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RFC 7642

Informational
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System for Cross-domain Identity Management: Definitions, Overview, Concepts, and Requirements

 


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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        K. LI, Ed.
Request for Comments: 7642                                 Alibaba Group
Category: Informational                                          P. Hunt
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                   Oracle
                                                           B. Khasnabish
                                                           ZTE (TX) Inc.
                                                              A. Nadalin
                                                               Microsoft
                                                              Z. Zeltsan
                                                              Individual
                                                          September 2015


              System for Cross-domain Identity Management:
           Definitions, Overview, Concepts, and Requirements

Abstract

   This document provides definitions and an overview of the System for
   Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM).  It lays out the system's
   concepts, models, and flows, and it includes user scenarios, use
   cases, and requirements.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7642.

Page 2 
Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  SCIM User Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Background and Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Model Concepts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Triggers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  Actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.3.  Modes and Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.4.  Bulk and Batch Operational Semantics  . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Flows from Cloud Service Provider to Cloud Service
           Provider (CSP->CSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.1.  CSP->CSP: Create Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.2.  CSP->CSP: Update Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.3.  CSP->CSP: Delete Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.4.  CSP->CSP: SSO Trigger (Push)  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.5.  CSP->CSP: SSO Trigger (Pull)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.6.  CSP->CSP: Password Reset (Push) . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.4.  Flows from Enterprise Cloud Subscriber to Cloud Service
           Provider    (ECS->CSP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.4.1.  ECS->CSP: Create Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.4.2.  ECS->CSP: Update Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.4.3.  ECS->CSP: Delete Identity (Push)  . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.4.4.  ECS->CSP: SSO Trigger (Pull)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  SCIM Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  Migration of the Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Single Sign-On (SSO) Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  Provisioning of the User Accounts for a Community of
           Interest (COI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.4.  Transfer of Attributes to a Relying Party's Website . . .  15
     3.5.  Change Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

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1.  Introduction

   This document provides the SCIM definitions, overview, concepts,
   flows, scenarios, and use cases.  It also provides a list of the
   requirements derived from the use cases.

   The document's objective is to help with understanding of the design
   and applicability of the SCIM schema [RFC7643] and SCIM protocol
   [RFC7644].

   Unlike the practice of some protocols like Application Bridging for
   Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) and SAML2 WebSSO, SCIM provides
   provisioning and de-provisioning of resources in a separate context
   from authentication (aka just-in-time provisioning).

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they
   appear in ALL CAPS.  These words may also appear in this document in
   lowercase as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.

   Here is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document:

   o  COI: Community of Interest

   o  CRM: Customer Relationship Management

   o  CRUD: Create, Read, Update, Delete

   o  CSP: Cloud Service Provider

   o  CSU: Cloud Service User

   o  ECS: Enterprise Cloud Subscriber

   o  IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service

   o  JIT: Just In Time

   o  PaaS: Platform as a Service

   o  SaaS: Software as a Service

   o  SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language

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   o  SCIM: System for Cross-domain Identity Management

   o  SSO: Single Sign-On

2.  SCIM User Scenarios

2.1.  Background and Context

   The System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) specification
   is designed to manage user identity in cloud-based applications and
   services in a standardized way to enable interoperability, security,
   and scalability.  The specification suite seeks to build upon
   experience with existing schemas and deployments, placing specific
   emphasis on simplicity of development and integration, while applying
   existing authentication, authorization, and privacy models.  The
   intent of the SCIM specification is to reduce the cost and complexity
   of user management operations by providing a common user schema and
   extension model, as well as binding documents to provide patterns for
   exchanging this schema using standard protocols.  In essence, make it
   fast, cheap, and easy to move users in to, out of, and around the
   cloud.

   The SCIM scenarios are overviews of user stories designed to help
   clarify the intended scope of the SCIM effort.

2.2.  Model Concepts

2.2.1.  Triggers

   Quite simply, triggers are actions or activities that start SCIM
   flows.  Triggers may not be relevant at the protocol level or the
   schema level; they really serve to help identify the type or activity
   that resulted in a SCIM protocol exchange.  Triggers make use of the
   traditional provisioning CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete)
   operations but add additional use-case contexts like SSO (Single-Sign
   On) as it is designed to capture a class of use case that makes sense
   to the actor requesting it rather than to describe a protocol
   operation.

   o  Create SCIM Identity Resource - Service On-boarding Trigger: A
      "create SCIM identity resource" trigger is a service on-boarding
      activity in which a business action such as a new hire or new
      service subscription is initiated by one of the SCIM Actors.  In
      the protocol itself, service on-boarding may well be implemented
      via the same resource PUT method as a service change.  This is
      particular to the implementation, and not to the use cases that
      drive that implementation.

