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Content for  TR 33.854  Word version:  17.1.0

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7  Conclusionsp. 59

7.1  Conclusions for KI#1p. 59

UAV Authentication and Authorization (UAA) is recommended for the normative work based on the following solutions and principles:
  • UAA is performed in 5G systems or EPS.
  • UAA is performed between UAV and USS/UTM after Primary Authentication.
  • Revocation of UAV is initiated by USS/UTM using the 3GPP UAV ID.
  • UAA is performed either optionally during registration (5G solutions #1, #3, #7, #10 as basis) or during PDU session establishment (5G solution #5 as basis).
  • USS/UTM is authorized to perform UAV authorization revocation, it is verified by UAS-NF (5G solutions #16 as basis).
  • For EPS: solution #13 is chosen as the basis for normative work, with similar principles above.
  • In UAA, CAA Level UAV ID is used to identify UAV.
  • Specific authentication methods for UAA are out of scope of 3GPP, the messages used for UAA exchanged between UAV and USS/UTM are included in transparent containers.
  • Security related application layer information can be transported between UAV and USS/UTM in transparent containers (the content is out of scope of 3GPP).
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7.2  Conclusions for KI#2p. 59

Pairing Authorization for UAV and UAVC is recommended for the normative work based on the following solutions and principles:
  • Pairing authorization is performed after successful UAA between UAV and USS/UTM.
  • Pairing authorization is performed during PDU session establishment/modification procedure (5G solution #5, #11, #14, #15 as bases) and enforced in the 3GPP network based on connectivity information received from USS.
  • Both SMF and authorized USS/UTM may trigger pairing authorization. Authorized USS/UTM may trigger updating and revocation of pairing authorization using 3GPP UAV ID (sol#15 as base for UAV-C change).
  • For EPS: solution #13 is chosen as the basis for normative work, with similar principles as for 5GS above.
  • During pairing authorization procedure, CAA Level UAV ID is used to identify UAV.
  • The messages used for pairing authorization that are exchanged between UAV and USS/UTM are included in transparent containers and the content is out of scope of 3GPP.
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7.3  Conclusions for KI#3p. 60

For Key Issue #3 on TPAE (Third Party Authorized Entity) authentication and authorization, it is concluded that there is no normative work for Rel-17, as TPAE authentication and authorization is not in scope of Rel-17.

7.4  Conclusion on KI #4p. 60

For key issue #4 on Location information veracity and location tracking authorization:
Solution #6, solution #8 and solution#12 are chosen as basis for normative work, based on the following key common principles:
  • The UAS NF (aka UFES) receives location request from USS/UTM which may include a 3GPP UAV ID. If authorized, UAS NF provides USS/UTM with UAV location information including the 3GPP UAV ID (GPSI).
  • To obtain UAV location information, the UAS NF uses location services (LCS) as supported by AMF/MME or GMLC. The Network-Assisted Positioning Procedure between the LMF and NG-RAN is selected for location information veracity.
  • The UAS NF ensures that the USS/UTM is authorized to track the location of a given UAV before sending the UAV location information to USS/UTM. A USS/UTM is authorized to receive the location information of a group of UAVs in a particular geographic area or of an individual UAV if it has authorized the UAV(s) for service. Furthermore, a USS/UTM can be authorized to receive the data about all UAVs in a particular geographic area.
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7.5  Conclusions for KI#5p. 60

It is concluded that there is no normative work for KI#5 in Rel-17, as the CAA level UAV identity in Rel-17 is determined by the USS/UTM and not in the scope of 3GPP in Rel-17.

7.6  Conclusions for KI#6p. 60

The following is recommended for normative work:
  • The transport of non-C2 UAS security information in a transparent container between USS/UTM and UAV during UUAA procedures is enabled.
  • The content of security information (e.g. key material to help establish security between UAV and USS/UTM) is not in 3GPP scope.

7.7  Conclusions for KI#7p. 60

The following is recommended for normative work:
  • The transport of security information in a transparent container between USS/UTM and UAV during PDU or PDN Session establishment/modification procedure is enabled.
  • The content of security information (e.g. key material to help establish security for C2 Communications) is not in 3GPP scope.

$  Change historyp. 62


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