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RFC 3331

Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2) - User Adaptation Layer

Pages: 94
Proposed Standard
Errata
Part 5 of 5 – Pages 85 to 94
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Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 85   prevText

6. Timer Values

The recommended default values for M2UA timers are: T(r) 2 seconds T(ack) 2 seconds T(beat) Heartbeat Timer 30 seconds

7. Security Considerations

M2UA is designed to carry signalling messages for telephony services. As such, M2UA MUST involve the security needs of several parties: the end users of the services; the network providers and the applications involved. Additional requirements MAY come from local regulation. While having some overlapping security needs, any security solution SHOULD fulfill all of the different parties' needs.

7.1 Threats

There is no quick fix, one-size-fits-all solution for security. As a transport protocol, M2UA has the following security objectives: * Availability of reliable and timely user data transport. * Integrity of user data transport. * Confidentiality of user data. M2UA runs on top of SCTP. SCTP [8] provides certain transport related security features, such as: * Blind Denial of Service Attacks * Flooding * Masquerade * Improper Monopolization of Services When M2UA is running in a professionally managed corporate or service provider network, it is reasonable to expect that this network includes an appropriate security policy framework. The "Site Security Handbook" [13] SHOULD be consulted for guidance. When the network in which M2UA runs in involves more than one party, it MAY NOT be reasonable to expect that all parties have implemented security in a sufficient manner. In such a case, it is recommended that IPSEC is used to ensure confidentiality of user payload. Consult [14] for more information on configuring IPSEC services.
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7.2 Protecting Confidentiality

Particularly for mobile users, the requirement for confidentiality MAY include the masking of IP addresses and ports. In this case application level encryption is not sufficient; IPSEC ESP SHOULD be used instead. Regardless of which level performs the encryption, the IPSEC ISAKMP service SHOULD be used for key management.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1 SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier

A request will be made to IANA to assign an M2UA value for the Payload Protocol Identifier in SCTP Payload Data chunk. The following SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier has been registered: M2UA "2" The SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier is included in each SCTP Data chunk, to indicate which protocol the SCTP is carrying. This Payload Protocol Identifier is not directly used by SCTP but MAY be used by certain network entities to identify the type of information being carried in a Data chunk. The User Adaptation peer MAY use the Payload Protocol Identifier as a way of determining additional information about the data being presented to it by SCTP.

8.2 M2UA Protocol Extensions

This protocol may also be extended through IANA in three ways: -- through definition of additional message classes, -- through definition of additional message types, and -- through definition of additional message parameters. The definition and use of new message classes, types and parameters is an integral part of SIGTRAN adaptation layers. Thus, these extensions are assigned by IANA through an IETF Consensus action as defined in [RFC2434]. The proposed extension must in no way adversely affect the general working of the protocol.
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8.2.1 IETF Defined Message Classes

The documentation for a new message class MUST include the following information: (a) A long and short name for the message class. (b) A detailed description of the purpose of the message class.

8.2.2 IETF Defined Message Types

Documentation of the message type MUST contain the following information: (a) A long and short name for the new message type. (b) A detailed description of the structure of the message. (c) A detailed definition and description of intended use of each field within the message. (d) A detailed procedural description of the use of the new message type within the operation of the protocol. (e) A detailed description of error conditions when receiving this message type. When an implementation receives a message type which it does not support, it MUST respond with an Error (ERR) message with an Error Code of Unsupported Message Type.

8.2.3 IETF-defined TLV Parameter Extension

Documentation of the message parameter MUST contain the following information: (a) Name of the parameter type. (b) Detailed description of the structure of the parameter field. This structure MUST conform to the general type-length-value format described in Section 3.1.5. (c) Detailed definition of each component of the parameter value. (d) Detailed description of the intended use of this parameter type, and an indication of whether and under what circumstances multiple instances of this parameter type may be found within the same message type.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Tom George (Alcatel) for contribution of text and effort on the specification.
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 88
   The authors would like to thank John Loughney, Neil Olson, Michael
   Tuexen, Nikhil Jain, Steve Lorusso, Dan Brendes, Joe Keller, Heinz
   Prantner, Barry Nagelberg, Naoto Makinae, Joyce Archibald, Mark
   Kobine, Nitin Tomar, Harsh Bhondwe and Karen King for their valuable
   comments and suggestions.

10. References

10.1 Normative

[1] ITU-T Recommendation Q.700, 'Introduction To ITU-T Signalling System No. 7 (SS7)' [2] ITU-T Recommendation Q.701-Q.705, 'Signalling System No. 7 (SS7) - Message Transfer Part (MTP)' [3] ANSI T1.111 'Signalling System Number 7 - Message Transfer Part' [4] Bellcore GR-246-CORE 'Bell Communications Research Specification of Signalling System Number 7', Volume 1, December 1995 [5] Telecommunication Technology Committee (TTC) Standard JT-Q704, Message Transfer Part Signaling Network Functions, April 28, 1992. [6] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. [7] Coded Character Set--7-Bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange, ANSI X3.4-1986.

