Network Working Group E. Rescorla Request for Comments: 4101 RTFM, Inc. Category: Informational IAB June 2005 Writing Protocol Models Status of This Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
AbstractThe IETF process depends on peer review. However, IETF documents are generally written to be useful for implementors, not reviewers. In particular, while great care is generally taken to provide a complete description of the state machines and bits on the wire, this level of detail tends to get in the way of initial understanding. This document describes an approach for providing protocol "models" that allow reviewers to quickly grasp the essence of a system. figure it out. This is acceptable when documenting a protocol for implementors, because they need to understand the protocol in any case; but it dramatically increases the strain on reviewers. Reviewers need to get the big picture of the system and then focus on particular points. They simply do not have time to give the entire document the attention an implementor would.
One way to reduce this load is to present the reviewer with a MODEL -- a short description of the system in overview form. This provides the reviewer with the context to identify the important or difficult pieces of the system and focus on them for review. As a side benefit, if the model is done first, it can be serve as an aid to the detailed protocol design and a focus for early review, prior to protocol completion. The intention is that the model would either be the first section of the protocol document or be a separate document provided with the protocol. KERBEROS]. By contrast, the use of ASN.1 is a simple implementation decision. S-expressions -- or XML, had it existed at the time -- would have served equally well. The purpose of a protocol model is explicitly not to provide a complete or alternate description of the protocol being discussed. Instead, it is to provide a big picture overview of the protocol so that readers can quickly understand the essential elements of how it works.
communicating parties and their inter-relationships. It is particularly important to lay out the trust relationships between the various parties, as these are often unobvious. STUN] is a UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) [UNSAF] protocol that allows a machine located behind a NAT to determine what its external apparent IP address is. Although STUN provides a complete and thorough description of the operation of the protocol, it does not provide a brief, up-front overview suitable for a quick understanding of its operation. The rest of this section shows what a suitable overview might look like. Network Address Translation (NAT) makes it difficult to run a number of classes of service from behind the NAT gateway. This is particularly a problem when protocols need to advertise address/port pairs as part of the application layer protocol. Although the NAT can be configured to accept data destined for that port, address translation means the address that the application knows about is not the same as the one on which it is reachable. Consider the scenario represented in the figure below. A SIP client is initiating a session with a SIP server in which it wants the SIP server to send it some media. In its Session Description Protocol (SDP) [SDP] request it provides the IP address and port on which it is listening. However, unbeknownst to the client, a NAT is in the way. The NAT translates the IP address in the header, but unless it is SIP aware, it doesn't change the address in the request. The result is that the media goes into a black hole.
+-----------+ | SIP | | Server | | | +-----------+ ^ | [FROM: 188.8.131.52:8954] | [MSG: SEND MEDIA TO 10.0.10.5:6791] | | +-----------+ | | | NAT | --------------+ Gateway +---------------- | | +-----------+ ^ | [FROM: 10.0.10.5:6791] | [MSG: SEND MEDIA TO 10.0.10.5:6791] | 10.0.10.5 +-----------+ | SIP | | Client | | | +-----------+ The purpose of STUN is to allow clients to detect this situation and determine the address mapping. They can then place the appropriate address in their application-level messages. This is done by using an external STUN server. That server is able to determine the translated address and tell the STUN client, as shown below.
