9. Security Requirements
9.1. XML Digital Signatures and Encryption
RID leverages existing security standards and data markings in
RIDPolicy to achieve the required levels of security for the exchange
of incident information. The use of standards includes TLS and the
XML security features of encryption [XMLencrypt] and digital
signatures [RFC3275] [XMLsig]. The standards provide clear methods
to ensure that messages are secure, authenticated, and authorized;
meet policy and privacy guidelines; and maintain integrity. XML
Signature Best Practices [XMLSigBP] should be referenced by
implementers for information on improving security to mitigate
attacks.
As specified in the relevant sections of this document, the XML
digital signature [RFC3275] and XML encryption [XMLencrypt] are used
in the following cases:
XML Digital Signature
o The originator of a Request MUST use a detached signature to sign
at least one of the original elements contained in the RecordItem
class to provide authentication to all upstream participants in
the trace or those involved in the investigation. All instances
of RecordItem provided by the originator may be individually
signed, and additional RecordItem entries by upstream peers in the
trace or investigation may be signed by the peer adding the data,
while maintaining the original RecordItem entry(s) and detached
signature(s) from the original requestor. It is important to note
that the data is signed at the RecordItem level. Since multiple
RecordItems may exist within an IODEF document and may originate
from different sources, the signature is applied at the RecordItem
level to enable the use of an XML detached signature. Exclusive
canonicalization [XMLCanon] is REQUIRED for the detached signature
and not the references, as the XML document generated is then
included in the RID message within the Signature element of the
ReportSchema class. This signature MUST be passed to all
recipients of the Request message.
o If a Request does not include a RecordItem entry, a timestamp MUST
be used to ensure there is data to be signed for the multi-hop
authentication use case. The DateTime element of the iodef:
RecordData class ([RFC5070], Section 3.19.1) is used for this
purpose.
o For all message types, the full IODEF-RID document MUST be signed
using an enveloped signature by the sending peer to provide
authentication and integrity to the receiving RID system. The
signature is placed in an instance of the Signature element.
o XML Signature Best Practices [XMLSigBP] guidance SHOULD be
followed to prevent or mitigate security risks. Examples include
the recommendation to authenticate a signature prior to processing
(executing potentially dangerous operations) and the
recommendation to limit the use of URIs since they may enable
cross-site scripting attacks or access to local information.
o XML Path Language (XPath) 2.0 [XMLPath] MUST be followed to
specify the portion of the XML document to be signed. XPath is
used to specify a location within an XML document. Best practice
recommendations for using XPath [XMLSigBP] SHOULD be referenced to
reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks. The use of XSLT
transforms MUST be restricted according to security guidance in
[XMLSigBP].
XML Encryption
o The IODEF-RID document MAY be encrypted to provide an extra layer
of security between peers so that not only the message is
encrypted for transport. This behavior would be agreed upon
between peers or a consortium, or determined on a per-message
basis, depending on security requirements. It should be noted
that there are cases for transport where the RIDPolicy class needs
to be presented in clear text, as detailed in the transport
document [RFC6546].
o A Request, or any other message type that may be relayed through
RID systems before reaching the intended destination as a result
of trust relationships, MAY be encrypted specifically for the
intended recipient. This may be necessary if the RID network is
being used for message transfer, the intermediate parties do not
need to have knowledge of the request contents, and a direct
communication path does not exist. In that case, the RIDPolicy
class is used by intermediate parties and as such, RIDPolicy is
maintained in clear text.
o The action taken in the Result message may be encrypted using the
key of the request originator. In that case, the intermediate
parties can view the RIDPolicy information and know the trace has
been completed and do not need to see the action. If the use of
encryption were limited to sections of the message, the History
class information would be encrypted. Otherwise, it is
RECOMMENDED to encrypt the entire IODEF-RID document and use an
enveloped signature for the originator of the request. The
existence of the Result message for an incident would tell any
intermediate parties used in the path of the incident
investigation that the incident handling has been completed.
o The iodef:restriction attribute sets expectations for the privacy
of an incident and is defined in Section 3.2 of RFC 5070.