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   o  Update SCIM Identity Resource - Service Change Trigger: An "update
      SCIM identity resource" trigger is a service change activity as a
      result of an identity moving or changing its service level.  An
      "update SCIM identity" trigger might be the result of a change in
      a service subscription level or a change to key identity data used
      to denote a service subscription level.  Password changes are
      specifically called out from other more general identity attribute
      changes as they are considered to have specific use-case
      differences.

   o  Delete SCIM Identity Resource - Service Termination Trigger: A
      "delete SCIM identity resource" trigger represents a specific and
      deliberate action to remove an identity from a given SCIM service
      point.  At this stage, it is unclear if the SCIM protocol needs to
      identify a separate protocol exchange for service suspension
      actions.  This may be relevant as target services usually
      differentiate between these results and thus may require separate
      resource representations.

   o  Single Sign-On (SSO) Trigger - Service Access Request: A "Single
      Sign-On" trigger is a special class of activity in which a Create
      or Update trigger is initiated during an SSO operational flow.
      The implication here is that, as the result of a service access
      request by the end user (SSO), defined SCIM protocol exchanges can
      be used to initiate SCIM resource CRUD operations somewhere in the
      service cloud.

2.2.2.  Actors

   Actors are the operating parties that take part in both sides of a
   SCIM protocol exchange and help identify the source of a given
   Trigger.  So far, we have identified the following SCIM Actors:

   o  Cloud Service Provider (CSP): A CSP is the entity operating a
      given cloud service.  In a SaaS scenario, this is simply the
      application provider.  In an IaaS or PaaS scenario, the CSP may be
      the underlying IaaS/PaaS infrastructure provider or the owner of
      the application running on that platform.  In all cases, the CSP
      is the thing that holds the identity information being operated
      upon.  Put another way, the CSP really is the service that the end
      user interacts with.

   o  Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS): An ECS represents a middle tier
      of aggregation for related identity records.  In one of our sample
      enterprise SaaS scenarios, the ECS is "Example.com" that
      subscribes to a cloud-based CRM service "SaaS-CRM Inc." (the CSP)
      for all of its sales staff.  The actual Cloud Service Users (CSUs)
      are the FooBar Inc. sales staff.  The ECS Actor is identified to

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      help capture use cases in which a single entity is given
      administrative responsibility for other identity accounts.  SCIM
      may not address the configuration and setup of an ECS within the
      CSP, but it does address use cases in which SCIM identity
      resources are grouped together and administered as part of some
      broader agreement or operational exchange.

   o  Cloud Service User (CSU): A CSU represents the real cloud service
      end user -- i.e., the person logging into and using the cloud
      service.  As described above, and ECS will typically own or manage
      multiple CSU identities, whereas the CSU represents the FooBar
      Inc. employee using the cloud service to manage their CRM process.

                           +---------------------+
                           |   Cloud Service     |
                           |   Provider (CSP)    |
                           +---------------------+
                                      |
                    +--------------------------------+
                    |                                |
                    v                                v
            +----------------+              +----------------+
            |Enterprise Cloud|              |Enterprise Cloud|
            |Subscriber (ECS)|              |Subscriber (ECS)|
            +----------------+              +----------------+
                    |                                |
            +----------------+              +----------------+
            |                |              |                |
            v                v              v                v
    +-------------+ +-------------+   +-------------+ +-------------+
    |Cloud Service| |Cloud Service|   |Cloud Service| |Cloud Service|
    |  User (CSU) | |  User (CSU) |   |  User (CSU) | |  User (CSU) |
    +-------------+ +-------------+   +-------------+ +-------------+

                           Figure 1: SCIM Actors

2.2.3.  Modes and Flows

   Modes identify the functional intent of a data flow initiated in a
   SCIM scenario.  The modes identified so far are 'Push' and 'Pull'
   referring to pushing data to and pulling data from an authoritative
   identity data store.

