tech-invite   World Map     

3GPP     Specs     Glossaries     Architecture     IMS     UICC       IETF     RFCs     Groups     SIP     ABNFs       Search



Here          Top          Up          Prev          Next
part:    1     2     3     4     5     6



5.3   Security area #3: Security context and key management
5.3.1   Introduction
5.3.2   Security assumptions
5.3.3   Key issues   Key Issue #3.1: Interception of radio interface keys sent between operator entities   Key Issue #3.2: Refreshing keys   Key issue #3.3: Principles of security negotiation   Word-p. 251   Key Issue #3.4: Security context sharing   Word-p. 252   Key issue #3.5: Unnecessary dependence of keys between security layers   Key issue #3.6: Top-level key for access-network-specific keys   Key issue #3.7: The storage of security context   Key issue #3.8: Security context for small data mode   Void   Void   Key issue #3.11: 5G security key and context identification
5.3.3.y   Key issue #3.y: <key issue name>
5.3.4   Solutions   Solution #3.1: Including a key exchange protocol into the derivation of the radio interface session keys   Solution #3.2: UE can request a radio interface key refresh   Word-p. 259   Solution #3.3: Security Context Management for UE with Multiple Access Technologies   Void   Solution #3.5: Trusted non-3GPP access      Up   Solution #3.6: Next Generation Key Set Identifier   Solution #3.7: Algorithms Negotiation Procedure   Solution #3.8: Key negotiation of dual connectivity to deal with the leakage of secret key   Solution #3.9: Security Key Refresh Triggered by UE   Void   Solution #3.11: Binding of keys to an authentication session with a serving network in NextGen systems   Word-p. 274      Up   Solution #3.12: "Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys"
5.3.4.z   Solution #3.z: <solution name>   Word-p. 277
5.3.5   Conclusions
5.4   Security area #4: RAN security
5.4.1   Introduction
5.4.2   Security assumptions   Word-p. 279
5.4.3   Key issues   Key Issue #4.1: AS security during RRC idle mode   Key issue #4.4: Security aspects of inactive mode mobility   Word-p. 282   Key issue #4.5: Security aspects of RAN-WLAN aggregation/integration   Key issue #4.6: User plane DoS attacks   Key Issue #4.7 Key handling in RRC inactive state to RRC active state transition   Void   Key issue #4.9: Security aspects of NG2 handover   Key issue #4.10: Security aspects of sidehaul interfaces   Word-p. 285   Key issue #4.11: Flexibility to retain or to change AS security keys   Key issue #4.12: Changing AS security keys on-the-fly   Key issue #4.13: Dealing with radio jamming   Key issue #4.14: Privacy aspects of RAN level temporary identifiers   Word-p. 288   Key issue #4.15: Security aspects of Xn handover   Key issue #4.16: Security algorithm negotiation between UE and RAN   Key issue #4.17: Supporting integrity protection of UP
5.4.3.y   Key issue #4.y: <key issue name>
5.4.4   Solutions   Solution #4.1: Network signs selected signalling messages   Solution #4.4: Fake gNB detection using UL traffic monitoring and System Query   Word-p. 300   Solution #4.5: Prevent User Plane DoS Attack over Air Interface for Small Data   Word-p. 302   Solution #4.6: Security mechanism for deployment scenario of option 3   Word-p. 304   Solution #4.7: Handover procedure for Intra NG (R)AN   Solution #4.8: Fake gNB Detection using Identity Based Signature   Solution #4.9: Security of Access Stratum (AS) keys on Xn handover   Solution #4.10: UE-assisted false base station detection   Solution #4.11: Security of sidehaul interfaces   Word-p. 312   Solution #4.12: Security Aspects of Option 3/3a/3x or EN-DC   Solution #4.13: Inputs to security algorithms at PDCP layer   Solution #4.14: Flexibile mechanism for AS key-change   Solution #4.15: Deriving ciphering and integrity keys in 5G
5.4.4.z   Solution #4.z: <solution name>
5.4.5   Conclusions
5.5   Security area #5: Security within NG-UE
5.6   Security area #6: Authorization
5.6.1   Introduction
5.6.2   Security assumptions
5.6.3   Key issues
5.6.4   Solutions
5.6.5   Conclusions

Up          Top          ToC