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RFC 7568

 Errata 
Proposed STD
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Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0

Updates:    5246


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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         R. Barnes
Request for Comments: 7568                                    M. Thomson
Updates: 5246                                                    Mozilla
Category: Standards Track                                     A. Pironti
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                    INRIA
                                                              A. Langley
                                                                  Google
                                                               June 2015


              Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0

Abstract

   The Secure Sockets Layer version 3.0 (SSLv3), as specified in RFC
   6101, is not sufficiently secure.  This document requires that SSLv3
   not be used.  The replacement versions, in particular, Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 (RFC 5246), are considerably more secure and
   capable protocols.

   This document updates the backward compatibility section of RFC 5246
   and its predecessors to prohibit fallback to SSLv3.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568.

Page 2 
Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Do Not Use SSL Version 3.0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  SSLv3 Is Comprehensively Broken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  Record Layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.2.  Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  Custom Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Limited Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Since it was released in 1996, the SSLv3 protocol [RFC6101] has been
   subject to a long series of attacks, both on its key exchange
   mechanism and on the encryption schemes it supports.  Despite being
   replaced by TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] in 1999, and subsequently TLS 1.1 in
   2002 [RFC4346] and 1.2 in 2006 [RFC5246], availability of these
   replacement versions has not been universal.  As a result, many
   implementations of TLS have permitted the negotiation of SSLv3.

   The predecessor of SSLv3, SSL version 2, is no longer considered
   sufficiently secure [RFC6176].  SSLv3 now follows.

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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Do Not Use SSL Version 3.0

   SSLv3 MUST NOT be used.  Negotiation of SSLv3 from any version of TLS
   MUST NOT be permitted.

   Any version of TLS is more secure than SSLv3, though the highest
   version available is preferable.

   Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
   ClientHello.client_version set to {03,00}.  Similarly, servers MUST
   NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
   {03,00}.  Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
   version set to {03,00} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
   message and close the connection.

   Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
   layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
   sending ClientHello.  Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
   TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
   though no definitive value is identified as ideal.  That guidance is
   still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
   {03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
   ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate SSLv3.

4.  SSLv3 Is Comprehensively Broken

4.1.  Record Layer

   The non-deterministic padding used in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   construction of SSLv3 trivially permits the recovery of plaintext
   [POODLE].  More generally, the CBC modes of SSLv3 use a flawed MAC-
   then-encrypt construction that has subsequently been replaced in TLS
   versions [RFC7366].  Unfortunately, the mechanism to correct this
   flaw relies on extensions: a feature added in TLS 1.0.  SSLv3 cannot
   be updated to correct this flaw in the same way.

   The flaws in the CBC modes in SSLv3 are mirrored by the weakness of
   the stream ciphers it defines.  Of those defined, only RC4 is
   currently in widespread use.  RC4, however, exhibits serious biases
   and is also no longer fit for use [RFC7465].

   This leaves SSLv3 with no suitable record protection mechanism.

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4.2.  Key Exchange

   The SSLv3 key exchange is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
   when renegotiation [RFC5746] or session resumption [TRIPLE-HS] are
   used.  Each flaw has been fixed in TLS by means of extensions.
   Again, SSLv3 cannot be updated to correct these flaws.

4.3.  Custom Cryptographic Primitives

   SSLv3 defines custom constructions for Pseudorandom Function (PRF),
   Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), and digital signature
   primitives.  Such constructions lack the deep cryptographic scrutiny
   that standard constructions used by TLS have received.  Furthermore,
   all SSLv3 primitives rely on SHA-1 [RFC3174] and MD5 [RFC1321]: these
   hash algorithms are considered weak and are being systematically
   replaced with stronger hash functions, such as SHA-256 [FIPS180-4].

5.  Limited Capabilities

   SSLv3 is unable to take advantage of the many features that have been
   added to recent TLS versions.  This includes the features that are
   enabled by ClientHello extensions, which SSLv3 does not support.

   Though SSLv3 can benefit from new cipher suites, it cannot benefit
   from new cryptographic modes and features.  Of these, the following
   are particularly prominent:

   o  Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) modes are
      added in [RFC5246].

   o  Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Digital Signature
      Algorithm (ECDSA) are added in [RFC4492].

   o  Stateless session tickets [RFC5077].

   o  A datagram mode of operation, DTLS [RFC6347].

   o  Application-layer protocol negotiation [RFC7301].

6.  Security Considerations

   This entire document aims to improve security by prohibiting the use
   of a protocol that is not secure.

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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2246]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
               RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.

   [RFC4346]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
               (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.

   [RFC5246]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
               (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6101]   Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure
               Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC6101, August 2011,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6101>.

   [RFC7366]   Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
               Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
               (DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>.

   [RFC7465]   Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS180-4] U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
               "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-4, March 2012.

   [POODLE]    Moeller, B., "This POODLE bites: exploiting the SSL 3.0
               fallback", October 2014,
               <http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/10/
               this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html>.

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   [RFC1321]   Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.

   [RFC3174]   Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm
               1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September
               2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174>.

   [RFC4492]   Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and
               B.  Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher
               Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, DOI
               10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.

   [RFC5077]   Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
               "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption
               without Server-Side State", RFC 5077,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC5077, January 2008,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.

   [RFC5746]   Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
               "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
               Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February
               2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.

   [RFC6176]   Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
               (SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
               2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.

   [RFC6347]   Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
               Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
               January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC7301]   Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
               "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer
               Protocol Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, July 2014,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.

   [TRIPLE-HS] Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
               A., and P-Y. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie
               Cutters: Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS",
               IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014.

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Authors' Addresses

   Richard Barnes
   Mozilla

   EMail: rlb@ipv.sx


   Martin Thomson
   Mozilla

   EMail: martin.thomson@gmail.com


   Alfredo Pironti
   INRIA

   EMail: alfredo@pironti.eu


   Adam Langley
   Google

   EMail: agl@google.com