5. Calling Conventions
Java provides the implementors with not just a syntax for the
language, but also an operational environment. For example, memory
is automatically managed and does not require application
intervention. These language features have allowed for a simpler API
and have led to the elimination of certain GSS-API functions.
Moreover, the JCA defines a provider model that allows for
implementation-independent access to security services. Using this
model, applications can seamlessly switch between different
implementations and dynamically add new services. The GSS-API
specification leverages these concepts by the usage of providers for
the mechanism implementations.
5.1. Package Name
The classes and interfaces defined in this document reside in the
package called "org.ietf.jgss". Applications that wish to make use
of this API should import this package name as shown in section 8.
5.2. Provider Framework
The Java security API's use a provider architecture that allows
applications to be implementation independent and security API
implementations to be modular and extensible. The
java.security.Provider class is an abstract class that a vendor
extends. This class maps various properties that represent different
security services that are available to the names of the actual
vendor classes that implement those services. When requesting a
service, an application simply specifies the desired provider and the
API delegates the request to service classes available from that
Using the Java security provider model insulates applications from
implementation details of the services they wish to use.
Applications can switch between providers easily and new providers
can be added as needed, even at runtime.
The GSS-API may use providers to find components for specific
underlying security mechanisms. For instance, a particular provider
might contain components that will allow the GSS-API to support the
Kerberos v5 mechanism [RFC4121] and another might contain components
to support the Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM) [RFC2025].
By delegating mechanism-specific functionality to the components
obtained from providers, the GSS-API can be extended to support an
arbitrary list of mechanism.
How the GSS-API locates and queries these providers is beyond the
scope of this document and is being deferred to a Service Provider
Interface (SPI) specification. The availability of such an SPI
specification is not mandatory for the adoption of this API
specification nor is it mandatory to use providers in the
implementation of a GSS-API framework. However, by using the
provider framework together with an SPI specification, one can create
an extensible and implementation-independent GSS-API framework.
5.3. Integer Types
All numeric values are declared as "int" primitive Java type. The
Java specification guarantees that this will be a 32-bit two's
complement signed number.
Throughout this API, the "boolean" primitive Java type is used
wherever a boolean value is required or returned.
5.4. Opaque Data Types
Java byte arrays are used to represent opaque data types that are
consumed and produced by the GSS-API in the form of tokens. Java
arrays contain a length field that enables the users to easily
determine their size. The language has automatic garbage collection
that alleviates the need by developers to release memory and
simplifies buffer ownership issues.
The String object will be used to represent all textual data. The
Java String object transparently treats all characters as two-byte
Unicode characters, which allows support for many locals. All
routines returning or accepting textual data will use the String
5.6. Object Identifiers
An Oid object will be used to represent Universal Object Identifiers
(Oids). Oids are ISO-defined, hierarchically globally interpretable
identifiers used within the GSS-API framework to identify security
mechanisms and name formats. The Oid object can be created from a
string representation of its dot notation (e.g., "188.8.131.52.5.6.2") as
well as from its ASN.1 DER encoding. Methods are also provided to
test equality and provide the DER representation for the object.
An important feature of the Oid class is that its instances are
immutable -- i.e., there are no methods defined that allow one to
change the contents of an Oid. This property allows one to treat
these objects as "statics" without the need to perform copies.
Certain routines allow the usage of a default oid. A "null" value
can be used in those cases.
5.7. Object Identifier Sets
The Java bindings represent object identifier sets as arrays of Oid
objects. All Java arrays contain a length field, which allows for
easy manipulation and reference.
In order to support the full functionality of RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE], the Oid class includes a method that checks for existence of
an Oid object within a specified array. This is equivalent in
functionality to gss_test_oid_set_member. The use of Java arrays and
Java's automatic garbage collection has eliminated the need for the
following routines: gss_create_empty_oid_set, gss_release_oid_set,
and gss_add_oid_set_member. Java GSS-API implementations will not
contain them. Java's automatic garbage collection and the immutable
property of the Oid object eliminates the memory management issues of
the C counterpart.
