7. Security Considerations
The use of location-related measurement data has privacy
considerations that are discussed in Section 6.
7.1. Threat Model
The threat model for location-related measurement data concentrates
on the Device providing falsified, stolen, or incorrect measurement
A Device that provides location-related measurement data might use
o acquire the location of another Device, without authorization;
o extract information about network topology; or
o coerce the LIS into providing falsified location information based
on the measurement data.
Location-related measurement data describes the physical environment
or network attachment of a Device. A third-party adversary in the
proximity of the Device might be able to alter the physical
environment such that the Device provides measurement data that is
controlled by the third party. This might be used to indirectly
control the location information that is derived from measurement
7.1.1. Acquiring Location Information without Authorization
Requiring authorization for location requests is an important part of
privacy protections of a location protocol. A location configuration
protocol usually operates under a restricted policy that allows a
requester to obtain their own location. HELD identity extensions
[RFC6155] allow other entities to be authorized, conditional on a
Rule Maker providing sufficient authorization.
The intent of these protections is to ensure that a location
recipient is authorized to acquire location information. Location-
related measurement data could be used by an attacker to circumvent
such authorization checks if the association between measurement data
and Target Device is not validated by a LIS.
A LIS can be coerced into providing location information for a Device
that a location recipient is not authorized to receive. A request
identifies one Device (implicitly or explicitly), but measurement
data is provided for another Device. If the LIS does not check that
the measurement data is for the identified Device, it could
incorrectly authorize the request.
By using unverified measurement data to generate a response, the LIS
provides information about a Device without appropriate
The feasibility of this attack depends on the availability of
information that links a Device with measurement data. In some
cases, measurement data that is correlated with a Target is readily
available. For instance, LLDP measurements (Section 5.1) are
broadcast to all nodes on the same network segment. An attacker on
that network segment can easily gain measurement data that relates a
Device with measurements.
For some types of measurement data, it's necessary for an attacker to
know the location of the Target in order to determine what
measurements to use. This attack is meaningless for types of
measurement data that require that the attacker first know the
location of the Target before measurement data can be acquired or
fabricated. GNSS measurements (Section 5.5) share this trait with
many wireless location determination methods.
7.1.2. Extracting Network Topology Data
Allowing requests with measurements might be used to collect
information about network topology.
Network topology can be considered sensitive information by a network
operator for commercial or security reasons. While it is impossible
to completely prevent a Device from acquiring some knowledge of
network topology if a location service is provided, a network
operator might desire to limit how much of this information is made
Mapping a network topology does not require that an attacker be able
to associate measurement data with a particular Device. If a
requester is able to try a number of measurements, it is possible to
acquire information about network topology.
It is not even necessary that the measurements are valid; random
guesses are sufficient, provided that there is no penalty or cost
associated with attempting to use the measurements.
7.1.3. Exposing Network Topology Data
A Device could reveal information about a network to entities outside
of that network if it provides location measurement data to a LIS
that is outside of that network. With the exception of GNSS
measurements, the measurements in this document provide information
about an access network that could reveal topology information to an
A Device MUST NOT provide information about network topology without
a clear signal that the recipient is authorized. A LIS that is
discovered using DHCP as described in LIS discovery [RFC5986] can be
considered to be authorized to receive information about the access
7.1.4. Lying by Proxy
Location information, which includes measurement data, is a function
of its inputs. Thus, falsified measurement data can be used to alter
the location information that is provided by a LIS.
Some types of measurement data are relatively easy to falsify in a
way that causes the resulting location information to be selected
with little or no error. For instance, GNSS measurements are easy to
use for this purpose because all the contextual information necessary
to calculate a position using measurements is broadcast by the
An attacker that falsifies measurement data gains little if they are
the only recipient of the result. The attacker knows that the
location information is bad. The attacker only gains if the
information can somehow be attributed to the LIS by another location
recipient. By coercing the LIS into providing falsified location
information, any credibility that the LIS might have -- that the
attacker does not -- is gained by the attacker.
A third party that is reliant on the integrity of the location
information might base an evaluation of the credibility of the
information on the source of the information. If that third party is
able to attribute location information to the LIS, then an attacker
Location information that is provided to the Device without any means
to identify the LIS as its source is not subject to this attack. The
Device is identified as the source of the data when it distributes
the location information to location recipients.
Location information is attributed to the LIS either through the use
of digital signatures or by having the location recipient directly
interact with the LIS. A LIS that digitally signs location
information becomes identifiable as the source of the data.
Similarly, the LIS is identified as a source of data if a location
recipient acquires information directly from a LIS using a
7.1.5. Measurement Replay
The values of some measured properties do not change over time for a
single location. The time invariance of network properties is often
a direct result of the practicalities of operating the network.
