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TR 33.700-29
Study on Security aspects of 5G Satellite access in the 5G architecture Phase 3

3GPP‑Page   fToC↓   Partial Content →
V19.1.0 (Wzip)  2025/06  116 p.
Rapporteur:
Mr. Zhou, Wei
CATT

full Table of Contents for  TR 33.700-29  Word version:  19.1.0

each clause number in 'red' refers to the equivalent title in the Partial Content
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1Scope  p. 9
2References  p. 9
3Definitions of terms,symbols and abbreviations  p. 10
3.1Terms  p. 10
3.2Symbols  p. 10
3.3Abbreviations  p. 10
4Architecture and security assumptions  p. 10
5Key issues  p. 11
5.1Key Issue #1: Security protection in Store and Forward Satellite Operation  p. 11
5.1.1Key issue details  p. 11
5.1.2Security threats  p. 11
5.1.3Potential security requirements  p. 12
5.2Key Issue #2: Key Issue on privacy threats in S&F operation  p. 12
5.2.1Key issue details  p. 12
5.2.2Security threats  p. 12
5.2.3Potential security requirements  p. 12
6Solutions  p. 13
6.0Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues  p. 13
6.1.1Introduction  p. 13
6.1.2Solution details  p. 13
6.1.2.1General  p. 13
6.1.2.2Solution details for S&F in EPS  p. 14
6.1.2.3Solution details for S&F in 5G  p. 15
6.1.3Evaluation  p. 17
6.2Solution #2: IOPS security concept for S&F  p. 18
6.2.1Introduction  p. 18
6.2.2Solution details  p. 18
6.2.2.1General  p. 18
6.2.2.2Solution details for S&F in EPS  p. 18
6.2.2.3Solution details for S&F in 5G  p. 20
6.2.3Evaluation  p. 21
6.3Solution #3: IOPS based solution for UE to satellite security  p. 22
6.3.2Solution details  p. 22
6.3.2.1IOPS based solution  p. 22
6.3.2.2Enhancement to IOPS solution  p. 22
6.3.2.2.1Enhancement description  p. 22
6.3.2.2.2Example sequence number management profile  p. 23
6.4Solution #4: Store and forward satellite operation  p. 24
6.4.1Introduction  p. 24
6.4.2Solution details  p. 25
6.4.3Evaluation  p. 27
6.5Solution #5: Onboard UDM  p. 27
6.5.1Introduction  p. 27
6.5.2Solution details  p. 28
6.5.3Evaluation  p. 28
6.6Solution #6: Primary authentication and NAS security context establishment during store-and-forward operations  p. 29
6.6.1Introduction  p. 29
6.6.2Solution details  p. 29
6.6.3Evaluation  p. 30
6.7Solution #7: Optimization of subsequent authentication procedure in S&F operation  p. 31
6.7.1Introduction  p. 31
6.7.2Solution details  p. 31
6.7.2.1Provisioning of authentication vectors  p. 31
6.7.2.2Optimized subsequent authentication procedure  p. 32
6.7.3Evaluation  p. 33
6.8Solution #8: Solution on preventing DoS attacks in S&F operation  p. 34
6.8.1Introduction  p. 34
6.8.2Solution details  p. 35
6.8.3Evaluation  p. 36
6.9Solution #9: Secure Initial Registration for S&F satellite operation  p. 37
6.9.1Introduction  p. 37
6.9.2Solution details  p. 37
6.9.3Evaluation  p. 38
6.10Solution #10: UE Attach/Registration method for S&F operation  p. 39
6.10.1Introduction  p. 39
6.10.2Solution details  p. 39
6.10.3Evaluation  p. 40
6.11Solution #11: UE context management for S&F operation  p. 40
6.11.1Introduction  p. 40
6.11.2Solution details  p. 41
6.11.3Evaluation  p. 42
6.12Solution #12: Authentication for store and forward satellite operation  p. 42
6.12.1Introduction  p. 42
6.12.2Solution details  p. 43
6.12.3Evaluation  p. 44
6.13Solution #13: Security protection based on onboard HSS  p. 45
6.13.1Introduction  p. 45
6.13.2Solution details  p. 45
6.13.3Evaluation  p. 45
6.14Solution #14: Authorization mechanism for uplink NAS message in S&F satellite operation  p. 46
6.14.1Introduction  p. 46
6.14.2Solution details  p. 46
6.14.3Evaluation  p. 47
6.15Solution #15: Attach procedure for split MME architecture  p. 47
6.15.1Introduction  p. 47
6.15.2Solution details  p. 48
6.15.3Evaluation  p. 49
6.16Solution #16: Authorization during S&F MO transmission  p. 49
6.16.1Introduction  p. 49
6.16.2Solution details  p. 50
6.16.3Evaluation  p. 50
6.17Solution #17: Attach procedure with MME on board the satellite  p. 51
6.17.1Introduction  p. 51
6.17.2Solution details  p. 51
6.17.3Evaluation  p. 52
6.18Solution #18: Security protection for store and forward satellite operation  p. 52
