC) field in the General Query to supply the gateway with a suggested time duration to use for the membership query timer. The QQIC field is defined in Section 4.1.7 of [RFC3376] and Section 5.1.9 of [RFC3810]. A relay MAY adjust this value to affect the rate at which the Request messages are sent from a gateway. However, a gateway is allowed to use a shorter duration than the duration specified in the QQIC field, so a relay may be limited in its ability to spread out Requests coming from a gateway. A relay MUST set the Querier's Robustness Variable (QRV) field in the General Query to a non-zero value. This value SHOULD be greater than one. If a gateway retransmits membership state-change messages, it will retransmit them (Robustness Variable - 1) times. The QRV field is defined in Section 4.1.6 of [RFC3376] and Section 5.1.8 of [RFC3810]. A relay SHOULD set the Maximum Response Code field in the General Query to a value of 1 to trigger an immediate response from the gateway (some host IGMP/MLD implementations may not accept a value of zero). A relay SHOULD NOT use the IGMPv3/MLDv2 Query Response Interval variable, if available, to generate the Maximum Response Code field value, as the Query Response Interval variable is used in setting the duration of group state timers and must not be set to
such a small value. The Maximum Response Code field is defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC3376] and Section 5.1.3 of [RFC3810]. See Section 22.214.171.124.
126.96.36.199. Handling a Membership Update MessageThis section describes relay requirements related to the membership update portion of the message sequence described in Section 188.8.131.52. When a relay receives a Membership Update message, it must first determine whether it should accept or ignore the message. A relay MUST NOT make any changes to group membership and forwarding state if the message fails to satisfy any of the following requirements: o The IP datagram encapsulated within the message MUST be one of the following: * IPv4 datagram carrying an IGMPv2 or IGMPv3 Membership Report message. * IPv4 datagram carrying an IGMPv2 Leave Group message. * IPv6 datagram carrying an MLDv1 or MLDv2 Multicast Listener Report message. * IPv6 datagram carrying MLDv1 Multicast Listener Done message. o The encapsulated IP datagram MUST satisfy the IP header requirements for the IGMP or MLD message type as described in Section 4 of [RFC3376], Section 2 of [RFC2236], Section 5 of [RFC3810], and Section 3 of [RFC2710], with the following exception: a relay MUST accept an IGMP or MLD message regardless of the IP source address carried by the datagram. o The total length of the encapsulated IP datagram as computed from the lengths contained in the datagram header(s) MUST NOT exceed the available field length within the Membership Update message. o The computed checksums for the encapsulated IP datagram and its payload MUST match the values contained therein. Checksum computation and verification vary by protocol; see [RFC0791] for IPv4, [RFC3376] for IGMPv3, and [RFC4443] for MLD (ICMPv6). o If processing of the encapsulated IGMP or MLD message would result in an allocation of new state or a modification of existing state, the relay MUST authenticate the source of the message by verifying that the value contained in the Response MAC field equals the MAC value computed from the fields in the Membership Update message
datagram. If a time-varying private secret is used in the computation of a Response MAC, the relay MUST retain the previous version of the private secret for use in authenticating Membership Updates sent during the subsequent query interval. If the first attempt at Response MAC authentication fails, the relay MUST attempt to authenticate the Response MAC using the previous private secret value unless 2 * query_interval time has elapsed since the private secret change. See Section 5.3.5. A relay MAY skip source authentication to reduce the computational cost of handling Membership Update messages if the relay can make a trivial determination that the IGMP/MLD message carried by the Membership Update message will produce no changes in group membership or forwarding state. The relay does not need to compute and compare MAC values if it finds there are no group subscriptions for the source of the Membership Update message and either of the following is true: o The encapsulated IP datagram is an IGMPv3 Membership Report or MLDv2 Multicast Listener Report message that contains no group records. This may often be the case for gateways that continuously repeat the membership update cycle even though they have no group subscriptions to report. o The encapsulated IP datagram is an IGMPv2 Leave Group or MLDv1 Multicast Listener Done message. The IGMP and MLD protocol specifications indicate that senders SHOULD use a link-local source IP address in message datagrams. This requirement must be relaxed for AMT because gateways and relays do not share a common subnet. For this reason, a relay implementation MUST accept IGMP and MLD datagrams regardless of the source IP address they carry. Once a relay has determined that the Membership Update message is valid, it processes the encapsulated IGMP or MLD message to update group membership state and communicates with the multicast protocol to update forwarding state and possibly send multicast protocol messages towards upstream routers. The relay MUST ignore any octets that might exist between the encapsulated IP datagram and the end of the Membership Update message. As described in Section 4.2.2, a relay uses the source IP address and source UDP port carried by a Membership Update message to identify a tunnel endpoint. A relay uses the tunnel endpoint as the destination address for any Multicast Data messages it sends as a result of the