Whenever a default value for an Object Identifier Set is required, a
"null" value can be used. Please consult the detailed method
description for details.
GSS-API credentials are represented by the GSSCredential interface.
The interface contains several constructs to allow for the creation
of most common credential objects for the initiator and the acceptor.
Comparisons are performed using the interface's "equals" method. The
following general description of GSS-API credentials is included from
the C-bindings specification:
GSS-API credentials can contain mechanism-specific principal
authentication data for multiple mechanisms. A GSS-API credential
is composed of a set of credential-elements, each of which is
applicable to a single mechanism. A credential may contain at
most one credential-element for each supported mechanism. A
credential-element identifies the data needed by a single
mechanism to authenticate a single principal, and conceptually
contains two credential-references that describe the actual
mechanism-specific authentication data, one to be used by GSS-API
for initiating contexts, and one to be used for accepting
contexts. For mechanisms that do not distinguish between acceptor
and initiator credentials, both references would point to the same
underlying mechanism-specific authentication data.
Credentials describe a set of mechanism-specific principals, and give
their holder the ability to act as any of those principals. All
principal identities asserted by a single GSS-API credential should
belong to the same entity, although enforcement of this property is
an implementation-specific matter. A single GSSCredential object
represents all the credential elements that have been acquired.
The creation of an GSSContext object allows the value of "null" to be
specified as the GSSCredential input parameter. This will indicate a
desire by the application to act as a default principal. While
individual GSS-API implementations are free to determine such default
behavior as appropriate to the mechanism, the following default
behavior by these routines is recommended for portability:
For the initiator side of the context:
1) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating security
contexts for the chosen mechanism that the application is
authorized to act on behalf of, then that principal shall be used;
2) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network-identity
for the chosen mechanism, and if the application is authorized to
act on behalf of that identity for the purpose of initiating
security contexts, then the principal corresponding to that
identity shall be used; otherwise,
3) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local identity,
and provides a means to map local identities into network-
identities for the chosen mechanism, and if the application is
authorized to act on behalf of the network-identity image of the
default local identity for the purpose of initiating security
contexts using the chosen mechanism, then the principal
corresponding to that identity shall be used; otherwise,
4) A user-configurable default identity should be used.
For the acceptor side of the context:
1) If there is only a single authorized principal identity capable of
accepting security contexts for the chosen mechanism, then that
principal shall be used; otherwise,
2) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target
principal by examining the context-establishment token processed
during the accept method, and if the accepting application is
authorized to act as that principal for the purpose of accepting
security contexts using the chosen mechanism, then that principal
identity shall be used; otherwise,
3) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any principal, and
if mutual authentication was not requested, any principal that the
application is authorized to accept security contexts under using
the chosen mechanism may be used; otherwise,
4) A user-configurable default identity shall be used.
The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be
established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior
whenever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are
likely to be more portable across mechanisms and implementations than
ones that instantiate an GSSCredential object representing a specific
The GSSContext interface is used to represent one end of a GSS-API
security context, storing state information appropriate to that end
of the peer communication, including cryptographic state information.
The instantiation of the context object is done differently by the
initiator and the acceptor. After the context has been instantiated,
the initiator may choose to set various context options that will
determine the characteristics of the desired security context. When
all the application-desired characteristics have been set, the
initiator will call the initSecContext method, which will produce a
token for consumption by the peer's acceptSecContext method. It is
the responsibility of the application to deliver the authentication
token(s) between the peer applications for processing. Upon
completion of the context-establishment phase, context attributes can
be retrieved, by both the initiator and acceptor, using the accessor
methods. These will reflect the actual attributes of the established
context. At this point, the context can be used by the application
to apply cryptographic services to its data.
5.10. Authentication Tokens
A token is a caller-opaque type that GSS-API uses to maintain
synchronization between each end of the GSS-API security context.