Following the guidance for XML encryption in the Security
Requirements section, the iodef:restriction attribute can be set
in any of the RID classes to define restrictions and encryption
requirements for the exchange of incident information. The
restriction options enable encryption capabilities for the
complete exchange of an IODEF document (including any extensions),
within specific classes of IODEF, or IODEF extensions, where more
limited restrictions are desired. The restriction attribute is
contained in each of the RID classes and MUST be used in
accordance with confidentiality expectations for either sections
of the IODEF document or the complete IODEF document. Consortiums
and organizations should consider this guidance when creating
exchange policies.
o Expectations based on how restriction is set:
* If restriction is set to 'private', the class or document MUST
be encrypted for the recipient using XML encryption and the
public key of the recipient. See Section 9.3 for a discussion
on public key infrastructure (PKI) and other security
requirements.
* If restriction is set to 'need-to-know', the class or document
MUST be encrypted to ensure only those with need-to-know access
can decrypt the data. The document can either be encrypted for
each individual for which access is intended or be encrypted
with a single group key. The method used SHOULD adhere to any
certificate policy and practices agreements between entities
for the use of RID. A group key in this instance refers to a
single key (symmetric) that is used to encrypt the block of
data. The users with need-to-know access privileges may be
given access to the shared key via a secure distribution
method, for example, providing access to the symmetric key
encrypted with each of the user's public keys.
* If restriction is set to 'public', the class or document MUST
be sent in clear text. This setting can be critical if certain
sections of a document or an entire document are to be shared
without restrictions. This provides flexibility within an
incident to share certain information freely where appropriate.
* If restriction is set to 'default', the information can be
shared according to an information disclosure policy pre-
arranged by the communicating parties.
o Expectations based on placement of the restriction setting:
* If restriction is set within one of the RID classes, the
restriction applies to the entire IODEF document.
* If restriction is set within individual IODEF classes, the
restriction applies to the specific IODEF class and the
children of that class.
The formation of policies is a very important aspect of using a
messaging system like RID to exchange potentially sensitive
information. Many considerations should be involved for peering
parties, and some guidelines to protect the data, systems, and
transport are covered in this section. Policies established should
provide guidelines for communication methods, security, and fall-back
procedures. See Sections 9.4 and 9.5 for additional information on
consortiums and PKI considerations.
The security considerations for the storage and exchange of
information in RID messaging may include adherence to local,
regional, or national regulations in addition to the obligations to
protect client information during an investigation. RIDPolicy is a
necessary tool for listing the requirements of messages to provide a
method to categorize data elements for proper handling. Controls are
also provided for the sending entity to protect messages from third
parties through XML encryption.
RID provides a method to exchange incident-handling requests and
Report messages between entities. Administrators have the ability to
base decisions on the available resources and other factors of their
network and maintain control of incident investigations within their
own network. Thus, RID provides the ability for participating
networks to manage their own security controls, leveraging the
information listed in RIDPolicy.
RID is used to transfer or exchange XML documents in an IODEF format
or using another IANA-registered format. Implementations SHOULD NOT
download schemas at runtime due to the security implications, and
included documents MUST NOT be required to provide a resolvable
location of their schema.
9.2. Message Transport
A transport specification is defined in a separate document
[RFC6546]. The specified transport protocols MUST use encryption to
provide an additional level of security and integrity, while
supporting mutual authentication through bidirectional certificate
usage. Any subsequent transport method defined should take advantage
of existing standards for ease of implementation and integration of
RID systems. Session encryption for the transport of RID messages is
enforced in the transport specification. The privacy and security
considerations are addressed fully in RID to protect sensitive
portions of documents and to provide a method to authenticate the
messages. Therefore, RID messages do not rely on the security
provided by the transport layer alone. The encryption requirements
and considerations for RID messages are discussed in Section 9.1 of
this document.
Consortiums may vary their selected transport mechanisms and thus
decide upon a mutual protocol to use for transport when communicating
with peers in a neighboring consortium using RID. RID systems MUST
implement and deploy HTTPS as defined in the transport document
[RFC6546] and optionally MAY support other protocols such as the
Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) [RFC3080]. Bindings would
need to be defined to enable support for other transport protocols.
Systems used to send authenticated RID messages between networks MUST
use a secured system and interface to connect to a border network's
RID systems. Each connection to a RID system MUST meet the security
requirements agreed upon through the consortium regulations, peering,
or SLAs. The RID system MUST listen for and send RID messages on
only the designated port, which also MUST be over an encrypted tunnel
meeting the minimum requirement of algorithms and key lengths
established by the consortium, peering, or SLA. The selected
cryptographic algorithms for symmetric encryption, digital
signatures, and hash functions MUST meet minimum security levels of
the times. The encryption strength MUST adhere to import and export
regulations of the involved countries for data exchange.