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   In the SCIM scenarios, modes are often used in the context of a flow
   between two Actors.  For example, one might refer to a Cloud-to-Cloud
   Pull exchange.  Here one Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is pulling
   identity information from another CSP.  Commonly referenced flows
   are:

   o  Cloud Service Provider to Cloud Service Provider (CSP->CSP)

   o  Enterprise Cloud Subscriber to Cloud Service Provider (ECS->CSP)

   Modes and flows simply help us understand what is taking place; they
   are likely to be technically meaningless at the protocol level, but
   they help the reader follow the SCIM scenarios and apply them to
   real-world use cases.

2.2.4.  Bulk and Batch Operational Semantics

   It is assumed that each of the trigger actions outlined in this
   document may be part of the larger bulk or batch operation.
   Individual SCIM actions should be able to be collected together to
   create single protocol exchanges.

   The initial focus of SCIM scenarios is on identifying base flows and
   single operations.  The specific complexity of full bulk and batch
   operations is left to a later version of the scenarios or to the main
   specification.

2.3.  Flows from Cloud Service Provider to Cloud Service Provider
      (CSP->CSP)

   These scenarios represent flows between two Cloud Service Providers
   (CSPs).  It is assumed that each CSP maintains an Identity Data Store
   for its Cloud Service Users (CSUs).  These scenarios address various
   joiner, mover, leaver, and JIT triggers, resulting in push and pull
   data exchanges between the CSPs.

2.3.1.  CSP->CSP: Create Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  CSP-1 receives a Create Identity trigger action from
   its Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1).  CSP-1 creates a local user
   account for the new CSU.  CSP-1 then pushes the new CSU joiner push
   request downstream to CSU-2 and gets confirmation that the account
   was successfully created.  After receiving the confirmation from CSP-
   2, CSP-1 sends an acknowledgment to the requesting ECS.

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2.3.2.  CSP->CSP: Update Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  The Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1) has already
   created an account with CSP-1 and supplied a critical attribute
   "department" that is used by CSP-1 to drive service options.  CSP-1
   then receives an Update Identity trigger action from its Enterprise
   Cloud Subscriber (ECS).  CSP-1 updates its local directory account
   with the new department value.  CSP-1 then initiates a separate SCIM
   protocol exchange to push the mover change request downstream to CSP-
   2.  After receiving the confirmation from CSP-2, CSP-1 sends an
   acknowledgment to ECS-1.

2.3.3.  CSP->CSP: Delete Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  CSP-1 receives a Delete Identity trigger action from
   its Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1).  CSP-1 suspends the local
   directory account for the specified CSU account.  CSP-1 then pushes a
   termination request for the specified CSU account downstream to CSP-2
   and gets confirmation that the account was successfully removed.
   After receiving the confirmation from CSP-2, CSP-1 finalizes the
   deletion operation and sends an acknowledgment to the requesting ECS.

   This use case highlights how different CSPs may implement different
   operational semantics behind the same SCIM operation.  Note CSP-1
   suspends the account representation for its service, whereas CPS-2
   implements a true delete operation.

2.3.4.  CSP->CSP: SSO Trigger (Push)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  However, rather than pre-provisioning accounts from
   CSP-1 to CSP-2, CSP-1 waits for a service access request from the end
   Cloud Service User (CSU-1) before issuing account creation details to
   CSP-2.  When the CSU completes a SSO transaction from CSP-1 to CSP-2,
   CSP-2 then creates an account for the CSU based on information pushed
   to it from CSP-1.

   At the protocol level, this class of scenarios may result in the use
   of common protocol exchange patterns between CSP-1 and CSP-2.

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2.3.5.  CSP->CSP: SSO Trigger (Pull)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  However, rather than pre-provisioning accounts from
   CSP-1 to CSP-2, CSP-2 waits for a service access request from the
   Cloud Service User (CSU-1) before initiating a Pull request to gather
   information about the CSU sufficient to create a local account.

   At the protocol level, this class of scenarios may result in the use
   of common protocol exchange patterns between CSP-2 and CSP-1.

2.3.6.  CSP->CSP: Password Reset (Push)

   In this scenario, two CSPs (CSP-1 and CSP-2) have a shared service
   agreement in place that requires the exchange of Cloud Service User
   (CSU) accounts.  CSP-1 wants to change the password for a specific
   Cloud Service User (CSU-1).  CSP-1 sends a request to CSP-2 to reset
   the password value for CSU-1.

   At the protocol level, this scenario may result in the same protocol
   exchange as any other attribute change request.