+-----------+ | STUN | | Server | | | +-----------+ ^ | [IP HDR FROM: 184.108.40.206:8954] | | [IP HDR TO: 220.127.116.11:8954] [MSG: WHAT IS MY ADDRESS?] | | [MSG: YOU ARE 18.104.22.168:8954] | v +-----------+ | | | NAT | --------------+ Gateway +---------------- | | +-----------+ ^ | [IP HDR FROM: 10.0.10.5:6791] | | [IP HDR TO: 10.0.10.5:6791] [MSG: WHAT IS MY ADDRESS?] | | [MSG: YOU ARE 22.214.171.124:8954] | v 10.0.10.5 +-----------+ | SIP | | Client | | | +-----------+
DCCP] is a protocol for providing datagram transport with network-friendly congestion avoidance behavior. The DCCP base protocol document is over 100 pages long and the congestion control mechanisms themselves are separate. Therefore, it is very helpful to have a an architectural overview of DCCP that abstracts away the details. The remainder of this section is an attempt to do so. NOTE: The author of this document was on the DCCP review team and his experience with that document was one of the motivating factors for this document. Since the review, the DCCP authors have added some overview material, some of which derives from earlier versions of this document. Although DCCP is datagram-oriented like UDP, it is stateful like TCP. Connections go through the following phases: 1. Initiation 2. Feature negotiation 3. Data transfer 4. Termination
separately in the next section. However, realize that the early phases of feature negotiation happen concurrently with initiation. In the DCCP-Response message, the server tells the client that it is willing to accept the connection and continues feature negotiation. In order to prevent SYN flood-style DOS attacks, DCCP incorporates an IKE-style cookie exchange. The server can provide the client with a cookie that contains all of the negotiation state. This cookie must be echoed by the client in the DCCP-Ack, thus removing the need for the server to keep state. In the DCCP-Ack message, the client acknowledges the DCCP-Response and returns the cookie to permit the server to complete its side of the connection. As indicated above, this message may also include feature negotiation messages.
In the second exchange, the client requests that the server use either CCID 3 or CCID 4, with 3 preferred. The server chooses 4 and supplies its preference list, "4 2". The Change L and Confirm R options are used for feature negotiations that are initiated by the feature location. In the following example, the server requests that CCID/Server be set to 3 or 2 (with 3 being preferred), and the client agrees. Client Server ------ ------ <-- Change L(CCID, 3 2) Confirm R(CCID, 3, 3 2) --> * agreement that CCID/Server = 3 * CCID2]), and TCP-friendly rate control (CCID-3 [CCID3]). CCID-2 is intended for applications that want maximum throughput. CCID-3 is intended for real-time applications that want smooth response to congestion. ECN] are used to indicate congestion. The response to congestion is to halve the congestion window. One subtle difference between DCCP and TCP is that the Acks in DCCP must contain the sequence numbers of all received packets (within a given window), not just the highest sequence number, as in TCP.
WEBDAV] is fairly terse, preferring to define the required behaviors and let the reader work out the implications. In some situations, explanatory material that details those implications can help the reader understand the overall model. The rest of this section describes one such case.
WebDAV [WEBDAV] includes both a COPY method and a MOVE method. While a MOVE can be thought of as a COPY followed by DELETE, COPY+DELETE and MOVE aren't entirely equivalent. The use of COPY+DELETE as a substitute for MOVE is problematic because of the creation of the intermediate file. Consider the case where the user is approaching a quota boundary. A COPY+DELETE should be forbidden because it would temporarily exceed the quota. However, a simple rename should work in this situation. The second issue is permissions. The WebDAV permissions model allows the server to grant users permission to rename files, but not to create new ones. This is unusual in ordinary filesystems, but nothing prevents it in WebDAV. This is clearly not possible if a client uses COPY+DELETE to do a MOVE. Finally, a COPY+DELETE does not produce the same logical result as would be expected with a MOVE. Because COPY creates a new resource, it is permitted (but not required) to use the time of new file creation as the creation date property. By contrast, the expectation for MOVE is that the renamed file will have the same properties as the original. IKE] is one of the most complicated security protocols ever designed by the IETF. Although the basic IKE core is a fairly straightforward Diffie-Hellman-based handshake, this can often be difficult for new readers to understand abstractly, apart from the protocol details. The remainder of this section provides overview of IKE suitable for those new readers.