Out-of-band communications dedicated to SP interaction for RID
messaging would provide additional security as well as guaranteed
bandwidth during a denial-of-service attack. For example, an out-of-
band channel may consist of logical paths defined over the existing
network. Out-of-band communications may not be practical or possible
between service providers, but provisions should be considered to
protect the incident management systems used for RID messaging.
Methods to protect the data transport may also be provided through
session encryption.
9.3. Public Key Infrastructure
It is RECOMMENDED that RID, the XML security functions, and transport
protocols properly integrate with a PKI managed by the consortium,
federate PKIs within a consortium, or use a PKI managed by a trusted
third party. Entities MAY use shared keys as an alternate solution,
although this may limit the ability to validate certificates and
could introduce risk. For the Internet, a few examples of existing
efforts that could be leveraged to provide the supporting PKI include
the Regional Internet Registry's (RIR's) PKI hierarchy, vendor issued
certificates, or approved issuers of Extended Validation (EV)
Certificates. Security and privacy considerations related to
consortiums are discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.
The use of PKI between entities or by a consortium SHOULD adhere to
any applicable certificate policy and practices agreements for the
use of RID. [RFC3647] specifies a commonly used format for
certificate policy (CP) and certification practices statements (CPS).
Systems with predefined relationships for RID include those who peer
directly or through a consortium with agreed-upon appropriate use
agreements. The agreements to trust other entities may be based on
assurance levels that could be determined by a comparison of the CP,
CPS, and/or RID operating procedures. The initial comparison of
policies and the ability to audit controls provide a baseline
assurance level for entities to form and maintain trust
relationships. Trust relationships may also be defined through a
bridged or hierarchical PKI in which both peers belong. If shared
keys or keys issued from a common CA are used, the verification of
controls to determine the assurance level to trust other entities may
be limited to the RID policies and operating procedures.
XML security functions utilized in RID require a trust center such as
a PKI for the distribution of credentials to provide the necessary
level of security for this protocol. Layered transport protocols
also utilize encryption and rely on a trust center. Public key
certificate pairs issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)
MAY be used to provide the necessary level of authentication and
encryption for the RID protocol. The CA used for RID messaging must
be trusted by all involved parties and may take advantage of similar
efforts, such as the Internet2 federated PKI or the ARIN/RIR effort
to provide a PKI to service providers. The PKI used for
authentication also provides the necessary certificates needed for
encryption used for the RID transport protocol [RFC6546].
9.3.1. Authentication
Hosts receiving a RID message MUST be able to verify that the sender
of the request is valid and trusted. Using digital signatures on a
hash of the RID message with an X.509 version 3 certificate issued by
a trusted party MUST be used to authenticate the request. The X.509
version 3 specifications as well as the digital signature
specifications and path validation standards set forth in [RFC5280]
MUST be followed in order to interoperate with a PKI designed for
similar purposes. Full path validation verifies the chaining
relationship to a trusted root and also performs a certificate
revocation check. The use of digital signatures in RID XML messages
MUST follow the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recommendations for
signature syntax and processing when either the XML encryption
[XMLencrypt] or digital signature [XMLsig] [RFC3275] is used within a
document.
It might be helpful to define an extension to the authentication
scheme that uses attribute certificates [RFC5755] in such a way that
an application could automatically determine whether human
intervention is needed to authorize a request; however, the
specification of such an extension is out of scope for this document.
The use of pre-shared keys may be considered for authentication at
the transport layer. If this option is selected, the specifications
set forth in "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)" [RFC4279] MUST be followed. Transport specifications
are detailed in a separate document [RFC6546].
9.3.2. Multi-Hop Request Authentication
The use of multi-hop authentication in a Request is used when a
Request is sent to multiple entities or SPs in an iterative manner.
Multi-hop authentication is REQUIRED in Requests that involve
multiple SPs where Requests are forwarded iteratively through peers.
Bilateral trust relationships MAY be used between peers; multi-hop
authentication MUST be used for cases where the originator of a
message is authenticated several hops into the message flow.
For practical reasons, SPs may want to prioritize incident-handling
events based upon the immediate peer for a Request, the originator of
a request, and the listed Confidence rating for the incident. In
order to provide a higher assurance level of the authenticity of a
Request, the originating RID system is included in the Request along
with contact information and the information of all RID systems in
the path the trace has taken. This information is provided through
the IODEF EventData class, which nests the list of systems and
contacts involved in a trace, while setting the category attribute to
"infrastructure".
