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5.3   Security area #3: Security context and key management
5.3.1   Introduction
5.3.2   Security assumptions
5.3.3   Key issues
5.3.3.1   Key Issue #3.1: Interception of radio interface keys sent between operator entities
5.3.3.2   Key Issue #3.2: Refreshing keys
5.3.3.3   Key issue #3.3: Principles of security negotiation   Word-p. 251
5.3.3.4   Key Issue #3.4: Security context sharing   Word-p. 252
5.3.3.5   Key issue #3.5: Unnecessary dependence of keys between security layers
5.3.3.6   Key issue #3.6: Top-level key for access-network-specific keys
5.3.3.7   Key issue #3.7: The storage of security context
5.3.3.8   Key issue #3.8: Security context for small data mode
5.3.3.9   Void
5.3.3.10   Void
5.3.3.11   Key issue #3.11: 5G security key and context identification
5.3.3.y   Key issue #3.y: <key issue name>
5.3.4   Solutions
5.3.4.1   Solution #3.1: Including a key exchange protocol into the derivation of the radio interface session keys
5.3.4.2   Solution #3.2: UE can request a radio interface key refresh   Word-p. 259
5.3.4.3   Solution #3.3: Security Context Management for UE with Multiple Access Technologies
5.3.4.4   Void
5.3.4.5   Solution #3.5: Trusted non-3GPP access      Up
5.3.4.6   Solution #3.6: Next Generation Key Set Identifier
5.3.4.7   Solution #3.7: Algorithms Negotiation Procedure
5.3.4.8   Solution #3.8: Key negotiation of dual connectivity to deal with the leakage of secret key
5.3.4.9   Solution #3.9: Security Key Refresh Triggered by UE
5.3.4.10   Void
5.3.4.11   Solution #3.11: Binding of keys to an authentication session with a serving network in NextGen systems   Word-p. 274      Up
5.3.4.12   Solution #3.12: "Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys"
5.3.4.z   Solution #3.z: <solution name>   Word-p. 277
5.3.5   Conclusions
5.4   Security area #4: RAN security
5.4.1   Introduction
5.4.2   Security assumptions   Word-p. 279
5.4.3   Key issues
5.4.3.1   Key Issue #4.1: AS security during RRC idle mode
5.4.3.4   Key issue #4.4: Security aspects of inactive mode mobility   Word-p. 282
5.4.3.5   Key issue #4.5: Security aspects of RAN-WLAN aggregation/integration
5.4.3.6   Key issue #4.6: User plane DoS attacks
5.4.3.7   Key Issue #4.7 Key handling in RRC inactive state to RRC active state transition
5.4.3.8   Void
5.4.3.9   Key issue #4.9: Security aspects of NG2 handover
5.4.3.10   Key issue #4.10: Security aspects of sidehaul interfaces   Word-p. 285
5.4.3.11   Key issue #4.11: Flexibility to retain or to change AS security keys
5.4.3.12   Key issue #4.12: Changing AS security keys on-the-fly
5.4.3.13   Key issue #4.13: Dealing with radio jamming
5.4.3.14   Key issue #4.14: Privacy aspects of RAN level temporary identifiers   Word-p. 288
5.4.3.15   Key issue #4.15: Security aspects of Xn handover
5.4.3.16   Key issue #4.16: Security algorithm negotiation between UE and RAN
5.4.3.17   Key issue #4.17: Supporting integrity protection of UP
5.4.3.y   Key issue #4.y: <key issue name>
5.4.4   Solutions
5.4.4.1   Solution #4.1: Network signs selected signalling messages
5.4.4.4   Solution #4.4: Fake gNB detection using UL traffic monitoring and System Query   Word-p. 300
5.4.4.5   Solution #4.5: Prevent User Plane DoS Attack over Air Interface for Small Data   Word-p. 302
5.4.4.6   Solution #4.6: Security mechanism for deployment scenario of option 3   Word-p. 304
5.4.4.7   Solution #4.7: Handover procedure for Intra NG (R)AN
5.4.4.8   Solution #4.8: Fake gNB Detection using Identity Based Signature
5.4.4.9   Solution #4.9: Security of Access Stratum (AS) keys on Xn handover
5.4.4.10   Solution #4.10: UE-assisted false base station detection
5.4.4.11   Solution #4.11: Security of sidehaul interfaces   Word-p. 312
5.4.4.12   Solution #4.12: Security Aspects of Option 3/3a/3x or EN-DC
5.4.4.13   Solution #4.13: Inputs to security algorithms at PDCP layer
5.4.4.14   Solution #4.14: Flexibile mechanism for AS key-change
5.4.4.15   Solution #4.15: Deriving ciphering and integrity keys in 5G
5.4.4.z   Solution #4.z: <solution name>
5.4.5   Conclusions
5.5   Security area #5: Security within NG-UE
5.6   Security area #6: Authorization
5.6.1   Introduction
5.6.2   Security assumptions
5.6.3   Key issues
5.6.4   Solutions
5.6.5   Conclusions

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