6.18.1Introduction  p. 52
6.18.2Solution details  p. 52
6.18.3Evaluation  p. 53
6.19Solution #19: Mitigating UE privacy risks using temporary UE ID  p. 53
6.19.1Introduction  p. 53
6.19.2Solution details  p. 54
6.19.3Evaluation  p. 55
6.20Solution #20: Mitigation of privacy issues of interim GUTI  p. 55
6.20.1Introduction  p. 55
6.20.2Solution details  p. 56
6.20.2.1General  p. 56
6.20.2.2Alternative 1: restrict the use of interim GUTI  p. 57
6.20.2.3Alternative 2: No use of interim GUTI  p. 57
6.20.3Evaluation  p. 58
6.21Solution #21: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F  p. 58
6.21.1Introduction  p. 58
6.21.2Details  p. 58
6.21.2.1General  p. 58
6.21.2.2Puzzles  p. 60
6.21.3Evaluation  p. 64
6.22Solution #22: AS security context establishment with store-and-forward operations  p. 64
6.22.1Introduction  p. 64
6.22.2Solution details  p. 65
6.22.3Evaluation  p. 67
6.23Solution #23: Security protection in S&F satellite operation with RAN on board  p. 67
6.23.1Introduction  p. 67
6.23.2Solution details  p. 68
6.23.3Evaluation  p. 69
6.24Solution #24: Expedited Authentication in 5GS in S&F Mode  p. 69
6.24.1Introduction  p. 69
6.24.2Solution details  p. 70
6.24.3Evaluation  p. 72
6.25Solution #25: Solution on preventing DoS attacks before security context is established  p. 72
6.25.1Introduction  p. 72
6.25.2Solution details  p. 73
6.25.3Evaluation  p. 74
6.26Solution #26: Protection of partial registration or attach accept message in S&F operation  p. 75
6.26.1Introduction  p. 75
6.26.2Solution details  p. 75
6.26.3Evaluation  p. 76
6.27Solution #27: Anti DoS attacks and privacy protection in S&F operations  p. 77
6.27.1Introduction  p. 77
6.27.2Solution details  p. 77
6.27.3Evaluation  p. 78
6.28Solution #28: Security protection based on AKA procedure in S&F operation with a full CN onboard the satellite  p. 79
6.28.1Introduction  p. 79
6.28.2Solution details  p. 79
6.28.3Evaluation  p. 80
6.29Solution #29: Authentication and authorization in S&F based on onboard EPC  p. 80
6.29.1Introduction  p. 80
6.29.2Solution details  p. 80
6.29.3Evaluation  p. 81
6.30Solution #30: Interim GUTI privacy protection based on pseudonym UE IDs  p. 81
6.30.1Introduction  p. 81
6.30.2Solution details  p. 82
6.30.3Evaluation  p. 83
6.31Solution #31: Mitigation of Security Issues of Unprotected NAS Reject  p. 84
6.31.1Introduction  p. 84
6.31.2Solution details  p. 85
6.31.3Evaluation  p. 86
6.32Solution #32: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F (Alternatives to Solution #21)  p. 86
6.32.1Introduction  p. 86
6.32.2Solution details  p. 86
6.32.2.1Alternative 1  p. 86
6.32.2.2Alternative 2  p. 88
6.32.3Evaluation  p. 90
6.33Solution #33: Integration of Solutions #8 and #21 to provide D(DOS) protection from both, pre-provisioned UEs and unauthenticated UEs  p. 91
6.33.1Introduction  p. 91
6.33.2Solution details  p. 91
6.33.3Evaluation  p. 94
6.34Solution #34: Integration of Solutions #9 and #21 to provide D(DOS) protection from both, pre-provisioned UEs and unauthenticated UEs  p. 94
6.34.1Introduction  p. 94
6.34.2Solution details  p. 94
6.34.3Evaluation  p. 96
6.35Solution #35: Integration of Solutions #9 and #21 to provide D(DOS) protection from both, pre-provisioned UEs and unauthenticated UEs  p. 97
6.35.1Introduction  p. 97
6.35.2Solution details  p. 97
6.35.3Evaluation  p. 100
6.36Solution #36: Extended Authentication on split MME architecture in S&F mode  p. 101
6.36.1Introduction  p. 101
6.36.2Solution details  p. 101
6.36.3Evaluation  p. 102
6.37Solution #37: NAS key distribution in split MME architecture  p. 103
6.37.1Introduction  p. 103
6.37.2Solution details  p. 103
6.37.2.1NAS key distribution procedure  p. 103
6.37.3Evaluation  p. 104
6.38Solution #38: Store and forward (s&f) satellite operation using GUTI or 5G-GUTI  p. 104
6.38.1Introduction  p. 104
6.38.2Solution details  p. 105
6.38.3Evaluation  p. 106
7Conclusions  p. 107
7.1Conclusions for Key Issue #1: Security protection in Store and Forward Satellite Operation  p. 114
7.2Conclusions for Key Issue #2: Key Issue on privacy threats in S&F operation  p. 114
$Change history  p. 115

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