To provide multi-hop authentication, the originating RID system MUST
include a digital signature in the Request sent to all systems in the
upstream path. The digital signature from the RID system is
performed on the RecordItem class of the IODEF following the XML
digital signature specifications from W3C [XMLsig] using a detached
signature. The signature MUST be passed to all parties that receive
a Request, and each party MUST be able to perform full path
validation on the digital signature [RFC5280]. In order to
accommodate that requirement, the RecordItem data MUST remain
unchanged as a request is passed along between providers and is the
only element for which the signature is applied. If additional
RecordItems are included in the document at upstream peers, the
initial RecordItem entry MUST still remain with the detached
signature. The subsequent RecordItem elements may be signed by the
peer adding the incident information for the investigation. A second
benefit to this requirement is that the integrity of the filter used
is ensured as it is passed to subsequent SPs in the upstream trace of
the incident. The trusted PKI also provides the keys used to
digitally sign the RecordItem class for a Request to meet the
requirement of authenticating the original request. Any host in the
path of the trace should be able to verify the digital signature
using the trusted PKI.
In the case in which an enterprise using RID sends a Request to its
provider, the signature from the enterprise MUST be included in the
initial request. The SP may generate a new request to send upstream
to members of the SP consortium to continue the investigation. If
the original request is sent, the originating SP, acting on behalf of
the enterprise network under attack, MUST also digitally sign, with
an enveloped signature, the full IODEF document to assure the
authenticity of the Request. An SP that offers RID as a service may
be using its own PKI to secure RID communications between its RID
system and the attached enterprise networks. SPs participating in
the trace MUST be able to determine the authenticity of RID requests.
9.4. Consortiums and Public Key Infrastructures
Consortiums are an ideal way to establish a communication web of
trust for RID messaging. It should be noted that direct
relationships may be ideal for some communications, such as those
between a provider of incident information and a subscriber of the
incident reports. The consortium could provide centralized
resources, such as a PKI, and established guidelines and control
requirements for use of RID. The consortium may assist in
establishing trust relationships between the participating SPs to
achieve the necessary level of cooperation and experience-sharing
among the consortium entities. This may be established through PKI
certificate policy [RFC3647] reviews to determine the appropriate
trust levels between organizations or entities. The consortium may
also be used for other purposes to better facilitate communication
among SPs in a common area (Internet, region, government, education,
private networks, etc.).
Using a PKI to distribute certificates used by RID systems provides
an already established method to link trust relationships between
consortiums that peer with SPs belonging to a separate consortium.
In other words, consortiums could peer with other consortiums to
enable communication of RID messages between the participating SPs.
The PKI along with Memorandums of Agreement could be used to link
border directories to share public key information in a bridge, a
hierarchy, or a single cross-certification relationship.
Consortiums also need to establish guidelines for each participating
SP to adhere to. The RECOMMENDED guidelines include:
o Physical and logical practices to protect RID systems;
o Network- and application-layer protection for RID systems and
communications;
o Proper use guidelines for RID systems, messages, and requests; and
o A PKI, certificate policy, and certification practices statement
to provide authentication, integrity, and privacy.
The functions described for a consortium's role parallel those of a
PKI federation. The PKI federations that currently exist are
responsible for establishing security guidelines and PKI trust
models. The trust models are used to support applications to share
information using trusted methods and protocols.
A PKI can also provide the same level of security for communication
between an end entity (enterprise, educational, or government
customer network) and the SP.
9.5. Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines
Privacy issues raise many concerns when information-sharing is
required to achieve the goal of stopping or mitigating the effects of
a security incident. The RIDPolicy class is used to automate the
enforcement of the privacy concerns listed within this document. The
privacy and system use concerns for the system communicating RID
messages and other integrated components include the following:
Service Provider Concerns:
o Privacy of data monitored and/or stored on Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) for attack detection.
o Privacy of data monitored and stored on systems used to trace
traffic across a single network.
o Privacy of incident information stored on incident management
systems participating in RID communications.
Customer Attached Networks Participating in RID with SP:
o Customer networks may include enterprise, educational, government,
or other networks attached to an SP participating in RID.