Limiting the changes to a network ensures greater consistency of
service. A largely static network also greatly simplifies the data
management tasks involved with providing a location service.
However, time-invariant properties allow for simple replay attacks,
where an attacker acquires measurements that can later be used
without being detected as being invalid.
Measurement data is frequently an observation of a time-invariant
property of the environment at the subject location. For
measurements of this nature, nothing in the measurement itself is
sufficient proof that the Device is present at the resulting
location. Measurement data might have been previously acquired and
For instance, the identity of a radio transmitter, if broadcast by
that transmitter, can be collected and stored. An attacker that
wishes it known that they exist at a particular location can claim to
observe this transmitter at any time. Nothing inherent in the claim
reveals it to be false.
7.1.6. Environment Spoofing
Some types of measurement data can be altered or influenced by a
third party so that a Device unwittingly provides falsified data. If
it is possible for a third party to alter the measured phenomenon,
then any location information that is derived from this data can be
Altering the environment in this fashion might not require
involvement with either a Device or LIS. Measurement that is passive
-- where the Device observes a signal or other phenomenon without
direct interaction -- is most susceptible to alteration by third
Measurement of radio signal characteristics is especially vulnerable,
since an adversary need only be in the general vicinity of the Device
and be able to transmit a signal. For instance, a GNSS spoofer is
able to produce fake signals that claim to be transmitted by any
satellite or set of satellites (see [GPS.SPOOF]).
Measurements that require direct interaction increase the complexity
of the attack. For measurements relating to the communication
medium, a third party cannot avoid direct interaction; they need only
be on the communications path (that is, man in the middle).
Even if the entity that is interacted with is authenticated, this
does not provide any assurance about the integrity of measurement
data. For instance, the Device might authenticate the identity of a
radio transmitter through the use of cryptographic means and obtain
signal strength measurements for that transmitter. Radio signal
strength is trivial for an attacker to increase simply by receiving
and amplifying the raw signal; it is not necessary for the attacker
to be able to understand the signal content.
Note: This particular "attack" is more often completely
legitimate. Radio repeaters are a commonplace mechanism used to
increase radio coverage.
Attacks that rely on altering the observed environment of a Device
require countermeasures that affect the measurement process. For
radio signals, countermeasures could include the use of authenticated
signals, or altered receiver design. In general, countermeasures are
highly specific to the individual measurement process. An exhaustive
discussion of these issues is left to the relevant literature for
each measurement technology.
A Device that provides measurement data is assumed to be responsible
for applying appropriate countermeasures against this type of attack.
Where a Device is the sole recipient of location information derived
from measurement data, a LIS might choose to provide location
information without any validation. The responsibility for ensuring
the veracity of the measurement data lies with the Device.
Measurement data that is susceptible to this sort of influence SHOULD
be treated as though it were produced by an untrusted Device for
those cases where a location recipient might attribute the location
information to the LIS. GNSS measurements and radio signal strength
measurements can be affected relatively cheaply, though almost all
other measurement types can be affected with varying costs to an
attacker, with the largest cost often being a requirement for
physical access. To the extent that it is feasible, measurement data
SHOULD be subjected to the same validation as for other types of
attacks that rely on measurement falsification.
Note: Altered measurement data might be provided by a Device that
has no knowledge of the alteration. Thus, an otherwise trusted
Device might still be an unreliable source of measurement data.
The following measures can be applied to limit or prevent attacks.
The effectiveness of each depends on the type of measurement data and
how that measurement data is acquired.
Two general approaches are identified for dealing with untrusted
1. Require independent validation of measurement data or the
location information that is produced.
2. Identify the types of sources that provided the measurement data
from which that location information was derived.
This section goes into more detail on the different forms of
validation in Sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2, and 7.2.3. The impact of
attributing location information to sources is discussed in more
detail in Section 7.2.4.
Any costs in validation are balanced against the degree of integrity
desired from the resulting location information.
7.2.1. Measurement Validation
Recognizing that measurement data has been falsified is difficult in
the absence of integrity mechanisms.
Independent confirmation of the veracity of measurement data ensures
that the measurement is accurate and that it applies to the correct
Device. When it's possible to gather the same measurement data from
a trusted and independent source without undue expense, the LIS can
use the trusted data in place of what the untrusted Device has sent.
In cases where that is impractical, the untrusted data can provide
hints that allow corroboration of the data (see Section 18.104.22.168).
Measurement information might not contain any inherent indication
that it is falsified. In addition, it can be difficult to obtain
information that would provide any degree of assurance that the
measurement device is physically at any particular location.
Measurements that are difficult to verify require other forms of
assurance before they can be used.