The token is a cryptographically protected octet-string, generated by
the underlying mechanism at one end of a GSS-API security context for
use by the peer mechanism at the other end. Encapsulation (if
required) within the application protocol and transfer of the token
are the responsibility of the peer applications.
Java GSS-API uses byte arrays to represent authentication tokens.
Overloaded methods exist that allow the caller to supply input and
output streams that will be used for the reading and writing of the
5.11. Inter-Process Tokens
Certain GSS-API routines are intended to transfer data between
processes in multi-process programs. These routines use a caller-
opaque octet-string, generated by the GSS-API in one process for use
by the GSS-API in another process. The calling application is
responsible for transferring such tokens between processes. Note
that, while GSS-API implementors are encouraged to avoid placing
sensitive information within inter-process tokens, or to
cryptographically protect them, many implementations will be unable
to avoid placing key material or other sensitive data within them.
It is the application's responsibility to ensure that inter-process
tokens are protected in transit, and transferred only to processes
that are trustworthy. An inter-process token is represented using a
byte array emitted from the export method of the GSSContext
interface. The receiver of the inter-process token would initialize
an GSSContext object with this token to create a new context. Once a
context has been exported, the GSSContext object is invalidated and
is no longer available.
5.12. Error Reporting
RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE] defined the usage of major and minor
status values for the signaling of GSS-API errors. The major code,
also called GSS status code, is used to signal errors at the GSS-API
level, independent of the underlying mechanism(s). The minor status
value or Mechanism status code, is a mechanism-defined error value
indicating a mechanism-specific error code.
Java GSS-API uses exceptions implemented by the GSSException class to
signal both minor and major error values. Both mechanism-specific
errors and GSS-API level errors are signaled through instances of
this class. The usage of exceptions replaces the need for major and
minor codes to be used within the API calls. The GSSException class
also contains methods to obtain textual representations for both the
major and minor values, which is equivalent to the functionality of
5.12.1. GSS Status Codes
GSS status codes indicate errors that are independent of the
underlying mechanism(s) used to provide the security service. The
errors that can be indicated via a GSS status code are generic API
routine errors (errors that are defined in the GSS-API
specification). These bindings take advantage of the Java exceptions
mechanism, thus, eliminating the need for calling errors.
A GSS status code indicates a single fatal generic API error from the
routine that has thrown the GSSException. Using exceptions announces
that a fatal error has occurred during the execution of the method.
The GSS-API operational model also allows for the signaling of
supplementary status information from the per-message calls. These
need to be handled as return values since using exceptions is not
appropriate for informatory or warning-like information. The methods
that are capable of producing supplementary information are the two
per-message methods GSSContext.verifyMIC() and GSSContext.unwrap().
These methods fill the supplementary status codes in the MessageProp
object that was passed in.
A GSSException object, along with providing the functionality for
setting of the various error codes and translating them into textual
representation, also contains the definitions of all the numeric
error values. The following table lists the definitions of error
Table: GSS Status Codes
Name Value Meaning
BAD_BINDINGS 1 Incorrect channel bindings were
BAD_MECH 2 An unsupported mechanism
BAD_NAME 3 An invalid name was supplied.
BAD_NAMETYPE 4 A supplied name was of an
BAD_STATUS 5 An invalid status code was
BAD_MIC 6 A token had an invalid MIC.
CONTEXT_EXPIRED 7 The context has expired.
CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 8 The referenced credentials
DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 9 A supplied credential was
DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 10 A supplied token was invalid.
FAILURE 11 Miscellaneous failure,
unspecified at the GSS-API
NO_CONTEXT 12 Invalid context has been
NO_CRED 13 No credentials were supplied, or
the credentials were unavailable
BAD_QOP 14 The quality-of-protection (QOP)
requested could not be provided.
UNAUTHORIZED 15 The operation is forbidden by
the local security policy.
UNAVAILABLE 16 The operation or option is
DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 17 The requested credential
element already exists.
