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4‑5x
TR 33.749
Study on Security aspects of enhancement for Proximity-based Services (ProSe) in the 5GS Phase 3
3GPP‑Page
fToC
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Partial Content
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V19.0.0 (Wzip)
2025/03 28 p.
Rapporteur:
Dr. Yao, Ge
China Unicom
full Table of Contents for
TR 33.749
Word version: 19.0.0
each clause number in
'red'
refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
1
Scope
p. 7
2
References
p. 7
3
Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
p. 8
3.1
Terms
p. 8
3.2
Symbols
p. 8
3.3
Abbreviations
p. 8
4
Overview
p. 9
5
Key issues
p. 9
5.1
General
p. 9
5.2
Key issues related with 5G System Enhancements for Edge Computing
p. 9
5.2.1
Key Issue #1.1: Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection.
p. 9
5.2.1.1
Key issue details
p. 9
5.2.1.2
Security threats
p. 9
5.2.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 9
5.3
Key issues related with enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications
p. 10
5.3.1
Key Issue #2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information.
p. 10
5.3.1.1
Key issue details
p. 10
5.3.1.2
Security threats
p. 10
5.3.1.2.1
Threats posed by a malicious EEC
p. 10
5.3.1.2.2
Threats posed by malicious EAS/EES outside of the operator domain
p. 10
5.3.1.3
Potential security requirements
p. 10
5.3.1.3.1
Verification of the user information provided by the EEC
p. 10
5.3.1.3.2
Protection of the UE privacy
p. 10
6
Solutions
p. 11
6.1
Solution #1: Usage of existing public IP address to verify EEC provided IP address
p. 11
6.1.1
Solution overview
p. 11
6.1.2
Solution details
p. 12
6.1.3
Solution evaluation
p. 13
6.2
Solution #2: Authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID
p. 13
6.2.1
Solution overview
p. 13
6.2.2
Solution details
p. 13
6.2.3
Evaluation
p. 15
6.3
Solution #3: Secure retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information
p. 15
6.3.1
Introduction
p. 15
6.3.2
Solution details
p. 15
6.3.3
Evaluation
p. 17
6.4
Solution #4: Secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA
p. 17
6.4.1
Introduction
p. 17
6.4.2
Solution details
p. 17
6.4.3
Evaluation
p. 18
6.5
Solution #5: EEC provided information verification
p. 18
6.5.1
Introduction
p. 18
6.5.2
Details
p. 18
6.5.3
Evaluation
p. 19
6.6
Solution #6: UE ID token
p. 19
6.6.1
Solution overview
p. 19
6.6.2
Solution details
p. 19
6.6.3
Solution evaluation
p. 20
6.7
Solution #7: Verification of EEC provided IP address
p. 21
6.7.1
Solution overview
p. 21
6.7.2
Solution details
p. 21
6.7.3
Solution evaluation
p. 22
6.8
Solution #8: Verification of EEC provided IP address using access token
p. 22
6.8.1
Solution overview
p. 22
6.8.2
Solution details
p. 22
6.8.3
Solution evaluation
p. 23
6.9
Solution #9: Simplified UE ID token based solution
p. 23
6.9.1
Solution overview
p. 23
6.9.2
Solution details
p. 23
6.9.3
Solution evaluation
p. 25
6.10
Solution #10: Reuse NDS/IP to protect N6 delay measurement message
p. 26
6.10.1
Introduction
p. 26
6.10.2
Solution details
p. 26
6.10.3
Evaluation
p. 26
7
Conclusions
p. 26
7.1
KI#1.1: Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection.
p. 26
7.2
KI#2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information
p. 27
$
Change history
p. 28