2.4.  Flows from Enterprise Cloud Subscriber to Cloud Service Provider
      (ECS->CSP)

   These scenarios represent flows between an Enterprise Cloud
   Subscriber (ECS) and a Cloud Service Providers (CSP).  It is assumed
   that the ECS and the CSP each maintain an information access service
   for the relevant Cloud Service Users (CSUs).  These scenarios address
   various joiner, mover, leaver, and JIT triggers, resulting in push
   and pull data exchanges between the ECS and the CSP.

   Many of these scenarios are very similar to those defined in
   Section 2.3.  They are identified separately here so that we may
   explore any differences that might emerge.

2.4.1.  ECS->CSP: Create Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, an Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1) maintains a
   service with a Cloud Service Provider (CSP-1) that requires the
   sharing of various Cloud Service User (CSU) accounts.  A new user
   joins ECS-1 and so ECS-1 pushes an account creation request to CSP-1,
   supplying all required attribute values for the base SCIM schema and
   additional values for the extended SCIM schema as required.

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2.4.2.  ECS->CSP: Update Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, an Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1) maintains a
   service with Cloud Service Provider (CSP-1) that drives service
   definition from a key account schema attribute called Department.
   ECS-1 wishes to move a given CSU from Department A to Department B
   and so it pushes an attribute update request to the CSP.

2.4.3.  ECS->CSP: Delete Identity (Push)

   In this scenario, an Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1) maintains a
   service with a Cloud Service Provider (CSP-1).  Upon termination of
   one of its employee's employment agreement, ECS-1 sends a suspend
   account request to CSP-1.  One week later, the ECS wishes to complete
   the process by fully removing the Cloud Service User (CSU) account,
   so it sends a terminate account request to CSP-1.

2.4.4.  ECS->CSP: SSO Trigger (Pull)

   In this scenario, an Enterprise Cloud Subscriber (ECS-1) maintains a
   service with a Cloud Service Provider (CSP-1).  No accounts are
   created or exchanged in advance.  However, rather than pre-
   provisioning accounts from ECS-1 to CSP-1, CSP-1 waits for a service
   access request from the Cloud Service User (CSU-1) under the control
   domain of ECS-1, before issuing an account Pull request to ECS-1.

3.  SCIM Use Cases

   This section lists the SCIM use cases.

3.1.  Migration of the Identities

   Description:

   A company SomeEnterprise runs an application ManageThem that relies
   on the identity information about its employees (e.g., identifiers,
   attributes).  The identity information is stored at the cloud
   provided by SomeCSP.  SomeEnterprise has decided to move identity
   information to the cloud of a different provider -- AnotherCSP.  In
   addition, SomeEnterprise has purchased a second application
   ManageThemMore, which also relies on the identity information.
   SomeEnterprise is able to move identity information to AnotherCSP
   without changing the format of identity information.  The application
   ManageThemMore is able to use the identity information.

   Pre-conditions:

   o  SomeCSP is a cloud service provider for SomeEnterprise.

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   o  SomeCSP has a known attribute name and value for the Enterprise
      used for managing and transferring data.

   o  AnotherCSP is a new cloud service provider for SomeEnterprise.

   o  All involved cloud service providers and applications support the
      same standard specifying the format for and actions on the user
      (e.g., employee) identity information.

   Post-conditions:

   o  SomeEnterprise has moved its employees' identity information from
      SomeCSP to AnotherCSP without making any changes to representation
      of identity information.

   o  Application ManageThemMore is able to use the identity
      information.

   Requirements:

   o  SomeEnterprise, the applications ManageThem and ManageThemMore,
      and the providers SomeCSP and AnotherCSP support a common standard
      for identity information, which specifies the following:

      *  Format (or schema) for representing user identity information

      *  Interfaces and protocol for managing user identity information

   o  Cloud providers shall be able to meet regulatory requirements when
      migrating identity information between jurisdictional regions
      (e.g., countries and states may have differing regulations on
      privacy).

   o  Cloud providers shall be able to log all actions related to
      SomeEnterprise employees' identities.

   o  The logs should be secure and available for auditing.

3.2.  Single Sign-On (SSO) Service

   Description:

   Bob has an account in an application hosted by a cloud service
   provider SomeCSP.  SomeCSP has federated its user identities with a
   cloud service provider AnotherCSP.  Bob requests a service from an
   application running on AnotherCSP.  The application running on
   AnotherCSP, relying on Bob's authentication by SomeCSP and using
   identity information provided by SomeCSP, serves Bob's request.