Customers should review data handling policies to understand how
data will be protected by a service provider. This information
will enable customers to decide what types of data at what
sensitivity level can be shared with service providers. This
information could be used at the application layer to establish
sharing profiles for entities and groups; see Section 9.6.
o Customers should request information on the security and privacy
considerations in place by their SP and the consortium of which
the SP is a member. Customers should understand if their data
were to be forwarded, how it might be sanitized and how it will be
protected. In advance of sharing data with their SP, customers
should also understand if limitations can be placed on how it will
be used.
o Customers should be aware that their data can and will be sent to
other SPs in order to complete a trace unless an agreement stating
otherwise is made in the service level agreements between the
customer and SP. Customers considering privacy options may limit
the use of this feature if they do not want the data forwarded.
Parties Involved in the Attack:
o Privacy of the identity of a host involved in an attack or any
indicators of compromise.
o Privacy of information such as the source and destination used for
communication purposes over the monitored or RID-connected
network(s).
o Protection of data from being viewed by intermediate parties in
the path of an Request request should be considered.
Consortium Considerations:
o System use restrictions for security incident handling within the
local region's definitions of appropriate traffic. When
participating in a consortium, appropriate use guidelines should
be agreed upon and entered into contracts.
o System use prohibiting the consortium's participating SPs from
inappropriately tracing traffic to locate sources or mitigate
traffic unlawfully within the jurisdiction or region.
Inter-Consortium Considerations:
o System use between peering consortiums should consider any
government communication regulations that apply between those two
regions, such as encryption export and import restrictions.
o System use between consortiums SHOULD NOT request traffic traces
and actions beyond the scope intended and permitted by law or
inter-consortium agreements.
o System use between consortiums should consider national boundary
issues and request limits in their appropriate system use
agreements. Appropriate use should include restrictions to
prevent the use of the protocol for limiting or restricting
traffic that is otherwise permitted within the country in which
the peering consortium resides.
The security and privacy considerations listed above are for the
consortiums, SPs, and enterprises to agree upon. The agreed-upon
policies may be facilitated through use of the RIDPolicy class and
application-layer options. Some privacy considerations are addressed
through the RID guidelines for encryption and digital signatures as
described in Section 9.1.
RID is useful in determining the true source of an incident that
traverses multiple networks or to communicate security incidents and
automate the response. The information obtained from the
investigation may determine the identity of the source host or the SP
used by the source of the traffic. It should be noted that the trace
mechanism used across a single SP may also raise privacy concerns for
the clients of the network. Methods that may raise concern include
those that involve storing packets for some length of time in order
to trace packets after the fact. Monitoring networks for intrusions
and for tracing capabilities also raises concerns for potentially
sensitive valid traffic that may be traversing the monitored network.
IDSs and single-network tracing are outside of the scope of this
document, but the concern should be noted and addressed within the
use guidelines of the network. Some IDSs and single-network trace
mechanisms attempt to properly address these issues. RID is designed
to provide the information needed by any single-network trace
mechanism. The provider's choice of a single trace mechanism depends
on resources, existing solutions, and local legislation. Privacy
concerns in regard to the single-network trace must be dealt with at
the client-to-SP level and are out of scope for RID messaging.
The identity of the true source of an attack being traced through RID
could be sensitive. The true identity listed in a Result message can
be protected through the use of encryption [XMLencrypt] enveloping
the IODEF document and RID Result information, using the public
encryption key of the originating SP. Alternatively, the action
taken may be listed without the identity being revealed to the
originating SP. The ultimate goal of the RID communication system is
to stop or mitigate attack traffic, not to ensure that the identity
of the attack traffic is known to involved parties. The SP that
identifies the source should deal directly with the involved parties
and proper authorities in order to determine the guidelines for the
release of such information, if it is regarded as sensitive. In some
situations, systems used in attacks are compromised by an unknown
source and, in turn, are used to attack other systems. In that
situation, the reputation of a business or organization may be at
stake, and the action taken may be the only additional information
reported in the Result message to the originating system. If the
security incident is a minor incident, such as a zombie system used
in part of a large-scale DDoS attack, ensuring the system is taken
off the network until it has been fixed may be sufficient. The
decision is left to the system users and consortiums to determine
appropriate data to be shared given that the goal of the
specification is to provide the appropriate technical options to
remain compliant. The textual descriptions should include details of
the incident in order to protect the reputation of the unknowing
attacker and prevent the need for additional investigation. Local,
state, or national laws may dictate the appropriate reporting action
for specific security incidents.
Privacy becomes an issue whenever sensitive data traverses a network.
