Content for TR 33.863 Word version: 14.2.0
4 Background and key objectives
5 Key issues
6 Candidate solutions
7 Conclusions
A AKA procedures assessment in very low data throughput environment
B Review of security standardization efforts in other SDOs
C Proposed normative changes
$ Change History
4 Background and key objectives p. 12
4.0 Motivation p. 12
4.1 Architectural assumptions p. 12
4.2 Clarification of "device to enterprise security" term p. 13
4.3 "Device to enterprise" user plane protection p. 14
4.4 "Device to HPLMN" user plane protection p. 14
4.5 Battery usage challenges p. 15
4.6 Cellular IoT traffic model p. 15
5 Key issues p. 16
5.1 Issue 1: N-PDU data tampering and eavesdropping p. 16
5.2 Issue 2: Efficient user data protection challenges p. 16
5.3 Issue 3: "VPLMN Specific Needs" p. 17
5.4 Issue 4: End-to-end security p. 17
6 Candidate solutions p. 18
6.0 General p. 18
6.1 Solution #1: "UE to HPLMN" security solutions based on UMTS/EPS AKA enhancements. p. 18
6.1.1 Introduction p. 18
6.1.2 Solution description p. 19
6.1.2.1 "UE to HPLMN" security solution with HSE context establishment procedure p. 19
6.1.2.2 "UE to HPLMN" security solution with HLR push procedure - Alternative p. 21
6.1.2.3 "UE to HPLMN" security solution with HSE pull procedure p. 22
6.1.2.4 Key derivation rules p. 24
6.1.2.5 Solution variant: End to Middle Key Server p. 25
6.1.2.6 Solution variant: key derivation on the ME (EPS AKA only) p. 25
6.1.3 Solution evaluation p. 26
6.2 Solution #2: "End-to-middle security based on AKA" p. 26
6.2.1 Introduction p. 26
6.2.2 Solution description p. 26
6.2.2.1 End-to-middle security solution based on AKA p. 26
6.2.2.2 Key derivation rules p. 27
6.2.2.3 Usage of e2m security p. 27
6.2.3 Solution evaluation p. 28
6.3 Solution #3: "Independent VPLMN and e2m security associations" p. 28
6.4 Solution #4: "Security policies" p. 29
6.4.1 Introduction p. 29
6.4.2 Solution description p. 30
6.4.2.1 Authentication and key usage policy p. 30
6.4.2.2 Algorithm policy p. 30
6.4.2.3 VPLMN Specific Algorithm policies p. 30
6.4.3 Solution evaluation p. 30
6.5 Solution #5: "End-to-end security solution" p. 31
6.5.1 Introduction p. 31
6.5.2 Solution Description p. 31
6.5.2.1 Specific e2e security association p. 31
6.5.2.2 Derivation of e2eKEYSET p. 31
6.5.2.3 Triggering the key derivation p. 31
6.5.2.4 Setting the timer p. 32
6.5.2.5 Interfaces of the EESE p. 32
6.5.3 Solution Evaluation p. 32
6.6 Solution #6: Bearer protection p. 32
6.7 Solution #X: "End-to-end" for solutions 1 and 2 p. 33
6.7.1 Introduction p. 33
6.7.2 Solution #1 and #2 in End-to-End case p. 33
6.7.3 Solution Evaluation p. 33
6.8 Solution #8: Complete end to middle solution p. 34
6.8.1 Introduction p. 34
6.8.2 Solution description p. 35
6.8.2.1 Proposed Architecture p. 35
6.8.2.2 Service Discovery and Negotiation p. 35
6.8.2.3 Ability to enable and disable the BEST service p. 39
6.8.2.4 End to Middle Security User Plane and Signalling Plane p. 40
6.8.2.4.1 Data transport p. 40
6.8.2.4.2 End to Middle Secured Data Protocol (EMSDP) p. 40
6.8.2.4.3 EMSDP general structure p. 40
6.8.2.4.3a EMSDP Counter Schemes p. 42