group membership and forwarding state created by processing the IGMP/ MLD messages contained in Membership Update messages received from the endpoint. If a Membership Update message originates from a new endpoint, the relay MUST determine whether it can accept updates from a new endpoint. If a relay has been configured with a limit on the total number of endpoints, or a limit on the total number of endpoints for a given source address, then the relay MAY ignore the Membership Update message and possibly withdraw any Relay Discovery Address Prefix announcement that it might have made. See Section 184.108.40.206. A relay MUST maintain some form of group membership database for each endpoint. The per-endpoint databases are used to update a forwarding table containing entries that map a (*,G) or (S,G) subscription to a list of tunnel endpoints. A relay MUST maintain some form of group membership database representing a merger of the group membership databases of all endpoints. The merged group membership database is used to update upstream multicast forwarding state. A relay MUST maintain a forwarding table that maps each unique (*,G) and (S,G) subscription to a list of tunnel endpoints. A relay uses this forwarding table to provide the destination address when performing UDP/IP encapsulation of the incoming multicast IP datagrams to form Multicast Data messages. If a group filter mode for a group entry on a tunnel endpoint is EXCLUDE, the relay SHOULD NOT forward datagrams that originate from sources in the filter source list unless the relay architecture does not readily support source filtering. A relay MAY ignore the source list if necessary because gateways are expected to do their own source filtering.
220.127.116.11. Handling a Teardown MessageThis section describes relay requirements related to the teardown message sequence described in Section 18.104.22.168. When a relay (that supports the Teardown message) receives a Teardown message, it MUST first authenticate the source of the Teardown message by verifying that the Response MAC carried by the Teardown message is equal to a MAC value computed from the fields carried by the Teardown message. The method used to compute the MAC differs from that used to generate and validate the Membership Query and Membership Update messages in that the source IP address and source UDP port number used to compute the MAC are taken from the Gateway IP
Address and Gateway Port Number fields in the Teardown message rather than from the IP and UDP headers in the datagram that carries the Teardown message. The MAC computation is described in Section 5.3.5. A relay MUST ignore a Teardown message if the computed MAC does not equal the value of the Response MAC field. If a relay determines that a Teardown message is authentic, it MUST immediately stop transmitting Multicast Data messages to the endpoint identified by the Gateway IP Address and Gateway Port Number fields in the message. The relay MUST eventually delete any group membership and forwarding state associated with the endpoint but MAY delay doing so to allow a gateway to recreate group membership state on a new endpoint and thereby avoid making unnecessary (temporary) changes in upstream routing/forwarding state. The state changes made by a relay when processing a Teardown message MUST be identical to those that would be made if the relay had received an IGMP/MLD report that would cause the IGMP or MLD protocol to delete all existing group records in the group membership database associated with the endpoint. The processing of the Teardown message should trigger or mimic the normal interaction between IGMP or MLD and a multicast protocol to produce required changes in forwarding state and possibly send prune/leave messages towards upstream routers.
22.214.171.124. Handling Multicast IP DatagramsWhen a multicast IP datagram is forwarded to the relay pseudo-interface, the relay MUST, for each gateway that has expressed an interest in receiving the datagram, encapsulate the IP datagram into a Multicast Data message or messages and send that message or messages to the gateway. This process is highly implementation dependent but conceptually requires the following steps: o Use the IP datagram source and destination address to look up the appropriate (*,G) or (S,G) entry in the endpoint forwarding table created for the pseudo-interface as a result of IGMP/MLD processing. o Possibly replicate the datagram for each gateway endpoint listed for that (*,G) or (S,G) entry.
o If the multicast IP datagram size exceeds the Tunnel MTU as determined according to the procedure described in Section 126.96.36.199.1, the relay must execute the procedure described in Section 188.8.131.52.2. o Encapsulate and transmit the IP datagram according to the procedure described in Section 184.108.40.206.3. The relay pseudo-interface MUST ignore any other IP datagrams forwarded to the pseudo-interface.