IKE] is a key establishment and parameter negotiation protocol for Internet protocols. Its primary application is for establishing security associations (SAs) [IPSEC] for IPsec AH [AH] and ESP [ESP]. +--------------------+ +--------------------+ | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | Key | | IKE | | Key | | | | Management | <-+-----------------------+-> | Management | | | | Process | | | | Process | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | ^ | | ^ | | | | | | | | v | | v | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | IPsec | | AH/ESP | | IPsec | | | | Stack | <-+-----------------------+-> | Stack | | | | | | | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | | | | | | | | Initiator | | Responder | +--------------------+ +--------------------+ The general deployment model for IKE is shown above. The IPsec engines and IKE engines typically are separate modules. When no security association exists for a packet that needs to be processed (either sent or received), the IPsec engine contacts the IKE engine and asks it to establish an appropriate SA. The IKE engine contacts the appropriate peer and uses IKE to establish the SA. Once the IKE handshake is finished it registers the SA with the IPsec engine. In addition, IKE traffic between the peers can be used to refresh keying material or adjust operating parameters, such as algorithms.
Before we move on, let's take a look at the cookie exchange. The basic anti-DoS measure used by IKE is to force the peer to demonstrate that it can receive traffic from you. This foils blind attacks like SYN floods [SYNFLOOD] and also makes it somewhat easier to track down attackers. The cookie exchange serves this role in IKE. The Responder can verify that the Initiator supplied a valid CookieR before doing the expensive DH key agreement. This does not totally eliminate DoS attacks, because an attacker who was willing to reveal his location could still consume server resources; but it does protect against a certain class of blind attack. In the final round trip, the peers establish their identities. Because they share an (unauthenticated) key, they can send their identities encrypted, thus providing identity protection from eavesdroppers. The exact method of proving identity depends on what form of credential is being used (signing key, encryption key, shared secret, etc.), but in general you can think of it as a signature over some subset of the handshake messages. So, each side would supply its certificate and then sign using the key associated with that certificate. If shared keys are used, the authentication data would be a key ID and a MAC. Authentication using public key encryption follows similar principles, but is more complicated. Refer to the IKE document for more details. At the end of the Main Mode handshake, the peers share: (1) A set of algorithms for encryption of further IKE traffic. (2) Traffic encryption and authentication keys. (3) Mutual knowledge of the peer's identity.
After the first round trip, the peers have all the required properties, but the Initiator has not authenticated to the Responder. The third message closes the loop by authenticating the Initiator. Note that since the authentication data is sent in the clear, no identity protection is provided; and because the Responder does the DH key agreement without a round trip to the Initiator, there is no DoS protection
Initiator Responder --------- --------- AH/ESP parameters, Algorithms, Nonce, Key Exchange, -> Handshake Hash <- AH/ESP parameters, Algorithms, Nonce, Key Exchange, Handshake Hash Handshake Hash -> A Variant of Quick Mode with PFS (Stage 2)
[AH] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998. [CCID2] Floyd, S. and E. Kohler, "Profile for DCCP Congestion Control ID 2: TCP-like Congestion Control", Work in Progress, October 2003. [CCID3] Floyd, S., Kohler, E., and J. Padhye, "Profile for DCCP Congestion Control ID 3: TFRC Congestion Control", Work in Progress, February 2004. [DCCP] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", Work in Progress, November 2004. [ECN] Ramakrishnan, K. Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168, September 2001. [ESP] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998. [IKE] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[IPSEC] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. [KERBEROS] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. [SDP] Handley, M. and V. Jacobson, "SDP: Session Description Protocol" RFC 2327, April 1998. [STUN] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy, "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)", RFC 3489, March 2003. [SYNFLOOD] CERT Advisory CA-1996-21 TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-21.html>, September 19, 1996. [UNSAF] Daigle, L. and IAB, "IAB Considerations for UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across Network Address Translation", RFC 3424, November 2002. [WEBDAV] Goland, Y., Whitehead, E., Faizi, A., Carter, S., and D. Jensen, "HTTP Extensions for Distributed Authoring -- WEBDAV", RFC 2518, February 1999.
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