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RFC 7672

SMTP Security via Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Pages: 34
Proposed Standard
Part 2 of 2 – Pages 20 to 34
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3. DANE Authentication

This section describes which TLSA records are applicable to SMTP opportunistic DANE TLS and how to apply such records to authenticate the SMTP server. With opportunistic DANE TLS, both the TLS support implied by the presence of DANE TLSA records and the verification parameters necessary to authenticate the TLS peer are obtained together. In contrast to protocols where channel security policy is set exclusively by the client, authentication via this protocol is expected to be less prone to connection failure caused by incompatible configuration of the client and server.

3.1. TLSA Certificate Usages

The DANE TLSA specification [RFC6698] defines multiple TLSA RR types via combinations of three numeric parameters. The numeric values of these parameters were later given symbolic names in [RFC7218]. The rest of the TLSA record is the "certificate association data field", which specifies the full or digest value of a certificate or public key. Since opportunistic DANE TLS will be used by non-interactive MTAs, with no user to "click OK" when authentication fails, reliability of peer authentication is paramount. Server operators are advised to publish TLSA records that are least likely to fail authentication due to interoperability or operational problems. Because DANE TLS relies on coordinated changes to DNS and SMTP server settings, the best choice of records to publish will depend on site-specific practices. The certificate usage element of a TLSA record plays a critical role in determining how the corresponding certificate association data field is used to authenticate a server's certificate chain. Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 explain the process for certificate usages DANE-EE(3) and DANE-TA(2), respectively. Section 3.1.3 briefly explains why certificate usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1) are not applicable with opportunistic DANE TLS. In summary, we RECOMMEND the use of "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)", with "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) SHA2-256(1)" TLSA records as a second choice, depending on site needs. See Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for more details. Other combinations of TLSA parameters either (1) are explicitly unsupported or (2) offer little to recommend them over these two.
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3.1.1. Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3)

Authentication via certificate usage DANE-EE(3) TLSA records involves simply checking that the server's leaf certificate matches the TLSA record. In particular, the binding of the server public key to its name is based entirely on the TLSA record association. The server MUST be considered authenticated even if none of the names in the certificate match the client's reference identity for the server. The expiration date of the server certificate MUST be ignored: the validity period of the TLSA record key binding is determined by the validity interval of the TLSA record DNSSEC signature. With DANE-EE(3), servers need not employ SNI (they may ignore the client's SNI message) even when the server is known under independent names that would otherwise require separate certificates. It is instead sufficient for the TLSA RRsets for all the domains in question to match the server's default certificate. Of course, with SMTP servers it is simpler still to publish the same MX hostname for all the hosted domains. For domains where it is practical to make coordinated changes in DNS TLSA records during SMTP server key rotation, it is often best to publish end-entity DANE-EE(3) certificate associations. DANE-EE(3) certificates don't suddenly stop working when leaf or intermediate certificates expire, nor do they fail when the server operator neglects to configure all the required issuer certificates in the server certificate chain. TLSA records published for SMTP servers SHOULD, in most cases, be "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" records. Since all DANE implementations are required to support SHA2-256, this record type works for all clients and need not change across certificate renewals with the same key.
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3.1.2. Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2)