220.127.116.11.1. Path and Tunnel MTUA relay MUST compute a Tunnel MTU (TMTU) value for each AMT tunnel that originates on the relay. A relay will use the TMTU value to determine whether an incoming multicast IP datagram can be delivered downstream in a Membership Data message without fragmentation. A relay MUST compute the TMTU by subtracting the size of the Membership Data message headers (IP, UDP, and AMT) from the current Path MTU (PMTU) associated with each AMT tunnel. The relay MUST maintain a PMTU value on a per-tunnel or per-relay basis. A relay MUST support one or both of the following methods for determining the PMTU value: o The relay MAY provide a configuration option that establishes a fixed PMTU that will be applied to all AMT tunnels originating at the relay. o The relay MAY dynamically adjust PMTU value(s) in response to receipt of ICMP/ICMPv6 Datagram Too Big messages as described in [RFC1191] and [RFC1981]. If a relay supports dynamic adjustment of per-tunnel or per-relay PMTU values in response to ICMP messages, the relay MUST provide a configuration option that disables this feature and also provide a configuration option that establishes a minimum PMTU for all tunnels. These configuration options may be used to mitigate certain types of denial-of-service attacks (see Section 6). When dynamic PMTU adjustments are disabled, the PMTU for all tunnels MUST default to the Link MTU (first hop) on the downstream interface.
18.104.22.168.2. MTU Filtering ProcedureThis section defines procedures that a relay must execute when it receives a multicast datagram whose size is greater than the Tunnel MTU of the tunnel or tunnels through which it must be delivered.
22.214.171.124.2.1. IPv4 Multicast IP DatagramsIf the DF bit in the multicast datagram header is set to 1 (Don't Fragment), the relay MUST discard the packet and, if the datagram originated from an SSM source, send an ICMPv4 [RFC0792] Destination Unreachable message to the source, with code 4 (fragmentation needed and DF set). The ICMP Destination Unreachable message MUST contain a Next-Hop MTU (as specified by [RFC1191]), and the relay MUST set the Next-Hop MTU to the TMTU associated with the tunnel or tunnels. If the DF bit in the multicast datagram header is set to 0 (May Fragment), the relay MUST fragment the datagram and encapsulate each fragment within Multicast Data messages for transmission through the tunnel or tunnels. This ensures that gateways will receive complete, non-fragmented Multicast Data messages, containing fragmented multicast datagram payloads. The relay SHOULD avoid generating a separate ICMP message for each tunnel but instead send a single ICMP message with a Next-Hop MTU equal to the smallest TMTU of all tunnels to which the datagram was to be forwarded. 126.96.36.199.2.2. IPv6 Multicast IP DatagramsThe relay MUST discard the packet and, if the datagram originated from an SSM source, send an ICMPv6 [RFC4443] Packet Too Big message to the payload source. The MTU specified in the Packet Too Big message MUST be equal to the TMTU associated with the tunnel or tunnels. The relay SHOULD avoid generating a separate ICMPv6 message for each tunnel but instead send a single ICMPv6 message with a Next-Hop MTU equal to the smallest TMTU of all tunnels to which the datagram was to be forwarded.
188.8.131.52.3. Encapsulation ProcedureA relay encapsulates a multicast IP datagram in a UDP/IP Membership Data message, using the tunnel endpoint UDP/IP address as the destination address and the unicast Relay Address and port number as the source UDP/IP address. To ensure successful NAT traversal, the source address and port MUST match the destination address and port carried by the Membership Update message sent by the gateway to create the forwarding table entry.
If possible, the relay SHOULD compute a valid, non-zero checksum for the UDP datagram carrying the Multicast Data message. See Section 184.108.40.206. The following sections describe additional requirements related to the IP protocol of the tunnel and that of the multicast IP datagram.
220.127.116.11.3.1. Tunneling over IPv4When a relay delivers an IPv4 payload over an IPv4 tunnel and the DF bit in the payload header is set to 1 (Don't Fragment), the relay MUST set the DF bit in the Multicast Data IP header to 1. When a relay delivers an IPv4 payload over an IPv4 tunnel and the DF bit in the payload header is set to 0 (May Fragment), by default, the relay MUST set the DF bit in the Multicast Data IP header to 1. However, a relay MAY provide a configuration option that allows the DF bit to be copied from the payload header to the Multicast Data IP header to allow downstream fragmentation of the Multicast Data message. When a relay delivers an IPv6 payload over an IPv4 tunnel, the relay MUST set the DF bit in the Multicast Data IP header to 1. The relay MUST NOT transmit a Multicast Data message with an IP header in which the MF (More Fragments) bit is set to 1. 18.104.22.168.3.2. Tunneling over IPv6When tunneling over IPv6, a relay MUST NOT emit a Multicast Data message datagram containing an IPv6 fragment header.