NAME_NOT_MN 18 The provided name was not a
The following four status codes (DUPLICATE_TOKEN, OLD_TOKEN,
UNSEQ_TOKEN, and GAP_TOKEN) are contained in a GSSException
only if detected during context establishment, in which case it
is a fatal error. (During per-message calls, these values are
indicated as supplementary information contained in the
MessageProp object.) They are:
DUPLICATE_TOKEN 19 The token was a duplicate of an
OLD_TOKEN 20 The token's validity period has
UNSEQ_TOKEN 21 A later token has already been
GAP_TOKEN 22 The expected token was not
The GSS major status code of FAILURE is used to indicate that the
underlying mechanism detected an error for which no specific GSS
status code is defined. The mechanism-specific status code can
provide more details about the error.
The different major status codes that can be contained in the
GSSException object thrown by the methods in this specification are
the same as the major status codes returned by the corresponding
calls in RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE].
5.12.2. Mechanism-Specific Status Codes
Mechanism-specific status codes are communicated in two ways, they
are part of any GSSException thrown from the mechanism-specific layer
to signal a fatal error, or they are part of the MessageProp object
that the per-message calls use to signal non-fatal errors.
A default value of 0 in either the GSSException object or the
MessageProp object will be used to represent the absence of any
mechanism-specific status code.
5.12.3. Supplementary Status Codes
Supplementary status codes are confined to the per-message methods of
the GSSContext interface. Because of the informative nature of these
errors it is not appropriate to use exceptions to signal them.
Instead, the per-message operations of the GSSContext interface
return these values in a MessageProp object.
The MessageProp class defines query methods that return boolean
values indicating the following supplementary states:
Table: Supplementary Status Methods
Method Name Meaning when "true" is returned
isDuplicateToken The token was a duplicate of an
isOldToken The token's validity period has
isUnseqToken A later token has already been
isGapToken An expected per-message token was
A "true" return value for any of the above methods indicates that the
token exhibited the specified property. The application must
determine the appropriate course of action for these supplementary
values. They are not treated as errors by the GSS-API.
A name is used to identify a person or entity. GSS-API authenticates
the relationship between a name and the entity claiming the name.
Since different authentication mechanisms may employ different
namespaces for identifying their principals, GSS-API's naming support
is necessarily complex in multi-mechanism environments (or even in
some single-mechanism environments where the underlying mechanism
supports multiple namespaces).
Two distinct conceptual representations are defined for names:
1) A GSS-API form represented by implementations of the GSSName
interface: A single GSSName object may contain multiple names from
different namespaces, but all names should refer to the same
entity. An example of such an internal name would be the name
returned from a call to the getName method of the GSSCredential
interface, when applied to a credential containing credential
elements for multiple authentication mechanisms employing
different namespaces. This GSSName object will contain a distinct
name for the entity for each authentication mechanism.
For GSS-API implementations supporting multiple namespaces,
GSSName implementations must contain sufficient information to
determine the namespace to which each primitive name belongs.
2) Mechanism-specific contiguous byte array and string forms:
Different GSSName initialization methods are provided to handle
both byte array and string formats and to accommodate various
calling applications and name types. These formats are capable of
containing only a single name (from a single namespace).
Contiguous string names are always accompanied by an object
identifier specifying the namespace to which the name belongs, and
their format is dependent on the authentication mechanism that
employs that name. The string name forms are assumed to be
printable, and may therefore be used by GSS-API applications for
communication with their users. The byte array name formats are
assumed to be in non-printable formats (e.g., the byte array
returned from the export method of the GSSName interface).
A GSSName object can be converted to a contiguous representation by
using the toString method. This will guarantee that the name will be
converted to a printable format. Different initialization methods in
the GSSName interface are defined allowing support for multiple
syntaxes for each supported namespace, and allowing users the freedom
to choose a preferred name representation. The toString method
should use an implementation-chosen printable syntax for each
supported name type. To obtain the printable name type,
getStringNameType method can be used.