Some domains may prefer to avoid the operational complexity of publishing unique TLSA RRs for each TLS service. If the domain employs a common issuing CA to create certificates for multiple TLS services, it may be simpler to publish the issuing authority as a trust anchor (TA) for the certificate chains of all relevant services. The TLSA query domain (TLSA base domain with port and protocol prefix labels) for each service issued by the same TA may then be set to a CNAME alias that points to a common TLSA RRset that matches the TA. For example: IN MX 0 IN MX 0 IN CNAME IN CNAME IN TLSA 2 0 1 e3b0c44298fc1c14.... With usage DANE-TA(2), the server certificates will need to have names that match one of the client's reference identifiers (see [RFC6125]). The server MAY employ SNI to select the appropriate certificate to present to the client. SMTP servers that rely on certificate usage DANE-TA(2) TLSA records for TLS authentication MUST include the TA certificate as part of the certificate chain presented in the TLS handshake server certificate message even when it is a self-signed root certificate. Many SMTP servers are not configured with a comprehensive list of trust anchors, nor are they expected to be at any point in the future. Some MTAs will ignore all locally trusted certificates when processing usage DANE-TA(2) TLSA records. Thus, even when the TA happens to be a public CA known to the SMTP client, authentication is likely to fail unless the TA certificate is included in the TLS server certificate message. With some SMTP server software, it is not possible to configure the server to include self-signed (root) CA certificates in the server certificate chain. Such servers either MUST publish DANE-TA(2) records for an intermediate certificate or MUST instead use DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. TLSA records with a matching type of Full(0) are discouraged. While these potentially obviate the need to transmit the TA certificate in the TLS server certificate message, client implementations may not be able to augment the server certificate chain with the data obtained from DNS, especially when the TLSA record supplies a bare key (selector SPKI(1)). Since the server will need to transmit the TA certificate in any case, server operators SHOULD publish TLSA records
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   with a matching type other than Full(0) and avoid potential
   interoperability issues with large TLSA records containing full
   certificates or keys.

   TLSA Publishers employing DANE-TA(2) records SHOULD publish records
   with a selector of Cert(0).  Such TLSA records are associated with
   the whole trust anchor certificate, not just with the trust anchor
   public key.  In particular, the SMTP client SHOULD then apply any
   relevant constraints from the trust anchor certificate, such as, for
   example, path length constraints.

   While a selector of SPKI(1) may also be employed, the resulting TLSA
   record will not specify the full trust anchor certificate content,
   and elements of the trust anchor certificate other than the public
   key become mutable.  This may, for example, allow a subsidiary CA to
   issue a chain that violates the trust anchor's path length or name

3.1.3. Certificate Usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1)

Note that this section applies to MTA-to-MTA SMTP, which is normally on port 25 -- that is, to servers that are the SMTP servers for one or more destination domains. Other uses of SMTP, such as in MUA-to-MSA submission on ports 587 or 465, are out of scope for this document. Where those other uses also employ TLS opportunistically and/or depend on DNSSEC as a result of DNS-based discovery of service location, the relevant specifications should, as appropriate, arrive at similar conclusions. As noted in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, sending MTAs cannot, without relying on DNSSEC for "secure" MX records and DANE for STARTTLS support signaling, perform server identity verification or prevent STARTTLS downgrade attacks. The use of PKIX CAs offers no added security, since an attacker capable of compromising DNSSEC is free to replace any PKIX-TA(0) or PKIX-EE(1) TLSA records with records bearing any convenient non-PKIX certificate usage. Finally, as explained in Section 1.3.4, there is no list of trusted CAs agreed upon by all MTAs and no user to "click OK" when a server's CA is not trusted by a client. Therefore, TLSA records for the port 25 SMTP service used by client MTAs SHOULD NOT include TLSA RRs with certificate usage PKIX-TA(0) or PKIX-EE(1). SMTP client MTAs cannot be expected to be configured with a suitably complete set of trusted public CAs. Lacking a complete set of public CAs, MTA clients would not be able to verify the certificates of SMTP servers whose issuing root CAs are not trusted by the client.
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   Opportunistic DANE TLS needs to interoperate without bilateral
   coordination of security settings between client and server systems.
   Therefore, parameter choices that are fragile in the absence of
   bilateral coordination are unsupported.  Nothing is lost; since the
   PKIX certificate usages cannot aid SMTP TLS security, they can only
   impede SMTP TLS interoperability.

   SMTP client treatment of TLSA RRs with certificate usages PKIX-TA(0)
   or PKIX-EE(1) is undefined.  As with any other unsupported
   certificate usage, SMTP clients MAY treat such records as "unusable".