22.214.171.124.4. Handling Destination Unreachable MessagesIf a relay receives a sequence of ICMP or ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages (excluding ICMP code 4; see below) in response to transmission of a sequence of AMT Multicast Data messages to a gateway, the relay SHOULD discontinue sending messages to that gateway and shut down the tunnel for that gateway. Handling of ICMP Destination Unreachable messages with code 4, "fragmentation needed and DF set" (i.e., "Datagram Too Big") is covered in Section 126.96.36.199.1. If a relay provides this capability, it MUST provide a configuration option that indicates what number of sequential Destination Unreachable messages can be received and ignored before the relay will automatically shut down a tunnel.
188.8.131.52. State TimersA relay MUST maintain a timer or timers whose expiration will trigger the removal of any group subscriptions and forwarding state previously created for a gateway endpoint should the gateway fail to refresh the group membership state within a specified time interval. A relay MAY use a variant of the IGMPv3/MLDv2 state management protocol described in Section 6 of [RFC3376] or Section 7 of [RFC3810] or may maintain a per-endpoint timer to trigger the deletion of group membership state. If a per-endpoint timer is used, the relay MUST restart this timer each time it receives a new Membership Update message from the gateway endpoint. The endpoint timer duration MAY be computed from tunable IGMP/MLD variables as follows: ((Robustness_Variable) * (Query_Interval)) + Query_Response_Interval If IGMP/MLD default values are used for these variables, the gateway will time out after 125s * 2 + 10s = 260s. The timer duration MUST be greater than the query interval suggested in the last Membership Query message sent to the gateway endpoint. Regardless of the timers used (IGMPv3/MLDv2 or endpoint), the Query_Response_Interval value SHOULD be greater than or equal to 10s to allow for packet loss and round-trip time in the Request/ Membership Query message exchange.
184.108.40.206. Relay Resource ManagementA relay may be configured with various service limits to ensure a minimum level of performance for gateways that connect to it. If a relay has determined that it has reached or exceeded maximum allowable capacity or has otherwise exhausted resources required to support additional gateways, it SHOULD withdraw any Relay Discovery Address Prefix it has advertised into the unicast internetwork and SHOULD set the L flag in any Membership Query messages it returns to gateways while in this state. If the relay receives an update from a gateway that adds group membership or forwarding state for an endpoint that has already reached maximum allowable state entries, the relay SHOULD continue to accept updates from the gateway but ignore any group membership/ forwarding state additions requested by that gateway.
If the relay receives an update from a gateway that would create a new tunnel endpoint for a source IP address that has already reached the maximum allowable number of endpoints (maximum UDP ports), it should simply ignore the Membership Update.
5.3.4. ShutdownThe following steps should be treated as an abstract description of the shutdown procedure for a relay: o Withdraw the Relay Discovery Address Prefix advertisement (if used). o Stop listening for Relay Discovery messages. o Stop listening for control messages from gateways. o Stop sending data messages to gateways. o Delete all AMT group membership and forwarding state created on the relay, coordinating with the multicast routing protocol to update the group membership state on upstream interfaces as required.
5.3.5. Response MAC GenerationA Response MAC value is computed by the relay. A Response MAC computation is required in the following situations: o To generate a Response MAC value from a Request message for inclusion in a Membership Query message. o To generate a Response MAC value from a Membership Update message for use in authenticating the Response MAC carried within that message. o To generate a Response MAC value from a Teardown message to authenticate the Response MAC carried within that message. Gateways treat the Response MAC field as an opaque value, so a relay implementation may generate the MAC using any method available to it. The RECOMMENDED method for computing the Response MAC is to compute a cryptographically secure hash or keyed-hash digest from the following values: o The source IP address of the message (or Teardown Gateway IP Address field).
o The source UDP port of the message (or Teardown Gateway Port Number field). o The Request Nonce contained in the message. o A private secret or key known only to the relay.
5.3.6. Private Secret GenerationIf the relay implementation uses a private secret (or key) to compute the Response MAC value, the relay SHOULD periodically compute a new private secret. The RECOMMENDED maximum interval is 2 hours. A relay MUST retain the prior secret for use in verifying MAC values that were sent to gateways just prior to the use of the new secret.
