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5.3   Security area #3: Security context and key management      Up
5.3.1   Introduction
5.3.2   Security assumptions
5.3.3   Key issues   Key Issue #3.1: Interception of radio interface keys sent between operator entities   Key Issue #3.2: Refreshing keys   Key Issue #3.4: Security context sharing   Word-p. 288   Key issue #3.5: Unnecessary dependence of keys between security layers   Key issue #3.6: Top-level key for access-network-specific keys      Up   Key issue #3.7: The storage of security context   Key issue #3.8: Security context for small data mode   Key issue #3.9: -   Key issue #3.10: -   Key issue #3.11: 5G security key and context identification
5.3.3.y   Key issue #3.y: <key issue name>
5.3.4   Solutions   Solution #3.1: Including a key exchange protocol into the derivation of the radio interface session keys   Solution #3.2: UE can request a radio interface key refresh   Word-p. 295   Solution #3.3: Security Context Management for UE with Multiple Access Technologies   Solution #3.4: -   Solution #3.5: Trusted non-3GPP access   Solution #3.6: Next Generation Key Set Identifier      Up   Solution #3.7: Algorithms Negotiation Procedure   Solution #3.8: Key negotiation of dual connectivity to deal with the leakage of secret key   Solution #3.9: Security Key Refresh Triggered by UE   Solution #3.10: -   Solution #3.11: Binding of keys to an authentication session with a serving network in NextGen systems   Solution #3.12: "Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys"
5.3.4.z   Solution #3.z: <solution name>
5.3.5   Conclusions
5.4   Security area #4: RAN security      Up
5.4.1   Introduction
5.4.2   Security assumptions   Word-p. 315
5.4.3   Key issues   Key Issue #4.1: AS security during RRC idle mode   Key issue #4.2: Security requirements on gNB   Word-p. 316   Key issue #4.3: Security aspects of dual connectivity   Key issue #4.4: Security aspects of inactive mode mobility   Word-p. 318   Key issue #4.5: Security aspects of RAN-WLAN aggregation/integration   Key issue #4.6: User plane DoS attacks   Key Issue #4.7: Key handling in RRC_INACTIVE state to RRC_CONNECTED state transition      Up   Key issue #4.8: -   Key issue #4.9: Security aspects of N2 handover   Key issue #4.11: Flexibility to retain or to change AS security keys   Key issue #4.12: Changing AS security keys on-the-fly   Word-p. 323   Key issue #4.13: Dealing with radio jamming   Word-p. 324   Key issue #4.14: Privacy aspects of RAN level temporary identifiers   Key issue #4.15: Security aspects of Xn handover   Key issue #4.16: Security algorithm negotiation between UE and RAN   Key issue #4.17: Supporting integrity protection of UP
5.4.3.y   Key issue #4.y: <key issue name>   Word-p. 329
5.4.4   Solutions   Solution #4.1: Network signs selected signalling messages   Solution #4.4: Fake gNB detection using UL traffic monitoring and System Query   Word-p. 336   Solution #4.5: Prevent User Plane DoS Attack over Air Interface for Small Data   Word-p. 339   Solution #4.6: Security mechanism for deployment scenario of option 3   Solution #4.7: Handover procedure for Intra NG (R)AN   Solution #4.8: Fake gNB Detection using Identity Based Signature   Solution #4.9: Security of Access Stratum (AS) keys on Xn handover   Solution #4.10: UE-assisted false base station detection   Solution #4.11: Security of sidehaul interfaces   Word-p. 349   Solution #4.12: Security Aspects of Option 3/3a/3x or EN-DC   Solution #4.13: Inputs to security algorithms at PDCP layer   Solution #4.14: Flexibile mechanism for AS key-change   Solution #4.15: Deriving ciphering and integrity keys in 5G   Solution #4.16: Security solution for inactive mode inter RAN notification area mobility   Solution #4.18: key Handling in RRC Inactive state to RRC active state transition   Solution #4.19: Intra AMF, Intra SMF, Inter NG RAN handover without Xn interface   Solution #4.20: Inter AMF, Intra SMF, Inter NG RAN handover without Xn interface   Solution #4.21: Inter AMF, Inter SMF, Inter NG RAN handover without Xn interface   Word-p. 364      Up   Solution #4.22: Intra AMF, Inter SMF, Inter NG RAN handover without Xn interface   Solution #4.23: Inter NG (R)AN handover with Xn interface   Solution #4.24: Mechanism for forward and backward security during Xn handover   Solution #4.25: Flexible retain key solution   Solution #4.26: Verifying gNB      Up
5.4.4.z   Solution #4.z: <solution name>
5.4.5   Conclusions
5.5   Security area #5: Security within NG-UE
5.6   Security area #6: Authorization
5.6.1   Introduction
5.6.2   Security assumptions
5.6.3   Key issues
5.6.4   Solutions
5.6.5   Conclusions

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