RFC 8460
SMTP TLS Reporting
5. Report Delivery
Reports can be delivered either via SMTP (as an email message) or via HTTP POST.
5.1. Report Filename
The filename is RECOMMENDED to be constructed using the following ABNF: filename = sender "!" policy-domain "!" begin-timestamp "!" end-timestamp [ "!" unique-id ] "." extension unique-id = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT) sender = domain ; from [RFC5321] -- this is used ; as the domain for the `contact-info` ; address in the report body. ; In the case of Internationalized Domain ; Names [RFC5891], the domain MUST consist of ; the Punycode-encoded A-labels [RFC3492] and ; not the U-labels. policy-domain = domain ; In the case of Internationalized Domain ; Names [RFC5891], the domain MUST consist of ; the Punycode-encoded A-labels [RFC3492] and ; not the U-labels. begin-timestamp = 1*DIGIT ; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970 ; indicating start of the time range contained ; in the report end-timestamp = 1*DIGIT ; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970 ; indicating end of the time range contained ; in the report extension = "json" / "json.gz" The extension MUST be "json" for a plain JSON file or "json.gz" for a JSON file compressed using gzip. "unique-id" allows an optional unique ID generated by the Sending MTA to distinguish among multiple reports generated simultaneously by different sources for the same Policy Domain. For example, this is a possible filename for a compressed report to the Policy Domain "example.net" from the Sending MTA "mail.sndr.example.com": "mail.sndr.example.com!example.net!1470013207!1470186007!001.json.gz"
5.2. Compression
The report SHOULD be subjected to gzip [RFC1952] compression for both email and HTTPS transport. Declining to apply compression can cause the report to be too large for a receiver to process (a commonly observed receiver limit is ten megabytes); compressing the file increases the chances of acceptance of the report at some computational cost.5.3. Email Transport
The report MAY be delivered by email. To make the reports machine- parsable for the receivers, we define a top-level media type "multipart/report" with a new parameter "report-type="tlsrpt"". Inside it, there are two parts: The first part is human readable, typically "text/plain", and the second part is machine readable with a new media type defined called "application/tlsrpt+json". If compressed, the report should use the media type "application/ tlsrpt+gzip". In addition, the following two new top-level message header fields are defined: "TLS-Report-Domain: Receiver-Domain" "TLS-Report-Submitter: Sender-Domain" The "TLS-Report-Submitter" value MUST match the value found in the domain [RFC5321] of the "contact-info" from the report body. These message header fields MUST be included and should allow for easy searching for all reports submitted by a reporting domain or a particular submitter, for example, in IMAP [RFC3501]: "s SEARCH HEADER "TLS-Report-Domain" "example.com"" It is presumed that the aggregate reporting address will be equipped to process new message header fields and extract MIME parts with the prescribed media type and filename, and ignore the rest. These additional headers SHOULD be included in the DKIM [RFC6376] signature for the message.