3.2. Certificate Matching

When at least one usable "secure" TLSA record is found, the SMTP client MUST use TLSA records to authenticate the SMTP server. Messages MUST NOT be delivered via the SMTP server if authentication fails; otherwise, the SMTP client is vulnerable to MITM attacks.

3.2.1. DANE-EE(3) Name Checks

The SMTP client MUST NOT perform certificate name checks with certificate usage DANE-EE(3) (Section 3.1.1).

3.2.2. DANE-TA(2) Name Checks

To match a server via a TLSA record with certificate usage DANE-TA(2), the client MUST perform name checks to ensure that it has reached the correct server. In all DANE-TA(2) cases, the SMTP client MUST employ the TLSA base domain as the primary reference identifier for matching the server certificate. TLSA records for MX hostnames: If the TLSA base domain was obtained indirectly via a "secure" MX lookup (including any CNAME-expanded name of an MX hostname), then the original next-hop domain used in the MX lookup MUST be included as a second reference identifier. The CNAME-expanded original next-hop domain MUST be included as a third reference identifier if different from the original next-hop domain. When the client MTA is employing DANE TLS security despite "insecure" MX redirection, the MX hostname is the only reference identifier. TLSA records for non-MX hostnames: If MX records were not used (e.g., if none exist) and the TLSA base domain is the CNAME-expanded original next-hop domain, then the original next-hop domain MUST be included as a second reference identifier.
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   Accepting certificates with the original next-hop domain in addition
   to the MX hostname allows a domain with multiple MX hostnames to
   field a single certificate bearing a single domain name (i.e., the
   email domain) across all the SMTP servers.  This also aids
   interoperability with pre-DANE SMTP clients that are configured to
   look for the email domain name in server certificates -- for example,
   with "secure" DNS records as shown below:            IN CNAME                IN CNAME                     IN MX    10                     IN MX    15                     IN MX    20
      ;                IN A       IN TLSA  2 0 1 ...
      ;                IN CNAME            IN A
      ; IN TLSA ? (NXDOMAIN)       IN TLSA  2 0 1 ...
      ;                IN CNAME            IN A   IN TLSA  2 0 1 ...

   Certificate name checks for delivery of mail to
   via any of the associated SMTP servers MUST accept at least the names
   "" and "", which are, respectively,
   the original and fully expanded next-hop domain.  When the SMTP
   server is, name checks MUST accept the TLSA base
   domain "".  If, despite the fact that MX hostnames
   are required to not be aliases, the MTA supports delivery via
   "" or "", then name checks MUST
   accept the respective TLSA base domains "" and

3.2.3. Reference Identifier Matching

When name checks are applicable (certificate usage DANE-TA(2)), if the server certificate contains a Subject Alternative Name extension [RFC5280] with at least one DNS-ID [RFC6125], then only the DNS-IDs are matched against the client's reference identifiers. The CN-ID [RFC6125] is only considered when no DNS-IDs are present. The server certificate is considered matched when one of its presented identifiers [RFC5280] matches any of the client's reference identifiers.
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   Wildcards are valid in either DNS-IDs or the CN-ID when applicable.
   The wildcard character must be the entire first label of the DNS-ID
   or CN-ID.  Thus, "*" is valid, while "smtp*"
   and "*" are not.  SMTP clients MUST support wildcards
   that match the first label of the reference identifier, with the
   remaining labels matching verbatim.  For example, the DNS-ID
   "*" matches the reference identifier "".
   SMTP clients MAY, subject to local policy, allow wildcards to match
   multiple reference identifier labels, but servers cannot expect broad
   support for such a policy.  Therefore, any wildcards in server
   certificates SHOULD match exactly one label in either the TLSA base
   domain or the next-hop domain.