6.8.2.4.4 EMSDP Integrity protection p. 42
6.8.2.4.5 EMSDP Encryption p. 43
6.8.2.4.6 EMSDP Commands p. 44
6.8.2.7 Key Agreement and Refreshing p. 45
6.8.2.7.1 Overview p. 45
6.8.2.7.2 Key setup messaging between HSE and UE p. 45
6.8.2.7.3 BEST key derivation mechanism p. 48
6.8.2.8 Starting a BEST service session p. 49
6.8.2.9 Resuming a BEST session following a power cycle at the UE or a re-attach p. 50
6.8.2.10 BEST service session operation p. 50
6.8.2.11 Ending a BEST service session p. 50
6.8.3 Solution Evaluation p. 50
6.9 Solution #9: Complete end to end solution p. 51
6.9.1 Introduction p. 51
6.9.2 Solution description p. 52
6.9.2.1 Proposed Architecture p. 52
6.9.2.2 Service Discovery and Negotiation p. 53
6.9.2.3 Ability to Enable and Disable the BEST service p. 53
6.9.2.4 End to Middle Security User Plane and Signalling Plane p. 53
6.9.2.4.1 Data transport p. 53
6.9.2.4.2 End to Middle Secured Data Protocol (EMSDP) p. 53
6.9.2.4.3 EMSDP general structure p. 54
6.9.2.4.3A EMSDP Counter Schemes p. 54
6.9.2.4.4 EMSDP Integrity protection p. 54
6.9.2.4.5 EMSDP Encryption p. 54
6.9.2.4.6 EMSDP Commands p. 54
6.9.2.7 Key Agreement and Refreshing p. 57
6.9.2.7.1 Overview p. 57
6.9.2.7.2 Key setup messaging between HSE and UE p. 57
6.9.2.7.3 BEST key derivation mechanism p. 60
6.9.2.8 Starting a BEST service session p. 62
6.9.2.9 Resuming a BEST session following a power cycle at the UE or a re-attach p. 63
6.9.2.10 BEST service session operation p. 64
6.9.2.11 Ending a BEST service session p. 64
6.9.3 Solution Evaluation p. 64
6.10 Solution #10: "AKA-based session key generation for application protocols" p. 64
6.10.1 Introduction p. 64
6.10.2 Solution description p. 65
6.10.2.1 Features p. 65
6.10.2.2 Interface between EMKS and EMSE p. 68
6.10.2.3 Example use of solution 10: information flow using pre-shared key DTLS p. 69
6.10.3 Solution evaluation p. 71
6.11 Solution #11: A method for IoT service layer security bootstrapping solution p. 71
6.11.1 Introduction p. 71
6.11.2 Solution description p. 72
6.11.3 Solution evaluation p. 76
6.12 Solution #12: A method for IoT service layer security bootstrapping solution p. 76
7 Conclusions p. 82
7.1 Issues identified p. 82
7.2 Solution evaluation summary p. 82
7.3 Recommendation for normative work p. 86
A AKA procedures assessment in very low data throughput environment p. 87
A.1 Introduction p. 87
A.2 UMTS AKA p. 87
A.3 DTLS handshake for ECDHE-ECDSA configuration p. 89
A.3.1 DTLS handshake procedure measurement p. 89
A.3.2 TLS Record and Handshake message measurement p. 91
A.4 DTLS record header overhead description for ciphered data p. 95
A.5 TLS handshake session resumption p. 96
A.5.1 TLS handshake session resumption procedure measurement p. 96
A.5.2 TLS Record and Handshake message measurement p. 96
A.6 GBA bootstrapping procedure p. 99
B Review of security standardization efforts in other SDOs p. 105
B.0 Introduction p. 105
B.1 (D)TLS optimization efforts in IETF p. 105
C Proposed normative changes p. 107
C.1 Introduction p. 107
C.2 Proposed changes to 3GPP TS 33.401 p. 107
C.2.1 Overview of changes p. 107
C.3 Proposed changes to 3GPP TS 43.020 p. 108
$ Change History p. 109
