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RFC 5274

Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements

Pages: 13
Proposed Standard
Updated by:  6402

Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 1
Network Working Group                                          J. Schaad
Request for Comments: 5274                       Soaring Hawk Consulting
Category: Standards Track                                       M. Myers
                                               TraceRoute Security, Inc.
                                                               June 2008


Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

This document provides a set of compliance statements about the CMC (Certificate Management over CMS) enrollment protocol. The ASN.1 structures and the transport mechanisms for the CMC enrollment protocol are covered in other documents. This document provides the information needed to make a compliant version of CMC.

Table of Contents

1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Requirements for All Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. CRMF Feature Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Requirements for Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Requirements for Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Requirements for EEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Requirements for RAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Requirements for CAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Overview

The CMC (Certificate Management over CMS) protocol is designed in terms of a client/server relationship. In the simplest case, the client is the requestor of the certificate (i.e., the End Entity (EE)) and the server is the issuer of the certificate (i.e., the Certification Authority (CA)). The introduction of a Registration Authority (RA) into the set of agents complicates the picture only slightly. The RA becomes the server with respect to the certificate requestor, and it becomes the client with respect to the certificate issuer. Any number of RAs can be inserted into the picture in this manner. The RAs may serve specialized purposes that are not currently covered by this document. One such purpose would be a Key Escrow agent. As such, all certificate requests for encryption keys would be directed through this RA and it would take appropriate action to do the key archival. Key recovery requests could be defined in the CMC methodology allowing for the Key Escrow agent to perform that operation acting as the final server in the chain of agents. If there are multiple RAs in the system, it is considered normal that not all RAs will see all certificate requests. The routing between the RAs may be dependent on the content of the certificate requests involved. This document is divided into six sections, each section specifying the requirements that are specific to a class of agents in the CMC model. These are 1) All agents, 2) all servers, 3) all clients, 4) all End-Entities, 5) all Registration Entities, 6) all Certificate Authorities.

2. Terminology

There are several different terms, abbreviations, and acronyms used in this document that we define here for convenience and consistency of usage: End-Entity (EE) refers to the entity that owns a key pair and for whom a certificate is issued. Registration Authority (RA) or Local RA (LRA) refers to an entity that acts as an intermediary between the EE and the CA. Multiple RAs can exist between the End-Entity and the Certification Authority. RAs may perform additional services such as key generation or key archival. This document uses the term RA for both RA and LRA.
Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 3
   Certification Authority (CA)  refers to the entity that issues
      certificates.

   Client  refers to an entity that creates a PKI Request.  In this
      document, both RAs and EEs can be clients.

   Server  refers to the entities that process PKI Requests and create
      PKI Responses.  In this document both CAs and RAs can be servers.

   PKCS #10  refers to the Public Key Cryptography Standard #10
      [PKCS10], which defines a certification request syntax.

   CRMF  refers to the Certificate Request Message Format RFC [CRMF].
      CMC uses this certification request syntax defined in this
      document as part of the protocol.

   CMS  refers to the Cryptographic Message Syntax RFC [CMS].  This
      document provides for basic cryptographic services including
      encryption and signing with and without key management.

   PKI Request/Response  refers to the requests/responses described in
      this document.  PKI Requests include certification requests,
      revocation requests, etc.  PKI Responses include certs-only
      messages, failure messages, etc.

   Proof-of-Identity  refers to the client proving they are who they say
      that they are to the server.

   Proof-of-Possession (POP)  refers to a value that can be used to
      prove that the private key corresponding to a public key is in the
      possession and can be used by an end-entity.

   Transport wrapper  refers to the outermost CMS wrapping layer.

3. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].

4. Requirements for All Entities

All [CMC-STRUCT] and [CMC-TRANS] compliance statements MUST be adhered to unless specifically stated otherwise in this document. All entities MUST support Full PKI Requests, Simple PKI Responses, and Full PKI Responses. Servers SHOULD support Simple PKI Requests.
Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 4
   All entities MUST support the use of the CRMF syntax for
   certification requests.  Support for the PKCS #10 syntax for
   certification requests SHOULD be implemented by servers.

   The extendedFailInfo field SHOULD NOT be populated in the
   CMCStatusInfoV2 object; the failInfo field SHOULD be used to relay
   this information.  If the extendedFailInfo field is used, it is
   suggested that an additional CMCStatusInfoV2 item exist for the same
   body part with a failInfo field.

   All entities MUST implement the HTTP transport mechanism as defined
   in [CMC-TRANS].  Other transport mechanisms MAY be implemented.

