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TR 33.749
Study on Security aspects of enhancement for Proximity-based Services (ProSe) in the 5GS Phase 3

V19.0.0 (Wzip)  2025/03  28 p.
Rapporteur:
Dr. Yao, Ge
China Unicom

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.749  Word version:  19.0.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
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1Scope  p. 7
2References  p. 7
3Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations  p. 8
3.1Terms  p. 8
3.2Symbols  p. 8
3.3Abbreviations  p. 8
4Overview  p. 9
5Key issues  p. 9
5.1General  p. 9
5.2Key issues related with 5G System Enhancements for Edge Computing  p. 9
5.2.1Key Issue #1.1: Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection.  p. 9
5.2.1.1Key issue details  p. 9
5.2.1.2Security threats  p. 9
5.2.1.3Potential security requirements  p. 9
5.3Key issues related with enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications  p. 10
5.3.1Key Issue #2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information.  p. 10
5.3.1.1Key issue details  p. 10
5.3.1.2Security threats  p. 10
5.3.1.2.1Threats posed by a malicious EEC  p. 10
5.3.1.2.2Threats posed by malicious EAS/EES outside of the operator domain  p. 10
5.3.1.3Potential security requirements  p. 10
5.3.1.3.1Verification of the user information provided by the EEC  p. 10
5.3.1.3.2Protection of the UE privacy  p. 10
6Solutions  p. 11
6.1Solution #1: Usage of existing public IP address to verify EEC provided IP address  p. 11
6.1.1Solution overview  p. 11
6.1.2Solution details  p. 12
6.1.3Solution evaluation  p. 13
6.2Solution #2: Authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID  p. 13
6.2.1Solution overview  p. 13
6.2.2Solution details  p. 13
6.2.3Evaluation  p. 15
6.3Solution #3: Secure retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information  p. 15
6.3.1Introduction  p. 15
6.3.2Solution details  p. 15
6.3.3Evaluation  p. 17
6.4Solution #4: Secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA  p. 17
6.4.1Introduction  p. 17
6.4.2Solution details  p. 17
6.4.3Evaluation  p. 18
6.5Solution #5: EEC provided information verification  p. 18
6.5.1Introduction  p. 18
6.5.2Details  p. 18
6.5.3Evaluation  p. 19
6.6Solution #6: UE ID token  p. 19
6.6.1Solution overview  p. 19
6.6.2Solution details  p. 19
6.6.3Solution evaluation  p. 20
6.7Solution #7: Verification of EEC provided IP address  p. 21
6.7.1Solution overview  p. 21
6.7.2Solution details  p. 21
6.7.3Solution evaluation  p. 22
6.8Solution #8: Verification of EEC provided IP address using access token  p. 22
6.8.1Solution overview  p. 22
6.8.2Solution details  p. 22
6.8.3Solution evaluation  p. 23
6.9Solution #9: Simplified UE ID token based solution  p. 23
6.9.1Solution overview  p. 23
6.9.2Solution details  p. 23
6.9.3Solution evaluation  p. 25
6.10Solution #10: Reuse NDS/IP to protect N6 delay measurement message  p. 26
6.10.1Introduction  p. 26
6.10.2Solution details  p. 26
6.10.3Evaluation  p. 26
7Conclusions  p. 26
7.1KI#1.1: Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection.  p. 26
7.2KI#2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information  p. 27
$Change history  p. 28

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