Tech-invite 3GPPspace IETFspace

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Content for TR 33.860 Word version: 13.1.0

0… 4…

4 Cellular IoT p. 8

4.1 Overview of Cellular IoT p. 9

4.2 The baseline architecture for Cellular IoT services p. 9

4.2.1 User plane (Gb mode) p. 9

4.3.2 Control plane (Gb mode) p. 9

5 Key Issues p. 9

5.1 Key Issue #1: Entity authentication and key agreement p. 10

5.1.1 Key issue details p. 10

5.1.2 Security threats p. 10

5.1.3 Potential security requirements p. 10

5.2 Key Issue #2: Eavesdropping p. 11

5.2.1 Key issue details p. 11

5.2.2 Security threats p. 11

5.2.3 Potential security requirements p. 11

5.3 Key Issue #3: Unauthorized modification of signalling data p. 12

5.3.1 Key issue details p. 12

5.3.2 Security threats p. 12

5.3.3 Potential security requirements p. 12

5.4 Key Issue #4: Unauthorized modification of user data p. 12

5.4.1 Key issue details p. 12

5.4.2 Security threats p. 13

5.4.3 Potential security requirements p. 13

5.5 Key Issue #5: Null-encryption and unauthorized transmission of user plane data p. 13

5.5.1 Key issue details p. 13

5.5.2 Security threats p. 13

5.5.3 Potential security requirements p. 13

6 Solutions p. 14

6.1 Solution #1: Integrity protection of signalling and algorithm negotiation p. 14

6.1.1 General p. 14

6.1.2 Control Plane (Gb mode) p. 14

6.1.3 Protection of algorithm negotiation p. 14

6.1.4 Integrity algorithms p. 16

6.1.5 Integrity key derivation p. 16

6.1.6 Interworking with legacy GPRS p. 16

6.1.7 Message Authentication Code p. 16

6.2 Solution #2: Data efficient rekeying p. 17

6.2.1 General p. 17

6.2.2 Generation of Kmed p. 17

6.2.3 Generation of Ktc and Kti p. 17

6.2.4 Key derivation in the network p. 18

6.2.5 Further details and analysis p. 18

6.3 Solution #3: Algorithms for ciphering and integrity protection p. 19

6.3.1 General p. 19

6.3.2 Null ciphering algorithm p. 19

6.3.3 Ciphering algorithm p. 19

6.3.3.1 Inputs and outputs p. 19

6.3.3.2 GEA5 p. 20

6.3.4 Integrity algorithm p. 20

6.3.4.1 Inputs and outputs p. 20

6.3.4.2 GIA4 p. 21

6.3.4.3 GIA5 p. 21

6.4 Solution #4: Protection for CIoT enhanced GPRS Layer 3 - GMM messages p. 22

6.4.1 General p. 22

6.5 Solution #5: Activating integrity protection for user data in bearer layer p. 25

6.5.1 General p. 25

6.5.2 Solution p. 25

6.6 Solution #6: Authenticated encryption p. 25

6.6.1 General p. 25

6.6.2 Conclusion p. 26

6.7 Solution #7: GIA with INPUT-I and CONSTANT-F p. 26

6.7.0 General p. 26

6.7.1 Integrity algorithm p. 26

6.7.1.1 Inputs and outputs p. 26

6.7.1.2 INPUT-I p. 27

6.7.1.3 CONSTANT-F p. 27

6.8 Solution #8: Implementation of integrity protection in LLC protocol p. 27

6.8.1 General p. 27

6.8.2 Integrity protection bit, integrity mode bit and MAC p. 27

7 Evaluation p. 29

7.1 Authentication and key agreement p. 29

8 Conclusions p. 30

A Solution #A: Early solution for EASE p. 31

A.1 General p. 31

A.2 Control Plane (Gb mode) p. 31

A.3 Authentication p. 31

A.4 Protection of algorithm negotiation p. 31

A.5 Interworking with legacy GPRS p. 32

A.6 Security considerations p. 32

B Analysis of data efficient rekeying p. 34

B.1 Battery life cost of existing AKA p. 34

B.1.1 Assumptions on power budget and power consumption p. 34

B.1.2 Analysis of existing AKA p. 34

B.2 Possible details of a data efficient rekeying approach p. 36

B.2.1 Use of key sequence numbers p. 36

B.2.2 Derivation of Kmed from K p. 37

B.2.3 Derivation of session keys from Kmed p. 38

B.2.4 Battery impact p. 39

C Access security related functions for enhanced General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) in relation to Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) p. 40

C.1 Introduction p. 40

C.1.1 General p. 40

C.1.2 Considerations on bidding down attacks p. 40

C.2 Authentication and key agreement p. 40

C.3 Ciphering and integrity mode negotiation p. 40

C.4 Protection of GMM messages p. 42

C.5 Algorithms for ciphering and integrity protection p. 42

C.5.1 Null ciphering algorithm p. 42

C.5.2 Ciphering algorithm p. 43

C.5.2.1 Inputs and outputs p. 43

C.5.2.2 GEA5 p. 43

C.5.3 Integrity algorithm p. 43

C.5.3.1 Inputs and outputs p. 43

C.5.3.2 GIA4 p. 44

C.5.3.3 GIA5 p. 44

C.6 Derivation of Kc128 and Ki128 p. 44

C.7 Integrity protection of user plane p. 45

D Comparison of authenticated encryption schemes p. 46

D.1 Feature comparison p. 46

D.2 Performance comparison p. 46

$ Change History p. 47