6. Security ConsiderationsAMT is not intended to be a strongly secure protocol. In general, the protocol provides the same level of security and robustness as is provided by the UDP, IGMP, and MLD protocols on which it relies. The lack of strong security features can be largely attributed to the desire to make the protocol lightweight by minimizing the state and computation required to service a single gateway, thereby allowing a relay to service a larger number of gateways. Many of the threats and vectors described in [RFC3552] may be employed against the protocol to launch various types of denial-of- service attacks that can affect the functioning of gateways or their ability to locate and communicate with a relay. These scenarios are described below. As is the case for UDP, IGMP, and MLD, the AMT protocol provides no mechanisms for ensuring message delivery or integrity. The protocol does not provide confidentiality -- multicast groups, sources, and streams requested by a gateway are sent in the clear. The protocol does use a three-way handshake to provide trivial source authentication for state allocation and updates (see below). The protocol also requires gateways and relays to ignore malformed messages and those messages that do not carry expected address values, protocol payload types, or content.
6.1. RelaysThe three-way handshake provided by the membership update message sequence (see Section 220.127.116.11) provides a defense against source- spoofing-based resource-exhaustion attacks on a relay by requiring source authentication before state allocation. However, in an effort
to consume computational resources, attackers may still attempt to flood a relay with Request and Membership Update messages to force the relay to make the MAC authentication computations. Implementations may choose to limit the frequency with which a relay responds to Request messages sent from a single IP address or IP address and UDP port pair, but support for this functionality is not required. The three-way handshake provides no defense against an eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacker. Attackers that execute the gateway protocol may consume relay resources by instantiating a large number of tunnels or joining a large number of multicast streams. A relay implementation should provide a mechanism for limiting the number of tunnels (Multicast Data message destinations) that can be created for a single gateway source address. Relays should also provide a means for limiting the number of joins per tunnel instance as a defense against these attacks. Relays may withdraw their AMT anycast prefix advertisement when they reach configured maximum capacity or exhaust required resources. This behavior allows gateways to use the relay discovery process to find the next topologically nearest relay that has advertised the prefix. This behavior also allows a successful resource-exhaustion attack to propagate from one relay to the next until all relays reachable using the anycast address have effectively been taken offline. This behavior may also be used to acquire the unicast addresses for individual relays that can then be used to launch a DDoS attack on all of the relays without using the relay discovery process. To prevent wider disruption of AMT-based distribution networks, relay anycast address advertisements can be limited to specific administrative routing domains. This will isolate such attacks to a single domain. The Path and Tunnel MTU adjustment (discovery) procedure described in Section 18.104.22.168.1 is vulnerable to two denial-of-service attacks (see Section 8 of [RFC1191] for details). Both attacks are based on a malicious party sending forged ICMPv4 Destination Unreachable or ICMPv6 Packet Too Big messages to a host. In the first attack, the forged message indicates an inordinately small Path MTU. In the second attack, the forged message indicates an inordinately large Path MTU. In both cases, throughput is adversely affected. In order to mitigate such attacks, relay implementations MUST include a configuration option to disable Path MTU adjustments on AMT tunnels.
6.2. GatewaysA passive eavesdropper may launch a denial-of-service attack on a gateway by capturing a Membership Query or Membership Update message and using the Request Nonce and message authentication code carried by the captured message to send a spoofed Membership Update or Teardown message to the relay. The spoofed messages may be used to modify or destroy group membership state associated with the gateway, thereby changing or interrupting the multicast traffic flows. A passive eavesdropper may also spoof Multicast Data messages in an attempt to overload the gateway or to disrupt or supplant existing traffic flows. A properly implemented gateway will filter Multicast Data messages that do not originate from the expected Relay Address and should filter non-multicast packets and multicast IP packets whose group or source addresses are not included in the current reception state for the gateway pseudo-interface. An active eavesdropper may launch a man-in-the-middle attack in which messages normally exchanged between a gateway and relay are intercepted, modified, spoofed, or discarded by the attacker. The attacker may deny access to, modify, or replace requested multicast traffic. The AMT protocol provides no means for detecting or defending against a man-in-the-middle attack -- any such functionality must be provided by multicast receiver applications through independent detection and validation of incoming multicast datagrams. The anycast discovery technique for finding relays (see Section 4.1.4) introduces a risk that a rogue router or a rogue Autonomous System (AS) could introduce a bogus route to a specific Relay Discovery Address Prefix and thus divert or absorb Relay Discovery messages sent by gateways. Network managers must guarantee the integrity of their routing to a particular Relay Discovery Address Prefix in much the same way that they guarantee the integrity of all other routes.