For example, if an attack occurred between a specific source and
destination, then every SP in the path of the trace becomes aware
that the cyber attack occurred. In a targeted attack, it may not be
desirable that information about two nation states that are battling
a cyber war would become general knowledge to all intermediate
parties. However, it is important to allow the traces to take place
in order to halt the activity since the health of the networks in the
path could also be at stake during the attack. This provides a
second argument for allowing the Result message to only include an
action taken and not the identity of the offending host. In the case
of a Request or Report, where the originating SP is aware of the SP
that will receive the request for processing, the free-form text
areas of the document could be encrypted [XMLencrypt] using the
public key of the destination SP to ensure that no other SP in the
path can read the contents. The encryption is accomplished through
the W3C [XMLencrypt] specification for encrypting an element.
In some situations, all network traffic of a nation may be granted
through a single SP. In that situation, options must support sending
Result messages from a downstream peer of that SP. That option
provides an additional level of abstraction to hide the identity and
the SP of the identified source of the traffic. Legal action may
override this technical decision after the trace has taken place, but
that is out of the technical scope of this document.
Privacy concerns when using an Request message to request action
close to the source of valid attack traffic need to be considered.
Although the intermediate SPs may relay the request if there is no
direct trust relationship to the closest SP to the source, the
intermediate SPs do not require the ability to see the contents of
the packet or the text description field(s) in the request. This
message type does not require any action by the intermediate RID
systems, except to relay the packet to the next SP in the path.
Therefore, the contents of the request may be encrypted for the
destination system. The intermediate SPs only need to know how to
direct the request to the manager of the ASN in which the source IP
address belongs.
Traces must be legitimate security-related incidents and not used for
purposes such as sabotage or censorship. An example of such abuse of
the system includes a request to block or rate-limit legitimate
traffic to prevent information from being shared between users on the
Internet (restricting access to online versions of papers) or
restricting access from a competitor's product in order to sabotage a
business.
Intra-consortium RID communications raise additional issues,
especially when the peering consortiums reside in different regions
or nations. Request messages and requested actions to mitigate or
stop traffic must adhere to the appropriate use guidelines and yet
prevent abuse of the system. First, the peering consortiums must
identify the types of traffic that can be traced between the borders
of the participating SPs of each consortium. The traffic traced
should be limited to security-incident-related traffic. Second, the
traces permitted within one consortium, if passed to a peering
consortium, may infringe upon the peering consortium's freedom-of-
information laws. An example would be a consortium in one country
permitting a trace of traffic containing objectionable material,
outlawed within that country. The RID trace may be a valid use of
the system within the confines of that country's network border;
however, it may not be permitted to continue across network
boundaries where such content is permitted under law. By continuing
the trace in another country's network, the trace and response could
have the effect of improperly restricting access to data. A
continued trace into a second country may break the laws and
regulations of that nation. Any such traces MUST cease at the
country's border.
The privacy concerns listed in this section address issues among the
trusted parties involved in a trace within an SP, a RID consortium,
and peering RID consortiums. Data used for RID communications must
also be protected from parties that are not trusted. This protection
is provided through the authentication and encryption of documents as
they traverse the path of trusted servers and through the local
security controls in place for the incident management systems. Each
RID system MUST perform a bidirectional authentication when sending a
RID message and use the public encryption key of the upstream or
downstream peer to send a message or document over the network. This
means that the document is decrypted and re-encrypted at each RID
system via TLS over a transport protocol such as [RFC6546]. The RID
messages may be decrypted at each RID system in order to properly
process the request or relay the information. Today's processing
power is more than sufficient to handle the minimal burden of
encrypting and decrypting relatively small typical RID messages.
9.6. Sharing Profiles and Policies
The application layer can be used to establish workflows and rulesets
specific to sharing profiles for entities or consortiums. The
profiles can leverage sharing agreements to restrict data types or
classifications of data that are shared. The level of information or
classification of data shared with any entity may be based on
protection levels offered by the receiving entity and periodic
validation of those controls. The profile may also indicate how far
information can be shared according to the entity and data type. The
profile may also indicate whether requests to share data from an
entity must go directly to that entity.
In some cases, pre-defined sharing profiles will be possible. These
include any use case where an agreement is in place in advance of
sharing. Examples may be between clients and SPs, entities such as
partners, or consortiums. There may be other cases when sharing
profiles may not be established in advance, such as an organization
dealing with an incident who requires assistance from an entity that
it has not worked with before. An organization may want to establish
sharing profiles specific to possible user groups to prepare for
possible incident scenarios. The user groups could include business
partners, industry peers, service providers, experts not part of a
service provider, law enforcement, or regulatory reporting bodies.