Measurement validation MUST be used if measurement data for a
particular Device can be easily acquired by unauthorized location
recipients, as described in Section 7.1.1. This prevents
unauthorized access to location information using measurement data.
Validation of measurement data can be significantly more effective
than independent acquisition of the same. For instance, a Device in
a large Ethernet network could provide a measurement indicating its
point of attachment using LLDP measurements. For a LIS, acquiring
the same measurement data might require a request to all switches in
that network. With the measurement data, validation can target the
identified switch with a specific query.
Validation is effective in identifying falsified measurement data
(Section 7.1.4), including attacks involving replay of measurement
data (Section 7.1.5). Validation also limits the amount of network
topology information (Section 7.1.2) made available to Devices to
that portion of the network topology to which they are directly
Measurement validation has no effect if the underlying environment is
being altered (Section 7.1.6).
22.214.171.124. Limitations (Unique Observer)
A Device is often in a unique position to make a measurement. It
alone occupies the point in space-time that the location
determination process seeks to determine. The Device becomes a
unique observer for a particular property.
The ability of the Device to become a unique observer makes the
Device invaluable to the location determination process. As a unique
observer, it also makes the claims of a Device difficult to validate
and easy to spoof.
As long as no other entity is capable of making the same
measurements, there is also no other entity that can independently
check that the measurements are correct and applicable to the Device.
A LIS might be unable to validate all or part of the measurement data
it receives from a unique observer. For instance, a signal strength
measurement of the signal from a radio tower cannot be validated
Some portion of the measurement data might still be independently
verified, even if all information cannot. In the previous example,
the radio tower might be able to provide verification that the Device
is present if it is able to observe a radio signal sent by the
If measurement data can only be partially validated, the extent to
which it can be validated determines the effectiveness of validation
against these attacks.
The advantage of having the Device as a unique observer is that it
makes it difficult for an attacker to acquire measurements without
the assistance of the Device. Attempts to use measurements to gain
unauthorized access to measurement data (Section 7.1.1) are largely
ineffectual against a unique observer.
7.2.2. Location Validation
Location information that is derived from location-related
measurement data can also be verified against trusted location
information. Rather than validating inputs to the location
determination process, suspect locations are identified at the output
of the process.
Trusted location information is acquired using sources of measurement
data that are trusted. Untrusted location information is acquired
using measurement data provided from untrusted sources, which might
include the Device. These two locations are compared. If the
untrusted location agrees with the trusted location, the untrusted
location information is used.
Algorithms for the comparison of location information are not
included in this document. However, a simple comparison for
agreement might require that the untrusted location be entirely
contained within the uncertainty region of the trusted location.
There is little point in using a less accurate, less trusted
location. Untrusted location information that has worse accuracy
than trusted information can be immediately discarded. There are
multiple factors that affect accuracy, uncertainty and currency being
the most important. How location information is compared for
accuracy is not defined in this document.
Location validation limits the extent to which falsified -- or
erroneous -- measurement data can cause an incorrect location to be
Location validation can be more efficient than validation of inputs,
particularly for a unique observer (Section 126.96.36.199).
Validating location ensures that the Device is at or near the
resulting location. Location validation can be used to limit or
prevent all of the attacks identified in this document.
The trusted location that is used for validation is always less
accurate than the location that is being checked. The amount by
which the untrusted location is more accurate, is the same amount
that an attacker can exploit.
For example, a trusted location might indicate an uncertainty region
with a radius of five kilometers. An untrusted location that
describes a 100-meter uncertainty within the larger region might be
accepted as more accurate. An attacker might still falsify
measurement data to select any location within the larger uncertainty
region. While the 100-meter uncertainty that is reported seems more
accurate, a falsified location could be anywhere in the
Where measurement data might have been falsified, the actual
uncertainty is effectively much higher. Local policy might allow
differing degrees of trust to location information derived from
untrusted measurement data. This might be a boolean operation with
only two possible outcomes: untrusted location information might be
used entirely or not at all. Alternatively, untrusted location
information could be combined with trusted location information using
different weightings, based on a value set in local policy.
7.2.3. Supporting Observations
Replay attacks using previously acquired measurement data are
particularly hard to detect without independent validation. Rather
than validate the measurement data directly, supplementary data might
be used to validate measurements or the location information derived
from those measurements.
These supporting observations could be used to convey information
that provides additional assurance that measurement data from the
Device was acquired at a specific time and place. In effect, the
Device is requested to provide proof of its presence at the resulting
For instance, a Device that measures attributes of a radio signal
could also be asked to provide a sample of the measured radio signal.
If the LIS is able to observe the same signal, the two observations
could be compared. Providing that the signal cannot be predicted in
advance by the Device, this could be used to support the claim that
the Device is able to receive the signal. Thus, the Device is likely
to be within the range that the signal is transmitted. A LIS could
use this to attribute a higher level of trust in the associated
measurement data or resulting location.