6.3. Encapsulated IP PacketsAn attacker forging or modifying a Membership Query or Membership Update message may attempt to embed something other than an IGMP or MLD message within the encapsulated IP packet carried by these messages in an effort to introduce these into the recipient's IP stack. A properly implemented gateway or relay will ignore any such messages and may further choose to ignore Membership Query messages that do not contain IGMP/MLD General Query or Membership Update messages that do not contain IGMP/MLD membership reports.
Properly implemented gateways and relays will also filter encapsulated IP packets that appear corrupted or truncated by verifying packet length and checksums.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. IPv4 and IPv6 Anycast Prefix AllocationThe following unicast prefixes have been assigned to provide anycast routing of Relay Discovery messages to public AMT relays as described in Section 4.1.4. Address assignments within these prefixes are described in Section 22.214.171.124.
7.1.1. IPv4IANA has assigned 126.96.36.199/24 from the "IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry". The block has been registered as follows: +----------------------+----------------+ | Attribute | Value | +----------------------+----------------+ | Address Block |188.8.131.52/24 | | Name | AMT | | RFC | [RFC7450] | | Allocation Date | 2014-12 | | Termination Date | N/A | | Source | True | | Destination | True | | Forwardable | True | | Global | True | | Reserved-by-Protocol | False | +----------------------+----------------+
7.1.2. IPv6IANA has registered the following special-purpose address block for IPv6 anycast AMT relay discovery. +----------------------+----------------+ | Attribute | Value | +----------------------+----------------+ | Address Block | 2001:3::/32 | | Name | AMT | | RFC | [RFC7450] | | Allocation Date | 2014-12 | | Termination Date | N/A | | Source | True | | Destination | True | | Forwardable | True | | Global | True | | Reserved-by-Protocol | False | +----------------------+----------------+
7.2. UDP Port NumberThe UDP port number 2268 has been reserved with IANA for use in the implementation and deployment of AMT. The protocol described by this document continues to use this port number according to the intent of the original request. IANA has updated the assignee, contact, and reference fields for this port number in accordance with this document.
8.1. Normative References[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3", RFC 3376, October 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3376>. [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed., and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for IP", RFC 4607, August 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4607>. [RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed., and C. Jennings, "Network Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, January 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
8.2. Informative References[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc0791>. [RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, September 1981, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc0792>. [RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5, RFC 1112, August 1989, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1112>. [RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191, November 1990, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>. [RFC1546] Partridge, C., Mendez, T., and W. Milliken, "Host Anycasting Service", RFC 1546, November 1993, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1546>. [RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981>. [RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 2", RFC 2236, November 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2236>. [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC 2663, August 1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2663>. [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>. [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>. [RFC4601] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas, "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 4601, August 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4601>. [RFC4786] Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, December 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>. [RFC6935] Eubanks, M., Chimento, P., and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 and UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets", RFC 6935, April 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6935>. [RFC6936] Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerlund, "Applicability Statement for the Use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums", RFC 6936, April 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6936>.
AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank the following individuals for their suggestions, comments, and corrections: Mark Altom Toerless Eckert Marshall Eubanks Gorry Fairhurst Dino Farinacci Lenny Giuliano Andy Huang Tom Imburgia Patricia McCrink Han Nguyen Doug Nortz Pekka Savola Robert Sayko Greg Shepherd Steve Simlo Mohit Talwar Lorenzo Vicisano Kurt Windisch John Zwiebel The anycast discovery mechanism described in this document is based on similar work done by the NGTrans WG for obtaining automatic IPv6 connectivity without explicit tunnels ("6to4"). Tony Ballardie provided helpful discussion that inspired this document. Juniper Networks was instrumental in funding several versions of this document as well as an open source implementation.
ContributorsThe following people provided significant contributions to the design of the protocol and earlier versions of this specification: Amit Aggarwal Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399 United States EMail: email@example.com Thomas Morin Orange 2, avenue Pierre Marzin Lannion 22300 France EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org Dirk Ooms OneSparrow Robert Molsstraat 11; 2018 Antwerp Belgium EMail: email@example.com Tom Pusateri !j Wake Forest, NC United States EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org Dave Thaler Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399 United States EMail: email@example.com
Author's AddressGregory Bumgardner Phone: +1 541 343 6790 EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org