The RFC5322.Subject field for report submissions SHOULD conform to the following ABNF: tlsrpt-subject = %s"Report" FWS ; "Report" %s"Domain:" FWS ; "Domain:" domain-name FWS ; per [RFC6376] %s"Submitter:" FWS ; "Submitter:" domain-name FWS ; per [RFC6376] %s"Report-ID:" FWS ; "Report-ID: "<" id-left "@" id-right ">" ; per [RFC5322] [CFWS] ; per [RFC5322] ; (as with FWS) The first domain-name indicates the DNS domain name about which the report was generated. The second domain-name indicates the DNS domain name representing the Sending MTA generating the report. The purpose of the "Report-ID:" portion of the field is to enable the Policy Domain to identify and ignore duplicate reports that might be sent by a Sending MTA. For instance, this is a possible Subject field for a report to the Policy Domain "example.net" from the Sending MTA "mail.sender.example.com". It is line-wrapped as allowed by [RFC5322]: Subject: Report Domain: example.net Submitter: mail.sender.example.com Report-ID: <735ff.e317+bf22029@mailexample.net>
5.3.1. Example Report
From: tlsrpt@mail.sender.example.com Date: Fri, May 09 2017 16:54:30 -0800 To: mts-sts-tlsrpt@example.net Subject: Report Domain: example.net Submitter: mail.sender.example.com Report-ID: <735ff.e317+bf22029@example.net> TLS-Report-Domain: example.net TLS-Report-Submitter: mail.sender.example.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type="tlsrpt"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00" Content-Language: en-us This is a multipart message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit This is an aggregate TLS report from mail.sender.example.com ------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00 Content-Type: application/tlsrpt+gzip Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="mail.sender.example!example.com! 1013662812!1013749130.json.gz" <gzipped content of report> ------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00-- ... Note that, when sending failure reports via SMTP, Sending MTAs MUST NOT honor MTA-STS or DANE TLSA failures.5.4. HTTPS Transport
The report MAY be delivered by POST to HTTPS. If compressed, the report SHOULD use the media type "application/tlsrpt+gzip"; otherwise it SHOULD use the media type "application/tlsrpt+json" (see Section 6, "IANA Considerations"). The receiving system MUST return a "successful" response from its HTTPS server, typically a 200 or 201 HTTP code [RFC7231]. Other codes could indicate a delivery failure and may be retried as per
local sender policy. The receiving system is not expected to process reports at receipt time and MAY store them for processing at a later time.5.5. Delivery Retry
In the event of a delivery failure, regardless of the delivery method, a sender SHOULD attempt redelivery for up to 24 hours after the initial attempt. As previously stated, the reports are optional, so while it is ideal to attempt redelivery, it is not required. If multiple retries are attempted, ideally they SHOULD be done with exponential backoff.5.6. Metadata Variances
As stated above, there are a variable number of ways to declare information about the data therein. If any of the items declared via subject or filename disagree with the report, the report MUST be considered the authoritative source.6. IANA Considerations
The following are the IANA considerations discussed in this document.6.1. Message Headers
Below is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Permanent Message Header Field registration information per [RFC3864]. Header field name: TLS-Report-Domain Applicable protocol: mail Status: standard Author/Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFC 8460 Header field name: TLS-Report-Submitter Applicable protocol: mail Status: standard Author/Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFC 8460
6.2. Report Type
This document creates a new registry for the "report-type" parameter to the Content-Type header field for the "multipart/report" top-level media type defined in [RFC6522]. The registry name is "Report Type Registry", and the procedure for updating the registry will be "Specification Required" [RFC8126]. An entry in this registry should contain: o the report-type being registered o one or more registered media types that can be used with this report-type o the document containing the registration action o an optional comment The initial entries are: Report-Type: tlsrpt Media Type: application/tlsrpt+gzip, application/tlsrpt+json Registered By: [RFC8460] Comment: Media types suitable for use with this report-type are defined in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 of [RFC8460] Report-Type: disposition-notification Media Type: message/disposition-notification Registered By: [RFC8098], Section 10 Report-Type: disposition-notification Media Type: message/global-disposition-notification Registered By: [RFC6533], Section 6 Report-Type: delivery-status Media Type: message/delivery-status Registered By: [RFC3464], Section 6.2 Report-Type: delivery-status Media Type: message/global-delivery-status Registered By: [RFC6533], Section 6
6.3. +gzip Media Type Suffix