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   Pre-conditions:

   o  Bob's identity information is stored on SomeCSP.

   o  SomeCSP and AnotherCSP have established trust and federated their
      user identities.

   o  SomeCSP is able to authenticate Bob.

   o  SomeCSP is able to securely provide the authentication results to
      AnotherCSP.

   o  SomeCSP is able to securely provide Bob's identity information
      (e.g., attributes) to AnotherCSP.

   o  AnotherCSP is able to verify information provided by SomeCSP.

   o  SomeCSP is able to process the identity information received from
      AnotherCSP.

   Post-conditions:

   Bob has received the requested service from an application running on
   AnotherCSP without having to authenticate to that application
   explicitly.

   Requirements:

   o  Bob must have an account with SomeCSP.

   o  SomeCSP and AnotherCSP must establish trust and federate their
      user identities.

   o  SomeCSP must be able to authenticate Bob.

   o  SomeCSP must be able to securely provide the authentication
      results to AnotherCSP.

   o  SomeCSP must be able to securely provide Bob's identity
      information (e.g., attributes) to AnotherCSP.

   o  AnotherCSP must be able to verify the identity information
      provided by SomeCSP.

   o  SomeCSP must be able to process the identity information received
      from AnotherCSP.

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   o  SomeCSP and AnotherCSP must log information generated by Bob's
      actions according to their policies and the trust agreement
      between them.

3.3.  Provisioning of the User Accounts for a Community of Interest
      (COI)

   Description:

   Organization YourHR provides Human Resources (HR) services to a
   Community of Interest (COI) YourCOI.  The HR services are offered as
   Software as a Service (SaaS) on public and private clouds.  YourCOI's
   offices are located all over the world.  Their Information Technology
   (IT) systems may be composed of combinations of the applications
   running on private and public clouds along with traditional IT
   systems.  The local YourCOI offices are responsible for collecting
   personal information (i.e., user identities and attributes).  YourHR
   services provide means for provisioning and distributing the employee
   identity information across all YourCOI offices.  YourHR also enables
   individual users (e.g., employees) to manage personal information
   that they are responsible for (e.g., update of an address or a
   telephone number).

   Pre-conditions:

   o  YourCOI has a complex infrastructure composed of a large number of
      local offices that rely on diverse IT systems.

   o  YourCOI has contracted YourHR to provide the HR services.

   o  Each local office has a right to establish a personal account for
      an employee.

   Post-conditions:

   o  All personal accounts are globally available to any authorized
      user or application across the YourCOI system through the services
      provided by YourHR.

   o  The employees have the ability to manage the part of personal
      information that is their responsibility.

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   Requirements:

   o  YourHR must ensure that the local offices generate information
      that is provisioned securely and consider privacy requirements in
      a timely fashion across systems that may span technical (e.g.,
      protocols and applications), administrative (e.g., corporate),
      regulatory (e.g., location), and jurisdictional domains.

   o  Management of personal information must be protected against
      unauthorized access and eavesdropping, and it should be
      distributed only to authorized parties and services.

   o  Regulatory requirements shall be met when migrating identity
      information between jurisdictional regions (e.g., countries and
      states may have differing regulations on privacy).

   o  All operations with identity data must be securely logged.

   o  The logs should be available for auditing.

3.4.  Transfer of Attributes to a Relying Party's Website

   Description:

   An end user has an account in a directory service A with one or more
   attributes.  That user then visits the website of relying party B,
   and the website requires attributes of the user.  The user selects
   some attributes and authorizes the transfer of data via authorization
   protocols (e.g., OAuth, SAML), so selected attributes of the user are
   transferred from the user's account in directory service A to the
   website of replying party B at the time of the user's first visit to
   that site.

   Pre-conditions:

   o  User has an account in directory service A.

   o  User has one or more attributes.

   o  User visits website of relying party B.

   Post-conditions:

   Selected attributes of the user are transferred from the user's
   account in directory service A to the website of relying party B at
   the time of the user's first visit to that site.

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   Requirements:

   o  Relying party B must be able to authenticate the end user.

   o  Relying party B must be able to securely provide the
      authentication results to directory service A.

   o  Directory service A must be able to securely provide end user's
      identity information (e.g., attributes) to relying party B.

   o  Regulatory requirements shall be met when migrating identity
      information between jurisdictional regions (e.g., countries and
      states may have differing regulations on privacy).

   o  Relying parties have to be aware of changes to their cached copy,
      as these would potentially cause a state change in other relying
      parties.

   o  A maximum period should be set for the relying party to cache the
      information.