4. Server Key Management

Two TLSA records MUST be published before employing a new EE or TA public key or certificate: one matching the currently deployed key and the other matching the new key scheduled to replace it. Once sufficient time has elapsed for all DNS caches to expire the previous TLSA RRset and related signature RRsets, servers may be configured to use the new EE private key and associated public key certificate or may employ certificates signed by the new trust anchor. Once the new public key or certificate is in use, the TLSA RR that matches the retired key can be removed from DNS, leaving only RRs that match keys or certificates in active use. As described in Section 3.1.2, when server certificates are validated via a DANE-TA(2) trust anchor and CNAME records are employed to store the TA association data at a single location, the responsibility of updating the TLSA RRset shifts to the operator of the trust anchor. Before a new trust anchor is used to sign any new server certificates, its certificate (digest) is added to the relevant TLSA RRset. After enough time elapses for the original TLSA RRset to age out of DNS caches, the new trust anchor can start issuing new server certificates. Once all certificates issued under the previous trust anchor have expired, its associated RRs can be removed from the TLSA RRset. In the DANE-TA(2) key management model, server operators do not generally need to update DNS TLSA records after initially creating a CNAME record that references the centrally operated DANE-TA(2) RRset. If a particular server's key is compromised, its TLSA CNAME SHOULD be replaced with a DANE-EE(3) association until the certificate for the compromised key expires, at which point it can return to using a CNAME record. If the central trust anchor is compromised, all
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   servers need to be issued new keys by a new TA, and an updated
   DANE-TA(2) TLSA RRset needs to be published containing just the
   new TA.

   SMTP servers cannot expect broad Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) support from SMTP clients.
   As outlined above, with DANE, compromised server or trust anchor keys
   can be "revoked" by removing them from the DNS without the need for
   client-side support for OCSP or CRLs.

5. Digest Algorithm Agility

While [RFC6698] specifies multiple digest algorithms, it does not specify a protocol by which the SMTP client and TLSA record publisher can agree on the strongest shared algorithm. Such a protocol would allow the client and server to avoid exposure to deprecated weaker algorithms that are published for compatibility with less capable clients. When stronger algorithms are an option, deprecated algorithms SHOULD be avoided. Such a protocol is specified in [RFC7671]. SMTP clients and servers that implement this specification MUST comply with the requirements outlined in Section 9 of [RFC7671].

6. Mandatory TLS Security

An MTA implementing this protocol may require a stronger security assurance when sending email to selected destinations. The sending organization may need to send sensitive email and/or may have regulatory obligations to protect its content. This protocol is not in conflict with such a requirement and, in fact, can often simplify authenticated delivery to such destinations. Specifically, with domains that publish DANE TLSA records for their MX hostnames, a sending MTA can be configured to use the receiving domain's DANE TLSA records to authenticate the corresponding SMTP server. Authentication via DANE TLSA records is easier to manage, as changes in the receiver's expected certificate properties are made on the receiver end and don't require manually communicated configuration changes. With mandatory DANE TLS, when no usable TLSA records are found, message delivery is delayed. Thus, mail is only sent when an authenticated TLS channel is established to the remote SMTP server. Administrators of mail servers that employ mandatory DANE TLS need to carefully monitor their mail logs and queues. If a partner domain unwittingly misconfigures its TLSA records, disables DNSSEC, or misconfigures SMTP server certificate chains, mail will be delayed and may bounce if the issue is not resolved in a timely manner.
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7. Note on DANE for Message User Agents

We note that SMTP is also used between Message User Agents (MUAs) and Message Submission Agents (MSAs) [RFC6409]. In [RFC6186], a protocol is specified that enables an MUA to dynamically locate the MSA based on the user's email address. SMTP connection security considerations for MUAs implementing [RFC6186] are largely analogous to connection security requirements for MTAs, and this specification could be applied largely verbatim with DNS MX records replaced by corresponding DNS Service (SRV) records [RFC7673]. However, until MUAs begin to adopt the dynamic configuration mechanisms of [RFC6186], they are adequately served by more traditional static TLS security policies. Specification of DANE TLS for MUA-to-MSA SMTP is left to future documents that focus specifically on SMTP security between MUAs and MSAs.