This document registers a new media type suffix "+gzip". The gzip format is a public domain, cross-platform, interoperable file storage and transfer format, specified in [RFC1952]; it supports compression and is used as the underlying representation by a variety of file formats. The media type "application/gzip" has been registered for such files. The suffix "+gzip" MAY be used with any media type whose representation follows that established for "application/gzip". The registration form for the structured syntax suffix for use with media types is as follows: Type name: gzip file storage and transfer format. +suffix: +gzip References: [RFC1952] [RFC6713] Encoding considerations: gzip is a binary encoding. Fragment identifier considerations: The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers specified for +gzip SHOULD be as specified for "application/gzip". (At publication of this document, there is no fragment identification syntax defined for "application/gzip".) The syntax and semantics for fragment identifiers for a specific "xxx/ yyy+gzip" SHOULD be processed as follows: For cases defined in +gzip, where the fragment identifier resolves per the +gzip rules, process as specified in +gzip. For cases defined in +gzip, where the fragment identifier does not resolve per the +gzip rules, process as specified in "xxx/yyy+gzip". For cases not defined in +gzip, process as specified in "xxx/yyy+gzip". Interoperability considerations: N/A Security considerations: gzip format doesn't provide confidentiality protection. Integrity protection is provided by an Adler-32 checksum, which is not cryptographically strong. See also the security considerations of [RFC6713]. Each individual media type registered with a +gzip suffix can have additional security considerations. Additionally, gzip objects can contain multiple
files and associated paths. File paths must be validated when the files are extracted; a malicious file path could otherwise cause the extractor to overwrite application or system files. Contact: art@ietf.org Author/Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).6.4. application/tlsrpt+json Media Type
This document registers multiple media types, beginning with Table 1 below. +-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ | Type | Subtype | File Ext | Specification | +-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ | application | tlsrpt+json | .json | Section 5.3 | +-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+ Table 1: SMTP TLS Reporting Media Type Type name: application Subtype name: tlsrpt+json Required parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to those specified for the "application/json" media type. See [RFC7493]. Security considerations: Security considerations relating to SMTP TLS Reporting are discussed in Section 7. Interoperability considerations: This document specifies the format of conforming messages and the interpretation thereof. Published specification: Section 5.3 of RFC 8460. Applications that use this media type: Mail User Agents (MUAs) and Mail Transfer Agents.
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): ".json"
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
See the Authors' Addresses section.
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: See the Authors' Addresses section.
Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).
6.5. application/tlsrpt+gzip Media Type
+-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
| Type | Subtype | File Ext | Specification |
+-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
| application | tlsrpt+gzip | .gz | Section 5.3 |
+-------------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
Table 2: SMTP TLS Reporting Media Type
Type name: application
Subtype name: tlsrpt+gzip
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Binary
Security considerations: Security considerations relating to SMTP TLS
Reporting are discussed in Section 7. Security considerations
related to gzip compression are discussed in RFC 6713.
Interoperability considerations: This document specifies the format
of conforming messages and the interpretation thereof.
Published specification: Section 5.3 of RFC 8460. Applications that use this media type: Mail User Agents (MUAs) and Mail Transfer Agents. Additional information: Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A Magic number(s): The first two bytes are 0x1f, 0x8b. File extension(s): ".gz" Macintosh file type code(s): N/A Person & email address to contact for further information: See the Authors' Addresses section. Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: N/A Author: See the Authors' Addresses section. Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).6.6. STARTTLS Validation Result Types
This document creates a new registry, "STARTTLS Validation Result Types". The initial entries in the registry are: +-----------------------------+--------------+ | Result Type | Description | +-----------------------------+--------------+ | starttls-not-supported | Section 4.3 | | certificate-host-mismatch | Section 4.3 | | certificate-expired | Section 4.3 | | tlsa-invalid | Section 4.3 | | dnssec-invalid | Section 4.3 | | dane-required | Section 4.3 | | certificate-not-trusted | Section 4.3 | | sts-policy-invalid | Section 4.3 | | sts-webpki-invalid | Section 4.3 | | validation-failure | Section 4.3 | | sts-policy-fetch-error | Section 4.3 | +-----------------------------+--------------+