There is no guarantee that calling the toString method on the GSSName
interface will produce the same string form as the original imported
string name. Furthermore, it is possible that the name was not even
constructed from a string representation. The same applies to
namespace identifiers, which may not necessarily survive unchanged
after a journey through the internal name form. An example of this
might be a mechanism that authenticates X.500 names, but provides an
algorithmic mapping of Internet DNS names into X.500. That
mechanism's implementation of GSSName might, when presented with a
DNS name, generate an internal name that contained both the original
DNS name and the equivalent X.500 name. Alternatively, it might only
store the X.500 name. In the latter case, the toString method of
GSSName would most likely generate a printable X.500 name, rather
than the original DNS name.
The context acceptor can obtain a GSSName object representing the
entity performing the context initiation (through the usage of
getSrcName method). Since this name has been authenticated by a
single mechanism, it contains only a single name (even if the
internal name presented by the context initiator to the GSSContext
object had multiple components). Such names are termed internal-
mechanism names (or MNs), and the names emitted by GSSContext
interface in the getSrcName and getTargName are always of this type.
Since some applications may require MNs without wanting to incur the
overhead of an authentication operation, creation methods are
provided that take not only the name buffer and name type, but also
the mechanism oid for which this name should be created. When
dealing with an existing GSSName object, the canonicalize method may
be invoked to convert a general internal name into an MN.
GSSName objects can be compared using their equal method, which
returns "true" if the two names being compared refer to the same
entity. This is the preferred way to perform name comparisons
instead of using the printable names that a given GSS-API
implementation may support. Since GSS-API assumes that all primitive
names contained within a given internal name refer to the same
entity, equal can return "true" if the two names have at least one
primitive name in common. If the implementation embodies knowledge
of equivalence relationships between names taken from different
namespaces, this knowledge may also allow successful comparisons of
internal names containing no overlapping primitive elements.
When used in large access control lists, the overhead of creating a
GSSName object on each name and invoking the equal method on each
name from the Access Control List (ACL) may be prohibitive. As an
alternative way of supporting this case, GSS-API defines a special
form of the contiguous byte array name, which may be compared
directly (byte by byte). Contiguous names suitable for comparison
are generated by the export method. Exported names may be re-
imported by using the byte array constructor and specifying the
NT_EXPORT_NAME as the name type object identifier. The resulting
GSSName name will also be a MN.
The GSSName interface defines public static Oid objects representing
the standard name types. Structurally, an exported name object
consists of a header containing an OID identifying the mechanism that
authenticated the name, and a trailer containing the name itself,
where the syntax of the trailer is defined by the individual
mechanism specification. Detailed description of the format is
specified in the language-independent GSS-API specification
Note that the results obtained by using the equals method will in
general be different from those obtained by invoking canonicalize and
export, and then comparing the byte array output. The first series
of operation determines whether two (unauthenticated) names identify
the same principal; the second whether a particular mechanism would
authenticate them as the same principal. These two operations will
in general give the same results only for MNs.
It is important to note that the above are guidelines as to how
GSSName implementations should behave, and are not intended to be
specific requirements of how name objects must be implemented. The
mechanism designers are free to decide on the details of their
implementations of the GSSName interface as long as the behavior
satisfies the above guidelines.
