TR 33.721
Study on Security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services

3GPP‑Page fToC_↓ Partial Content _→

V19.1.0 (Wzip) 2025/09 … p.

Rapporteur:: Miss Xiong, Lihui
OPPO

full Table of Contents for TR 33.721 Word version: 19.1.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content

Scope p. 8

References p. 8

Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations p. 8

3.1	Terms p. 8
3.2	Symbols p. 9
3.3	Abbreviations p. 9

Security assumptions p. 9

Key issues p. 9

5.1

Key Issue #1: Authorization supporting spatial localization service p. 9

5.1.1	Key issue details p. 9
5.1.2	Security threats p. 9
5.1.3	Potential security requirements p. 10

5.2

Key Issue #2: Privacy of user sensitive information p. 10

5.2.1	Key issue details p. 10
5.2.2	Security threats p. 10
5.2.3	Potential security requirements p. 10

5.3

Key issue #3: Security aspects of digital asset container in 5G p. 10

5.3.1	Key issue details p. 10
5.3.2	Security threats p. 10
5.3.3	Potential security requirements p. 10

5.4

Key Issue #4: Authentication and authorization of digital representation p. 11

5.4.1	Key issue details p. 11
5.4.2	Security threats p. 11
5.4.3	Potential security requirements p. 12

Solutions p. 12

6.0

Mapping of solutions to key issues p. 12

6.1

Solution #1: Support for spatial localization service authorization p. 12

6.1.1	Introduction p. 12
6.1.2	Solution details p. 12
6.1.3	Evaluation p. 14

6.2

Solution #2: Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service with CAPIF Core Function (CCF) p. 14

6.2.1

Introduction p. 14

6.2.2

Solution details p. 14

6.2.2.0	General p. 14
6.2.2.1	Procedure of authorization for spatial localization service p. 15

6.2.3

Evaluation p. 16

6.3

Solution #3: Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service with CAPIF Core Function (CCF) in case of different resource owner p. 16

6.3.1

Introduction p. 16

6.3.2

Solution details p. 16

6.3.2.0	General p. 16
6.3.2.1	Procedure of authorization of spatial anchor service with multiple VAL server p. 17

6.3.3

Evaluation p. 18

6.4

Solution #4: Privacy protection for user sensitive information exposure p. 18

6.4.1	Introduction p. 18
6.4.2	Solution details p. 18
6.4.3	Evaluation p. 18

6.5

Solution #5: Privacy protection during metaverse service discovery p. 18

6.5.1	Introduction p. 18
6.5.2	Solution details p. 19
6.5.3	Evaluation p. 20

6.6

Solution #6: Digital asset request validation p. 20

6.6.1

Introduction p. 20

6.6.2

Solution details p. 20

6.6.2.1	Access token request/response p. 20
6.6.2.2	Digital asset request validation procedure p. 21

6.6.3

Evaluation p. 21

6.7

Solution #7: Authorize avatar by metaverse service provider p. 21

6.7.1	Introduction p. 21
6.7.2	Solution details p. 22
6.7.3	Evaluation p. 23

6.8

Solution #8: Authenticate and authorize DA client to create a digital asset p. 23

6.8.1	Introduction p. 23
6.8.2	Solution details p. 24
6.8.3	Evaluation p. 25

6.9

Solution #9: Authenticate and authorize VAL server/client to access digital asset p. 25

6.9.1	Introduction p. 25
6.9.2	Solution details p. 26
6.9.3	Evaluation p. 27

6.10

Solution #10: Avatar authentication and authorization supported by A-DACM architecture p. 27

6.10.1

Introduction p. 27

6.10.2

Solution details p. 27

6.10.2.1	Description p. 27
6.10.2.2	Avatar authentication procedure p. 28
6.10.2.3	Avatar authorization procedure p. 29

6.10.3

Evaluation p. 30

6.11

Solution #11: Avatar authentication and authorization supported by CAPIF p. 31

6.11.1	Introduction p. 31
6.11.2	Solution details p. 31
6.11.3	Evaluation p. 32

Conclusions p. 32

7.1	Conclusion on Key Issue #1 p. 32
7.2	Conclusion on Key Issue #2 p. 32
7.3	Conclusion on Key Issue #3 p. 32
7.4	Conclusion on Key Issue #4 p. 33

Change history p. 34

TR 33.721 Study on Security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services

full Table of Contents for TR 33.721 Word version: 19.1.0

TR 33.721
Study on Security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services