8. Interoperability Considerations

8.1. SNI Support

To ensure that the server sends the right certificate chain, the SMTP client MUST send the TLS SNI extension containing the TLSA base domain. This precludes the use of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) HELLO that is SSL 2.0 compatible by the SMTP client. Each SMTP server MUST present a certificate chain (see [RFC5246], Section 7.4.2) that matches at least one of the TLSA records. The server MAY rely on SNI to determine which certificate chain to present to the client. Clients that don't send SNI information may not see the expected certificate chain. If the server's TLSA records match the server's default certificate chain, the server need not support SNI. In either case, the server need not include the SNI extension in its TLS HELLO, as simply returning a matching certificate chain is sufficient. Servers MUST NOT enforce the use of SNI by clients, as the client may be using unauthenticated opportunistic TLS and may not expect any particular certificate from the server. If the client sends no SNI extension or sends an SNI extension for an unsupported domain, the server MUST simply send some fallback certificate chain of its choice. The reason for not enforcing strict matching of the requested SNI hostname is that DANE TLS clients are typically willing to accept multiple server names but can only send one name in the SNI extension. The server's fallback certificate may match a different name acceptable to the client, e.g., the original next-hop domain.
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8.2. Anonymous TLS Cipher Suites

Since many SMTP servers either do not support or do not enable any anonymous TLS cipher suites, SMTP client TLS HELLO messages SHOULD offer to negotiate a typical set of non-anonymous cipher suites required for interoperability with such servers. An SMTP client employing pre-DANE opportunistic TLS MAY also include one or more anonymous TLS cipher suites in its TLS HELLO. SMTP servers that need to interoperate with opportunistic TLS clients SHOULD be prepared to interoperate with such clients by either always selecting a mutually supported non-anonymous cipher suite or correctly handling client connections that negotiate anonymous cipher suites. Note that while SMTP server operators are under no obligation to enable anonymous cipher suites, no security is gained by sending certificates to clients that will ignore them. Indeed, support for anonymous cipher suites in the server makes audit trails more informative. Log entries that record connections that employed an anonymous cipher suite record the fact that the clients did not care to authenticate the server.

9. Operational Considerations

9.1. Client Operational Considerations

An operational error on the sending or receiving side that cannot be corrected in a timely manner may, at times, lead to consistent failure to deliver time-sensitive email. The sending MTA administrator may have to choose between allowing email to queue until the error is resolved and disabling opportunistic or mandatory DANE TLS (Section 6) for one or more destinations. The choice to disable DANE TLS security should not be made lightly. Every reasonable effort should be made to determine that problems with mail delivery are the result of an operational error and not an attack. A fallback strategy may be to configure explicit out-of-band TLS security settings if supported by the sending MTA. SMTP clients may deploy opportunistic DANE TLS incrementally by enabling it only for selected sites or may occasionally need to disable opportunistic DANE TLS for peers that fail to interoperate due to misconfiguration or software defects on either end. Some implementations MAY support DANE TLS in an "audit only" mode in which failure to achieve the requisite security level is logged as a warning and delivery proceeds at a reduced security level. Unless local policy specifies "audit only" or specifies that opportunistic DANE TLS is not to be used for a particular destination, an SMTP
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   client MUST NOT deliver mail via a server whose certificate chain
   fails to match at least one TLSA record when usable TLSA records are
   found for that server.

9.2. Publisher Operational Considerations

Some MTAs enable STARTTLS selectively. For example, they might only support STARTTLS with clients that have previously demonstrated "proper MTA behavior", e.g., by retrying the delivery of deferred messages (greylisting). If such an MTA publishes DANE TLSA records, sending MTAs that implement this specification will not attempt the initial cleartext SMTP transaction needed to establish the "proper MTA behavior", because they cannot establish the required channel security. Server operators MUST NOT implement selective STARTTLS if they also want to support DANE TLSA. TLSA Publishers MUST follow the guidelines in Section 8 of [RFC7671]. TLSA Publishers SHOULD follow the TLSA publication size guidance found in Section 10.1 of [RFC7671]. TLSA Publishers SHOULD follow the TLSA record TTL and signature lifetime recommendations found in Section 13 of [RFC7671].