4.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements

All entities MUST verify DSA-SHA1 and RSA-SHA1 signatures in SignedData (see [CMS-ALG]). Entities MAY verify other signature algorithms. It is strongly suggested that RSA-PSS with SHA-1 be verified (see [CMS-RSA-PSS]). It is strongly suggested that SHA-256 using RSA and RSA-PSS be verified (see [RSA-256]). All entities MUST generate either DSA-SHA1 or RSA-SHA1 signatures for SignedData (see [CMS-ALG]). Other signatures algorithms MAY be used for generation. All entities MUST support Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the content encryption algorithm for EnvelopedData (see [CMS-AES]). Other content encryption algorithms MAY be implemented. All entities MUST support RSA as a key transport algorithm for EnvelopedData (see [CMS-ALG]). All entities SHOULD support RSA-OAEP (see [CMS-RSA-OAEP]) as a key transport algorithm. Other key transport algorithms MAY be implemented. If an entity supports key agreement for EnvelopedData, it MUST support Diffie-Hellman (see [CMS-DH]). If an entity supports PasswordRecipientInfo for EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData, it MUST support PBKDF2 [PBKDF2] for key derivation algorithms. It MUST support AES key wrap (see [AES-WRAP] as the key encryption algorithm. If AuthenticatedData is supported, PasswordRecipientInfo MUST be supported.
Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 5
   Algorithm requirements for the Identity Proof Version 2 control
   (Section 6.2.1 of [CMC-STRUCT]) are: SHA-1 MUST be implemented for
   hashAlgId.  SHA-256 SHOULD be implemented for hashAlgId.  HMAC-SHA1
   MUST be implemented for macAlgId.  HMAC-SHA256 SHOULD be implemented
   for macAlgId.

   Algorithm requirements for the Pop Link Witness Version 2 control
   (Section 6.3.1 of [CMC-STRUCT]) are: SHA-1 MUST be implemented for
   keyGenAlgorithm.  SHA-256 SHOULD be implemented for keyGenAlgorithm.
   PBKDF2 [PBKDF2] MAY be implemented for keyGenAlgorithm.  HMAC-SHA1
   MUST be implemented for macAlgorithm.  HMAC-SHA256 SHOULD be
   implemented for macAlgorithm.

   Algorithm requirements for the Encrypted POP and Decrypted POP
   controls (Section 6.7 of [CMC-STRUCT]) are: SHA-1 MUST be implemented
   for witnessAlgID.  SHA-256 SHOULD be implemented for witnessAlgID.
   HMAC-SHA1 MUST be implemented for thePOPAlgID.  HMAC-SHA256 SHOULD be
   implemented for thePOPAlgID.

   Algorithm requirements for Publish Trust Anchors control (Section
   6.15 of [CMC-STRUCT]) are: SHA-1 MUST be implemented for
   hashAlgorithm.  SHA-256 SHOULD be implemented for hashAlgorithm.

   If an EE generates DH keys for certification, it MUST support section
   4 of [DH-POP].  EEs MAY support Section 3 of [DH-POP].  CAs and RAs
   that do POP verification MUST support Section 4 of [DH-POP] and
   SHOULD support Section 3 of [DH-POP].

   EEs that need to use a signature algorithm for keys that cannot
   produce a signature MUST support Appendix C of [CMC-STRUCT] and MUST
   support the Encrypted/Decrypted POP controls.  CAs and RAs that do
   POP verification MUST support this signature algorithm and MUST
   support the Encrypted/Decrypted POP controls.
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4.2. Controls

The following table lists the name and level of support required for each control. +----------------------------+----------+----------+----------+ | Control | EE | RA | CA | +----------------------------+----------+----------+----------+ | Extended CMC Status Info | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | CMC Status Info | SHOULD | SHOULD | SHOULD | | | | | | | Identity Proof Version 2 | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Identity Proof | SHOULD | SHOULD | SHOULD | | | | | | | Identification | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | POP Link Random | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | POP Link Witness Version 2 | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | POP Link Witness | SHOULD | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Data Return | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Modify Cert Request | N/A | MUST | (2) | | | | | | | Add Extensions | N/A | MAY | (1) | | | | | | | Transaction ID | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Sender Nonce | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Recipient Nonce | MUST | MUST | MUST | | | | | | | Encrypted POP | (4) | (5) | SHOULD | | | | | | | Decrypted POP | (4) | (5) | SHOULD | | | | | | | RA POP Witness | N/A | SHOULD | (1) | | | | | | | Get Certificate | optional | optional | optional | | | | | | | Get CRL | optional | optional | optional | | | | | | | Revocation Request | SHOULD | SHOULD | MUST | | | | | |
Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 7
      | Registration Info          | SHOULD   | SHOULD   | SHOULD   |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Response Information       | SHOULD   | SHOULD   | SHOULD   |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Query Pending              | MUST     | MUST     | MUST     |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Confirm Cert.  Acceptance  | MUST     | MUST     | MUST     |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Publish Trust Anchors      | (3)      | (3)      | (3)      |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Authenticate Data          | (3)      | (3)      | (3)      |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Batch Request              | N/A      | MUST     | (2)      |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Batch Responses            | N/A      | MUST     | (2)      |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Publication Information    | optional | optional | optional |
      |                            |          |          |          |
      | Control Processed          | N/A      | MUST     | (2)      |
      +----------------------------+----------+----------+----------+

                      Table 1: CMC Control Attributes

   Notes:

   1.  CAs SHOULD implement this control if designed to work with RAs.

   2.  CAs MUST implement this control if designed to work with RAs.

   3.  Implementation is optional for these controls.  We strongly
       suggest that they be implemented in order to populate client
       trust anchors.

   4.  EEs only need to implement this if (a) they support key agreement
       algorithms or (b) they need to operate in environments where the
       hardware keys cannot provide POP.

   5.  RAs SHOULD implement this if they implement RA POP Witness.

   Strong consideration should be given to implementing the Authenticate
   Data and Publish Trust Anchors controls as this gives a simple method
   for distributing trust anchors into clients without user
   intervention.
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4.3. CRMF Feature Requirements

The following additional restrictions are placed on CRMF features: The registration control tokens id-regCtrl-regToken and id-regCtrl- authToken MUST NOT be used. No specific CMC feature is used to replace these items, but generally the CMC controls identification and identityProof will perform the same service and are more specifically defined. The control token id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions SHOULD NOT be supported. An alternative method is under development to provide this functionality. The behavior of id-regCtrl-oldCertID is not presently used. It is replaced by issuing the new certificate and using the id-cmc- publishCert to remove the old certificate from publication. This operation would not normally be accompanied by an immediate revocation of the old certificate; however, that can be accomplished by the id-cmc-revokeRequest control. The id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey is not used.

4.4. Requirements for Clients

There are no additional requirements.

5. Requirements for Servers

There are no additional requirements.

6. Requirements for EEs

If an entity implements Diffie-Hellman, it MUST implement either the DH-POP Proof-of-Possession as defined in [DH-POP], Section 4, or the challenge-response POP controls id-cmc-encryptedPOP and id-cmc- decryptedPOP.

7. Requirements for RAs

RAs SHOULD be able to do delegated POP. RAs implementing this feature MUST implement the id-cmc-lraPOPWitness control. All RAs MUST implement the promotion of the id-aa-cmc-unsignedData as covered in Section 3.2.3 of [CMC-STRUCT].
Top   ToC   RFC5274 - Page 9

8. Requirements for CAs

Providing for CAs to work in an environment with RAs is strongly suggested. Implementation of such support is strongly suggested as this permits the delegation of substantial administrative interaction onto an RA rather than at the CA. CAs MUST perform at least minimal checks on all public keys before issuing a certificate. At a minimum, a check for syntax would occur with the POP operation. Additionally, CAs SHOULD perform simple checks for known bad keys such as small subgroups for DSA-SHA1 and DH keys [SMALL-SUB-GROUP] or known bad exponents for RSA keys. CAs MUST enforce POP checking before issuing any certificate. CAs MAY delegate the POP operation to an RA for those cases where 1) a challenge/response message pair must be used, 2) an RA performs escrow of a key and checks for POP in that manner, or 3) an unusual algorithm is used and that validation is done at the RA. CAs SHOULD implement both the DH-POP Proof-of-Possession as defined in [DH-POP], Section 4, and the challenge-response POP controls id- cmc-encryptedPOP and id-cmc-decryptedPOP.

9. Security Considerations

This document uses [CMC-STRUCT] and [CMC-TRANS] as building blocks to this document. The security sections of those two documents are included by reference. Knowledge of how an entity is expected to operate is vital in determining which sections of requirements are applicable to that entity. Care needs to be taken in determining which sections apply and fully implementing the necessary code. Cryptographic algorithms have and will be broken or weakened. Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic algorithms listed in this document make sense from a security level. The IETF from time to time may issue documents dealing with the current state of the art. Two examples of such documents are [SMALL-SUB-GROUP] and [HASH-ATTACKS].

10. Acknowledgements

The authors and the PKIX Working Group are grateful for the participation of Xiaoyi Liu and Jeff Weinstein in helping to author the original versions of this document.
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   The authors would like to thank Brian LaMacchia for his work in
   developing and writing up many of the concepts presented in this
   document.  The authors would also like to thank Alex Deacon and Barb
   Fox for their contributions.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[CMC-STRUCT] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008. [CMC-TRANS] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008. [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3852, July 2004. [CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC 2631, June 1999. [CRMF] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, September 2005. [CMS-RSA-OAEP] Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3560, July 2003. [CMS-RSA-PSS] Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056, June 2005. [DH-POP] Prafullchandra, H. and J. Schaad, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 2875, June 2000.
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   [MUST]             Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
                      Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14,
                      March 1997.

   [RSA-256]          Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley,
                      "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA
                      Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public
                      Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
                      Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
                      June 2005.

   [PBKDF2]           Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
                      Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898,
                      September 2000.

   [AES-WRAP]         Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption
                      Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394,
                      September 2002.

11.2. Informative References

[PKCS10] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification v1.7", RFC 2986, November 2000. [SMALL-SUB-GROUP] Zuccherato, R., "Methods for Avoiding the "Small- Subgroup" Attacks on the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method for S/MIME", RFC 2785, March 2000. [HASH-ATTACKS] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270, November 2005.
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Authors' Addresses

Jim Schaad Soaring Hawk Consulting PO Box 675 Gold Bar, WA 98251 Phone: (425) 785-1031 EMail: jimsch@nwlink.com Michael Myers TraceRoute Security, Inc. EMail: mmyers@fastq.com
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