The use of supporting observations is limited by the ability of the
LIS to acquire and validate these observations. The advantage of
selecting observations independent of measurement data is that
observations can be selected based on how readily available the data
is for both LIS and Device. The amount and quality of the data can
be selected based on the degree of assurance that is desired.
The use of supporting observations is similar to both measurement
validation and location validation. All three methods rely on
independent validation of one or more properties. The applicability
of each method is similar.
The use of supporting observations can be used to limit or prevent
all of the attacks identified in this document.
The effectiveness of the validation method depends on the quality of
the supporting observation: how hard it is for the entity performing
the validation to obtain the data at a different time or place, how
difficult it is to guess, and what other costs might be involved in
acquiring this data.
In the example of an observed radio signal, requesting a sample of
the signal only provides an assurance that the Device is able to
receive the signal transmitted by the measured radio transmitter.
This only provides some assurance that the Device is within range of
As with location validation, a Device might still be able to provide
falsified measurements that could alter the value of the location
information as long as the result is within this region.
Requesting additional supporting observations can reduce the size of
the region over which location information can be altered by an
attacker, or increase trust in the result, but each additional
measurement imposes an acquisition cost. Supporting observations
contribute little or nothing toward the primary goal of determining
the location of the Device.
Lying by proxy (Section 7.1.4) relies on the location recipient being
able to attribute location information to a LIS. The effectiveness
of this attack is negated if location information is explicitly
attributed to a particular source.
This requires an extension to the location object that explicitly
identifies the source (or sources) of each item of location
Rather than relying on a process that seeks to ensure that location
information is accurate, this approach instead provides a location
recipient with the information necessary to reach their own
conclusion about the trustworthiness of the location information.
Including an authenticated identity for all sources of measurement
data presents a number of technical and operational challenges. It
is possible that the LIS has a transient relationship with a Device.
A Device is not expected to share authentication information with a
LIS. There is no assurance that Device identification is usable by a
potential location recipient. Privacy concerns might also prevent
the sharing of identification information, even if it were available
Identifying the type of measurement source allows a location
recipient to make a decision about the trustworthiness of location
information without depending on having authenticated identity
information for each source. An element for this purpose is defined
in Section 4.4.
When including location information that is based on measurement data
from sources that might be untrusted, a LIS SHOULD include
alternative location information that is derived from trusted sources
of measurement data. Each item of location information can then be
labeled with the source of that data.
A location recipient that is able to identify a specific source of
measurement data (whether it be LIS or Device) can use this
information to attribute location information to either entity or to
both entities. The location recipient is then better able to make
decisions about trustworthiness based on the source of the data.
A location recipient that does not understand the "source" element is
unable to make this distinction. When constructing a PIDF-LO
document, trusted location information MUST be placed in the PIDF-LO
so that it is given higher priority to any untrusted location
information according to Rule #8 of [RFC5491].
Attribution of information does nothing to address attacks that alter
the observed parameters that are used in location determination
7.2.5. Stateful Correlation of Location Requests
Stateful examination of requests can be used to prevent a Device from
attempting to map network topology using requests for location
information (Section 7.1.2).
Simply limiting the rate of requests from a single Device reduces the
amount of data that a Device can acquire about network topology. A
LIS could also make observations about the movements of a Device. A
Device that is attempting to gather topology information is likely to
be assigned a location that changes significantly between subsequent
requests, possibly violating physical laws (or lower limits that
might still be unlikely) with respect to speed and acceleration.
7.3. An Unauthorized or Compromised LIS
A compromised LIS, or a compromise in LIS discovery [RFC5986], could
lead to an unauthorized entity obtaining measurement data. This
information could then be used or redistributed. A Device MUST
ensure that it authenticates a LIS, as described in Section 9 of
An entity that is able to acquire measurement data can, in addition
to using those measurements to learn the location of a Device, also
use that information for other purposes. This information can be
used to provide insight into network topology (Section 7.1.2).
Measurement data might also be exploited in other ways. For example,
revealing the type of 802.11 transceiver that a Device uses could
allow an attacker to use specific vulnerabilities to attack a Device.
Similarly, revealing information about network elements could enable
targeted attacks on that infrastructure.
8. Measurement Schemas
The schemas are broken up into their respective functions. A base
container schema into which all measurements are placed is defined,
including the definition of a measurement request (Section 8.1). A
PIDF-LO extension is defined in a separate schema (Section 8.2). A
basic Types Schema contains common definitions, including the
"rmsError" and "samples" attributes, plus types for IPv4, IPv6, and
MAC addresses (Section 8.3). Each of the specific measurement types
is defined in a separate schema.