10. Security Considerations

This protocol leverages DANE TLSA records to implement MITM-resistant Opportunistic Security [RFC7435] for SMTP. For destination domains that sign their MX records and publish signed TLSA records for their MX hostnames, this protocol allows sending MTAs to securely discover both the availability of TLS and how to authenticate the destination. This protocol does not aim to secure all SMTP traffic, as that is not practical until DNSSEC and DANE adoption are universal. The incremental deployment provided by following this specification is a best possible path for securing SMTP. This protocol coexists and interoperates with the existing insecure Internet email backbone. The protocol does not preclude existing non-opportunistic SMTP TLS security arrangements, which can continue to be used as before via manual configuration with negotiated out-of-band key and TLS configuration exchanges. Opportunistic SMTP TLS depends critically on DNSSEC for downgrade resistance and secure resolution of the destination name. If DNSSEC is compromised, it is not possible to fall back on the public CA PKI to prevent MITM attacks. A successful breach of DNSSEC enables the attacker to publish TLSA usage 3 certificate associations and thereby
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   bypass any security benefit the legitimate domain owner might hope to
   gain by publishing usage 0 or usage 1 TLSA RRs.  Given the lack of
   public CA PKI support in existing MTA deployments, avoiding
   certificate usages 0 and 1 simplifies implementation and deployment
   with no adverse security consequences.

   Implementations must strictly follow Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2,
   2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 3.2, and 9.1 of this specification; these
   sections indicate when it is appropriate to initiate a
   non-authenticated connection or cleartext connection to an SMTP
   server.  Specifically, in order to prevent downgrade attacks on this
   protocol, implementations must not initiate a connection when this
   specification indicates that a particular SMTP server must be
   considered unreachable.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, <>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <>. [RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207, February 2002, <>. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, <>. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, <>. [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, <>.
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   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,

   [RFC5598]  Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5598, July 2009,

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
              March 2011, <>.

   [RFC6186]  Daboo, C., "Use of SRV Records for Locating Email
              Submission/Access Services", RFC 6186,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6186, March 2011,

   [RFC6672]  Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
              DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698,
              August 2012, <>.
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   [RFC7218]  Gudmundsson, O., "Adding Acronyms to Simplify
              Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named
              Entities (DANE)", RFC 7218, DOI 10.17487/RFC7218,
              April 2014, <>.

   [RFC7671]  Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
              and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
              October 2015, <>.

11.2. Informative References

[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, <>. [RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997, <>. [RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997, <>. [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, <>. [RFC6409] Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail", STD 72, RFC 6409, DOI 10.17487/RFC6409, November 2011, <>. [RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, December 2014, <>. [RFC7673] Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA Records with SRV Records", RFC 7673, DOI 10.17487/RFC7673, October 2015, <>.
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The authors would like to extend great thanks to Tony Finch, who started the original version of a DANE SMTP document. His work is greatly appreciated and has been incorporated into this document. The authors would like to additionally thank Phil Pennock for his comments and advice on this document. Acknowledgements from Viktor: Thanks to Paul Hoffman, who motivated me to begin work on this memo and provided feedback on early draft versions of this document. Thanks to Patrick Koetter, Perry Metzger, and Nico Williams for valuable review comments. Thanks also to Wietse Venema, who created Postfix, and whose advice and feedback were essential to the development of the Postfix DANE implementation.

Authors' Addresses

Viktor Dukhovni Two Sigma Email: Wes Hardaker Parsons P.O. Box 382 Davis, CA 95617 United States Email: