Content for TS 24.008 Word version: 17.4.0
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4.3 MM common procedures
4.3.1 TMSI reallocation procedure
4.3.2 Authentication procedure
4.3.2a Authentication procedure used for a UMTS authentication challenge
4.3.2b Authentication Procedure used for a GSM authentication challenge
4.3.3 Identification procedure
4.3.4 IMSI detach procedure
4.3.5 Abort procedure
4.3.6 MM information procedure
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4.3 MM common procedures Word‑p. 89
4.3.1 TMSI reallocation procedure Word‑p. 89
4.3.1.0 General |R14| Word‑p. 89
4.3.1.1 TMSI reallocation initiation by the network Word‑p. 90
4.3.1.2 TMSI reallocation completion by the mobile station Word‑p. 90
4.3.1.3 TMSI reallocation completion in the network. Word‑p. 90
4.3.1.4 Abnormal cases in the mobile station Word‑p. 90
4.3.1.5 Abnormal cases on the network side |R12| Word‑p. 91
4.3.2 Authentication procedure Word‑p. 91
4.3.2a Authentication procedure used for a UMTS authentication challenge Word‑p. 91
4.3.2b Authentication Procedure used for a GSM authentication challenge Word‑p. 92
4.3.2.1 Authentication request by the network Word‑p. 92
4.3.2.2 Authentication response by the mobile station Word‑p. 92
4.3.2.3 Authentication processing in the network Word‑p. 93
4.3.2.3a 128-bit circuit-switched GSM ciphering key |R9| Word‑p. 93
4.3.2.4 Ciphering key sequence number Word‑p. 93
4.3.2.5 Authentication not accepted by the network Word‑p. 94
4.3.2.6 Abnormal cases Word‑p. 96
4.3.2.7 Handling of keys at intersystem change from Iu mode to A/Gb mode Word‑p. 98
4.3.2.7a Use of established security contexts Word‑p. 99
4.3.2.8 Handling of keys at intersystem change from A/Gb mode to Iu mode Word‑p. 100
4.3.2.9 Void
4.3.2.10 Derivation of keys at SRVCC or vSRVCC handover from S1 mode |R8| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.10.0 General |R11| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.10.1 PDN connection with integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.10.2 PDN connection without integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.11 Derivation of keys at SRVCC handover from Iu mode to Iu mode |R8| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.11.1 PDN connection with integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 101
4.3.2.11.2 PDN connection without integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 102
4.3.2.12 Derivation of keys at SRVCC handover from Iu mode to A/Gb mode |R8| Word‑p. 103
4.3.2.12.1 PDN connection with integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 103
4.3.2.12.2 PDN connection without integrity protection |R9| Word‑p. 104
4.3.2.13 Derivation of keys at CS to PS SRVCC handover from A/Gb mode to Iu mode |R11| Word‑p. 104
4.3.2.14 Derivation of keys at 5G-SRVCC from NG-RAN to UTRAN |R16| Word‑p. 106
4.3.2.14.1 PDU session with integrity protection Word‑p. 106
4.3.2.14.2 PDU session without integrity protection Word‑p. 106
4.3.3 Identification procedure Word‑p. 106
4.3.3.0 General |R14| Word‑p. 106
4.3.3.1 Identity request by the network Word‑p. 106
4.3.3.2 Identification response by the mobile station Word‑p. 106
4.3.3.3 Abnormal cases in the mobile station Word‑p. 107
4.3.3.4 Abnormal cases on the network side |R14| Word‑p. 107
4.3.4 IMSI detach procedure Word‑p. 107
4.3.4.0 General |R10| Word‑p. 107
4.3.4.1 IMSI detach initiation by the mobile station Word‑p. 108
4.3.4.2 IMSI detach procedure in the network Word‑p. 108
4.3.4.3 IMSI detach completion by the mobile station Word‑p. 108
4.3.4.4 Abnormal cases Word‑p. 108
4.3.5 Abort procedure Word‑p. 109
4.3.5.1 Abort procedure initiation by the network Word‑p. 109
4.3.5.2 Abort procedure in the mobile station Word‑p. 109
4.3.6 MM information procedure Word‑p. 109