Workflows to approve transactions may be specific to sharing profiles
and data types. Application developers should include capabilities
to enable these decision points for users of the system.
Any expectations between entities to preserve the weight and
admissibility of evidence should be handled at the policy and
agreement level. A sharing profile may include notes or an indicator
for approvers in workflows to reflect if such agreements exist.
10. Security Considerations
RID has many security requirements and considerations built into the
design of the protocol, several of which are described in the
Security Requirements section. For a complete view of security,
considerations include the availability, confidentiality, and
integrity concerns for the transport, storage, and exchange of
information.
Protected tunnels between systems accepting RID communications are
used to provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and privacy
for the data at the transport layer. Encryption and digital
signatures are also used at the IODEF document level through RID
options to provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, privacy
and traceability of the document contents at the application layer.
Trust relationships are based on PKI and the comparison/validation of
security controls for the incident management systems communicating
via RID. Trust levels can be established in cross-certification
processes where entities compare PKI policies that include the
specific management and handling of an entity's PKI and certificates
issued under that policy. [RFC3647] defines an Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
Framework that may be used in the comparison of policies to establish
trust levels and agreements between entities, an entity and a
consortium, and consortiums. The agreements SHOULD consider key
management practices including the ability to perform path validation
on certificates [RFC5280], key distribution techniques [RFC2585], and
Certificate Authority and Registration Authority management
practices.
The agreements between entities SHOULD also include a common
understanding of the usage of RID security, policy, and privacy
options discussed in both the Security Requirements and Security
Considerations sections. The formality, requirements, and complexity
of the agreements for the certificate policy, practices, supporting
infrastructure, and the use of RID options SHOULD be decided by the
entities or consortiums creating those agreements.
11. Internationalization Issues
The Node class identifies a host or network device. This document
reuses the definition of Node from the IODEF specification [RFC5070],
Section 3.16. However, that document did not clearly specify whether
a NodeName could be an Internationalized Domain Name (IDN). RID
systems MUST treat the NodeName class as a domain name slot
[RFC5890]. RID systems SHOULD support IDNs in the NodeName class.
If they do so, the UTF-8 representation of the domain name MUST be
used, i.e., all of the domain name's labels MUST be U-labels
expressed in UTF-8 or NR-LDH labels [RFC5890]; A-labels MUST NOT be
used. An application communicating via RID can convert between
A-labels and U-labels by using the Punycode encoding [RFC3492] for
A-labels as described in the protocol specification for
Internationalized Domain Names in Applications [RFC5891].
12. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
[XMLschema] conforming to a registry mechanism described in
[RFC3688].
Registration request for the iodef-rid namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0
Registrant Contact: IESG.
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the iodef-rid XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-rid-2.0
Registrant Contact: IESG.
XML: See Section 8, "RID Schema Definition", of this document.
The following registry has been created and is now managed by IANA:
Name of the registry: "XML Schemas Exchanged via RID"
Namespace details: A registry entry for an XML Schema Transferred
via RID consists of:
Schema Name: A short string that represents the schema
referenced. This value is for reference only in the table.
The version of the schema MUST be included in this string to
allow for multiple versions of the same specification to be in
the registry.
Version: The version of the registered XML schema. The version
is a string that SHOULD be formatted as numbers separated by a
'.' (period) character.
Namespace: The namespace of the referenced XML schema. This is
represented in the RID ReportSchema class in the XMLSchemaID
attribute as an enumerated value is represented by a URN or
URI.
Specification URI: A URI [RFC3986] from which the registered
specification can be obtained. The specification MUST be
publicly available from this URI.
Reference: The reference to the document that describes the
schema.
Information that must be provided to assign a new value: The above
list of information.
Fields to record in the registry: Schema Name, Version, Namespace,
Specification URI, Reference
Initial registry contents: See Section 5.6.1.
Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226] and Specification
Required [RFC5226].
The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the MILE (Managed
Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any
such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list).
The Designated Expert is expected to retrieve the XML schema
specification from the provided URI in order to check the public
availability of the specification and verify the correctness of the
URI. An important responsibility of the Designated Expert is to
ensure that the XML schema is appropriate for use in RID.
The following registry has been created and is now managed by IANA:
Name of the registry: "RID Enumeration List"
The registry is intended to enable enumeration value additions to
attributes in the iodef-rid XML schema.
Fields to record in the registry: Attribute Name, Attribute Value,
Description, Reference
Initial registry content: none.
Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226]
The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the MILE (Managed
Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any
such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list).