The above entries are described in Section 4.3, "Result Types". New result types can be added to this registry using the "Expert Review" IANA registration policy.7. Security Considerations
SMTP TLS Reporting provides visibility into misconfigurations or attempts to intercept or tamper with mail between hosts who support STARTTLS. There are several security risks presented by the existence of this reporting channel: o Flooding of the Aggregate Report URI (rua) endpoint: An attacker could flood the endpoint with excessive reporting traffic and prevent the receiving domain from accepting additional reports. This type of Denial-of-Service attack would limit visibility into STARTTLS failures, leaving the receiving domain blind to an ongoing attack. o Untrusted content: An attacker could inject malicious code into the report, exploiting any vulnerabilities in the report-handling systems of the receiving domain. Implementers are advised to take precautions against evaluating the contents of the report. o Report snooping: An attacker could create a bogus TLSRPT record to receive statistics about a domain the attacker does not own. Since an attacker that is able to poison DNS is already able to receive counts of SMTP connections (and, absent DANE or MTA-STS policies, actual SMTP message payloads), this does not present a significant new vulnerability. o Ignoring HTTPS validation when submitting reports: When reporting benign misconfigurations, it is likely that a misconfigured SMTP server may also mean a misconfigured HTTPS server; as a result, reporters who require HTTPS validity on the reporting endpoint may fail to alert administrators about such misconfigurations. Conversely, in the event of an actual attack, an attacker who wishes to create a gap in reporting and could intercept HTTPS reports could, just as easily, simply thwart the resolution of the TLSRPT TXT record or establishment of the TCP session to the HTTPS endpoint. Furthermore, such a man-in-the-middle attacker could discover most or all of the metadata exposed in a report merely through passive observation. As a result, we consider the risks of failure to deliver reports on misconfigurations to outweigh those of attackers intercepting reports.
o Reports as DDoS: TLSRPT allows specifying destinations for the
reports that are outside the authority of the Policy Domain, which
allows domains to delegate processing of reports to a partner
organization. However, an attacker who controls the Policy Domain
DNS could also use this mechanism to direct the reports to an
unwitting victim, flooding that victim with excessive reports.
DMARC [RFC7489] defines a solution for verifying delegation to
avoid such attacks; the need for this is greater with DMARC,
however, because DMARC allows an attacker to trigger reports to a
target from an innocent third party by sending mail to that third
party (which triggers a report from the third party to the
target). In the case of TLSRPT, the attacker would have to induce
the third party to send mail to the attacker in order to trigger
reports from the third party to the victim; this reduces the risk
of such an attack and the need for a verification mechanism.
Finally, because TLSRPT is intended to help administrators discover
man-in-the-middle attacks against transport-layer encryption,
including attacks designed to thwart negotiation of encrypted
connections (by downgrading opportunistic encryption or, in the case
of MTA-STS, preventing discovery of a new MTA-STS Policy), we must
also consider the risk that an adversary who can induce such a
downgrade attack can also prevent discovery of the TLSRPT TXT record
(and thus prevent discovery of the successful downgrade attack).
Administrators are thus encouraged to deploy TLSRPT TXT records with
a large TTL (reducing the window for successful application of
transient attacks against DNS resolution of the record) or to deploy
DNSSEC on the deploying zone.
8. Privacy Considerations
MTAs are generally considered public knowledge; however, the
internals of how those MTAs are configured and the users of those
MTAs may not be as public. It should be noted that providing a
receiving site with information about TLS failures may reveal
information about the sender's configuration or even information
about the senders themselves. For example, sending a report may
disclose what TLS implementation the sender uses, as the inability to
negotiate a session may be a known incompatibility between two
implementations. This may, indirectly, leak information on the
reporter's operating system or even region, if, for example, a rare
TLS implementation is popular among certain users or in certain
locations.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3", RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/RFC1952, May 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. [RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3492>. [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>. [RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.
[RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, DOI 10.17487/RFC5891, August 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5891>. [RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>. [RFC6068] Duerst, M., Masinter, L., and J. Zawinski, "The 'mailto' URI Scheme", RFC 6068, DOI 10.17487/RFC6068, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6068>. [RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>. [RFC6522] Kucherawy, M., Ed., "The Multipart/Report Media Type for the Reporting of Mail System Administrative Messages", STD 73, RFC 6522, DOI 10.17487/RFC6522, January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6522>. [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>. [RFC6713] Levine, J., "The 'application/zlib' and 'application/gzip' Media Types", RFC 6713, DOI 10.17487/RFC6713, August 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6713>. [RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208, DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208>. [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. [RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF", RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.
[RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493, DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493>. [RFC7671] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671, October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>. [RFC7672] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672, DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [RFC8461] Margolis, D., Risher, M., Ramakrishnan, B., Brotman, A., and J. Jones, "SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA- STS)", RFC 8461, DOI 10.17487/RFC8461, September 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8461>.9.2. Informative References
[RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207, February 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3207>. [RFC3464] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464, DOI 10.17487/RFC3464, January 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3464>. [RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>. [RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864, DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>. [RFC6533] Hansen, T., Ed., Newman, C., and A. Melnikov, "Internationalized Delivery Status and Disposition Notifications", RFC 6533, DOI 10.17487/RFC6533, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6533>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>. [RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>. [RFC7489] Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489>. [RFC8098] Hansen, T., Ed. and A. Melnikov, Ed., "Message Disposition Notification", STD 85, RFC 8098, DOI 10.17487/RFC8098, February 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8098>. [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
Appendix A. Example Reporting Policy
A.1. Report Using MAILTO
_smtp._tls.mail.example.com. IN TXT \ "v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:reports@example.com"A.2. Report Using HTTPS
_smtp._tls.mail.example.com. IN TXT \ "v=TLSRPTv1; \ rua=https://reporting.example.com/v1/tlsrpt"Appendix B. Example JSON Report
Below is an example JSON report for messages from Company-X to Company-Y, where 100 sessions were attempted to Company-Y servers with an expired certificate, and 200 sessions were attempted to Company-Y servers that did not successfully respond to the "STARTTLS" command. Additionally, 3 sessions failed due to "X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED". { "organization-name": "Company-X", "date-range": { "start-datetime": "2016-04-01T00:00:00Z", "end-datetime": "2016-04-01T23:59:59Z" }, "contact-info": "sts-reporting@company-x.example", "report-id": "5065427c-23d3-47ca-b6e0-946ea0e8c4be", "policies": [{ "policy": { "policy-type": "sts", "policy-string": ["version: STSv1","mode: testing", "mx: *.mail.company-y.example","max_age: 86400"], "policy-domain": "company-y.example", "mx-host": "*.mail.company-y.example" }, "summary": { "total-successful-session-count": 5326, "total-failure-session-count": 303 }, "failure-details": [{ "result-type": "certificate-expired", "sending-mta-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:0012::1", "receiving-mx-hostname": "mx1.mail.company-y.example", "failed-session-count": 100 }, {
"result-type": "starttls-not-supported",
"sending-mta-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:0013::1",
"receiving-mx-hostname": "mx2.mail.company-y.example",
"receiving-ip": "203.0.113.56",
"failed-session-count": 200,
"additional-information": "https://reports.company-x.example/
report_info ? id = 5065427 c - 23 d3# StarttlsNotSupported "
}, {
"result-type": "validation-failure",
"sending-mta-ip": "198.51.100.62",
"receiving-ip": "203.0.113.58",
"receiving-mx-hostname": "mx-backup.mail.company-y.example",
"failed-session-count": 3,
"failure-reason-code": "X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED"
}]
}]
}
Contributors
Laetitia Baudoin Google, Inc. lbaudoin@google.comAuthors' Addresses
Daniel Margolis Google, Inc. Email: dmargolis@google.com Alexander Brotman Comcast, Inc. Email: alex_brotman@comcast.com Binu Ramakrishnan Oath, Inc. Email: prbinu@yahoo.com Janet Jones Microsoft, Inc. Email: janet.jones@microsoft.com Mark Risher Google, Inc. Email: risher@google.com