10.2 Informative

[8] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000. [9] Ong, L., Rytina, I., Garcia, M., Schwarzbauer, H., Coene, L., Lin, H., Juhasz, I., Holdrege, M. and C. Sharp, "Architectural Framework for Signalling Transport", RFC 2719, October 1999. [10] ITU-T Recommendation Q.2140, 'B-ISDN ATM Adaptation Layer', February 1995 [11] ITU-T Recommendation Q.2210, 'Message transfer part level 3 functions and messages using the services of ITU-T Recommendation Q.2140', August 1995
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   [12] ITU-T Recommendation Q.751.1, 'Network Element Management
        Information Model for the Message Transfer Part', October 1995

   [13] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC 2196, September
        1997.

   [14] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
        Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 90

Appendix A: Signalling Network Architecture

A Signalling Gateway will support the transport of MTP2-User signalling traffic received from the SS7 network to one or more distributed ASPs (e.g., MGCs). Clearly, the M2UA protocol description cannot in itself meet any performance and reliability requirements for such transport. A physical network architecture is required, with data on the availability and transfer performance of the physical nodes involved in any particular exchange of information. However, the M2UA protocol is flexible enough to allow its operation and management in a variety of physical configurations that will enable Network Operators to meet their performance and reliability requirements. To meet the stringent SS7 signalling reliability and performance requirements for carrier grade networks, these Network Operators should ensure that there is no single point of failure provisioned in the end-to-end network architecture between an SS7 node and an IP ASP. Depending of course on the reliability of the SGP and ASP functional elements, this can typically be met by spreading SS7 links in a SS7 linkset [1] across SGPs or SGs, the provision of redundant QoS- bounded IP network paths for SCTP Associations between SCTP End Points, and redundant Hosts. The distribution of ASPs within the available Hosts is also important. For a particular Application Server, the related ASPs MAY be distributed over at least two Hosts.
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 91
   An example of logical network architecture relevant to carrier-grade
   operation in the IP network domain is shown in Figure 7 below:

        **************                              **************
        *  ********__*______________________________*__********  * Host1
   SG1  *  * SGP1 *__*________________       _______*__* ASP1 *  *
        *  ********  *                |     |       *  ********  *
        *      .     *                |     |       *            *
        *      .     *                |     |       **************
        **************                |     |
                                      |     |
        **************                |     |
        *  ********__*______________________|
   SG2  *  * SGP2 *__*________        |
        *  ********  *        |       |
        *      .     *        |       |
        *      .     *        |       |
        **************        |       |             **************
                              |       |_____________*__********  * Host2
                              |_____________________*__* ASP2 *  *
               .                                    *  ********  *
               .            SCTP Associations       *            *
               .                                    **************
                                                            .
                                                            .
                                                            .

                     Figure 7: Logical Model Example

   To avoid a single point of failure, it is recommended that a minimum
   of two ASPs be configured in an AS list, resident in separate hosts
   and, therefore, available over different SCTP associations.  For
   example, in the network shown in Figure 7, all messages for the
   Interface Identifiers could be sent to ASP1 in Host1 or ASP2 in
   Host2.  The AS list at SGP1 might look like the following:

         Interface Identifiers - Application Server #1
             ASP1/Host1  - State = Active
             ASP2/Host2  - State = Inactive

   In this 1+1 redundancy case, ASP1 in Host1 would be sent any incoming
   message for the Interface Identifiers registered.  ASP2 in Host2
   would normally be brought to the active state upon failure of
   ASP1/Host1.  In this example, both ASPs are Inactive or Active,
   meaning that the related SCTP association and far-end M2UA peer is
   ready.
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 92
   For carrier grade networks, Operators should ensure that under
   failure or isolation of a particular ASP, stable calls or
   transactions are not lost.  This implies that ASPs need, in some
   cases, to share the call/-transaction state or be able to pass the
   call/transaction state between each other.  Also, in the case of ASPs
   performing call processing, coordination MAY be required with the
   related Media Gateway to transfer the MGC control for a particular
   trunk termination.  However, this sharing or communication is outside
   the scope of this document.

11. Authors' Addresses

Ken Morneault Cisco Systems Inc. 13615 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon, VA. 20171 USA Phone: +1-703-484-3323 EMail: kmorneau@cisco.com Ram Dantu, Ph.D. NetRake Corporation 3000 Technology Drive Plano, TX 75074 USA Phone: +1-214-291-1111 EMail: rdantu@netrake.com Greg Sidebottom Signatus Technologies Kanata, Ontario, Canada EMail: greg@signatustechnologies.com Brian Bidulock OpenSS7 Corporation 1469 Jeffreys Crescent Edmonton, AB T6L 6T1 Canada Phone: +1-780-490-1141 EMail: bidulock@openss7.org
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 93
   Jacob Heitz
   Lucent Technologies
   1701 Harbor Bay Parkway
   Alameda, CA, 94502
   USA

   Phone: +1-510-747-2917
   EMail: jheitz@lucent.com
Top   ToC   RFC3331 - Page 94
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