The Designated Expert is expected to review the request and validate
the appropriateness of the enumeration for the attribute. If a
specification is associated with the request, it MUST be reviewed by
the Designated Expert.
13. Summary
Security incidents have always been difficult to trace as a result of
spoofed sources, resource limitations, and bandwidth utilization
problems. Incident response is often slow even when the IP address
is known to be valid because of the resources required to notify the
responsible party of the attack and then to stop or mitigate the
attack traffic. Methods to identify and trace attacks near real time
are essential to thwarting attack attempts. SPs need policies and
automated methods to combat the hacker's efforts. SPs need automated
monitoring and response capabilities to identify and trace attacks
quickly without resource-intensive side effects. Integration with a
centralized communication system to coordinate the detection,
tracing, and identification of attack sources on a single network is
essential. RID provides a way to integrate SP resources for each
aspect of attack detection, tracing, and source identification and
extends the communication capabilities among SPs. The communication
is accomplished through the use of flexible IODEF XML-based documents
passed between incident-handling systems or RID systems. A Request
is communicated to an upstream SP and may result in an upstream trace
or in an action to stop or mitigate the attack traffic. The messages
are communicated among peers with security inherent to the RID
messaging scheme provided through existing standards such as XML
encryption and digital signatures. Policy information is carried in
the RID message itself through the use of the RIDPolicy. RID
provides the timely communication among SPs, which is essential for
incident handling.
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
RFC 2585, May 1999.
[RFC3023] Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.
[RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible
Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
RFC 3275, March 2002.
[RFC3470] Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines
for the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML)
within IETF Protocols", BCP 70, RFC 3470, January 2003.
[RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of
Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in
Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81,
RFC 3688, January 2004.
[RFC4051] Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 4051, April 2005.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, December 2005.
[RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The
Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
December 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 5226, May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
[RFC5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
RFC 5755, January 2010.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document
Framework", RFC 5890, August 2010.
[RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in
Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010.
[RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546,
April 2012.
[XML1.0] Bray, T., Maler, E., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.,
and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0",
W3C Recommendation XML 1.0, November 2008,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/>.
[XMLCanon] Boyer, J., "Canonical XML 1.0", W3C Recommendation 1.0,
December 2001, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-c14n>.
[XMLPath] Berglund, A., Boag, S., Chamberlin, D., Fernandez, M.,
Kay, M., Robie, J., and J. Simeon, "XML Schema Part 1:
Structures", W3C Recommendation Second Edition,
December 2010, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath20/>.
[XMLSigBP] Hirsch, F. and P. Datta, "XML-Signature Best
Practices", W3C Recommendation, August 2011,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-bestpractices/>.
[XMLencrypt] Imaura, T., Dillaway, B., and E. Simon, "XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing", W3C Recommendation,
December 2002, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/>.
[XMLschema] Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M., and N.
Mendelsohn, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C
Recommendation Second Edition, October 2004,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-1/>.
[XMLsig] Bartel, M., Boyer, J., Fox, B., LaMaccia, B., and E.
Simon, "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", W3C
Recommendation Second Edition, June 2008,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/>.
14.2. Informative References
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System
(AS)", BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.
[RFC3080] Rose, M., "The Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol
Core", RFC 3080, March 2001.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax",
STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC5735] Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4 Addresses",
BCP 153, RFC 5735, January 2010.
[RFC6045] Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",
RFC 6045, November 2010.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman,
"Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1
Message-Digest Algorithms", RFC 6194, March 2011.
[XMLNames] Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H.
Thomson, "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)", W3C
Recommendation , December 2009,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to colleagues and the Internet community for reviewing
and commenting on the document as well as providing recommendations
to improve, simplify, and secure the protocol: Steve Bellovin, David
Black, Harold Booth, Paul Cichonski, Robert K. Cunningham, Roman
Danyliw, Yuri Demchenko, Sandra G. Dykes, Stephen Farrell, Katherine
Goodier, Cynthia D. McLain, Thomas Millar, Jean-Francois Morfin,
Stephen Northcutt, Damir Rajnovic, Tony Rutkowski, Peter Saint-Andre,
Jeffrey Schiller, Robert Sparks, William Streilein, Richard Struse,
Tony Tauber, Brian Trammell, Sean Turner, Iljitsch van Beijnum, and
David Waltermire.
Author's Address
Kathleen M. Moriarty
EMC Corporation
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA
United States
EMail: Kathleen.Moriarty@emc.com