5.14. Channel Bindings
GSS-API supports the use of user-specified tags to identify a given
context to the peer application. These tags are intended to be used
to identify the particular communications channel that carries the
context. Channel bindings are communicated to the GSS-API using the
ChannelBinding object. The application may use byte arrays to
specify the application data to be used in the channel binding as
well as using instances of the InetAddress. The InetAddress for the
initiator and/or acceptor can be used within an instance of a
ChannelBinding. ChannelBinding can be set for the GSSContext object
using the setChannelBinding method before the first call to init or
accept has been performed. Unless the setChannelBinding method has
been used to set the ChannelBinding for a GSSContext object, "null"
ChannelBinding will be assumed. InetAddress is currently the only
address type defined within the Java platform and as such, it is the
only one supported within the ChannelBinding class. Applications
that use other types of addresses can include them as part of the
Conceptually, the GSS-API concatenates the initiator and acceptor
address information, and the application-supplied byte array to form
an octet-string. The mechanism calculates a Message Integrity Code
(MIC) over this octet-string and binds the MIC to the context
establishment token emitted by the init method of the GSSContext
interface. The same bindings are set by the context acceptor for its
GSSContext object and during processing of the accept method, a MIC
is calculated in the same way. The calculated MIC is compared with
that found in the token, and if the MICs differ, accept will throw a
GSSException with the major code set to BAD_BINDINGS, and the context
will not be established. Some mechanisms may include the actual
channel binding data in the token (rather than just a MIC);
applications should therefore not use confidential data as channel-
Individual mechanisms may impose additional constraints on addresses
that may appear in channel bindings. For example, a mechanism may
verify that the initiator address field of the channel binding
contains the correct network address of the host system. Portable
applications should therefore ensure that they either provide correct
information for the address fields, or omit the setting of the
5.15. Stream Objects
The context object provides overloaded methods that use input and
output streams as the means to convey authentication and per-message
GSS-API tokens. It is important to note that the streams are
expected to contain the usual GSS-API tokens, which would otherwise
be handled through the usage of byte arrays. The tokens are expected
to have a definite start and an end. The callers are responsible for
ensuring that the supplied streams will not block, or expect to block
until a full token is processed by the GSS-API method. Only a single
GSS-API token will be processed per invocation of the stream-based
The usage of streams allows the callers to have control and
management of the supplied buffers. Because streams are non-
primitive objects, the callers can make the streams as complicated or
as simple as desired simply by using the streams defined in the
java.io package or creating their own through the use of inheritance.
This will allow for the application's greatest flexibility.
5.16. Optional Parameters
Whenever the application wishes to omit an optional parameter the
"null" value shall be used. The detailed method descriptions
indicate which parameters are optional. Method overloading has also
been used as a technique to indicate default parameters.
6. Introduction to GSS-API Classes and Interfaces
This section presents a brief description of the classes and
interfaces that constitute the GSS-API. The implementations of these
are obtained from the CLASSPATH defined by the application. If Java
GSS becomes part of the standard Java APIs, then these classes will
be available by default on all systems as part of the JRE's system
This section also shows the corresponding RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE]
functionality implemented by each of the classes. Detailed
description of these classes and their methods is presented in
6.1. GSSManager Class
This abstract class serves as a factory to instantiate
implementations of the GSS-API interfaces and also provides methods
to make queries about underlying security mechanisms.
A default implementation can be obtained using the static method
getInstance(). Applications that desire to provide their own
implementation of the GSSManager class can simply extend the abstract
This class contains equivalents of the following RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE] routines:
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section(s)
gss_import_name Create an internal name from 7.1.6-
the supplied information. 7.1.9
gss_acquire_cred Acquire credential 7.1.10-
for use. 7.1.12
gss_import_sec_context Create a previously exported 7.1.15
gss_indicate_mechs List the mechanisms 7.1.3
supported by this GSS-API
gss_inquire_mechs_for_name List the mechanisms 7.1.5
specified name type.
gss_inquire_names_for_mech List the name types 7.1.4
supported by the
6.2. GSSName Interface
GSS-API names are represented in the Java bindings through the
GSSName interface. Different name formats and their definitions are
identified with Universal Object Identifiers (oids). The format of
the names can be derived based on the unique oid of each name type.
The following GSS-API routines are provided by the GSSName interface:
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section(s)
gss_display_name Covert internal name 7.2.7
representation to text format.
gss_compare_name Compare two internal names. 7.2.3,
gss_release_name Release resources associated N/A
with the internal name.
gss_canonicalize_name Convert an internal name to a 7.2.5
gss_export_name Convert a mechanism name to 7.2.6
gss_duplicate_name Create a copy of the internal N/A
The gss_release_name call is not provided as Java does its own
garbage collection. The gss_duplicate_name call is also redundant;
the GSSName interface has no mutator methods that can change the
state of the object so it is safe for sharing across threads.