3.5.  Change Notification

   Description:

   An end user has an account in a directory service A with one or more
   attributes.  That user then visits the web site of relying party B.
   The website of relying party B queries directory service A for
   attributes associated with that user, and related resources.

   The attributes of the user change later in directory service A.  For
   example, the attributes might change if the user changes their name,
   has their account disabled, or terminates their relationship with
   directory service A.  Furthermore, other resources and their
   attributes might also change.  The directory service A then wishes to
   notify the website of relying party B of these changes, as relying
   party B might (or might not) have a cache of those attributes, and if
   relying party B were aware of these changes to their cached copy, it
   would potentially cause a state change in relying party B.

   The volume of changes, however, might be substantial, and only some
   of the changes may be of interest to relying party B, so directory
   service A does not wish to "push" all the changes to B.  Instead,
   directory service A wishes to notify B that there are changes
   potentially of interest, such that B can at an appropriate time
   subsequently contact directory service A and retrieve just the subset
   of changes of interest to B.

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   Note that the user must authorize directory service A to transfer
   data to the website, and the user must authorize directory service A
   to notify the website.

   Pre-conditions:

   o  User has an account in directory service A.

   o  User has one or more attributes.

   o  User visits the website of relying party B.

   o  The resource being updated is at the website.

   Post-conditions:

   Directory service A is able to notify relying party B that there are
   changes potentially of interest.

   Requirements:

   o  Relying party B must be able to authenticate the end user.

   o  Relying party B must be able to securely provide the
      authentication results to directory service A.

   o  Directory service A must be able to securely provide end user's
      changed identity information (e.g., attributes) to relying party
      B.

   o  Relying party B must be able at an appropriate time to
      subsequently contact directory service A and retrieve just the
      subset of changes of interest to relying party B.

4.  Security Considerations

   Authentication and authorization must be guaranteed for the SCIM
   operations to ensure that only authenticated entities can perform the
   SCIM requests and the requested SCIM operations are authorized.

   SCIM resources (e.g., Users and Groups) can contain sensitive
   information.  Thus, data confidentiality MUST be guaranteed at the
   transport layer.

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   There can be privacy issues that go beyond transport security, e.g.,
   moving personally identifying information (PII) offshore between
   CSPs.  Regulatory requirements shall be met when migrating identity
   information between jurisdictional regions (e.g., countries and
   states may have differing regulations on privacy).

   Additionally, privacy-sensitive data elements may be omitted or
   obscured in SCIM transactions or stored records to protect these data
   elements for a user.  For instance, a role-based identifier might be
   used in place of an individual's name.

   Detailed security considerations are specified in Section 7 of the
   SCIM protocol [RFC7644] and Section 9 of the SCIM schema [RFC7643].

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7643]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Wahlstroem, E., and
              C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Core Schema", RFC 7643, DOI 10.17487/RFC7643,
              September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7643>.

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Ray Counterman, Richard Fiekowsky,
   Bert Greevenbosch, Barry Leiba, Kelly Grizzle, Magnus Nystrom,
   Stephen Farrell, Kathleen Moriarty, Benoit Claise, Dapeng Liu, and
   Jun Li for their reviews and comments.

   Also, thanks to Darran Rolls and Patrick Harding; Section 2 ("SCIM
   User Scenarios") is taken from them.

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Authors' Addresses

   Kepeng LI (editor)
   Alibaba Group
   969 Wenyixi Road, Yuhang District
   Hangzhou, Zhejiang  311121
   China

   Email: kepeng.lkp@alibaba-inc.com


   Phil Hunt
   Oracle

   Email: phil.hunt@oracle.com


   Bhumip Khasnabish
   ZTE (TX) Inc.
   55 Madison Ave, Suite 302
   Morristown, New Jersey  07960
   United States

   Phone: +001-781-752-8003
   Email: vumip1@gmail.com, bhumip.khasnabish@ztetx.com
   URI:   http://tinyurl.com/bhumip/


   Anthony Nadalin
   Microsoft

   Email: tonynad@microsoft.com


   Zachary Zeltsan
   Individual

   Email: Zachary.Zeltsan@gmail.com