6.3. GSSCredential Interface
The GSSCredential interface is responsible for the encapsulation of
GSS-API credentials. Credentials identify a single entity and
provide the necessary cryptographic information to enable the
creation of a context on behalf of that entity. A single credential
may contain multiple mechanism-specific credentials, each referred to
as a credential element. The GSSCredential interface provides the
functionality of the following GSS-API routines:
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section(s)
gss_add_cred Constructs credentials 7.3.12
gss_inquire_cred Obtain information about 7.3.4-
gss_inquire_cred_by_mech Obtain per-mechanism 7.3.5-
information about 7.3.10
gss_release_cred Dispose of credentials 7.3.3
6.4. GSSContext Interface
This interface encapsulates the functionality of context-level calls
required for security context establishment and management between
peers as well as the per-message services offered to applications. A
context is established between a pair of peers and allows the usage
of security services on a per-message basis on application data. It
is created over a single security mechanism. The GSSContext
interface provides the functionality of the following GSS-API
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section(s)
gss_init_sec_context Initiate the creation of a 7.4.3-
security context with a peer. 7.4.6
gss_accept_sec_context Accept a security context 7.4.7-
initiated by a peer. 7.4.10
gss_delete_sec_context Destroy a security context. 7.4.12
gss_context_time Obtain remaining context 7.4.41
gss_inquire_context Obtain context 7.4.32-
gss_wrap_size_limit Determine token-size limit 7.4.13
gss_export_sec_context Transfer security context 7.4.22
to another process.
gss_get_mic Calculate a cryptographic 7.4.18,
Message Integrity Code (MIC) 7.4.19
for a message.
gss_verify_mic Verify integrity on a received 7.4.20,
gss_wrap Attach a MIC to a message and 7.4.14,
optionally encrypt the message 7.4.15
gss_unwrap Obtain a previously wrapped 7.4.16,
application message verifying 7.4.17
its integrity and optionally
The functionality offered by the gss_process_context_token routine
has not been included in the Java bindings specification. The
corresponding functionality of gss_delete_sec_context has also been
modified to not return any peer tokens. This has been proposed in
accordance to the recommendations stated in RFC 2743 [GSSAPIv2-UPDATE]. GSSContext does offer the functionality of destroying the
locally stored context information.
6.5. MessageProp Class
This helper class is used in the per-message operations on the
context. An instance of this class is created by the application and
then passed into the per-message calls. In some cases, the
application conveys information to the GSS-API implementation through
this object and in other cases the GSS-API returns information to the
application by setting it in this object. See the description of the
per-message operations wrap, unwrap, getMIC, and verifyMIC in the
GSSContext interfaces for details.
6.6. GSSException Class
Exceptions are used in the Java bindings to signal fatal errors to
the calling applications. This replaces the major and minor codes
used in the C-bindings specification as a method of signaling
failures. The GSSException class handles both minor and major codes,
as well as their translation into textual representation. All GSS-
API methods are declared as throwing this exception.
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section
gss_display_status Retrieve textual 7.8.5, 7.8.6,
representation of error 7.8.8, 7.8.9
6.7. Oid Class
This utility class is used to represent Universal Object Identifiers
and their associated operations. GSS-API uses object identifiers to
distinguish between security mechanisms and name types. This class,
aside from being used whenever an object identifier is needed,
implements the following GSS-API functionality:
RFC 2743 Routine Function Section
gss_test_oid_set_member Determine if the specified oid 7.7.5
is part of a set of oids.
6.8. ChannelBinding Class
An instance of this class is used to specify channel binding
information to the GSSContext object before the start of a security
context establishment. The application may use a byte array to
specify application data to be used in the channel binding as well as
to use instances of the InetAddress. InetAddress is currently the
only address type defined within the Java platform and as such, it is
the only one supported within the ChannelBinding class. Applications
that use other types of addresses can include them as part of the